TELOS

Number 51 Spring 1982

Table of Contents

SPECIAL ISSUE ON
EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENTS
AND THE POLISH CRISIS

Contributions by Ammon, Arato, Bahro, Benhabib, Berman, Brandt, Breines, Castoriadis, Cohen, Diner, Frankenberg, Gorz, Gremliza, Hassner, Hirsch, Kuron, Mason, Michnik, Suss, Thibaud, Vester, Viveret

Articles:
TIMOFEEV: *Black Market Technology in the USSR*
RITTERSPORN: *Facing the War Psychosis*

Notes and Commentary:
HACKMAN: *The Foucault Conference*
NAFISI: *The Clerical State in Iran*

Reviews:
KANTOR: Jameson, *The Political Unconscious*
EHRLICH: Lears, *Antimodernism and American Culture*
ENNIS: Hirsh, *The French New Left*
BERGER, KOSTEDE: Gorz, *Abschied vom Proletariat*
FINOCCHIARO: Jacobitti, *Revolutionary Humanism and Historicism in Italy;* Nemeth, *Gramsci's Philosophy*
FUCHSER: Sulloway, *Freud, Biologist of the Mind*

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 3

ARTICLES:

Black Market Technology in the U.S.S.R.: Or, The Peasants' Art of Starving 5
Leo Timofeev

Facing the War Psychosis 22
Gabor T. Rittersporn

Special Section: European Peace Movements

The German Question 32
Herbert Ammon and Peter Brandt

Seven Taboos and a Perspective 45
Rudolf Bahro and Michael Vester

NATO and the Warsaw Pact: "Armament Insanity" versus "Calculated Power" . . . 52
Walter Suss

Introduction to Mary Kaldor and the English Peace Movement 80
John Mason

Interview with Mary Kaldor 88

A German Document 97
Herman Gremliza

Peace and Liberty 101
Patrick Viveret

Defense, Human Rights and Detente: A Dialogue With Viveret 110
Pierre Hassner

On the German Non-Response to the Polish Crisis: An Interview with André Gorz . . 117

Rapallo— Why Not? Reply to Gorz 123
Rudolf Bahro

What, Then, Is Freedom? Reply to Bahro 126
André Gorz

Olympics of Nationalism: Notes on the Gorz-Bahro Controversy 128
Dan Diner

Poland, of Course, Is a Critical Case! 131
Günter Frankenberg

The West German Peace Movement 135
Joachim Hirsch

Opposition to Rearmament and West German Culture 141
Russell Berman

The West German Peace Movement and its Critics 148
Seyla Benhabib

The Peace Movement and Western European Sovereignty 158
Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen

On Berman and Social Movements 171
Paul Breines

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Special Section on the Polish Crisis

We Are All Hostages 173
Adam Michnik

How to Get Out of a Dead-End Situation 182
Jacek Kuron

The Toughest and Most Fragile of Regimes 186
Cornelius Castoriadis and Paul Thibaud

NOTES AND COMMENTARY:

The Foucault Conference 191
William R. Hackman

The Genesis of the Clerical State in Iran 197
Rasoul Nafisi

REVIEWS:

Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious* 206
Robert Kandor

T.J. Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Anti-Modernism and the Transformation of American Culture 1880-1920* 215
Robert Ehrlich

Arthur Hirsh, *The French New Left: An Intellectual History from Sartre to Gorz* 223
David Ennis

André Gorz, *Abschied vom Proletariat: Jenseit des Sozialismus* 230
Johannes Berger and Norbert Kostede

Edmund E. Jacobitti, *Revolutionary Humanism and Historicism in Modern Italy*

Thomas Nemeth, *Gramsci's Philosophy: A Critical Study* 234
Maurice A. Finocchiaro

Frank Sulloway, *Freud, Biologist of the Mind* 236
Larry Fuchser

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☐ Val Burris on *Patriarchy and Capitalism*
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INTRODUCTION

With the development of a new phase of the Cold War, characterized by massive rearmament and the growing mention of localized nuclear confrontations, it is not surprising that peace movements are springing up all over Western Europe — especially since that is the likely site in the event such a "limited" nuclear war does break out. But owing to different national problems and traditions, these movements have taken shape along quite different lines. The imposition of martial law in Poland and the different ways these movements have responded to it dramatically brings into the open major differences among them, raising a set of crucial new issues.

This number of *Telos*, then, focuses on the various ways these new problems are being articulated and the significance they have for broadening leftist discourse in the United States, where yet another indigenous peace movement is rapidly taking form. Predictably, a number of old questions resurface, but with a new urgency.

As is obvious from the heated exchanges between Gorz and Bahro, the old specter of nationalism has once again come to hound the European Left. What is at issue here, as Frankenberg points out, is the very concept of the Left. Most of the German Left's responses betray a failure to transcend old myths concerning, for example, the most outrageous fraud in the 20th century (the October Revolution), or to understand adequately the social and political character of either the United States or the Soviet Union. Thus, the all-important lingering pluralism, heterogeneity and vitality of American civil society are dogmatically overlooked in a simplistic analysis of "monopoly capitalism" while the barbarity and incorrigibility of Soviet despotism are papered over by, for example, the Soviet Union's "emancipatory" function in the Third World. In this context, the French attacks are well-taken and may help the German Left to awaken from its post-World War II dogmatic slumber.

A similar — but not so severe — problem besets British unilateral disarmament proposals. A naiveté with respect to the nature of the Soviet empire leads to politically catastrophic consequences. As Arato and Cohen show, the closed nature of the Soviet Union rules out any social movements there reminiscent of Western ones. Consequently, the unilateral disarmament approach risks falling prey to sinister Soviet schemes. As Rittersporn shows, however, this does not mean that the Soviet Union is likely to embark on a major world expansion — not because it would not want to, but because its weak internal economic and political structure prevents it.

To document this point, which is generally acknowledged but never fully digested in Western Leftist analyses, Timofeev (obviously, a pseudonym) describes here the Soviet peasantry and the unimaginable crimes still perpetrated on it by the Soviet system. A better understanding of these realities will go a long way in dispelling Left nostalgia concerning any "emancipatory" role of the Soviet Union — either domestic or international.

A general blindness towards Soviet realities, of course, does not exhaust the meaning of European peace movements. As Breines and Benhabib indicate, it may be premature to reduce the heterogeneity of these new social movements to any of its predominant features. While the ulterior nationalistic motives Berman outlines may very well be behind much of the German peace movement, it is neither the only one, nor even its predominant feature. And this raises the much broader issue of social movements in the present socio-historical predicament. An issue already broached by Habermas and others in previous numbers of *Telos*, this will be the focus of our next number, devoted to "Ecology and Social Movements." Thus, the contributions in this number are meant to *open* rather than exhaust an international debate on a topic that has been under discussion in the pages of this journal for some time: the changing function of the Left and the redefinition of emancipatory politics.

Paul Piccone

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BLACK MARKET TECHNOLOGY IN THE U.S.S.R.: OR, THE PEASANTS' ART OF STARVING*

by Leo Timofeev

The longer the relatively peaceful period without war, revolution or mass repression lasts, the more the Soviet socio-economic system takes on the appearance of a colossal black market. This black market exists and develops openly, right before everyone's eyes. Within its framework, it is possible to feed the country with potatoes or to build a diesel locomotive, to enroll one's son in the university or to buy an agronomist diploma, to repair a tractor or to obtain a plot in Moscow's "exclusive" cemetery. Everything is bought and sold outside plans and regulations. One hand washes the other. But who wins?

Sometimes the black market — that art of breathing within the noose of prohibitions and restrictions, that simple-minded slyness, that subterfuge of paupers — seems to be designed to deceive the Soviet government: force us into collective farms and we'll till our private plots; impose shortages and rationing and we'll bribe and get ours on the side; feed us lean cafeteria food and we'll raise rabbits in our apartments; offer us a lousy doctor at the end of a long queue and we'll troop to a good one with a gift. But do we end up on top? Not on your life!

If necessary the authorities will stifle private plot production with restrictions and levies (nothing new, to say the least); the police will rid the apartment of rabbits and even a doctor will catch a jail term for receiving his gifts. Our disingenuous trickery could not survive otherwise. We are on a leash just loose enough to breathe, nothing more.

The black market is not just the loophole, not just the secret doorway we surreptitiously cut in the wall. The black market is both the loophole and the wall itself. At first sight, the black market appears to lead a marginal existence and to play a subordinate role in the planned economy. But no! A closer examination shows that the black market is the very basis of the Soviet economy, the foundation on which the planned economic structure rests. The black market is the socialist mechanism of power and exploitation, the very essence of our socio-economic system, more obviously so in recent times.

The commodities which circulate in it support the existing political and social order. How, exactly, do they support it? In what direction is society heading? We will not understand this unless we understand the black market itself, unless its technology is made clear. Soviet society, in its essence, is absolutely unique in the history of the socialist economic system (whatever analogies there may have been in the minds of scholars), and to analyze it entirely new methods, new concepts, are needed. Until now these haven't existed. Therefore we must proceed more descriptively than analytically.

*This article circulated originally as a *samizdat* publication in Moscow. It was first published in Russian in the West by *Grani*, 120 (1981), pp. 41-160. This is an abridged version. Translated by David J. Parent with the assistance of Alexander Zaslavsky.

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There is only one sector of the black market, discussion of which was permitted recently under the threat of general famine, and even encouraged: the peasant's private farm. It is what primarily interests us here. The peasant's yard will be our starting point.

Money was of little importance in collective farmer's income — only in the last ten years has he been paid even a little money for the working day. Before he had received payment in kind, although the three or four bags of rye, sometimes the yearly payment for a peasant's backbreaking labor, meant a lot to his family. The main thing was the right to buy straw and hay for one's own cattle, the right to mow hay and, finally, and most importantly, the right to a personal plot, to half a hectare of land, the right to run a private economy. Sometimes they worked completely without pay on the collective farm, without money and without payment in kind, but in return they enjoyed their rights, for otherwise it would have been impossible to realize that other right not granted by governments — the *right to life*.

Stalin, in 1935, said: "If in the collective you don't have an abundance of products and you cannot give the individual collective-farm workers and their families everything they need, then the collective farm cannot undertake to satisfy both public and private needs." [1] The peasants in those years comprised three-fourths of the population of the country, but the peasant family was, as it were, outside society. Its needs did not deserve attention. "The collective farm cannot undertake..." Nor did the government concern itself unduly with the well-being of the peasants and their families. "In 1939 about 16,000 collective farms did not pay for work with money; 46,000 collective farms paid only two kopeks per work day; about 9,000 collective farms did not pay any grain per work day." [2] These official statistics cover as many as a third of all the collective farms in the land, 6 million peasant families. How many hungry mouths do these statistics represent? We do not know, just as we know little of hunger even on those collective farms which paid an average of 3-4 kopeks and a half-kilo of grain per work day.

Perhaps not so many people starved in the pre-war years, fewer than in the fatal year of 1933 — they were already learning to feed themselves at that time, relying only on the private garden plots. But the government also was learning to squeeze the peasants ever more tightly, ever more relentlessly, to take away their personal property for the benefits of "society": in 1939, after the regular plenum of the central committee of the party, more than 2.5 million hectares of personal land were taken away from the peasants — "surplus" land was diverting attention from the official economy and allowing the peasants to preserve some slight degree of independence.

The authorities generally considered the prosperity or even just the satiation of the farm family completely incidental, or perhaps even a harmful excess; and so the farmer not only is denied everything produced on the collective farm by his labor, but even the private parcel, the personal farming

1. Second All-Union Congress of Kholkhoz-shock-workers. Stenographic transcript. 1935. Page 1.
2. G.V. Dyachkov, *Obshchestvennoe i lichnoe v kolkhozakh* (Moscow, 1968), p. 22.

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to feed his family, was severely taxed. Each farm yard, regardless of the family composition, delivered the mandatory quotas of milk, meat, eggs, wool and hides. In addition there was a monetary tax — some paid 100 rubles, some even more. But where is money to be had, if the collective farm pays nothing? They had to seek it by farming the private plots: selling the products on the market, even if they went hungry themselves!

The crippling levies were officially repealed in 1958, but the local authorities were immediately saddled with quotas for the aforesaid products. As their good standing was directly dependent on the fulfillment of the quotas, local soviet officials literally forced the peasants to deliver to the state for a minuscule restitution the same products levied prior to 1958. And the peasants delivered — what choice did they have? One needs a passport to leave the collective farm, a passport that the authorities will never issue, and without which one cannot obtain work or lodging. The peasants can eke out a living, however scanty, as long as they can realize a part of their working time, a part of their strength, outside the economic system, not in the public, regular socialist system, but in the market.

The peasant's market, restricted to the confines of the market square, distorted by the feudal relations of personal dependence of the collective farmer on the administrative authority, has in general the appearance of an appendage to that main "bazaar" where they trade in party positions and demagogic values, such as a promise of the general welfare of the people and the imminent victory of communism — and yet it is a market and nothing else. A market which the socialist government cannot do without.

On first acquaintance, the statistics are shocking: the private parcels, as calculated by those in the know, make up only 2½ or even 1½ percent of all the cultivated land in the country; and the peasant farming has at its disposal only one tenth of all productive funds in agriculture. Still, it produces one third of all agricultural products — and this according to official figures.[3]

But official statistics ignore the fact that no less than a third of the agricultural production on the collective and state farms is lost: in the field, in transport, in storage, in the first processing. According to some statistics, for example, up to half of the potato crop is lost. Official statistics, too, calculating the gross product in terms of price, gloss over the fact that the government purchasing prices for grains — produced mainly by collective and state farms — is significantly overstated, while prices for meat, oats, potatoes — i.e., products which are much more widespread on the peasants' farms — are understated.

Official statistics mislead, for otherwise it would be necessary to admit that, in aggregate volume of the *consumed* agricultural production, the share of the peasants' private parcels, with their 2½ percent of tilled land, is much more than half. And that in the Baltic republics the share of private farming in the aggregate agricultural product, even according to official data, makes up almost half: in Lithuania, for example, 43.6 percent. At the same time,

3. G.I. Shmelev, *Lichnoe podcobnoe khozyaystvo i evo cvyazi s obshchestvennim proizvodstvom* (Moscow, 1971), p. 11.

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"in the families of the collective farmers of Lithuanian SSR in 1971, 50.5 percent of public earnings were obtained from their own private farming."[4]

These figures are a disgrace to the Soviet economic system and a bane for the peasants whose initiatives and talent are constrained by the small size of the personal gardening and an enormous amount of administrative prohibitions. It is the peasants' bane, but also their hope. The production of the peasants' economy feeds all rural inhabitants — 40 percent of the population. Moreover, even according to official statistics, it produces half of all the marketed potatoes, not less than a third of the marketed quantity of eggs, a third of the marketed meat — i.e., products sold to feed a significant part of the urban population. No, without the peasant farms the socialist economy would not survive a day.

It could, of course, be suggested that the existing prohibitions are a dismal error, conditionalities, a misunderstanding that will disappear as the gap widens between the needs of the population for food products and low productivity of peasant labor and the scant possibilities of socialist agriculture to satisfy those needs. But let us not delude ourselves. The prohibitions are far from accidental. They are an instrument of the *ruling structure*, an instrument of the party bureaucracy, i.e., a means of preserving the existing order. And all the prohibitions are established in an effort to protect the government of the party officials from an assault by the economically strengthened peasantry or the politically aware technostructure.

Stalin understood this best. And although the present party leadership pretends to spurn his legacy, it was Stalin, of all the exponents of Marxism, who came closest to the current policy of the state: "Is the central goal of the Five-Year plan an increase in labor productivity?" he asked in his famous speech against Bukharin. "No, it is not. For we do not need every kind of increase of labor productivity. We need a particular growth of labor productivity, namely that which contributes to the preponderance of the socialist sector of the national economy (i.e., the non-market sector directly subject to the party-bureaucracy and objectively working to strengthen its power — L.T.) over the capitalist sector."[5]

For the prohibitions are the essence of power, the substance of party bureaucracy activities: the bureaucracies will do without an abundance of grain in the country. It needs no market profit; a varied and harmonious development of the economy is not essential — it needs only power, an unlimited abundance of power, profit in the form of increased power, and a system of power distribution wherein more and more power is gained as one advances in the hierarchy.

Since the party bureaucracy (like the degenerating feudal landlords of yore) in no way participates in the production of material and spiritual values, in what we term progress, it has only one way to avoid being swept away by that current: to impose a strict system of prohibitions, restrictions

4. L.-I. S Vilimavichus, *Lichnoe podsobnoe khozyaystvo pri sotsializme...*, revised dissertation (1976), pp. 3, 19.

5. I.V. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, Vol. 12, p. 79.

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and "taboos." And all "measures effected by the party and the government in the area of economics," which are presented each time as a great gift to the people, are the efforts of a timid navigator to avoid self-imposed dams and barriers, maneuvers to keep the ship afloat. On the other hand, the *black market* poses no threat to the stability of the present government. On the contrary, it is totally under the government's control — and therefore to its advantage. Indeed, the collective farm system was, from the very beginning, conceived as a system of black market, and its scope is significantly broader than the market square. Back to Stalin: "And if you do not have an abundance of products on your collective farm and are unable to give the collective farmers and their families everything they need, then the collective farm cannot undertake to satisfy both social and personal needs. Then it is better to define some work as social and other — as personal. It is better to agree directly, candidly and honestly that the collective farmer must have his own personal plot, not large, but personal. It is better to start from the fact that there is a collective economy, public, large, powerful, decisive, necessary to satisfy public needs, and along with it a small, personal economy, necessary to satisfy the personal needs of the collective farmer."[6]

Both Stalin, who decided that the farm family should not die of starvation in the 1930s, as well as Brezhnev, who persistently urges the peasants to intensify labor on their private plots in the 1970s, of course do not specify what part of the day peasants are to devote to their "personal" economy. Obviously, only what is left over from their labors on the collective farm. That is where the black market comes in. Here and not at the market gates. It begins with the fact that the peasants are compelled to work overtime for society, while their labor on the collective farm is taken without payment or almost without payment, without satisfying the elementary needs of the peasant family. This is the most important "transaction" in the black market; not the carrots and parsley sold on the market square, but the life and labor of the peasant.

But who benefits from all this?

The government robs the peasant of the fruits of his labor on the collective farm, but not directly, not crudely, not by physical pressure, which might provoke undesirable opposition, by surreptitiously, through a system of purchase prices. This creates the impression that the product is not taken but bought, and the peasant who earned nothing is the one who produced little — so who's to blame?

In financing agricultural production, the authorities assume the role of a kind uncle whose extraordinary generosity moves him to back an unprofitable enterprise. Can the people possibly consider it unprofitable to feed themselves? Can it be, anywhere else, that a shortage of meat, milk, potatoes, would still render their production unprofitable? This hungry masquerade is of one use only: to hide the obvious fact that a significant part of agricultural production is simply taken away without payment, because the current prices do not at all reflect its actual value.

6. Second All-Union Congress, *op.cit.*, p. 1.

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It is possible to estimate the portion of the necessary product which is extracted from the peasants free of charge; calculated by various means, it comprises from 40 percent to 60 percent of the value of skilled labor productivity. But this means that from 60 percent to 40 percent of the peasants' necessary product must be gotten from their personal gardens.

But even that does not seem to be enough. "Comparison of the actual minimal level of income of the collective-farm family with the estimated minimum material sustenance shows that in the years 1969-70 the minimal payment of labor in the collective *farms, including all other sources of family income* [italics added] was about 80-85 percent of the level of compensation paid to unskilled workers in industry." [7]

The minuscule size of the personal plot and the attendant compulsory labor on a collective or state farm, strict control over foraging, lack of agricultural equipment, prohibitions on intensive use of the land, a strict prohibition on private partnerships and cooperatives — all this prevents the peasant from becoming an independent operator. This thick web of prohibitions prevents the market from developing to full strength, prevents production from becoming directly connected with consumer demand. The black market remains under the control of the administrative authority, which dictates harsh conditions of constant exploitation of the peasant on the collective farm, the state farm and the private parcel.

But at the same time the authorities cannot, and will not, and are afraid to completely proletarianize the peasant, making him just a hired hand. At the end of the 1960s in Latvia, the local party organs, apparently departing somewhat in the European direction from the central-Russian management methods, introduced compensation to collective farmers for renouncing their parcels. Not much, in all 300 to 400 rubles per year; but here the amount is secondary to the fact itself. [8] It would appear quite logical; the collective farm receives additional land, its earnings increase, and some compensation is paid to those who gave up that land. But no, the authorities need neither the land, nor the dubious additional income. The authorities do not need a rural proletariat; the party bureaucracy cannot utilize its labor properly, cannot create such conditions of labor that, obtaining the necessary product in the form of a salary, it would produce the quantity of surplus product sufficient for society; the authorities can neither organize the production of goods or market them. They can only *take* what is already produced. But what can be had from a prole? Less, at any rate, than from a peasant.

Moreover, industrial workers have inalienable rights which, in the case of the peasantry, are quite problematic: the right to work, to rest, to lodging. Rights that are guaranteed to some extent or other, depending on the level of development of the productive forces. And also, of course, the right to an eight-hour work day which, though violated right and left, is still promulgated, making it necessary to seek a justification for violating it. But in

7. M.M. Sidorova, *Vosmeshchenie neobchodimikh zatrat i formirovanie fonda vosproizvodstva rabochey cili vi kolkhozakh* (Moscow, 1972), p. 187.

8. A.S. Stamkulov, *Priusadebnoe zemlepol'zovanie* (Alma-Ata, 1972).

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the countryside, such rights simply cannot exist. The peasant in many cases would like to be a proletariat! "According to social research, in the collective farms of the non-chernozem zone, the time spent by the able-bodied collective farmer on collective production averaged 2,600 hours, while the collective farm woman spent 2,380 hours, versus the 2,000 hours of optimally possible time in industrial production." [9] Adding approximately 1,000 hours spent by each collective farmer on his private plot, we get some idea of the real expenditure of work time.

The peasant is forced to put in two days' work every day. A great deal of what he earns on the first day, in the *kolkhoz,* in the public socialist system, is confiscated by the government and redistributed in the interests of preserving the existing system. The peasant is left with neither the necessary product nor the right to use the surplus. Then the second day begins, according to the law of black-market commodity production, according to the law of private socialism — a working day during which the peasant invests all his personal capital: labor power, his own, left over from collective labor, and that of his family. He himself determines the level of exploitation here: the minimum is enough to ward off starvation, the maximum, not so much as to fall down from drowsiness, working from three in the morning to ten at night. He himself (within the permitted framework) determines the nature of production, depending on the demand for this or that product. "When personal subsidiary farming becomes the basic source of income and is basically market-oriented, while the work of one of the family in public production serves only as a means to obtain the right to run an operation, the latter can be regarded as a small enterprise," [10] writes a Soviet sociologist.

To admit the existence of small *private* enterprise in the land of developed socialism is no mean feat. Such an admission cannot help but call for a re-examination from top to bottom (or from bottom to top) of the entire system of economic relations. Having admitted the existence of 40 million small private enterprises after almost half a century of collectivization, it is necessary to admit also the complete *economic* inefficiency of the collective farm system. But then it is also necessary to admit that the collective farms are politically very useful since, co-existing as they do with small private enterprise, they create ideal conditions for robbing the peasantry with the help of the black market.

Alas, after making an all but revolutionary "discovery," the sociologist after a few generalities also claims that the peasant economy "will voluntarily wither away according to the degree of development of the public economy.... Guaranteeing the conditions for the disappearance of that economy as a source of supplementary earnings will make it possible to eliminate the residual backwardness of the countryside when compared to the city." [11] No, private farming will not wither away, voluntarily or otherwise. As

9. V.I. Staroverov, *Gorod i derevnya* (Politizdat, 1972), p. 80.
10. V.I. Staroverov, Preodolenie cushchestvennikh mezhdu gorodom i derevney... in *Sotsiologischeskie issledovaniya* (1975), p. 51.
11. *Ibid.*

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leading specialists note, for the collective and state farms in the year 2000 to completely satisfy the mounting needs of society in basic food products and to replace private farms of peasants and workers, the production of meat would have to be increased 4.5 times; milk, 3 times; eggs, 8 times. And that is not all! Economic arguments do not decide matters here — such rapid growth of agriculture is perhaps possible if the system of prohibitions and restrictions imposed on economic resourcefulness were relaxed. But no, private peasant farms will live on in their present form as long as the ruling structure achieves its policy by means of the black market. Whether its policy can be maintained by any other means is very doubtful.

Can two adults working on a collective or state farm also work their personal holding effectively enough to feed their family of five or six people? No, they cannot. To obtain a potato harvest from an acre-sized plot, two able-bodied people must put in a full work day two months at a stretch.[12] A cow takes one and a half to two hours daily; and all other livestock also requires time and attention. And no one releases the peasant from work on the collective farm, especially in summer.[13] But in those same summer months the hay must be brought in for the winter and all the other chores still have to be done. No, two people have neither the strength nor the time. And in large families, those who earn the right to private farming — collective farmers and state-farm workers — are not the main workers in their own gardens.

The private plot system is a colossal system of exploiting children, the aged, and the invalid. Twelve million rural inhabitants do not work anywhere except on private plots; moreover, of that number, seven and a half million are aged and adolescent.[14] The remaining are mainly the disabled or partly disabled, and housewives with large families. Three fourths of the work done on the private parcels is done by women. Add another 15 million rural children, the number of pupils not counting those still in primary school, and we get some idea of whose hands produce such a significant part of the gross production of the rural economy, which, both literally and figuratively, feeds the government in the land of developed socialism, with all its mighty

12. According to the estimates of the Government Planning Committee (*Gosplan*) of the USSR, the expenditures of labor in producing a hundred kilos of potatoes on the personal subsidiary farms stands today at 2.8 man-days. *Izvestia*, Jan. 14, 1977. An acre of private plot land produces a harvest of about 5,000 kilos. Under the very favorable conditions of the Chmelnitski region on a personal farm the amount of work time spent in producing 100 kilos of milk is three man-days; that of raising a head of cattle, 45.5 man-days. Cf. V.A. Belyaev. *Lichnoe podsobnoe khozyaystvo pri sotsialisme* in *Ekonomika* (Moscow, 1970), p. 95.

13. In the Novo-Sibirisk region, which is not outstanding among the other agricultural regions of the country and can very well be taken for a statistical median, "in 1973, compared with 1967, the average length of the work day [in *kolkhoz* and *sovkhoz* — L.T.], according to workers' estimates, increased from 7.8 hours to 8.4 in winter, and from 8 to 9 hours in summer. The percentage of those working 8 to 11 hours increased from 30 percent to 55 percent, but more than 12 hours, doubled. In 1972 less than one third of the workers had a normal work day, while the other two-thirds worked overtime in one way or the other." P.V. Rivkina, "Kizucheniu osnovnikh napravleniy urbanizatsii obraza zhizni cel'skovo naseleniya," in *Sovremennaya sibirskaya derevnya* (Novosibirsk, 1975), part I, p. 36.

14. V.A. Belyaev, *Lichnoe podsobnoe khozyaystvo pri sotsialisme*, pp. 81, 93.

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party-government and ideological apparatus.[15]

The exploitation of the young and the disabled, glossed over by sociologists and economists, suddenly reappears in lawyers who have to precisely determine the legal side of reciprocal relations in the rural family. "The collective farmer's family, as distinguished from the usual family of the white or blue-collar worker, takes on additional characteristics, expressed in the fact that it is not only a natural, family-fraternal association of particular persons, . . . but a family unit of people wherein particular working relations between specific people exist, by virtue of the collective effort implicit in the farming of their private plot."[16]

A more precise definition is in order: a peasant's family is a micro-capitalist enterprise where the head of the family is required to exploit the labor of his dependents, to obtain from the personal farm the maximum surplus value and so to make up for the necessary product not received by them on the collective and state farms. This exploitation is carried on, as a rule, by completely barbaric methods, without any modern agricultural methods, without machines, without the application of modern achievements of agronomy and animal husbandry. Space, wheelbarrow, sack, basket — these are almost the only tools.

Of course, there is here no division of labor, no cooperation to increase output, nor can there be. The private parcel is not land-ownership, nor even leasing. The peasant's right to his private parcel entitles him to till the land only with the help of his family. The family's work load can be eased only by resorting to the simple mutual assistance of two or three collective farm yards according to the principle: you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours. That is how people with small families dig potatoes. That is how in some regions they carry out the simplest individual construction.

But the unification of those two or three peasant farm yards for a more rational, more intensive market economy is not possible — it is most severely "taboo"! With an efficient division of labor, with an intensive operation of the farm, the *capitalist* nature of such unification would be obvious and might even do without the prefix "micro." If private farms, shackled by prohibitions, compete successfully with collective and state farms, even an elementary unification of independent peasant holdings — a hectare or two of land and the simplest machinery — would testify to the complete, economic irrationality of the existing collective farms.

But authorities do not want this. In the eyes of the party bureaucracy even two or three-fold increases in food production would never constitute sufficient justification for further capitalist development of private farming.

15. "Developed socialism" of such a type goes back in its roots to 'ancient history': facts of language show that the ancient source of slavery was connected with family law. The word *semiya* means slave or household servant. The term *rab* (slave) means *robya, robenets, rebyonok* (child); *kholop* (serf) is cognate with the malo-Russian *khlopets* (boy, son); these terms are applied to persons subject to paternal power as well as to slaves." M.F. Vladimirskiy-Budanov, *Obzor istorii russkovo prava.* B.D. Grekova, *Krestyane na Rusi,* p. 132.

16. *Kommentariy k primernomu Ustavu kolkhoza. "Yuridicheskaya literatura"* (Moscow, 1972), p. 239.

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And it is not hard to understand the political thinking behind the prohibitions: by preserving a half-starved "mature socialism" which guarantees the unconditional power of the party bureaucracy, by preserving the black market, they do not allow the development of open market relations under which the need for administrative control is quite limited.

In general, any *voluntary* association of private people in the countryside, of the existing administrative collective and state farms, is impossible irrespective of its communist or capitalist nature. In a country advertising itself as a model of the initial stages of communism, communes are absolutely forbidden. They already existed under the czar and in the first years of Soviet power, but disappeared with the onset of collectivization. They were personally buried by Stalin himself. "Only as the strengthening and consolidation of agricultural collectives progress can the ground be created for the mass movement of peasants towards the commune. However, that will not be soon. Therefore the commune, representing the highest form of development, may become the essence of collective farm movement only in the future."[17] It did not matter to him where he sent his victims — to the past or to the future — only to non-existence, lest they get in the way in the present.

The communes consisted of people religiously committed to the communist idea. Such cohesive, committed collectives could and did show serious opposition to the Soviet policy of coercing the peasantry into serfdom. "A certain number of the communes displayed an anti-governmental attitude manifested by contrasting the commune's interests with the government's interests (an excessive increase in the consumption of the commune, diminished production of public commodities, etc.)."[18]

Recently, even in party circles, there has been more and more talk of the colossal amount of theft in the countryside. Statistics and data gathered by the courts and law-enforcement agencies are staggering. All that is trivial. Firstly, numbers can hardly indicate the ubiquity of theft; secondly, the phenomenon has little to do with penal agencies. Theft, especially in the countryside, has become a matter of survival. It is a commercial line on the black market.

For the peasant, theft is the extension of his struggle for his share of the necessary product, the extension of private farming. The peasant's work is impossible without tools, without sheds, without thousands of small items: without skeins of wire to mend the fence, without machine grease to oil the wheels of the hand cart used to bring in the hay, without the wheels themselves, without nails. How often, standing in the middle of a peasant's farmyard, we gawk at the various objects around us, wondering if any of them had ever been purchased. And not because the peasant is an innately immoral type and prefers to steal a dime's worth of nails rather than buy them. It is simply that there is no place to buy all that; none of these necessities are sold.

17. I.V. Stalin, *Otvet tovarishcham kolkhoznikam. Voproci leninisma.* 2nd ed., p. 351.
18. BSE, 1st ed., vol. 33. *Kommuna celskokhozyaystvennaya.*

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But though they are not for sale, the farm still must run, thus they are stolen.

What few available statistics there are illustrate the point: "In 1964, 37 percent less hay and straw were distributed on the average collective farm than in 1958. In certain regions public feed supplies were consequently plundered.... In 1964 the losses averaged in the Lvov and Nikolaev districts, respectively, 85 and 150 kilograms of hay and 110 and 140 kilograms of straw for every peasant family."[19] This admission in print of the connection between the production of an essential product and theft is unique. And there is every reason to extend the discovered dependency to the private plot economy in general.

There is no legal market for the goods and services necessary in the peasant's economy, but a colossal market in stolen goods flourishes. And if we say that the capital funds of the personal farming sector today are worth about 10 billion rubles, then each year theft in rural places must also run in the billions. But if adults steal as they work, i.e., acquire some product which they would otherwise earn, children incur mainly a moral loss. The subsequent preaching of the Seventh Commandment in school will undermine a consistent worldview acquired through innocent childhood theft, but will it provide anything in return as solid as the conviction that stealing is the only means of survival?

Here it is appropriate to introduce some very important medical data: "For the ages of 15 to 19, in rural districts compared with the city, a higher mortality rate is recorded from diseases of the nervous system of organs of feelings (2.5 times as many), psychological breakdowns (3 times as many). Characteristically, in that age group not a single cause of death has higher indicators in the city than in rural districts."[20] Could it be that the exacerbated sensitivity of adolescents is fatally heightened by the obvious gap between reality and ideals propagated daily by all channels of information? Perhaps the delicate adolescent awareness perceives with tragic sagacity the lies which the small child still does not understand and to which the adult has become accustomed?

If each day a person breaks the generally accepted moral norms, if the propaganda he hears does not and cannot agree with the only possible mode of behavior, the words either lose their meaning or they split the person's psyche, destroying his personality. This applies to the entire black market in general — everyone knows that bribes, speculation, theft are immoral, but no one can survive without bribes, speculation and theft. No crime statistics are available, but experience shows that in a medium-sized village — about 150 to 200 farms — at least one murder or other grave crime against life and limb is committed each year. The population of an average village can easily be

19. G.V. Dyachkov, *Obshchestvennoe i lichnoe v kolkhozakh,* p. 57.

20. M.S. Bedniy, *Prodolzhitelnost zhizni v gorodakh u selakh,* p. 46. In quoting I took the liberty to correct an obvious error. The actual text reads: "Characteristically, in this age-group not a single cause of death has lower indicators in the cities than in rural places." Obviously, the statement should read that in the cities those indicators are lower — which is clear from the numbers in the preceding sentence and from p. 43 of the quoted pamphlet. Or is this the specialized terminology of medical statistics?

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settled in a smallish apartment building in the city. Would city dwellers feel secure in a building where a murder is committed each year?

Let us not forget alcoholism and its sordid consequences: the animal stupidity of family life; the mentally retarded children, born in practically all rural families; the mutilation and ruined machinery; arson; murder; and, once again, the children whose lives are crippled by the atmosphere of general drunkenness. Experts claim — not in print, of course, but confidentially — that profits from the sale of vodka far exceed the current economic losses from alcoholism. Authorities will not readily give up this profit even if half the denizens of the victorious communist society will be idiots and congenital alcoholics. After all, if the book sales quota in some rural district is not met, all it takes to remedy it is a carload of cheap vodka — the prime commodity in the black market.

Who personifies the idea of a socialist government? The party bureaucracy, the 3 million functionaries of the party apparatus and its propaganda and repressive agencies. They are the ruling structure, the preservers of the stability of the established socio-political and economic system. But as the idea outlives itself and loses any trust on the part of the people, it loses even the dedication of the ruling structure. Even they are not protecting the *idea*, but only their own power and personal privileges. The ruling structure presides over the black market less as an impersonal monitoring agency than as a trading partner with vital interests at stake. Who enjoys the greatest privileges under black market conditions? Who, incapable and unwilling to rationally organize the country's economic life, would force peasants or workers to the daily grind of overtime? Who actually enjoys the greatest package of perks and benefits, which inevitably surface as black market commodities? Who metes out the cushiest positions in the system and enjoys all the privileges possible? To whom, finally, are meat, shoes, and books sold not through the back doors of the stores and with a mark-up, but simply in their own store and at a discount? No one but the professional politicians of all shapes and sizes, the party management, representing no one, but having all the fullness of power in the land.

All economic and political plans, all present governmental efforts are designed to preserve the political and material privileges of the party bureaucracy. That is the primary task; all other tasks, including the material and spiritual welfare of society, are of secondary importance in developing plans for the future. The privileges are significantly greater than indicated by the comparison of direct monetary incomes — it is even difficult to measure them on the same scale.

The scanty price of food products in the special dispensary for party workers can be compared with the market price — for workers — but how can one compare each group's expenditures if the worker often cannot buy meat, milk, and other vitally important products anywhere? The tiny rent which the party officials pay for housing can be compared with the peasant's huge outlay to construct his own home, but how can one compare the

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luxurious apartments and villas for officials with the overnight bunks of dormitories for workers and for the homeless, who number at least 10 million (and even those accommodations aren't enough, hence the intrigue, humiliation, and bribery).

In the world of secret exploitation and crooked economic machinations in which everyone is immersed regardless of personal will or desire, the party bureaucracy lords over the black market like an underworld kingpin. The party post itself becomes a black market economy. The economic limits of the ruling structure are very blurred. Its various strata participate in appropriation and in the distribution of the surplus products to a different extent. Some of the surplus product goes to research and development, which logically should lead to the creation of additional values and benefits for society. But in the socialist state the ruling structure obviously controls all technological development and consequently funds projects which enhance its ruling position, i.e., in pure science and technology, research connected with military production; in the social sciences research that promotes the manipulation and stupefaction of the masses.

The party bureaucracy is closely intertwined with the technostructure — those who directly control production — intelligentsia, and the artistic intelligentsia. They all receive their share of the surplus product in proportion to their contribution to the system's stability — receiving more the higher their activity is valued by the party bureaucracy, which is the only customer and purchaser of labor. Very interesting are the benefits enjoyed by people at the lowest rungs on the party and government ladder — where the bureaucracy almost merges with the peasantry (or the peasantry extends up to the bureaucracy). These benefits and privileges concern, curiously enough, farming and private holdings. "The chairman of the Lautsesky rural council [in the Latvian republic — L.T.] had on the collective farm a private parcel .97 of a hectare in size and, in addition, used one hectare of collective-farm clover to graze his own cattle; while the president of the Prodsky rural council appropriated for his private use 2.11 hectares of collective-farm arable land." [21]

Those two overplayed their hand and were taken to task. But, in principle, the experts and the administrative personnel of the collective and state farms and the rural soviets exploit the farm's production funds, where they are employed for the needs of their own private holdings — that is the norm. "At the present time, administrators, especially those of the lower and middle echelons, possess the largest private holdings." [22]

The ruling structure arbitrarily sets the price for the economic system's most important commodity: labor. And it pays more highly that part of society from which it seeks political support. Thus, an extremely important truth for us: the more essential a role of one social group or another in supporting the rule of the party bureaucracy, the less its prosperity depends

21. G.V. Dyachkov, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

22. G. Antonova, *K voprosu o perspektivakh sushchestvovaniya lichnovo podsobnovo khozyaystva naseleniya* (Moscow, 1975).

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on failures and successes in the economy. The availability of commodities in the special dispensary system does not depend on their level of production in the country as a whole. Moscow shops are well stocked even in the hardest years: the complacent prosperity of the capital's populace is crucial for the system's stability.

The fate of the ruling structure itself does not depend in the least on economic circumstances. Economic failures in this or that branch of the economy rarely, if ever, affect the career of any officials — as a rule they are slightly reduced in rank or assigned to a similar position, in a different line of work. Their removal is just a ritual to give the appearance of decisive action in the czardom of complete managerial irresponsibility.

The exclusiveness, the limitation of the public interests of the party bureaucracy to that sphere where perks connected with party positions are allotted only in exchange for obedience and meekness (but in the last analysis in exchange for observing the prohibitions and suppressing all vitality and talent) also does not depend on economic activity — a strength of the ruling structure, but a serious weakness of the system as a whole. The feudal ways of the ruling structure, its economic backwardness and obtuseness, constantly kill the promise of industrial production, which under conditions of even relative freedom of market relations would provide a colossal impulse to the development of the productive forces and significantly increase prosperity. Under open-market conditions, the party bureaucracy will have no means to finance its state policy; enormous funds which it can acquire in practically any quantity through a system of tariffs and norms by promoting the black market as a sphere of controlled initiatives would vanish into thin air.

How does the black market differ from the open market? In the last analysis, in that the policy of the party bureaucracy is financed through the mechanism of the black market while the mechanism of the open market primarily stimulates the development of the economy. The *black* market is a mechanism that supports the stability of the political system, its independence from economic laws. The *open* market is a mechanism that supports the stability of the economic system, its independence from the laws of political life. Either the market or socialism. Either economic stability or a stable polititical system independent of the welfare of society. Consequently, all discussions of market socialism are an empty pastime. The more intelligent representatives of the government understand this.

The system has painted itself into a corner; it searches for an answer, and, not wanting to accept the real reason, resorts to falsehoods: see, theft is to blame for it all — all thieves to the firing squad! But no, the dominance of the national minorities is to blame. . . . seek the cause in. . . bureaucratization. . . , red tape, sabotage. . . thick-headed senility. . . . These judgments express a desire to find a saving detail. Let them stay at the top, if only they'd slacken the bridle. To think of change is frightening; change means blood! One should probe the extent to which market relations can be liberated under a socialist government. The answer: in Russia they are as free as they will ever

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be — within the framework of the black market. In this case, the party bureaucracy's instinct of self-preservation, its knack for discerning political and economic sedition, can be trusted to prevent the process of liberation from proceeding further.

Socialism was once believed to be pure justice. From each according to his abilities, to each according to his work. But look, what there is now is a grandiose black market: you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours. Ability is wasted, work remains unpaid, and life passes away in vain. So a socialist country cannot be fed without raw materials, if it were not for the skilled procurers, masters of bribes and speculation. The party apparatus itself, let alone procurers, will not function without benefits on the side: dispensaries, apartments, other privileges.

Was that the socialism of our dreams? Now even the party theorists curse the simpleton who blurted out without thinking: "The present generation of Soviet people will live under Communism!" All right, communism is easy enough to proclaim, but what's there to eat under communism? As everyone knows, the planned growth rate of agricultural production in the last five-year period was only about 60 percent met. The party officials are trying to compensate for the inherent defects of the economic system with familiar methods of administrative pressure. Some tens of thousands of meetings are held daily at various levels. It suffices to learn what was said at any one of them; the methods are the same everywhere. As chance would have it, I know verbatim from an eyewitness what was being said at a high level: speaking in February 1977 at a meeting of the secretaries of the regional committees (*obkom*) of the party on agricultural problems, a member of the Politburo, one F. Kulakov (now deceased), claimed that he "would have the heads of those who do not show sufficient initiative in solving the problem." This peculiar understanding of initiative was expressed in connection with the diminished interest of some farms in planting buckwheat because the purchase prices did not justify the expenditures on that capricious and labor-intensive crop.

A few weeks later, the same statesman, at yet another meeting, declared literally: "We put the questions thus: 'You are not the secretary of your district committee (*raykom*) if there are no vegetables in your district's stores.' " Of course, as the idea moves from a member of the Politburo to the direct production of the product, the managerial tone will become harsher. Such is the feudal administrative style of economic policy. Unfortunately, at the very last link, the bureaucratic chain breaks! The peasant cannot be forced to work more than he is already working. So it is very doubtful that more vegetables and buckwheat meal will appear in the stores in the future. In any case, the appearance of buckwheat will signal the disappearance of, let us say, millet, or some other product whose production in some period or other escaped the personal attention of the late Fedor Davidovich Kulakov or his successor.

Labor is a commodity. And those who are trying to get it more cheaply

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know this very well. Here is an example that can indirectly show the esteem the Soviet leadership holds for the value of labor. It deals with the post-war restoration of the Zaporodg-Steel Factory, a chapter in Brezhnev's biography: "At the time many thought it would be simpler and cheaper to tear down the remains, dismantle them and then build a new factory from the ground up. That is also what was recommended by the experts from UNRRA — an international organization dealing with aid to countries that had suffered from the Nazi invasion. After having visited Zaporodg, they unanimously agreed that it was absolutely impossible to repair the destruction, but if such an experiment were attempted more funds would be expended than if a brand new factory were built. However, the country acutely needed thin cold-rolled sheet metal, of which Zaporodg Steel was to be the prime manufacturer, and so the Soviet people defied all prognoses and predictions of foreign experts." [23] Wait a moment! What prognoses defied? The question was: *more expensive* or *cheaper*? It was "necessary," even though the cost was prohibitive. Then again, what cost? Labor is well-nigh free, remember?.

Foreign experts are often wrong in evaluating this or that economic prospect in the Soviet Union. They assumed a fixed cost of labor. But in practice, the cost of labor in the Soviet Union is valued very approximately and subjectively, depending on how the ruling class understands social necessity. The socially necessary norm of satisfying individual needs can in some cases be infinitesimally lowered, down to labor camp rations. The argument that "the country acutely needed it" can be dismissed, too. After the war, all countries needed it, and the restoration of the economy — for instance, in West Germany — went at an equally rapid pace, although there labor is far from being the cheapest commodity.

Not only in the years of the post-war devastation but right to this hour, the country's economic rulers, in their capacity as all-powerful sovereigns of the black market, force workers to sell their labor for a pittance, and to work significantly more than eight hours. Moreover, while appropriating the worker's overtime labor, these highly placed purchasers describe the matter in such a light as if the workers had worked badly for the prescribed eight hours and now had to make up for lost time to meet the "country's needs." This is done with the help of the same quotas and purchase prices: for all their labor they pay them as much as should be paid for an eight-hour work day. If they don't work overtime — they don't survive. All the incidental slogans about the country's needs serve to obfuscate the essence. If they really took the country's needs into account, the entire economy would be organized differently.

However, the productivity of unpaid labor refuses to increase. The worker's generosity is not inexhaustible. And if labor is regularly exploited without a just return, men begin to work well below their potential. And that is precisely what is happening in the Soviet Union, so much so that even party offficials have noticed it: "Quite a few managers have pointed out that in the last 10 to 15 years, the workers' relation to labor has changed. If critical

23. *Leonid Ilich Brezhnev. Kratkiy biograficheskiy ochork* (Moscow, 1976), p. 47.

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statements on the technical-economic aspects of production are rare, criticism of the relation between a worker and his work are much more common."[24] This feedback connection is perhaps the most important facet of current economic reality.

Today, there appears to be little difference between the lives of workers and those of peasants. But though it is possible to analyze the peasant's life, using data from the official Soviet press, no serious analysis of the worker's situation is possible. A witty Frenchman noted: "The working class has lost all individuality to the extent that of all the strata of the Soviet population, it is understood the least. We know the details of life in labor camp, but life in the factories remains almost a complete mystery."

Statistics about overtime in industry and construction are nowhere to be found. This overtime itself is kept carefully hidden. I should think so! If the bureaucracy can intimate that the peasantry has been sacrificed to the proletarian state, to whom was the worker sacrificed — the proletarian that supposedly rules the land? The fact that Soviet-style socialism is not the stuff of which dreams are made is not the problem. The trouble is that there are bleak economic prospects. In his lengthy speeches to the assemblies of the party's Central Committee on the subject of increasing the productivity of underpaid labor, Brezhnev never forgets to speak of the need for the peasants, and recently also the workers, to run a private plot economy. But no, the workers' and collective farmers' personal economies, with their jerry-built technology of mixers and vacuum cleaners, and with their stolen construction materials, will not save agriculture. By betting on the further intensification of the private plot economy, the ruling structure is once again refusing to face the need for radical changes in the economy. The country does not need the "Association of Market-Gardeners and Horticulturists" but the development of an agricultural industry in which all socially necessary labor would be fully compensated.

24. P.V. Rivkina, *Mneniya rukovoditeley celskovo khozyaystva*, p. 95.

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FACING THE WAR PSYCHOSIS*

by Gabor T. Rittersporn

It is well known that both the computer and the nuclear industry have undergone an incredible development in France over the last 15 years. But if a political scientist was to claim that French society would soon be dominated by a conspiracy of computer programmers and nuclear specialists, he would risk not being taken seriously — at least until additional data were submitted to support his thesis. Yet, nothing prevents pronouncements of this sort from being made concerning the Soviet Union.

Specifically, Cornelius Castoriadis' thesis [1] claiming that the Soviet regime is completely enslaved by the expansionist interests of a "military society" composed of tens of millions of people, the only empirical proof for which is the USSR's impressive armament effort, shows quite clearly that excessive data are not needed if one wishes to come up with sensational discoveries in Sovietology asnd strategy. If one takes into account that the current political situation is very encouraging to all sorts of conjectures about the danger of war, then everything leads one to think that this thesis — which is certainly no less supported with proof than the great majority of almost axiomatic truths that are now commonly accepted concerning the USSR — has every chance of becoming, in a short time, one of the fundamental truths that one will have to accept about Soviet realities. To be precise, it is the precariousness of the proofs that this thesis advances, and the surprising ignorance of elementary facts that this thesis reveals, that places Castoriadis' demonstration among the crudest speculations of an obsolete Kremlinology having more to do with the demonology of centuries past than with the modern study of social and political phenomena.

Let us not emphasize the errors, however large, which concern only questions of detail — such as the figure that Castoriadis gives for the membership of the Communist Party, 15 million, a figure that was already greatly surpassed five years ago. Today the Soviet Union's Communist Party numbers more than 17.4 million members.[2] What is more serious is the identification in one bloc of the entire popular mass of the Party with the privileged members of the regime, for the evolution of the Party in the last few decades has greatly devalued the role and function of these party members who, in a great majority, constitute even in the best cases, only a sort of "elite of the non-elite" in Soviet society.[3] Similarly, to affirm that everything in the USSR since World War II has been subordinated to the constant expansion of the military apparatus is to ignore the political reversals that the army heads had to undergo in the late 1940s, towards the end of the 1950s, and especially at the beginning of the 1960s, when one faction became

*Translated by Matthew H. Furfine.

1. Cornelius Castoriadis, "Facing the War," *Telos*, 46 (Winter 1980-81), pp. 43-61; and his *Devant la guerre* (Paris, 1981).

2. *Pravda*, editorial of Jan. 12, 1981, and March 9, 1981.

3. T.H. Rigby, *Communist Party Membership in the Soviet Union 1917-1967* (Princeton, 1968), pp. 327-349, 413, 449-453, 510-525.

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temporarily hegemonic at the top of the party-state and succeeded in obtaining the demobilization of 1.2 million military men, 250,000 of whom were officers.[4]

Apart from the spectacular growth of the arsenal, it is the supposition that Soviet arms are of an extraordinary quality that is supposed to lend credence to the hypothesis of a "military-industrial sub-society" that is alone capable of producing an arsenal in every way superior to that of the West, though faced with the well-known inefficiency of the nation's civil economy. Nothing, however, indicates that the Soviet arms possess the virtues that Castoriadis is ready to attribute to them. With respect to tanks, the technical limits of the scanning system and the maneuverability of the models constituting the largest part of the Soviet supply are inferior to those of their foreign rivals.[5] Of the 50,000 tanks in the Soviet arsenal, about 30,000 are of a design dating back to the beginning of the 1950s, and a good many of these machines are about twenty years old.[6] In general, the Soviet tanks are very vulnerable to anti-tank weapons, which the armies of the West possess by the hundreds of thousands, and whose armor and equipment are of a quality that the Soviets have not been able to equal.[7]

A detailed examination of 28 engines used in Soviet warplanes has shown that their technical superiority over American engines lasted only until the middle of the 1950s. The American advances have continued since then, so that by the beginning of the 1970s, the lag of the Soviets was estimated at 4 to 6 years.[8] The latest generation of Soviet airplanes appeared at that time and included the famous MiG-25,[9] which was long believed the most sophisticated aerial weapon in the world. The myth, however, did not survive the landing of one of these planes in northern Japan in 1976; an inspection revealed its inferiority in all respects to American planes of its class. The materials of which the MiG-25 is made show a technological level no more advanced than that of the West, its cruising speed is surpassed by the best American models, its electronic equipment is comparable to the one conceived for its rivals during the first half of the 1960s.[10] This last fact hardly seems to bear out Castoriadis' thesis concerning the overwhelming technological superiority of Soviet military equipment with respect to the rest of its industrial production, especially if one considers that the third generation of computers that had already appeared in the United States in 1965 did not begin to be built by the Soviets until 1972.[11]

With respect to strategic arms missiles, it is only in the realm of nuclear

4. R. Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and the Communist Party* (Princeton, 1967), pp. 71-79, 135-171, 239-243, 261-268.
5. R. Amann, J. Cooper, R.W. Davies, *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry* (New Haven and London, 1977), pp. 46, 141-146.
6. *World Armament and Disarmament 1977* (London, 1978), p. 193. P.S. Lutz, ed., *Die Rüstung der Sowjetunion* (Baden-Baden, 1979), pp. 84-85.
7. Lutz, *op.cit.*, pp. 85-87.
8. Amann, *et al.*, *op.cit.*, pp. 47, 410. The study has been undertaken by the RAND Corp.
9. *World Armament, op.cit.*, p. 173.
10. Lutz, *op.cit.*, pp. 93-95. See also *Der Spiegel*, 142 (1976), pp. 251-259.
11. Amann, *op.cit.*, p. 401.

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warhead power that the Soviet armament has a considerable advantage. It is, however, the precision of the shot and therefore the possibility of neutralizing the launchers of the adversary which confers a true strategic superiority. However, not very accurate to begin with, the precision of these missiles was improved upon at a much slower rate than for American rockets. If the precision of U.S. intercontinental arms has increased ten times between 1959 and 1970, that of the Soviet missiles has been multiplied only four to six times between 1962 and 1975, and one can predict that this qualitative disparity will not diminish until the mid-1980s.[12] The strategic launchers of the United States have had computers on board since 1962. The Soviets did not install any on their missiles until some ten years later. This lateness corresponds roughly to the lateness of their civil electronics industry, and hardly seems to signal a particular pre-eminence of military technology, at least in the field of computers.[13]

Nothing, then, suggests that irreversible military superiority of the USSR in all areas that Castoriadis talks about. The current state of Soviet armament systems most sensitive to technological development does not indicate that the sector of the economy which produces them is particularly privileged when compared to the rest of the industry, even if it is logical to think that these systems and this sector represent the most advanced technological realizations of the nation. It is in this perspective that one ought to re-examine Castoriadis' assertion that the production of military equipment occupies around 20 million people. Let us not analyze the details of his calculation. But let us not lose sight of the fact that, if the production of military materials does not exceed one third of the total production of the sectors that specialize in such work, the industrial personnel of the USSR as a whole numbered only 36,496,000 people in 1979.[14] Even if one assumes that military equipment constitutes 30 percent of *all* industrial production, by accepting the calculations of Castoriadis, the production of this military equipment would involve the labor of 54.8 percent of the industrial work force. Although we were ready to admit the extremely mediocre quality of the products furnished to non-military segments of Soviet society, the fact that, according to Castoriadis' figures, 45.2 percent of the industrial work force must be able to fabricate everything the USSR turns out hardly seems to support his thesis with respect to the extraordinary efficiency of the military economy, or to its all-privileged status compared to civil sectors.

Everything leads one to think that, if the military production is incomparably better provided for than the rest of the economy, it employs far fewer workers than Castoriadis supposes. This would not rule out, however, the possibility that those workers and their partners at the heart of the state-party and in the army might constitute a powerful, privileged "sub-society" whose interest in expansion would be capable of determining

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47, 472-473, Lutz, *op.cit.*, pp. 152-153.
13. Amann, *op.cit.*, p. 472.
14. *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change,* Joint Economic Committee (Washington, 1979), Vol. I, p. 426; *Narodnoe hozjajstvo SSSR v 1979 g.* (Moscow, 1980), p. 147.

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the evolution and orientations of the entire regime. To verify this last thesis of Castoriadis, let us try to examine the limitations of the Soviet system which seem inseparable from the *raison d'être* of a "stratocracy," in order to understand the regime's ability to mobilize all of its resources to win a modern war. Let us not, however, make another mistake: one certainly should not take into account the current strength of the Soviet army or the successes — sometimes rather relative — that it or its allies obtain against small nations, torn and weakened by internecine wars. What one must envision is a confrontation with adversaries of more or less comparable strength, that is, a conflict betwen the USSR and its Western rivals.

Certainly, a confrontation of this type is hardly conceivable without the large-scale use of strategic arms missiles and a chaotic escalation of nuclear attacks and counter-attacks, from which no participant would emerge the victor. One should then accept the hypothesis — rather unlikely for the moment — of a conflict that would involve the restricted use of strategic arms whose ability to devastate seems impossible to calculate, even in the case of limited utilization. The data at our disposal permit us, however, to have a vague idea, sufficient for our purpose, of the loss of conventional military material.

Let us reflect, then, only on this: during the 18 days of the Mideast War of 1973, Israel lost about 105 planes and 800 tanks while destroying about 450 planes and 1,900 tanks of its adversaries.[15] It is reasonable to believe that the destructive capabilities of modern arms have increased somewhat since then, and on the other hand, it is certain that an eventual confrontation between the USSR and its Western rivals would evolve into a war of an incomparable larger scale, provoking far greater damage. However, if the Soviet army currently disposes of about 9,300 combat planes of all kinds and of 50,000 tanks, the Soviet military industry produces only 1,000 and 3,000 of them, respectively, every year.[16]

Thus, in the event a conflict would inflict losses of the same order as those suffered in October 1973, the Soviet Union would have to multiply its production more than seven times just to maintain its strength, which evidently it would not be able to do without recourse to its civil economy. And there, even if the highly centralized structure of command of this economy facilitated its entrance into the service of military production, the inefficiency which it demonstrates in peacetime weakens any anticipation of exceptional performances under conditions of a modern war.

One of the sectors whose contribution would be crucial to a military effort is the mechanical industry. This is, however, one of the most lagging branches from the point of view of productivity, which has spectacularly diminished in the last few decades.[17] Since its development is inseparable from the increase

15. *World Armament and Disarmament 1973* (Stockholm and London, 1974), p. 151.

16. *The Military Balance 1980-1981* (London, 1980), pp. 9-12, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective*, Joint Economic Committee (Washington, 1976), p. 231, J.S. Gansler, *The Defense Industry* (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1981), p. 60, *Le Monde*, Sept. 9, 1981, p. 6, Amann, *op.cit.*, p. 440.

17. *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change, op.cit.*, pp. 411, 432-433.

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in construction of machine-tools, the technological under-development of this sector is the object of serious preoccupations among the members of the Central Committee.[18] This is also the case for this industrial sector as a whole, for at a plenary session of the Central Committee in October 1980, Brezhnev felt obligated to make a public appeal to the manufacturers of military apparatus to obtain their participation in the revitalization of the mechanical industry.[19] The situation of this sector does not appear as brilliant. To take only one example, more than 20,000 combine-harvesters had to remain out of use during the 1978 harvest because of the lack of replacement parts, and nothing since then indicates any notable improvement in this area.[20] As it is unable to satisfy the country's needs in peacetime, it is difficult to see how the mechanical industry would function any better under conditions of war, with the damage that could be inflicted on its installations.

The problem of constructing machines is in turn aggravated by the inefficiency of the mining and metallurgical industry, which sometimes allow the machine factories to go completely without resources to utilize; even worse, the modernization of their equipment advances very slowly, just as on the side of the industries, the adoption of technologies capable of economizing raw materials is also seriously lagging.[21] The progressive exhaustion of a certain number of mines and the deterioration of geological working conditions in the mining industry that is hinted at more and more in high circles[22] certainly does nothing to ease the difficulty in supplying raw materials and combustibles. The difficulties appear quite considerable, especially in light of the positions taken by the Central Committee and the alarmist declarations concerning energy and fuel problems.[23] The mechanical industry, whose performance is influenced by everything that happens in the energy sector, is, besides, one of the agents responsible for its weaknesses, to the extent that the mechanical industry still does not furnish the necessary equipment to the energy sector and is even less able to insure its technological development.[24] Another culprit for the inadequacies of fuel supply is the railway system, which does not always guarantee the forwarding of fuel, although that is one of its highest priorities.[25]

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18. V Central'nom Komitete KPSS, *Pravda*, March 12, 1980, p. 2, editorial, Dec. 18, 1980, Jan. 1, 1981; and *Soviet Economy in a Time of Change, op.cit.*, pp. 561-568.

19. This speech can be read in *Pravda*, Oct. 10, 1980, p. 2. On the same problem see also the editorial of Oct. 31, 1980.

20. Editorial in *Pravda,* Dec. 12, 1978, Nov. 26, 1980, Jan. 28, 1981, April 4, 1981, *Le Monde,* Sept. 9, 1981, p. 44.

21. Editorial in *Pravda,* April 4, 1979, Oct. 29, 1979, July 14, 1980, Oct. 28, 1980, Jan. 3, 1981, Jan. 6, 1981; see also the decree of the Central Committee in *Pravda,* June 8, 1980 and the article of V. Tcherkasov, *ibid.,* June 9, 1981, p. 2.

22. Besides the already cited discourse of L.I. Brezhnev, see on this subject the article of I. Tkhomirov, *Pravda,* Oct. 18, 1980, p. 2.

23. See the decrees of the Central Committee and of the government, *Pravda,* June 14, 1979, March 30, 1980, the communiques concerning the Central Committee, which were dedicated to these problems, *Pravda,* Oct. 25, 1979, Aug. 15, 1981, as well as the speech of L.I. Brezhnev, *Pravda,* June 24, 1980, p. 1.

24. Editorial in *Pravda,* Sept. 13, 1979, Oct. 18, 1980.

25. See for example the reports on the joint meetings of the Central Committee and the

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The state of the transport system is crucial, especially if one considers that its regular functioning conditions the development of the furthermost eastern regions of the country, which are more and more the places from which raw materials must be brought, towards the industrial centers of the Ural and the European areas: 30 percent of the copper, 50 percent of the zinc, and more than 70 percent of the lead, for example, come today from Kazakhstan.[26] However, the mediocre functioning of the railway system is a frequently mentioned subject in the press and in the documents of the party and of the government.[27] The completion of the summer farmwork and the transport of food products impose a supplementary burden on the railway system, and regularly provoke chaos in autumn, even when, as in 1981, the harvest is not particularly abundant.[28]

This confusion is produced in peacetime, when the duties of the railroads are more or less routine and foreseeable and, above all, when their function is not complicated by strategic bombardments. One has trouble imagining how they would be able to insure the maintenance of communications in wartime. The capacities of their obsolete equipment are already overextended, and their normal upkeep is poorly assured. Inevitably, though, the railroads will for a long time constitute the principal means of transport in this immense country. The extent of the network of roads in the Soviet Union represents only 17 percent of the length of roads in the United States, whose territory is almost three times smaller than that of the USSR.[29] Fifty percent of these Soviet roads are unpaved and are practically unusable several months of the year. Their reconstruction is planned before 1990 in a general improvement of the entire roadway communications system, but no one hides the fact that the quality of the newly installed road surfaces leaves much to be desired.[30] Everything thus leads one to believe that exceptional efforts will not be necessary to insure the inability of the Soviet transportation system to provide for the necessarily increased demands of a wartime economy.

The strategic vectors of a modern army expose almost all enemy territory to devastating bombardments. The ability to repair or to reconstruct damaged industrial installations in relatively little time becomes under these conditions a decisive factor in the maintenance of military potential. Since nearly all the apparatus of production will be engaged in the wartime economy, it seems improbable that the underground shelters, which the USSR possesses in great number, will suffice to protect more than a very small proportion of this apparatus. This is especially true since certain essential targets such as steel

government, *Pravda,* July 21, 1979, Oct. 25, 1979 and the editorials of April 7, 1979, July 2, 1980, Sept. 29, 1980.

26. See on this subject the speech of Brezhnev in *Pravda,* Aug. 29, 1980, p. 2, and the articles of A. Derhabin of Aug. 22, 1980, and the editorial of Oct. 25, 1980.

27. For a few documents see *Pravda*, Feb. 10, 1979, March 24, 1979, July 21, 1979, Sept. 20, 1979, March 14, 1980. See also the editorials of April 16, 1979, July 14, 1970, Feb. 13, 1980, April 29, 1981.

28. Editorial in *Pravda,* Sept. 8, 1981; *Le Monde,* Sept. 9, 1981, p. 44.

29. *Soviet Economy in a Tme of Change, op.cit.,* p. 830.

30. These problems have been the object of a decree (*Pravda,* April 23, 1980), and of editorials July 16, 1980, and Sept. 2, 1980 in *Pravda.*

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plants, shipyards, and communication infrastructures are rather difficult to hide in the ground. Leaving untouched the question of knowing how the Soviet economy would be able to stand the supplementary charge of repairing and replacing its destroyed technical equipment, let us examine only what one knows of the functioning of the building industry in peacetime.

It is admitted that its feeble productivity constitutes one of the most important obstacles to the economic development of the USSR. Outside of the problems of workers' discipline, it is above all the weak planning and organization, as well as the extreme slowness of construction which cause these obstacles, not to mention its inability to insure the regular supply of work yards and materials and the impossibility of coordinating the efforts of different groups and enterprises. These difficulties are systematically enumerated at every adoption of official policy which deals with the national economy, and are the regular subject of energetic interventions emanating from the highest echelons of the state-party.[31]

One of the reasons for the current state of the building industry is, certainly, the excessive number of construction sites and the exaggerated scattering of investments. But one must not forget that it is exactly under conditions like this, aggravated even more by the enemy's shelling, that repair and construction will have to operate in time of war. Yet, it was calculated in 1979, that only to finish the construction already begun in just one region of Siberia, 19 more years would be required at the present rate.[32] Let us note, however, that this is nowhere near the record that, so far as we know, is being set by the construction of a factory to blend precious metals in the Urals — a factory whose importance seems considerable to the construction of military aircraft. It was begun 14 years ago, and if the current speed of work is not increased, it will require 28 more years for completion.[33] Bureaucratic wranglers are evidently not strangers to this type of performance, but one does not see how these delays could be overcome from one day to the next in time of war.

It is clear also that a military effort would not lift the weight of demographic pressures from the Soviet economy. It is of course impossible to evaluate what the human losses would be under the conditions of a modern conflict, above all, among the civil population. What one knows, however, is that the USSR is experiencing a growing deficiency in the work force and that even the maintenance of its armed forces at their current strength is going to pose some serious problems, as people of certain age groups are being taken away from the economy.[34] Forty-nine percent of the Soviet work force is

31. From an impressive quantity of texts we cite only the communiques on the meetings of the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet on the problems of constructing infrastructures. Cf. *Pravda* of Jan. 30, 1979, April 15, 1980, June 19, 1981, July 25, 1981, a decree in *Pravda,* June 4, 1980, and *Pravda* editorials of Sept. 12, 1979, Jan. 17, 1980, and Aug. 27, 1981.

32. This is cited in an article by the academician A. Aganbegyan, *Pravda,* Dec. 7, 1979, p. 3.

33. See the article of B. Mironov, *Pravda,* May 7, 1980, p. 2. This is not an important exception. Begun in 1958, the reconstruction of one of the largest tire factories in the country, whose military importance is obvious, should have been finished, barring unforeseen circumstances, in 1981. See the article of Z. Bystrova, *Pravda,* Aug. 4, 1978, p. 2, and the column *Posle kritiki,* March 25, 1979, p. 3.

34. *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective, op.cit.,* pp. 113, 127-128, 149-152.

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composed of barely qualified auxiliary workers, whose proportion in the mechanical industry exceeds even 50 percent. [35] A war effort would place some difficult choices before strategists. It would be useful, without doubt, to draft into service the maximum number of qualified workers who would be capable of handling sophisticated military hardware. But it would be no less important to insure the repair and reproduction of that same material, duties which demand equally professional preparation.

One cannot envision how this dilemma could be resolved. Similarly, it cannot be seen how they would be capable of insuring the loyalty of an army in which by 1975, 39.7 percent of the young draftees were conscripts from the Caucasus and Central Asia (a proportion that will increase up to 62 percent toward the end of the century), not to mention those originating from ethnic groups who only with difficulty can identify with the eventual imperialist aims of their country's leaders.[36] It remains to be seen also if the population of each brother-country will be at all enthusiastic about participating in wartime enterprises. But to stick to our subject, the economy of war, one can wonder if the organizational and administrative capacity that the Soviets demonstrate today would allow them to utilize adequately the industrial and human resources of the eventually occupied territories.

At the same time, nothing seems to justify the prediction that the economic potential of the USSR will be more adapted to the demands of a modern war in a more or less near future. Quite the contrary. If the hypothesis of a completely independent military economy is accurate, the development of its limited capacities will not be enough to face the challenge of a contemporary conflict for a very long time to come, whereas its forced acceleration will risk aggravating the retardation of the rest of the apparatus of production. On the other hand, if Soviet leaders envision the economic recovery of the civil sector, it is hardly likely that they will succeed in maintaining the current level of the country's military potential.

All this leads one to think that the military-industrial establishment of the USSR is not at all on the way to becoming an all-powerful stratocracy whose inevitably expansionist interests would be capable of dominating the internal evolution and foreign policy of the regime. Quite the opposite: it seems clear that the army and the Soviet military economy are prisoners of the system. Fundamentally, if it is truly the extreme inefficiency of the apparatus of production which confines them within a prison which an immense chasm separates from the rest of the economy, the weaknesses of the latter are exactly those which seem to impose obvious limits both to the development of the "military-industrial-complex" and to its eventual appetite for planetary conquest.

Nothing indicates that the weaknesses of the Soviet economy are the result of simple accidents. Far from that: their omnipresence, their permanence and their historical evolution reveal that they are inseparable from the socio-

35. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 148. Cf. also H. Carrère d' Encausse, *L'Empire éclaté* (Paris, 1978), pp. 195-254.

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political system of the USSR. The considerable effort that the activation of a wartime economy demands would only exacerbate these weaknesses, which could possibly have a stronger effect than the corrective measures which seem hardly effective now, in peacetime. To the extent that the structural faults of the Soviet economy are at the same time the inherent weaknesses of the entire system, it is possible that the nearly unavoidable aggravation of these faults in wartime would be as nearly capable of endangering the survival of the regime as the hostile military operations whose force would eventually be felt.

It seems rather unlikely that the military heads of the USSR would be inclined to engage themselves in a war with the prospect of remaining without sufficient reinforcements after a certain passage of wartime. Is not the observable and conventional stockpiling of arms a process of accumulation on the part of those constrained to calculate in terms of the weaknesses of their backup system? But it is even less likely that the Soviet leaders, whether military or civil, would accept the highly probable collapse of the entire system as the price of an eventual war. Everything leads one to believe they would be able to prevent disaster only with difficulty, faced with adversaries endowed with forces comparable to their own and with a more efficient economy. But one could equally conceive that by likening their defeat to a planetary catastrophe, they would hardly hesitate to engage their powers to effect massive annihilation once the disintegration of their regime becomes obvious.

One ought not excessively fear the sight of victorious Soviet troops soon marching through the streets of Paris. But one can foresee that the Soviet leaders will not fail to intervene *manu militani* in the regions which they regard as their legitimate sphere of influence, principally in developing countries, once the slightest possibility of or the slightest excuse for modifying the current division of the world in their favor presents itself. We must not, however, be mistaken: it is not the overwhelming supremacy, but rather the opposite — the weakness of the USSR — which will facilitate their task. It is not the unbounded power, but the extreme vulnerability of the Soviet system, which makes the threat of blackmail weigh mutually on the nations that would be capable of holding them in check but which could not be able to risk escalation in order to resolve local conflicts whose dynamics are of no direct importance.

One can sleep quietly in the developed countries of the West and the Soviet leaders ought not worry about any imminent danger when thinking about the unthinkable war against redoubtable adversaries. The weaknesses of the Soviet regime keep vigil over our security as well as over that of the Soviet leaders, even if these weaknesses hardly guarantee peace for the peoples of the Third World, of the USSR, or of certain of its satellites. Only the prospect of a nuclear disarmament would be capable of endangering the shaky balance of terror that at present protects the Soviet chiefs, but this disarmament is further away than ever today, when it is precisely the threat of mutual destruction that these chiefs need to maintain their tactical operations. The arms race and nuclear proliferation, both becoming more and more

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uncontrollable, render the prospect of disarmament always less probable, at the same time they possess the merit of supporting Soviet strategy and furnishing material to the Soviets' pacifist rhetoric which justifies this strategy.

Soviet realities seem a little more complex than Castoriadis supposes. The armament effort and the underdevelopment of the non-military sectors of the economy can hardly be accepted by themselves as the key to the analysis of Soviet society, and even less as a compass able to indicate the future orientation of the Soviet regime. Even though the Soviet arsenal is very impressive and its development constitutes a phenomenon undeniably disquieting, these two facts, however important, certainly are not enough to explain everything that is essential to the nature and to the evolution of the Soviet universe.

If, on the other hand, a veteran of socio-political analysis like Castoriadis can be moved to create an entirely new conception of the Soviet system on the basis of two facts so untested and so uncharged with explicative value, then one is as justified worrying about the manner Soviet realities tend to be deciphered at present, as about the meaning and the dangers of the arms race. In fact, contrary to the possibly demystifying intentions of analyses of this genre, nothing contributes more to the construction of myths than the excessive amplification of the significance of certain phenomena torn and separated from their context, the concealment, certainly in good faith, behind two or three more or less arbitrarily chosen trees, of an entire overgrown jungle of facts and problems.

The accumulation of gigantic arsenals, the constant perfecting of military equipment, the arms race, nuclear proliferation, and the easy recourse to force in international relations are phenomena extremely disquieting and give immediate importance to the debate that Castoriadis has the merit of having launched. It would be unfortunate, though, if the discussion was forced to develop without our being able to comprehend all the complexity of the data and of the implied questions. Similarly, it is deplorable that the image one has of the Soviet Union resembles more and more that of those strange and monstrous animals with which the ancients populated the distant lands.

One knows today that a furtive glance of an inexperienced traveler is often enough to transform into frightening dragons mere common animals, which though certainly dangerous, are far less enormous and formidable than the one detail seized upon would suggest, and the one which scholarly writings will not cease to amplify thereafter. The development of zoology has succeeded in correcting these errors, sometimes after hundreds of years of observation and experiment. But do we have enough time to harmonize our knowledge of the USSR with the demands and challenges of our age, when one must be convinced daily that even the most lucid minds seem not to surpass the methods and vision of Pliny's contemporaries with respect to Soviet realities?

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Special Section on European Peace Movements:

THE GERMAN QUESTION*

by Herbert Ammon and Peter Brandt

In the 1970s, the "German question" no longer seemed central in European politics, after the social-liberal coalition of the Brandt-Scheel era developed its policies toward Eastern Europe and the two Germanies. According to a widely accepted interpretation, the recognition of the two Germanies became part of the European status quo through the treaties with the East and the original founding agreement, as well as with the entrance of both East and West Germany into the United Nations.

Even in West Germany, it went largely unnoticed that, along with a settling of accounts with Eastern Europe, the new *Ostpolitik* was motivated by the desire to maintain the nation's cultural and human unity — despite its division as a political entity — and thus to create the conditions for its future unification. Beyond the German border, in Poland and in France, this feature of the East-West policy met a much more cautious reception. By contrast, this point receded from public debate in West Germany as the social-liberal politics of the Schmidt-Genscher era increasingly distanced itself from the basic position of the original *Ostpolitik*, setting other goals and a different tone. Sections of the liberal-to-left public even greeted this weakening of national political goals as a necessary phase of self-recognition for West Germany. In this respect, *Ostpolitik* was interpreted as an effort to consolidate the unification of Europe over and against the East.

Parallel to the depoliticization of the German question there arose an essentially academic discussion in the 1970s concerning the concept of "the nation," impelled by the premise of an inner-German policy which posited the existence of two states in one nation. The fact of this division gave fresh impetus to the search for conceptual definitions and distinctions, reviving the old German dichotomy between a "nation of culture" and a "nation of the state." The continuation of European political nations necessitated reflection on German "national identity," which had been thoroughly challenged as a result of Nazism. An interview in *Die Zeit* with Günter Gaus upon his recall from East Germany alerted a wide public to the political implications of this debate.[1]

Shortly thereafter, Honecker's speech further increased public awareness of the issue; he once again recalled the continuing relevance of the national question as a social question, as a theme of class struggle for his party and for East Germany. This linking of social and national questions in the 1970s had been the task of certain sections of the West German population, especially of the West Berlin Left, in their critical confrontation with East Germany as well as with the West German state.[2] Developments in Poland are an impressive reminder of the explosive potential of this dialectic of concepts in Germany: a similar movement in East Germany would tend toward a social upheaval with immediate political consequences, necessitating a challenge to the political structure.

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*This is an abbreviated and reworked version of an article that originally appeared in *Befreiung*, 21 (1981). Translated by Judith Butler.

1. In *Die Zeit,* January 3, 1981.

2. See Peter Brandt and Herbert Ammon, eds., *Die Linke und die nationale Frage: Dokumente zur deutschen Einheit seit 1945* (Reinbek, 1981), pp. 301ff.

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Even after the contractually fixed bi-partite status of the two Germanies, the German question has neither become less actual nor has it been resolved. Certainly, the 20th anniversary of the Berlin wall's construction, recalling the humanitarian aspects of German suffering and the still untenable situation of West Berlin, elicited from both East and West an exercise of duty. Nonetheless, the unresolved German question has received renewed attention because of worldwide political developments in the last two years, stemming from a general concern to preserve a "peaceful situation" in Europe in view of the heightened global conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The following attempts to develop a political conception that accounts for the relation between the German question and the defense of peace in objectively established terms — a connection that was, of course, taken for granted in the 1950s by the West German peace movement and parts of the SPD in their resistance to the danger of integration into and confrontation between East and West. We are reformulating the German question "radically," i.e., in the sense of the fundamental principles of the democratic Left, those of popular sovereignty and the right to self-determination, principles upon which the concepts of equality and emancipation from internal and external structures of domination can be built. As critics of both "real, existing" systems in Germany, we insist upon this genuine Left doctrine: the realization of these principles must take into account on the one hand the relatively stable power relations in both states and in the over all context and, on the other hand, the potentially eruptive process of destabilization, which is not subject to calculation. However, let the importance of these principles also be recalled here: from the formulations of the constitution to Willy Brandt's reformulation in Erfurt, East Germany has been recognized by West Germany only with the proviso that the German people gain the right to self-determination. Honecker's most recent statements make it clear again that Germans from East Germany as well claim the right to self-determination — although formulated in class-specific terms. A total German national-democratic unity cannot be based on a bi-partite state structure: one important reason being that each of the German states as they exist can only gain legitimation through being demarcated from the other. Furthermore, the concept of a "nation" defines for us a concrete, historical-political content: the people's long-standing suffering in both German states as a consequence of Nazism demands continual political reflection and action aiming at the overcoming of this situation. For the first time in 20th-century history, this task coincides with the interests of our European neighbors — one hopes for a situation of peace, which will overcome the division of Europe into East and West. The "national task" of Germans in both East and West Germany is thus not the imprisonment in the aliiances prescribed to them, but a thorough overcoming of the status quo.

Through an analysis of the internal contradictoriness of detente, we criticize the present practice that limits itself to a stabilization of the political and social status quo in East and West. In addition, we question the currently predominant view which, following the motto, "peace before unity," elevates the acceptance of the status quo to a national political maxim. This kind of belief entails an artificial contradiction that proves its obsolescence in light of the current threat to peace in Europe.

Contradictions in the Social-Liberal Policy toward the Two Germanies

All of the current protagonists — including, of course, Egon Bahr — of the new *Ostpolitik* adhere to the above view. An analysis calling for a transformation of the status quo must therefore begin with those discussions of political alternatives which

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Berlin politicians around Willy Brandt were forced to consider under the shock of the construction of the Berlin wall. At issue here is the notion of "change through approximation," which Bahr considers a mistaken and misleading description of his position.[3]

When one tries to define Bahr's conception that reunification is an immediate goal while also taking into account the necessary historical changes, it can be seen as a "convergence theory," even though he rejects this concept, understood as a mixture of systems, as "nonsense."[4] Bahr's starting point is the diminishing significance of ideologies. At the same time, he believes that as for the decisive questions of world politics until the end of the century, "neither American-style capitalism nor Soviet-style state capitalism can offer credible, meaningful answers." Rather, Bahr has confidence "that what one calls democratic socialism basically has a future which is yet to come." While Bahr was critical in 1968 of a contractually stipulated coexistence between the blocs that would formally institutionalize the German partition, now he sees the disarmament and peace initiatives between the blocs as related to the idea of an overarching alliance between them, which has the possibility of strengthening cooperation and extending economic integration to the international division of labor. Such a rapprochement of blocs, whose direction is determined by the interests of the hegemonial powers, is at some point supposed to render military alliances superfluous. The integration of Western and Eastern Europe thus offers a solution to the German question that would render the legal framework for this connection irrelevant. The rapprochement of the two German states would conform then with the interests of all the neighboring European states, even with those in whom the thought of a unified Germany evokes little sympathy.

The policy toward the two Germanies took on a new orientation at the end of the 1960s, a direction that was both inevitable and long overdue, especially considering the readiness of the United States and the Soviet Union for coexistence, evidenced by the nuclear stalemate. As a result, the contractual settlements that came in the wake of the Moscow agreement presumably represented the most that could be attained at the beginning of the 1970s with the other German state that would be approved by its superpower. The contractual relations made possible a renewal of human contact, which proved to be decisive in keeping the nation together.

In a famous interview, Gaus called attention to one particular consideration which discussions about the social-liberal inner-German policy tend to gloss over. This is the question as to whether German national goals can be viewed as thoroughly consistent. This was a dilemma that Adenauer ran into with his brand of national rhetoric, which was apart from his policy of Western integration. Opposing the predominant tendency toward West Germany's "self-recognition," Gaus directed his challenge not only to West Germany to recognize East Germany as the other German state, but also reminded Bonn "at every step" of its integration into Western Europe, of its obligation to weigh the consequences "for relations between the two German states." Here lies the real strength of Gaus' statement. But Bahr's statements with respect to European reunification are also contradictory: "I am first of all German, then European." The nation has always been the decisive historical power, and so it will remain. "The actual decision of post-war German history was that the nations were not forfeited to a Western community of nations, nor was their sovereignty given up.

3. This discussion is based on an unpublished manuscript of the Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung, "Berliner Dialog."

4. Cf. the interview in *Der Spiegel*, September 11, 1979.

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This also applies to the German nation. We will see this historically proven one day. But let's not speak about this much more." [5]

The basis for Bahr's concept is the long-term strategic goal of overcoming the status quo. In this conception, the pace of change remains dependent on the relations of the two superpowers, each of which had recognized the security needs of the other in the Helsinki accords and each of which relies for its security on the stability of the bloc it belongs to. Bahr does not regard the question of West Germany's integration into the Western alliance as a taboo subject, but he does understand it as a completed historical development, essentially beyond re-examination. There is no return to the 1950s. Similarly, he rejects the notion of Europe as a "third power" between the two superpowers. In this age of missiles, the security interests of Western Europe are linked with those of the United States. To Bahr's way of thinking, "security" has become the decisive factor in contemporary politics. Accordingly, his plan focuses on the realization of the fundamental principles of the Helsinki accords, so that "in the year 2010, with any luck," the division of Germany will be overcome. When Europe's boundaries are completely open, the form of a newly won unity would have to be of secondary interest if the goal of the unification of both German states is still to be kept in mind.

The protagonists of this *Ostpolitik* are clearly alarmed by the threat to the detente process posed by the perspective of a policy seeking German unification. Gaus speaks of the most dangerous phase of post-war Europe and admits "that at this time we need a finely tuned Cabinet politics as in the 19th century(!) in order to emerge in fair shape." To this he adds, "But precisely at this time our societies are incapable of providing this kind of discrete, finely tuned Cabinet policy. Thus, I am forced to conclude: the future does not look good."

The conservative dimension of the social-liberal policy toward the two Germanies becomes understandable in light of this position. Some champions of the social-liberal *Ostpolitik* find refuge from the threatened breakdown of detente by appealing to Europeans. Peter Bender, one of the public promoters of *Ostpolitik* in the 1960s and 1970s, repeated his desire to set the moderating influence of Europeans against the unpredictability of both nuclear superpowers. He supports the notion of non-alignment only for Third World countries, and believes that peace in Europe cannot be secured by abandoning the dual power structure of Russia and America. If the author wants, however, to accuse both superpowers of being fixated on a "mythical notion of nuclear parity," his argument reveals its own circularity.[6] Basically, such commentaries seek to deny the fact that the current structure of alliances will not allow Europeans such peaceful indulgences.

Since the NATO resolution of December 1979 and since the invasion of Afghanistan, bloc mentality and strategic security interests have taken hold once again. It became evident in 1980 that the pledges of peace between the United States and the Soviet Union in Helsinki in 1975 were undermined by the strength of global antagonisms between them. Since we are in a new era of confrontation, the premises of Bahr's conception reveal themselves all the more faulty. The latitude of West German policy is once again restricted to the task of keeping the alliance together for the purpose of preventing a nuclear confrontation. The hope disappears that a rapprochement between the two German states will follow from cooperating within

5. In *Vorwärts*, February 7, 1981.

6. "USA und UdSSR: Zwei neurotische Riesen. Am Beginn der grossen Weltkrise," in *Der Spiegel*, June 30, 1980.

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the system. Beyond these considerations, the danger looms that global tensions between the superpowers will destroy the commitment to the accord between the two Germanies. Peace today appears no less certain than it did 15 years ago; on the contrary, it is even more threatened. The detente process is no longer valid when it is prevented by the arms race from regaining the "balance of mutually assured threats." The consequences of this terrifying parity have become more uncanny for those who live on the boundaries between the blocs than ever before.

No Security Through "Parity"

The security formula of "East-West parity," which underlies West Germany policy toward the German question in the context of the NATO alliance, makes this dependent upon the general climate of the East-West conflict. Each worsening of the climate has regressive effects on inner-German policy — a fact evident to all this past year.

The chancellor's refusal to attend the inter-German summit conference in August 1980 and East Germany's restriction on travel cannot be explained only in terms of caution towards Poland and Polish sensibilities. An explanation of these events cannot ignore the Soviet Union's asserted right to intervene in the Eastern bloc (acknowledged by the West in 1953, 1956, and 1968, and formalized in the Brezhnev doctrine in 1968). The permanent threat of intervention for a country such as Poland exists as a result of the alliance structure imposed upon it. This threat would be considerably diminished if it were possible to create a neutral zone in central Europe in which Soviet troops, now amassed and unloved in East Germany, would be withdrawn from a partially demilitarized central Europe as part of a genuine security system.

The long accepted security doctrine in Western Europe — that security can only be attained under the nuclear umbrella of the United States — confirms the actual dependence on the Americans and strengthens a certain attitude of this country, not unlike that of the Soviet claim to be "master of the household." Incantations, like those of Peter Bender, which make clear the self-interest of the Europeans against the interests of the superpowers, are of course obligated to document the non-existence of isolated European structures of interest. They also cannot minimize the loyalty pressure exercised by the American leadership on West Germany, its most important ally, the strongest and, in the last analysis, the only relevant NATO power, to maintain and uphold its security policy.

Clearly, the only possible way for the allied nations to influence the shaping of the security doctrine is *via negativa*; as a defender of the principle against its uninspired execution by its initiators. One could at least interpret Schmidt's effort to restore strategic nuclear parity at the level of medium-range missiles (called the "Eurostrategic nuclear carriers") along these lines — if his own claims are true that he himself made the Americans aware of the gaps in European strategy and pressured them to restore parity. As is well known, it was the West German government that, strengthened by the absolution granted to it at the Berlin SPD congress in December 1979, pushed through the Brussels "double-track" resolution against other opposing West European allies. This resolution called for the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Central Europe and for negotiations on limiting transcontinental strategic weapons.

This security concept was its intrinsic logic and intrinsic morality. Criticism of the alliance's security dogma must therefore begin on two levels. E.P. Thompson shows a convincing connection between these two lines of reasoning. He brings together with

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the concept of "exterminism" the perversion of human reason under the advance of nuclear strategy and the growth of the military-industrial complex within the domain of both superpowers.[7]

It is impossible here to undertake a detailed refutation of the West German government's security concept. But several central points reveal its faulty logic. (1) The deterrence doctrine posits the necessity of maintaining second-strike capability at every level: the aggressor should be restrained from the outset through the anticipated counter-strike of the other party. But such a goal could be achieved without realizing a full balance of destructive capacities by insuring second-strike capability at the lowest level. (2) The "flexible reaction" doctrine seeks to extend the possibilities of strategic bargaining and to avoid "needless" escalation. On the basis of the aforementioned logic, however, this leads to an inevitable escalation in order to remain at a credible level of deterrence. (3) At every level of escalation, the danger increases that the U.S. leadership will want to withdraw in order to protect its own survival interests. On the other hand, every new stage of the arms race enhances the temptation to execute a preventive strike. (4) The danger of nuclear self-destruction is latent even at the most rudimentary levels of confrontation. The NATO strategy is even incapable of contemplating the successful defeat of a conventional attack in view of the supposed conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. Hence, even here defense should be guaranteed through the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. This entails the annihilation of a great part of the German population (on both sides of the border) in densely populated Central Europe. With the threat of suicide, the deterrence premises loses its meaning; it becomes simply unbelievable. A defense conception that makes its own military logic superfluous because it is doubtful whether it can realize its own postulated security goals thereby refutes its own ethical claim. The West German soldier cannot honor his oath to "defend bravely the rights and freedom of the German people" in the context of this reigning self-annihilation strategy.

Possibilities for Non-Alignment in View of the Superpowers' Global Interests

Given the questionability of the entire West German foreign, inner-German, and security policy, further considerations of an alternative demand analysis of the global positions and superpowers' interests. Since a comprehensive analysis of the global conflict is not possible here, we will limit ourselves to the following claims: (1) Since the Kennedy era in the United States, the tendency, necessitated by the nuclear threat, toward coexistence or detente has competed with the contrary tendency to continue the conflict (beneath the all-out war threshold) with heightened intensity. (2) The perception patterns of the United States and the Soviet Union have shifted since the emergence of the Sino-Soviet conflict. At the same time, the development of China as a major power has essentially changed the rules of the game. (3) The central focus of the conflict has clearly been displaced from Europe, and that means essentially from Germany, to the Third World, especially to those Third World countries rich in raw materials. This means that the vigilance that both sides have practiced since the Cuban intervention in Africa in 1976, as part of the Soviet mission, has had the following consequences: (a) the European allies are increasingly restricted in their freedom of movement; (b) the readiness to wage regional substitute wars and to engage in indirect intervention has increased, with the consequence that the conflict can no longer remain within the limits of the alliance, but returns to strike Europe itself. And this is all the more true today, when the Americans are demanding West

7. In *Befreiung*, 19-20, pp. 12ff.

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European participation in defense concerns beyond the NATO sphere.

The American consensus, which has never really been challenged by the members of the power elite either before or after the Vietnam war, is concerned with discovering and applying appropriate methods to defend worldwide the model of the American social system (the American dream). In domestic politics, this competition reflects the strife between conservatives and liberals; in foreign affairs, this competition is evident in disputes over the proper course for pursuing the national interest. These conflicts over ideas and methods, nevertheless, share a common presupposition, namely, a belief in the superiority of American institutions, including the capitalist system.

Those in power in the post-war era have accepted the conflict with the Eastern superpower as constitutive for the period of detente as well. The Carter administration clearly revealed the difficulties involved in deciding how the Soviet Union ought to be countered. And the Reagan administration has made it clear that today geo-strategic, military conceptual schemas take precedent over political alternatives. Alexander Haig is not alone in personifying the most hard-line position toward the rival superpower; he enjoys this distinction with the rest of Reagan's ideological adherents. This new leading elite is united in the belief in America's mission in the world. This conviction has the effect of heightening the readiness for confrontation with the Soviet Union on a world scale and, in our view, this conviction weighs heavier than Reagan's undiplomatic rhetoric at his inauguration.

Since the division of Germany, the Europeans' role in the global conflict has been confined to compliance with the shared interests of the Atlantic community (a concept from Kennedy's "Grand Design"). This concept does not allow any elbow room for West Germany, the major ally of the United States. Because if its political vulnerability (Berlin) and military exposure, it is a foregone conclusion for West Germany that it must carry the brunt of any action the U.S. takes in a global conflict. This role of West Germany alone renders illusory the hope for a unified Germany through convergence of these antagonistic systems, so long as the rival system cannot be forced to become more reasonable. But this is hardly to be expected. Therefore, once West Germany's secondary role in the alliance is seen, a reconceptualization of the whole situation becomes necessary.

The question of what the risks and possibilities of a non-aligned policy are essentially depends on an evaluation of Soviet foreign policy. Here the discussion inevitably takes on a highly hypothetical character since the power structures and inner struggles of Moscow's power structure are not as open for inspection as those in the West. The controversies and dissenting opinions in domestic and foreign policy are usually only made known after the fact. The professional astrologists of the Kremlin help themselves in judging cases in which the Soviets asserted their hegemonial power with force, by distinguishing between "hawks" and "doves." But this speculation carries very little power in helping judge the actual strategy of the Soviet Union at the present time, and particularly in Afghanistan. It leaves unanswered the question of whether the dissenting parties fundamentally disagree over goals — expansive imperialist policy or imperial defense strategy — or over the choice of means alone.

The Soviet Union is a system in which the bureaucratic party apparatus, the army, and economic planning, each composed of elites that are at least in part in competition with one another, strive to secure domination through the slow increase in the material satisfaction of needs, on the one hand, and through the aid of a massive repressive apparatus, on the other. The concept of totalitarianism at least today no

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longer describes this system adequately. Contrary to the Western detente and convergence hypothesis, the Krushchev era evidenced a decrease in repression, although it was located in the transition from the Cold War to coexistence, while during the decade of detente, from 1970 to 1980, the Brezhnev era has clearly strengthened repressive and authoritarian control. An evaluation of how the Soviet Union's foreign policy goals compare with those of the United States varies according to the observer's perspective and the weight given to a "world-revolutionary" ideology.

Some critics of the Soviet Union, along with East European emigrants, proceed from the Soviets' alleged desire for massive and unlimited political and ideological expansion. We do not treat these claims lightly, but we draw different conclusions from the fact of the global political situation; these conclusions necessitate the withdrawal of the Germans and the Europeans in general from the bloc confrontation in the interest of self-preservation. We share the view of the Soviet Union as setting "world-revolutionary" goals only conditionally, since, as the examples of Asia and Africa show, allied governments rarely control these goals. It would be fatal to lose sight of the decolonialization process and revolutionary social situation in the Thrid World by concentrating exclusively on the successes of the Soviet Union in Africa or on their alleged interference in Latin America. Finally, the Soviet Union has had to make spectacular retreats from the Third World in the last decade, in Egypt, Somalia, Guinea, and more.

Today the Soviet Union, like the United States, is a superpower in trouble. This state of affairs, determined to a large extent by signs of disintegration in Eastern Europe, appears to us as *more* relevant than all observations concerning the Soviet leaders' putative "love of peace" and plans for world domination. As long as those powers who seek a total confrontation of blocs through a new nuclear "war communism" are not fully influential, one must assume that Soviet policy is that of a superpower, limited and predictable in its short- and middle-range goals (even in the event of a decision in favor of nuclear "war communism" the developments in the East and in the Soviet Union itself could only be controlled in the long run). The fact that extra-economic force plays a greater role in the case of the Soviet Union than in the United States is due to the blunt disadvantages of the Soviet economy.

After the trauma of the German invasion in 1941 — itself a great failure of Stalinist power politics in view of the Hitler-Stalin pact — the Soviet leadership kept itself open to alternative policies toward the two Germanies long after 1945 (possibly into the 1960s). But with the outbreak of the Cold War in 1947-48, there was no longer any chance of achieving a common repression of Germany with other Western powers, thus arriving at a determination of war indemnities.

Since the Soviets had suffered war casualties, the most probable solution for them took a twofold form: either the "German danger" would be neutralized through maintaining the division, or West Germany would break out of the Western alliance. This latter possibility could be realized through the Soviets' reaching an understanding with non-communist West German strongholds, be it with the West German bourgeoisie or with the social-democratic workers' movement. Such a tactic, however, would necessarily require the withdrawal of East Germany out of the Warsaw Pact as well as the elimination of the "popular democratic" order in East Germany. Such moves, though could constitute high risks for the preservation of the East bloc's unity. It cannot be overlooked that this second alternative receded into the background of Soviet policy thinking over time, and by the 1960s and 1970s was no longer seriously considered.

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This two-tiered view of Soviet German policy is being challenged today. Does the Soviet Union, as a bona fide nuclear superpower in the 1980s, still find it necessary, on the basis of certain presuppositions, to reflect upon those variants that are most advantageous to us? Are there still historical possibilities for an alternative Soviet policy toward the two Germanies? On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Moscow agreement — in August, 1980 — Valentin Falin spoke hypothetically with the German television correspondent, Klaus Bednarz, claiming that with respect to certain formulations of the agreement, especially those concerning the inviolability of borders and thus the preservation of the post-war status quo, they would be subject to much stricter stipulations than they were 10 years ago.[8]

If these statements from the leading expert in German policy are not valid, then our account is clearly off the mark. And yet the Soviet Union has always caught the ball at the right time when this was merely being bounced back and forth. This is proved time and again in the history of Soviet-German relations.

Egon Bahr assumes "that the Soviet Union has more of a sense of historical development than many other countries, and besides, it is the only country in Europe large enough not to fear the Germans." Bahr bases his hopes for world peace agreements between the blocs on the Russians' historical sense of reality. In his view, such agreements would also provide for the unconditional loyalty of present social democracy to the United States, conforming the former as a reliable partner. For, in Bahr's view, the United States could provide a better solution for the Germans than the present one.

Apart from Bahr's security and convergence theories, we insist upon a consideration of the second Soviet option. Press reports emerge time and again that hint at the Soviet leadership's considerations along these lines. West Germany's unconditional orientation toward the West prevents its government from even sounding out in talks the Soviets' readiness to achieve a comprehensive solution to the German question.

Soviet policy monitors carefully those signs of change in political consciousness that could be turned to their own advantage — just as the Reagan administration is at the moment concerned with the loyalty of the various NATO members. Hence, a de-nuclearization and non-alignment sought by West Germany for all of Central Europe would alter fundamental political conditions for all sides.

Usually at this point in the discussion, the issue of Finlandization is raised. Thus it is important to note that our conception of policy toward the two Germanies has nothing to do with that, but is rather concerned with a "Yugoslavianization" of East Germany and a "Swedenization" of West Germany. The contractual stipulations which freeze the Finns' freedom of movement were fixed in a post-war era that had them at the greatest disadvantage. Moreover, the social, political and economic conditions of this small Scandinavian nation are completely different from those that characterize both German states. The conversion of military superiority into political dominance requires a readiness to incur military risks. We are not harboring any illusions when we assert that the Soviet Union's military activities are no more nor less constrained by moral considerations than are those of the current U.S. leadership. An atomic attack on a non-aligned West Germany across the borders of a non-aligned East Germany is hardly imaginable, especially if one imputes "rational" war interests to the aggressor — in this case the direct appropriation of West German industry potential. A conventional attack on these two non-aligned states would not leave them defenseless — especially West Germany. Instead, their flexibility and mobile territorial defense

8. *Deutschland Archiv*, 10 (1980), p. 1110.

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would set high risks for the attacker.

On the part of East Germany, it can be presupposed that the overwhelming consensus of the population is in favor of the withdrawal of Soviet forces. Currently, the optimal East German expectation is for economic, social, and political emancipation movements without the danger of indirect intervention. On the other hand, the Berlin wall and the disposition of the inner-German border is more than just an image problem for East Germany. Because of them, East German communist leaders can even today claim only a relatively small basis of legitimation among the population. As soon as the government (a) exhibits a desire to liberalize foreign relations, i.e., show a willingness to ease travel restrictions on West Germans, and (b) shows a greater flexibility in the area of domestic reform, even on the undisputed basis of the continued existence of East Germany as a state — this basis of legitimation would extend to other strata of society, who have long had only a passive loyalty to the government. Moreover, a current policy that would accord special recognition to West Germany would accommodate the national sentiments of the East German populace. If one assumes a yet stronger need for legitimation on the part of the East German Communist Party leadership and among the ranks of middle officials, then a detailed model of both Germanies as non-alienged and mutually supportive could find positive resonance in spite of the inherent risks such a model would pose for each side. This would not apply, of course, to the neo-Stalinist faction and to those political groups who speculate on annexation in the event of a potential crisis of West Germany. On the one hand, the Communist Party would be compelled to accommodate more generously the desires and demands of the population and, on the other hand, it would have the opportunity to gain moral consolidation of its power on the basis of a definite recognition of its state sovereignty.

Non-Alignment and Confederation as Steps Toward a Solution

Since both German states have existed now for more than a generation, and since it is neither desirable nor thinkable that one would capitulate to the other, it is necessary to think about the gradual stages by which unification might be achieved in the long run. We are certainly not ruling out the possibility that this could only take place after a collective German secession from the superpowers. A continental European movement would once more make the German question into a central theme. On the basis of this presupposition, we are setting forth the following solution for consideration.

(1) *Transformation of the military status quo.* For the secession of both German states from their respective blocs, we must assume the construction of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, an idea that is being discussed with increasing vigor. Efforts in both Eastern and Western Europe to achieve nuclear disengagement have reached much further into national power centers than 20 years ago, so that the superpowers would find it more difficult to kill such a serious inner-German initiative at the outset. In order to get the agreement of the European states as well as the superpowers to have the victorious forces of World War II withdraw from all of Germany (as was done with the Austrian solution in 1955), this demand would have to be combined with a changed armament of the West German military and the National People's Army, to restrict them to a defensive protection of their territories alone. As a parallel move, the foreign troops stationed in Berlin's four sectors should be reduced to a symbolic contingency. Even when one considers a real threat to West Berlin, the troops stationed there today have only a symbolic value *vis-à-vis* their defense capabilities.

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Their withdrawal would improve the psychological conditions for a German peace policy without implying any serious disadvantages for security policy outlined in this context. Since rearmament increases rather than decreases military security with regard to potential aggression,[9] such a move could be undertaken as a unilateral effort. The same holds for the expressed readiness to withdraw from the alliance system together with the other German state.

(2) *Transformation of the Political Status Quo*. What we strive for is the building of a German partnership, formed by both German states on a contractual basis, with the seat of government in (East and West) Berlin. A commonly formulated groundwork could establish the understanding that beyond the irreconcilable social and political orders there exist historically based cultural and family ties, that the will of the people is in favor of working together closely, and that the preservation of strict distinctions between the two represents a threat to peace, both on domestic and foreign fronts. Since there will doubtless be differing opinions about what structure a united Germany ought to have, it will only be possible to establish a confederative relation at first. The mutual pledge to work for an eventual reunification based on the consent of each state would mean that on a state level the forceful undermining of each state by the other would cease, but it would not necessarily guarantee the constitutional order of each. A governmental organ would be considered that would be an inner-German parliamentary body with representatives from both parliaments and an inner-German coordinating office, to which each government would make special appointments and which would, in turn, coordinate joint practical efforts.

Both states would pledge themselves to a step-by-step liberalization plan to allow the citizens of the other state to travel freely across the borders. A comprehensive regulation which would guarantee the mobility of citizens cannot be realistically expected of East Germany because of the high risks involved, but this could still remain a long-term goal to be realized through the gradual rapprochement process between the two states and peoples of the two Germanies. The partnership would take the place of the constitutional agreement of 1972. It would require a change in each of the Germany's constitutions, and it would provide a framework in which a new regulation concerning the choice of citizenship would also become possible.

An important part of any such alliance of the two states would have to concern itself with the status of West Berlin, since the continuation of the present situation there will prove untenable in the long run. The population of West Berlin must be given the chance to decide whether it wants to continue to be considered a limited constitutional entity of West Germany, with special status, or whether it wants to be considered an independent "free state." To achieve this end, respective commissions of the city administrations in both parts of Berlin must be established.

As a start toward developing the Germans' right to travel freely in Berlin, consideration ought to be given to sharing control over air traffic going in and out of West Berlin with East Germany. East Germany already exercises clearly defined air rights in West Berlin. With such a proposal, the wall could in time become no longer necessary. As a counter-move, East Germany would have to make sure that its citizens residing in West Berlin would not be penalized; and it would have to stop persecuting earlier "refugees from the republic." Even before the wall is taken down, a number of procedures might be instituted that would lighten the burden of inner-German traffic. West Berlin citizens could enjoy an alleviation of entry taxes and visa permits, and East Berlin citizens could be free of the age limit restraint on travel.

9. Horst Afheldt, *Verteidigung und Frieden* (Munich, 1976).

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(3) *The Transformation of the Economic Status Quo.* A confederative solution would not require a withdrawal from the present integration in the Comecon and the Common Market. In spite of this involvement with multinational economic blocs, there have nevertheless existed for a long time special economic relations between East and West Germany (including the secret membership of West Germany in the European Common Market) through which commodity exchanges have increased significantly over time. These relations should be contractually fixed and extended as aspects of the German partnership. In the context of strengthened intra-European cooperation between the Comecon and the Common Market, the relations between East and West Germany could serve as a further link betwen these larger bodies. Such has, in fact, been the goal of *Ostpolitik* for some time. The sovereignty of both states, as well as their internal order, would not be challenged by the particulars of the German economic community nor by the proposed suggestion of the East German Communist Party opposition in 1978 to the participation of East Germany in the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade and to making the East German mark convertible.

For West Berlin, which has been cut off from its natural economic background for 35 years, the question of German economic cooperation is one of survival. Only the realization of a complete economic integration of both Germanies — in whatever form — would raise fundamental problems for the economic blocs and for the individual state economies of the European countries outside of Germany. Since such a reunification of Germany would presuppose major qualitative modifications in the social structure in both parts of the German nation, these aspects will have to go largely untreated in this discussion.

(4) *The Transformation of the Legal Status Quo.* After a new definition of their relation to each other, both German states and the German partnership could reach a peace accord with the victorious states of World War II. In such an accord, Germany's non-alignment would be guaranteed against the former war allies, following the Austrian model. Moreover, there must be some stipulation against any intervention in Germany. Germany would recognize all borders as binding, especially the border between Germany and Poland. And the dissolution of the four-power control over Berlin would herald the end of the allies' occupation rights. The World War II victors must, before all else, consent to the potential reunification of both German states effected through mutual agreement.

Policy Toward the Two Germanies: Leftist Peace Policy in Europe

Our considerations have centered almost exclusively on political concerns generated from the top down, as it were, i.e., with the views of leading politicians, negotiations between governments, settlements between states. But it is clear that the German states will only throw off the shackles imposed by the blocs, i.e., the hegemonic powers, if this is made possible through a massive grass-roots movement. We can see efforts at such a movement (also being secretly articulated in East Germany) in the newly forming peace movement. As is the case with all protest and resistance movements, the peace movement draws its impetus from the indignation felt when human existence is assaulted, in this case by the growing threat of atomic self-annihilation. In everyday political discussions, the "fabricators of actuality" (to use Martin Walser's term) will not find it difficult to dismiss this protest position as wholly negative, and thereby try to neutralize its impact. But over and beyond the pessimistic slogan, "reunification on the graves of both Germanies" — the theme of a protest

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action on June 17, 1980 — the new German peace movement needs a goal orientation similar to that proposed by E.P. Thompson's intra-European campaign, but one that also would set concrete, practical goals. Moreover, it is important that these goals are such that Germany would be freed from the dilemma of becoming — against its will — a supporter of one or another antagonistic power bloc. The movement needs spokesmen and allies within the political elites of both East and West Germany; thus, it must address itself to those goals that will first come into question. Our remarks should serve these goals; the one-sidedness of our perspective should therefore be understood in this light.

Our recommendation for a restructuring of armament policy will undoubtedly require a major reorientation of the peace movement's way of thinking. Our position is not consistent with a fundamentally pacifist position. The altered military strategy we suggest would initially pose an extraordinary financial burden, but would over time become a saving. It would be tied to the readiness for defense of the population and would imply a certain defensive militarization of civil life, as we know today only in countries such as Yugoslavia.

The decisive advantage of this concept is that it leaves open the question whether or not this or that superpower can rearm itself and operate offensively or defensively and regardless urges the pursuit of an active and unequivocal peace policy without neglecting the security needs of the population, which have hitherto supplied NATO and its strategies with the strongest support. The peace forces would come out of their corners of refusal, and would force the conservatives to take a stand by leading the debate over national security and national interests. In this context, the policy toward the two Germanies would automatically become one of burning interest.

The transition to a non-aligned political position would simultaneously put to rest the latent civil war situation in Germany. Following on its heels would be an essential improvement of the political climate and a positive constellation for the Left and its emancipatory politics.

In the 1950s and 1970s, every success of the intransigent, separatist ruling powers in one of the Germanies only succeeded in strengthening the corresponding group in the other Germany. Hence, the Adenauer wing of the Christian Democratic parties' coalition and the Ulbricht wing of the Communist Party worked to mutually reinforce each other. Non-alignment, restructuring of armament, and confederation of all of Germany would open the way for setting an opposite mechanism in motion. Every extra-parliamentary civil action in one of the Germanies would throw out the invitation for a cooperative effort with the people of the other Germany. The new unification of Germany, established on an anti-imperialist basis, would become a goal to be reached only through movement from below.

Every serious effort in Germany to break out of the bloc confrontation under the superpowers' hegemony eventually takes the form of "making peace, democracy and national autonomy in East and West into a single, combined issue."[10] And this is far removed from being a nationalist rebellion against Europe.

In both East and West, signs of erosion of military blocs are clear: the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark are resisting NATO contributions. A de-nuclearized Central Europe would be an important asset to the European peace movement's goal of preventing a European apocalypse. The end of a European zone free of nuclear weapons would become more reachable when the danger of a nuclear exchange can be averted at its center.

10. E.P. Thompson in *The Observer*, August 24, 1980.

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The doubt is everywhere increasing that the young generation "will be ready to accept the European order as it grew out of the Yalta accord" — this, according to the Polish Vice Premier Rakowski.[11] In Polish opposition circles, the question began to be asked many years ago whether Poland's national independence and fixed territorial boundaries are really best served by the division of Germany. Against the impression that the prospect of a unified Germany or a close cooperation between the two German states has not yet elicited the approval of our European neighbors, we offer the following for consideration: the policy conceived here seeks a disengagement of the hegemonic powers in Central Europe. Social and political emancipation processes can only procure genuine security against the danger of intervention through such a mutual withdrawal. It is worth noting that the questioning by each people out of their own self-interest of the defined bloc structures in Europe leads by itself to an awareness of the peculiar fragility of the German situation. The Norwegian foreign minister objected strongly to the comfortable image of the German partition as binding: "If the rapprochement between the countries in both parts of Europe goes further, this would mean an eventual overcoming of the division of Europe itself. But it is difficult to see how that is to happen without such a development holding consequences for a divided Germany. This does not mean that we will be confronted with a unified Germany in the traditional sense of a national political entity, but rather with a model of cooperation — a new form of partnership. This would be something other European countries could approve of and which would presuppose a broader system of European security and cooperation"

The Swedish disarmament expert, Alva Myrdal, went further, explaining that she misses "incitement from the Germans" in favor of an atomic-free zone in Central Europe, even though the Germans "should be the first to demand that the two superpowers withdraw their atomic weapons from both parts of Germany." Why are there no German politicians, she asked, "who speak out openly...and who thus pursue German policy and represent German concerns instead of American or Soviet ones?"[12]

11. Cf. *Vorwärts,* February 26, 1981.
12. In *Tagesspiegel,* December 31, 1980.

SEVEN TABOOS AND A PERSPECTIVE*

by Rudolf Bahro and Michael Vester

The initiative of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation for Nuclear Disarmament (END) at first appears to be another one of the many appeals that warn of the threat of imminent war after the NATO double-track rearmament resolution of December 12, 1979. Yet, the initiative also aims at a far-reaching political concept. It proceeds from the recognition that the fatal armament madness can only be ended when its cause can

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be successfully dismantled, i.e., when the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is reduced and the rift that has run through Europe since the Russian-American "meeting at the Elbe" is gradually mended.

In this sense, the initiative takes as its aim a European withdrawal — from Poland to Portugal — from the atomic armaments race, weakening the military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and opening a way to dissolving power blocs altogether. For this reason, the appeal is not primarily aimed at formal measures such as withdrawal from the pacts. Rather, it aims primarily at processes, such as the crumbling away of the bloc system, which begin first at the periphery, reducing the confrontation along the especially dangerous boundaries, e.g., in Scandinavia and in Germany.

Currently in West Germany, the official methods of dealing with the problems of securing peace, armament, and defense are losing the people's confidence because their suicidal consequences are becoming increasingly uncontrollable. The U.S. administration is also contributing its share in further underscoring the mortal risks for us. The Russell Foundation's valuable initiative can hardly be over-estimated under the circumstances. The conception upon which this initiative rests, and which serves as the basis of new results in peace research, departs from hitherto taken-for-granted assumptions of present security and disarmament policies — among them, some fixed Left dogmas.

The strength of the initiative proposal is its openness. Insofar as it breaks through taboos of thought and action, it offers new perspectives. It does not promote a unified strategy to attain a Europe free of atomic weapons. The appropriate procedures should in every instance come from the disarmament movement itself, from the people of the countries in question, but they should also be developed through transcontinental exchanges. Neither do we want to propose here an authoritative interpretation of the Russell Foundation initiative, but, rather, to state our own view as it has developed so far in discussions with English, German and other West European supporters of the initiative. Our paramount concern is to show that effective peace initiatives can only reach their goals when they no longer rely on the ideologies and taboos of previous security and disarmament policies.

The Ideology of the Parity of Deterrence

Many still assume, and many more believe, that the parity of deterrence secures peace and that a nuclear war, as opposed to a conventional war, is made impossible by the inevitability of the destructive second-strike capacity. Since the highest chiefs of staff proceed from the "secured foundations" of having capacities prepared for the worst possible case, the demand for a balance of power automatically means an unending increase in the weapons race: at any point in time each side could find it necessary to "rearm." The antagonists incessantly talk past each other. Everywhere the population is presented with the confusing game of using calculations for the purposes of justification. The formula that seeks to maintain military parity "at the lowest possible level" can only have the purpose of blinding the public from the fact that it must reckon instead with a continually higher level of armament efforts.

The Russell Foundation initiative goes beyond the parity mode of thinking, even where it is disguised by either side as a demand for a "balanced" disarmament. And the initiative departs from the deterrence idea with which the first is inseparably bound. This departure has a compelling reason: the idea of a balance of deterrence loses the last semblance of reasonableness with the recent developments in weapons techniques. What can the future hold for us?

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The new middle-range missiles are so precise and can be so selectively aimed that their discharge with atomic warheads is not hindered — as the argument for preventing war through the reciprocal exchange of insufferable consequences would have us believe — but rather encouraged. They render nuclear war plausible in that they make it seem logically contained and capable of being restricted. Above all, they promise the winning of the war to the party that has "first-strike" capability. And as the pre-strike warning time sinks to five minutes, they *attract* a possible strike by the opponent's missiles instead of deterring them. Nuclear defense means under every circumstance a fatal defense. The stationing of new missiles would mean direct preparation for suicide.

Technological developments in the service of the arms race have, by virtue of their immanent logic, pushed the idea of deterrence *ad absurdum*. And it is moving further in the direction of multiplying the attack capabilities of weapons. The time when deterrents could furnish even a relative and temporary security is gone for good. The Russell initiative suggests a procedure according to the principle of a "multilateral unilateralism," *"while we maintain the general goal of a nuclear-free zone from Poland to Portugal, we want to take care of unilateral disarmament in our own country first,"* and this means to proceed independently from the timetable and conduct of whatever "opponent." Only then can we achieve a transition from an escalation of arms to an escalation of disarmament. Unilateral disarmament is just as appropriate to end the arms race as "balanced" disarmament is suited to secure its continuation.

Against the Taboo of Neutrality and Non-Alignment

The post-war situation resulted in the consensus — also approved by the Social Democrats — that the existence of the West Germany and of its basic order, called "free and democratic" in the constitution, could only be secured from the Soviet threat through integration with the West, especially through the Atlantic alliance with the United States. This was the cornerstone of West Germany's foreign and defense policy. On the other side, East Germany's bond with the Soviet Union and its subordination to the Warsaw Pact was completed in a parallel way — albeit an alliance in which consent played a much smaller role.

The Russell initiative questions the unconditional fidelity to blocs, not only of West Germany, but of all of Western Europe, and not only of East Germany, but of Eastern Europe in general. In view of the circumstances that have become evident in the meanwhile — i.e., that Europe has been selected by the leading Western power to be the stage of a "limited" nuclear exchange between it and the Soviet Union — the Atlantic alliance offers us only the hopeless vision of a quick defense to the death. It does not offer security; rather, it fundamentally endangers what it ought to protect.

Moreover, this undisguised strategy of "better dead than red" is offered us, even though the present state of Soviet imperialism — not only in Poland, but elsewhere, too — rules out for the foreseeable future any chance that "the Russians are coming." It is incredible that Russian missiles should have been *called forth* by the Americans precisely at a point in which the deep-seated psychological anxiety over the Russians was beginning to fall off.

In view of this challenge, the Russell initiative suggests that the people of Europe force their governments to assert national sovereignty. The initiative does not accept as valid the claim to protection offered by those in power — a claim that relies upon the people's willingness to think in highly limited terms — and according to which *the lesser powers would have no room to meet independent decisions concerning their*

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defense policies. Instead, the initiative calls attention to the fact that the United States' plans to station missiles has as its aim the creation of a set of material facts that subject our countries, for better or worse, to a destiny decided in Washington.

Given that West Germany may never possess atomic weapons, it must claim the right — before other, more independent European countries — to determine for itself fundamentally and in every respect what its defense and disarmament policy ought to be, which foreign troops and weapons may be stationed on its territory. Clearly, the expression of the people's sovereignty through a peace movement of unprecedented intensity and popularity constitutes the condition for asserting the sovereignty of states *vis-à-vis* the United States.

Our country plays an international role that is fatal in two respects. First of all, West Germany is burdened — as is East Germany, on the other side — through a diligent subordination to the claims of the ruling power and through the renewed military strength of its relations to all neighboring peoples. On the other hand, West Germany can force a similar pledge of unconditional loyalty to NATO on the part of other governments and other social-democratic parties by virtue of its economic power position in Europe and through the Social-Democratic hegemony in the International. Much to our outrage, the social-liberal government perceives how strong the anti-nuclear movement is in England, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway, extending deep into established parties, associations, and churches, with a sense of weariness rather than relief.

West Germany thus occupies a key and bottle-neck position for European atomic disarmament. Therefore, it is of special importance to us that the Russell initiative, on the European level, broke the taboo according to which it was forbidden for Central Europe to form a perspective of neutrality, to want for itself freedom from pacts and blocs.

Since the division of Germany is a consequence of this confrontation between blocs, whose present form emerged at the end of World War II, the overcoming of this confrontation naturally opens new possibilities for the German question. If the blocs would begin to crumble in Germany, then the two German states could begin to approach one another.

Detente as Ideology

It has long been regarded as certain that *detente held out hope for disarmament and a long-term guarantee of peace*. In West Germany, this view was symbolized by Willy Brandt. Without doubt, detente had for its part contributed in limited ways to the guarantee of peace; it held back the cold war, it ameliorated images of enemies both in domestic and foreign policy. Detente also created greater opportunities for the convergence of new liberation movements, e.g., in Poland, but also in West Germany.

At the same time, the military threat retreated from public consciousness. It was generally repressed that detente was in no way committed to final disarmament, but that it continued the old policy of guaranteeing security through armament. Independently of trading transactions, which served at the most a channelling function, the arms race continued. The repression of the war danger released a great deal of energy in the 1970s for other social movements, which are now becoming integrated into the new peace movement. But this repression of the danger of war persisted much longer for us than it did in other places, probably because of our position as the focal point of the East-West confrontation, and because of the German question. Only at the beginning of 1981, a year later than in other countries, did the wider public become aware that the new missile plans signalled the end of the old politics of detente.

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It is perfectly consistent with the logic of hitherto accepted presuppositions that they now serve Willy Brandt's successor to justify "armament," which in the final analysis means atomic suicide. These presuppositions are clearly wrong. And with the aid of hindsight we can see that they were always wrong, because they never promised us any more than a moratorium of survival. Now they are shown to be thoroughly wrong.

The Russell initiative *dispenses with the idea of the insurpassability of the blocs*, which has meant an orientation toward manipulating their relations rather than to a process of overcoming them altogether. But the initiative reveals the *fundamental inadequacy of any policy of detente that limits itself to establishing a settlement between the blocs*. It understands the bloc confrontation to be a *system* that transcends both sides, and whose proper dynamic cannot be explained with reference to the interests of one or another rival. The confrontation as such gives birth to the escalation of rearmament. This confrontation must be disbanded; the sources that feed it must be taken away. One must withdraw from the system, one must "retreat from the field." *Only real steps* toward overcoming the blocs can lead to disarmament and peace.

The Illusion of Calculable Risks

The presupposition, indispensable to the previous detente mode of thinking, of the far-reaching calculability of war risks has now become dubious in every regard. Not only were the actions of politicians and military officers deemed calculable, but so also were the command chain and technical systems related to it. Above all, the interests supporting armament buildup and aggressive foreign policy were deemed calculable, especially by the Left.

West Germany's current foreign policy offers itself as an effort to save detente. In reality, since the NATO "rearmament" resolution and the invasion of Afghanistan, this policy reduces to maintaining and promoting the two superpowers' capacity and willingness to negotiate. This is no policy for a new situation but, rather, a juggling act on unsteady ground on which people are dependent. From Carter to Reagan, the development of U.S. policy and the decision of the Soviet leadership to engage in the Afghan adventure both show the unforeseeable character of political actors, who have our destiny all the more firmly in hand as we refuse to undertake the effort to pull ourselves out of the field of tension between them. More than ever, West European countries are becoming toys in an international confrontation, born out of the logic of blocs, in which domestic and foreign policy considerations play an essential role. The Russell initiative seeks to reduce as much as possible the risk of depending on these incalculable power games. In the recent past, the North American warning systems have let out so many false alarms that any country that wants to protect itself from an erroneously started nuclear war has only a single option left: not to offer targets at which a potential opponent would be able to aim missiles.

The Reduction of Foreign Policy to Rational Interests

The illusion of calculability still has a strong hold, especially on that mode of thinking that has viewed the rational relation between objective economic interests and political behavior as indubitable. The classical Marxist theory of imperialism begins with the essentially transparent capital interest in the military protection of foreign markets, and attributes the threat of war largely to this motive. Neo-Marxists, as well as many other post-Keynesian bourgeois economists, added to this analysis that the state's armament sales would also secure domestic markets insofar as they provided jobs and a demand for commodities. According to New Left theory, the power elite at the apex of the military-industrial complexes is interested in the overall stability of the

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entire system, in which it occupies a privileged position, and in maintaining strong armies and foreign policy tension — and this is true of the West as well as the East.

It is not that the reference to all of these factors, which clearly play a role, is wrong. But the reduction of the causes of armament to rationally deducible capital and power interests has itself degenerated into a source of false consciousness and has become the medium of a sterile demystification polemic. Even those members and officials belonging to the ruling classes and following their interests rationally could not set their stakes on modern war, for in all likelihood they themselves would be destroyed in such a war. In view of the proper dynamic of armament competition resulting from the logic of the blocs, they themselves have long since been reduced to the role of the sorcerer's apprentice, who can no longer manage to control the spirits he has conjured up.

The assumption that they are masters of their own decisions weakens the task of stopping the arms race. Beyond the global competition and beyond the specific motive of maximizing profits and securing domination, the competition for various kinds of weapons propels them to their relative places of value. This armament insanity is also propelled by employment interests as well, and very often by the self-legitimating desires of implicated bureaucrats, scientists, and technicians. Thompson names these results which, though by no means directly intended, are the immanent or uncontrollable consequences of all these factors, "exterminism." This is to be understood as humanity's tendency to destroy itself, at least in our Northern civilization. Those who short-sightedly attribute responsibility to the military-industrial complex of the West alone misunderstand not only the bi-polar drive structure of this exterminist tendency, but also the breadth, depth and vicissitudes of militarism, which pervade the *entire* body of society here as well as there.

Against this background, the Russell initiative is directed toward finding and testing forms of action that would allow us to break out of *the total context in which 'exterminism' reproduces itself.*

From Ideals and Appeals to Interests and Action

Insofar as detente has been understood as a relation between blocs, it remained the business of governments rather than the concern of the people. Detente belongs to the convention according to which foreign and military policies are "concerns of the king," to be worked out among empowered officials and experts, in secret meetings, and to be decided at summit conferences.

The Russell initiative proposes that we set this convention aside, and that we rid ourselves of the illusion that the institutions in which we trust are in any way able to fulfill their apparent aims.

On the contrary, these institutions are constitutionally incapable of fulfilling their aims. Just look at the disarmament negotiators who meet from the very outset in their capacity as representatives of the military-industrial complexes. They can only be understood as servile spirits, fundamentally obligated to the "professional logic" they serve. Their activity cannot serve anything more than the rational regulation of nuclear parity in the continued course of the arms race. Where politicians who are committed to the interests of either bloc speak of arms control and arms limitation, they can only mean in such a case that the arms escalation, at least in the short run, should be calculable and controllable. Moreover, neither will offer measures that are "conciliatory" or encouraging for negotiations, addressed from one government to another, that would be able to lead out of this vicious circle.

Whether something different can emerge from this situation depends on the ability

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to disrupt from the outside the "normal" functioning of the entire regular mechanism, indeed, the entire social context in which militarism is reproduced. Only then can sympathizers in various institutions obtain the chance for autonomous, dissenting action and, if necessary, resolve upon "treason" dictated by their consciences. There are still too few examples of such a resolution from Stauffenberg to Bastian. If the development is left to the politicians, technicians and military experts, who allow their brains, whether intentionally or not, to function as computers for the preparation of fatal "constraints," the continuation of the arms race and the stationing of new missiles is certain.

When all proceeds without interruption, World War III will erupt. Hence, this is clearly not the time for opportunistic *Realpolitik*, and not the time for what is viewed as "feasible" within the power apparatus, within the system-conformist brain of the megamachine. Left to itself, this structure is incapable of producing anything but its own program for catastrophe.

Until now proposals for disarmament were addressed in the form of appeals to "above" and in the form of "enlightenment" for the masses below. Until now we have engaged in a politics of anti-nuclear and anti-militarist agitation, but we must now move to a politics based on the real *interests* of those affected by the stationing of weapons, those who are in their immediate environment. Secretly, bunkers are already being built from which the new missiles are to be launched, and our country is thus being readied to become the battlefield of World War III. Under these circumstances, the resistance must be transformed from an appeal to multifaceted forms of direct action, which will join with the practice of citizens' movements and anti-nuclear movements.

The main thrust of the Russell initiative is to exert pressure on the institutional system through the highest possible mobilization of the public. In order to reach the majority of the people, including conservative circles, we must unite the militancy of civil disobedience with a fundamental commitment to non-violence in our methods of action, and throughout we must seek to maintain exceptional courage.

Peace Movements as Critical Grass-Roots Movements in the East and West

Finally, detente between blocs goes hand in hand with the ideology that the status quo must continue not only in regard to territorial claims, but also in regard to the current domestic, social and political relations inside the countries involved. Brezhnev felt himself to be in the same boat with Giscard, and Schmidt with Gierek. And even certain factions of the Left have accepted the thesis that an autonomous people's movement in Eastern Europe threatens peace. According to this view, the interests of peace are identical with the Soviet-dominated political-bureaucratic interests in Eastern Europe.

There is a pervasive agreement between the power elites both here and there, that they alone are empowered and capable of carrying out peace and foreign policy activities, that their capabilities of pursuing business and negotiations must be protected from "disturbances" of the population at the moment. They could not possibly be interested in the disappearance of images of foreign policy enemies, since they use these images to legitimate their internal monopoly of force and for the continuation of their unthinkable experiments for an insane growth in armaments.

The Russell initiative gives no credence to this officious agreement for the benefit of the status quo. It demands a new internationalism. This calls for actions of solidarity that go beyond geographic boundaries. At the same time, this means making use of the many political, economic, social, cultural and professional communications

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channels between countries, significantly including those between West and East.

The upsurge of action in Western Europe and West Germany is having an encouraging effect on political developments in Eastern Europe and East Germany. The unity of grass-roots movements will be decisive, as on both sides of the boundary they begin to put their respectively dominating blocs under pressure. Instead of loyalty to one's "own" establishment, to one's "own" bloc, the peace movements' loyalty to each other will take their place.

Disarmament in Eastern-bloc states as well is dependent on a grass-roots dynamic of resistance. The Russell initiative is thus all the more supportive of the Eastern European struggle for political and civil liberties, just as in the past it had stepped in for their defense in West Germany. Only if the people can defend themselves against the growing powers of the military defense machines will our commitment be spared the total destruction that the exterminist logic of the blocs appears destined to follow.

NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT: "ARMAMENT INSANITY" VERSUS "CALCULATED POWER"*

by Walter Suss

During the past year, there has been a noteworthy shift in public expressions of apprehension about the future. This shift can be seen in the selection of a new date for the culmination of threatening developments: until recently, "1984" symbolized the turning point; now 1983 is increasingly cited. Of course, these dates also differ because 1984 symbolizes a long-observed trend in the development of the state, while 1983 has direct meaning as a real deadline: it is the year NATO intends to station tactical nuclear missiles on European soil. With this step, mass-murder of the European population becomes more likely. For significant factions of the peace movement, this date has become the main point of reference. "We must stop the 'modernization' of NATO or we take one more step towards making the entire process irreversible." [1]

Thompson attempts to clarify these fears with the moral-critical concept of "exterminism," [2] a term intended to denounce the monstrosity that leaders of the East and West dare to prepare for the genocide of other peoples as well as their own under the guise of security. It seeks to destroy the fetishization of this so-called security by pointing out its consequences. It seeks to help overcome the lack of imagination and apathy that leads us to believe we can trust decisions of life and death to such

*Originally published in *Probleme des Klassenkampfes*, 45, pp. 5-45. Translated by Alex Locke.

1. E.P. Thompson, "Ich selbst bin davon überzeugt..." in *Für ein atomwaffenfreies Europa*, ed. Russell Peace Campaign (Berlin, 1981), p. 7.

2. E.P. Thompson, " 'Exterminismus' als letztes Stadium der Zivilisation," *Befreiung*, 19-20 (1981), pp. 12-43; Rudolf Bahro, "Ueberlegungen zu einem Neuansatz der Friedensbewegung in Deutschland im Anschluss an Edward P. Thompson's Aufsatz über 'Exterminismus,' " in *Befreiung*, 21 (1981), pp. 9-37.

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specialists as politicians and military officers. Furthermore, it attacks the moral scandal that in the wake of two world wars the concept of technological mass murder seems to have become generally plausible. Thus, the following criticism of exterminism is not directed at its moral dimension, but only at its analytical usage, i.e., the attempt to explain the predominance of this sort of thinking through a social theory of exterminism. The following questions remain either partly or totally unanswered: (1) What is the meaning of escalated armament to the NATO strategy as an alliance of countries? (After all, this decision, though prepared by the United States and West Germany, was reached collectively). (2) Why does the U.S. government support rearmament? (3) Why did the West European allies for the most part follow this lead? (4) Why does the Soviet Union participate in the arms race?

Different appraisals emerge as the result of many factors: the different interpretation of the arms race as exterminism, i.e., as a destructive drive on the part of both West and East; the position of Europe in this new phase of international tension; the Soviet contribution to the arms race; the connection between the question of freedom and socio-economically determined conflicts in West European societies. To take a position other than that of Thompson (or Bahro) regarding these points means to see different goals and have different priorities in the struggle for peace within the same framework.

On the Changing NATO Strategy

In order to understand the NATO armament decision of 1979, one must view it as a step in the development of a distinct military strategy. For this reason, it is necessary to understand the position of nuclear weapons within this strategy.[3] The decision was aimed primarily against the Soviet Union and later against the Warsaw Pact countries in general. The question of whether this step was purely defensive, as Schmidt claims,[4] is not easily resolved.[5] The territorial expansion of the Soviet Union at the beginning of World War II and the establishment of satellite regimes upon its conclusion unquestionably provided the conditions leading to the increased dependence of the West on the United States. Kennan's "containment policy," developed in 1947, sought to prevent the spread of systems similar to the Soviet one and forms the conceptual framework for the NATO strategy. The 1953-1960 period marked the pursuit under Dulles of a "rollback policy" to regain lost territories. "Massive retaliation" was developed to position nuclear weapons within this policy. Under this strategy, every conventional attack by the Soviet countries would be answered by an atomic counter-attack. This model assumed that the enemy did not have similar nuclear capabilities. When in the 1950s the Soviets developed rockets that could carry a nuclear warhead to the United States, this doctrine collapsed; it would have meant that the United States threatened the Soviet Union with collective suicide in the event of a conventional

3. I follow the presentation of H. Schmidt in his *Verteidigung oder Vergeltung. Ein deutscher Beitrag zum strategischen Problem der NATO* (Stuttgart, 1965) and his *Strategie des Gleichgewichts. Deutsche Friedenspolitik und die Weltmächte* (Stuttgart, 1969). A new overview of various American deterrence theories is available in K.-D. Schwarz and W.R. van Cleave, "Die Theorie der Abschrekung," in K.-D. Schwarz, ed., *Sicherheitspolitik* (Bad Honnef-Erpel, 1978), pp. 131-149.

4. See Schmidt, *Verteidigung oder Vergeltung, op.cit.*, p. 128: "The political conception of NATO is naturally defensive and reactive." Since it is a matter of a "natural quality," Schmidt does not provide any arguments or proof for this claim.

5. G.F. Kennan, the American ambassador to Moscow until 1946, characterized NATO's establishment in 1949 as "a military defense against an attack that no one was planning." Cited in D. Horowitz, ed., *Strategien der Konterrevolution. Containment und Revolution* (Darmstadt, 1969), p. 14.

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attack on Europe.[6] This clearly nonsensical threat did nothing to calm Western European fears that they could no longer rely upon NATO's "nuclear shield." [7] In reaction to this situation, two safety measures were taken: first, a significant increase in conventional arms in Western European countries and second, under McNamara, a transition to the doctrine of "flexible response," meaning that any attack by the Warsaw Pact countries would be answered by a response at the same level (conventional versus conventional, tactical nuclear versus tactical nuclear), with the option of escalation under threat of defeat.[8] The stationing of "tactical" nuclear weapons in Western Europe since the mid-1950s laid the foundation for this change in strategy.[9] Undoubtedly, the credibility of the NATO doctrine grew tremendously with this[10] but so did the "calculated risk" of totally destroying Western Europe. It was the old dilemma reproduced at a higher level: as a part of NATO, Western European countries also were threatened with collective suicide. The discussion over who should decide to detonate nuclear weapons reveals this insanity.[11] In the course of these discussions, a second irresolvable contradiction emerged: in prewar periods European countries would consider the lowest possible detonation threshold in their own best interest in order to increase the deterrence effect, while the United States tried to avoid nuclear weapons for as long as possible to avoid the retributive destruction of the United States. The problem was "solved" when plans for collective decision-making were shelved and authority was given to the U.S. president alone.[12] That meant even then that the threat of nuclear annihilation was in the hands of someone separated from the battlefield by the Atlantic Ocean.

So much for the general framework behind the strategy. Examined more closely, the premises of the "deterrence doctrine" are as follows: (1) The enemy, the Soviet Union, is by nature expansionist and aggressive. (2) Expansionism and aggression can only be contained by the threat of "unacceptable consequences" in the event of war. (3) This threat assumes destructive capacities equal to or greater than the enemy's. (4) The enemy cannot hope that, by a surprise attack (first strike), it can incapacitate the opposition's ability to retaliate (second strike). (5) An opponent with the capacity for a successful first strike that could force the enemy to capitulate would make this first strike. As a consequence, "the essence of nuclear-strategic balance [is] the opponent's capacity for a second strike." On the other hand, this reasoning collapses when both sides develop the capacity to destroy the enemy's second-strike capacities in a first-strike attack. As a result of this, an "anti-ballistic missile agreement" was reached in 1972 between the Soviet Union and the United States, in which both sides agreed not to develop an anti-missile system, leaving the possibility of an enemy second strike open.

6. Cf. Schmidt, *Verteidigung, op.cit.*, pp. 132ff.; Schwarz and van Cleave, *Sicherheitspolitik, op.cit.*, p. 134.

7. Cf. Schmidt, *Strategie,* pp. 28ff.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 189ff. and 211ff.; cf. NATO Information Service, *NATO Facts and Figures* (Brussels, 1978), p. 108.

9. On February 22, 1954, the American government announced that 12 American atomic launchers with tactical nuclear weapons were located in Germany west of the Rhine. Cf. *Dokumentation zur Abrüstung und Sicherheit von 1943 bis 1959,* ed. H. Siegler (Bad Godesberg, 1960), p. xv.

10. Cf. Schwarz and van Cleave, *Sicherheitspolitik, op.cit.*, p. 133; Schmidt, *Verteidigung, op.cit.*, pp. 123ff.

11. Cf. Henry A. Kissinger, *Was wird aus der westlichen Allianz* (Düsseldorf, 1956), pp. 192ff.; Schmidt, *Strategie, op.cit.*, pp. 34ff.

12. Cf. E. Lutz, *Lexicon zur Sicherheitspolitik* (Munich, 1980), p. 90; *NATO Facts and Figures, op.cit.*, pp. 106ff.

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In order to understand the political concept of nuclear deterrence, a distinction must be drawn between political weapons which exist only to threaten, and actual weapons of war. This distinction is often dismissed as merely ideological, but its reality appears obvious: since the end of World War II, 20 million to 25 million people have been killed by conventional arms, while nuclear arms (with the exception of the massacres in Hiroshima and Nagasaki) have killed no one, and still the "political weapons" have probably had a greater influence on world history than all subsequent conventional wars. The distinction between the two categories of weapons is at the same time absolute and relative: absolute in order to avoid the ultimate human catastrophe and relative because their effectiveness as a threat depends on the belief that they will be used. As long as the United States maintained nuclear supremacy, the separation between the two categories was more relative (because they were intended to be used in retaliation for a conventional Soviet attack on Europe).[13] As soon as the Soviet Union attained similar capacities, this distinction became more absolute and with it the doctrine of massive retaliation became a fiction. The policy of flexible response again made this distinction relative, while consciously allowing for a "sub-nuclear" response. Along with their effects on the second-strike capacities of the enemy, new nuclear weapons systems should be evaluated with respect to their effect on the distinction between political weapons and weapons of war.

The Military Significance of Arms Escalation

Military-technological developments of the 1970s that frame the NATO rearmament decision threaten us both ways. The conditions necessary for nuclear stability are slowly being destroyed: (1) with the development of surveillance satellites, it is possible to locate enemy positions within one meter;[14] (2) the Pentagon has plans for a rocket defense system stationed in outer space (the space shuttle marked an important step in this direction) that would take away the enemy's second-strike capability;[15] (3) the U.S. submarine protection devices have been perfected to the extent that the "invincibility" of the Soviet submarine fleet and, with it, their capacity for retaliation, becomes doubtful;[16] and (4) guidance systems of the new rockets are so precise that even reinforced silos would not be able to withstand attack.[17] In light of these developments, it is no comfort to realize that it would be a military-technological utopia to assume that one side, probably the United States, could achieve 100 percent superiority in both offense and defense. At least for the foreseeable future, the risk would continue to exist that one untouched Soviet rocket or submarine could do intolerable damage to the United States.[18] For this reason, the chances of a rationally calculated first strike seem slim. In no way does that rule out the possibility that, in a crisis situation, each side would feel threatened and would ascribe the objective threat to the opponent. In this situation, it is possible that the stronger side would accuse the

13. Eisenhower declared on January 12, 1955, that in localized conflicts the United States would normally (!) not use nuclear weapons. Cf. *Dokumentation zur Abrüstung und Sicherheit, op.cit.*, p. xvii.

14. Cf. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ed., *Rüstung und Abrüstung im Atomzeitalter* (Reinbek, 1977);, pp. 33-36.

15. Cf. "Der Weltraum wird zum Schlachtfeld," in *Der Spiegel*, March 30, 1981, pp. 156-177.

16. Cf. G. Krell, "Das militärische Kräfteverhältnis bei den nuklear-strategischen Waffen," in G. Krell and D.S. Lutz, *Nuklearrüstung im Ost-West-Konflikt* (Baden-Baden, 1980), pp. 137-139.

17. Cf. Krell, *op.cit.*, pp. 117ff.

18. Cf. R.W. Leonhardt's report on a conversation of atomic war strategists, "Europa wurde vergessen," in *Die Zeit*, August 28, 1981, p. 5.

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weaker side of wishing to better its position by a nuclear first strike. The result would be a "pre-emptive" first strike to avoid a feared first strike.[19]

In this culmination of developments, the cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles that are to be stationed on West European soil take on added significance. The consensus among many critics of the NATO agreement[20] is that these new rockets are dangerous in the following ways:[21] (1) They are the first tactical missiles to be stationed in Western and Southern Europe and the first that could reach the Soviet Union; (2) This means the creation of potential sites for attack in heavily populated areas; (3) The missiles themselves mark a tremendous advance in the development of carrying systems for nuclear warheads due to their exceptionally high accuracy,[22] their significantly increased ability to penetrate enemy defenses,[23] the speed with which the Pershing II can reach enemy territory,[24] and the significant increase in the ability to limit the damage caused by attack, increasing the possibility of "selective" employment on military or political targets.[25] The technological characteristics listed under the third point represent an especially pressing threat to the European

19. The seriousness of such considerations is evident in Schmidt, *Verteidigung, op.cit,* p. 47; H. Kahn in *Der Spiegel,* April 13, 1981; D.S. Lutz, "Sowjetische Nuklearrüstung und SALT," in Lutz, ed., *Die Rüstung der Sowjetunion. Rüstungsdynamik und bürokratische Strukturen* (Baden-Baden, 1979), pp. 140ff., 152ff. Schwarz and van Cleave (p. 133) follow G. Snyder in the insight that "the whole risk calculation on one side is based on the risk calculation of the other, i.e., on suspicions about suspicions."

20. On the military-strategic significance of tactical nuclear weapons, cf. A.-A. Guha, *Der Tod in der Grauzone. Ist Europa noch zu verteidigen?* (Frankfurt, 1980); W. Bittorf, "Schiessplatz der Supermächte. Die sowjetische Bedrohung Westeuropas und die Nachrüstung," in *Der Spiegel,* 28 (1981), pp. 122-138, 29, pp. 105-121; and 30, pp. 118-125; A.-A. Guha, " 'Der dritte Weltkrieg findet in Europa statt.' Ist ein begrenzter atomarer Konflikt auf dem alten Kontinent denkbar? Eine Tagung in Gronigen," in *Frankfurter Rundschau,* April 29, 1981; D.S. Lutz, "Kriegsgefahr und Kriegsführung in den 80er Jahren," in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschehen,* January 17, 1981, pp. 23-38.

21. On the technical details, cf. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Rüstungsjahrbuch '80-81* (Reinbek, 1980), pp. 103-107; G. Krell and S. Lutz, *Nuklearrüstung, op.cit.,* pp. 55ff.

22. The striking precision of the Pershing II missiles is about 45 meters; that for the cruise missiles, between 30 and 100 meters. By comparison, the highest precision of the Eurostrategic weapons up to now has been that of the Pershing 1A, at 450 meters; the SS-20 allegedly has a precision of 400 meters. (The "circular error probable" represents the radius of the circle in which the missile will strike with 50 percent probability.) Cf. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Rüstungsjahrbuch, op.cit.,* pp. 104ff. (According to Krell and Lutz in *Nuklearrüstung, op.cit.,* pp. 55ff., the circular error probability of the Pershing II is 30 meters, while the value for the cruise missile is under 30 meters.) The possibilities provided by such precision are heightened in the case of the Pershing II due to the availability of an "earth penetration warhead," which can destroy subterranean bunkers, etc. Cf. *Rüstungsjahrbuch, op.cit.,* p. 105. Since the destructive potential of an explosive body declines by the sphere of the distance from the striking point, this precision has become the central problem in the development of practical nuclear weapons.

23. This is a result of the missile's very small radar cross-section of 0.05 square meters, their ability to fly at a height of less than 50 meters and the possibility of flying a zig-zag course. *Rüstungsjahrbuch, op.cit.,* pp. 103ff.

24. The flying time of the Pershing II from its planned locations in West Germany to target sites in the Soviet Union is about 7 minutes. Therefore there is actually no advanced warning period.

25. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the cruise missiles will carry warheads with an explosive force of 200 megatons, the Pershing II will be at 10-20 megatons. A terrifying insider's account of nuclear target planning can be found in E.P. Thompson and D. Smith, eds., *Protest and Survive* (London, 1980): H.T. Nash's, "The Bureaucratization of Homicide," pp. 62-74.

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population for two reasons. First, they make a "limited nuclear war" appear possible. Second, they destabilize the "balance of fear" that has existed so far. As instruments for a nuclear war "limited" to Europe, these missiles represent the realization of the military-political goal of the U.S. leadership since the prescription of strategic balance with the Soviet Union in SALT II.[26]

The deeper military meaning of NATO rearmament is revealed in the Presidential Directive 59 of July 1980,[27] which proclaims a new direction in nuclear military strategy, moving from "mutual fear" to the concept of a limited, selective and therefore "conceivable" employment of nuclear weapons *aimed at Soviet territory* (or at least listing that concept as a new strategic "option"). In an interview with *Der Spiegel*, Brzezinski, the directive's author, put it openly: "I supported the idea that we adopt a practical military doctrine. It was clear to me that, for political reasons, I could not name it as such; I therefore spoke of 'tactically required corrections to our doctrine.' But the Presidential Directive 59 brings us one step closer to flexible retaliation, i.e., the capacity to react to the conflict on different levels." Asked if this included limited nuclear war, he replied: "If necessary, that includes limited nuclear war... It could escalate, would probably escalate.... But when one side is capable of carrying it out and the other isn't, then the side that has that capability is in a better position to negotiate in a crisis situation." [28]

Seen from this perspective, the function of rearmament is to create a military instrument capable of demonstrating to the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact states that nuclear weapons could be used in a "non-suicidal" way in a conflict. This means consciously obscuring the border between political weapons and weapons of war in order to increase *political utility*. (Here one must beware of Eurocentric distortions: the 464 cruise missiles that are supposed to be stationed in Western and Southern Europe according to the NATO agreement appear modest in comparison with the 3,020 cruise missiles that are to equip the strategic B-52 bombers of the U.S. Air Force and which are not under the jurisdiction of NATO.)[29]

No less important are the negative consequences of rearmament for the "balance of fear" in the area of nuclear-strategic stability. In his 1961 book, *Defense or Retaliation?*, Helmut Schmidt, then one of the most influential military strategists in West Germany, put together several arguments criticizing the implications of what is now coming about with the cruise and Pershing II missile deployment in Western Europe. "Any objective thinker must admit that the stationing of mobile tactical missiles in one's backyard (Turkey!) has the psychological effect of a provocation on any world power; imagine the American reaction to the stationing of Soviet mid-range missiles in Cuba!" [30] On the stationing of weapons in heavily populated areas, Schmidt said: "Land-based missiles belong in Labrador, Alaska, Greenland or in the deserts of Libya, but never in densely populated areas. They attract the opponents' nuclear

26. Cf. Guha, *Der Tod in der Grauzone, op.cit.*, p. 50; *Rüstungsjahrbuch, op.cit.*, p. 24; G. Krell, "Das militärische Kräfteverhältnis bei den nuklearstrategischen Waffen," in Krell and Lutz, *Nuklearrüstung, op.cit.*, p. 161; cf. also the article "Victory Is Possible," on which one of Reagan's military advisers collaborated: C.S. Grey and K. Payne, in *Foreign Policy*, 39 (Summer 1980).

27. Cf. *The Economist*, August 16, 1980, and J. Baylis and G. Segal in *Soviet Strategy* (London, 1981), pp. 16, 36, 41.

28. *Der Spiegel*, April 13, 1981, pp. 158-281, esp. p. 172.

29. Cf. *Rüstungsjahrbuch, op.cit.*, p. 34.

30. H. Schmidt, *Verteidigung, op.cit.*, p. 40. Shortly after this book was first published (1961), the Cuban crisis provided a concrete example. The United States was prepared to go to the brink of World War II to prevent such a stationing.

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missiles, and anything that attracts enemy attack should be avoided in countries with a dense population or a small area." [31] On the technical perfection of tactical missiles, he had this to say: "Even the West must wish for an indestructible, secure Soviet nuclear defense system, so that the temptation to devastate our cities in a pre-emptive attack will be avoided." [32] "Public opinion and the politicians will have to accept that the stability of the nuclear stalemate depends upon neither of the two powers attempting to turn the enemy's 'hard' defense system (safe against first strike) into a 'soft' (vulnerable) weapon system." [33]

Considering these arguments and considering that Schmidt was aware of the intolerable consequences of a limited nuclear war for Europe, [34] it is confusing that the same politician has become an advocate of rearmament. The possibility that this change of heart is due to Soviet stationing of the SS-20s can be ruled out. [35] In order to understand the compliance of Western European politicians with this arms escalation one must first understand the basis for the new U.S. policies. [36]

Exterminism as an Explanation of Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy

E.P. Thompson has proposed a model for understanding this development. His thesis postulates that "exterministic" structures and forces have existed in both superpowers since the end of World War II. These forces have gained an inordinate influence and, because of their inner dynamic, they are certain to destroy all of Northern Civilization if not stopped. "The term 'exterminism' describes those aspects of a society — be it political organization, economics or ideology — that tend in a direction which will inevitably lead to the annihilation of a large mass of the population.... Of course, in order for exterminism to exist, two powers must be in disagreement. The resulting conflict can no longer be considered a coincidence when both parties involved have forseen the problem and have chosen to accelerate the race for destruction.... Exterminism is a product of the same order (like militarism and imperialism); its institutional basis is the weapons system and the entire economic, social, political and ideological foundation for the system — the social system that researches, 'selects,' produces, guards and keeps this weapons system functioning." [37]

This is a description of highly industrialized society that reminds one of the "military-industrial complex." Thompson distances himself from this description, however: "When considered from this perspective, the United States and the Soviet Union do not *have* military-industrial complexes, they *are* military-industrial complexes. The ruling body (the weapons system and its social foundation)...dictate society's priorities. It influences the direction of its growth.... Weapons requiring detailed scientific knowledge add a civilian element to the military, but at the same time they militarize the civilian population.... After a certain point, the group in

31. *Ibid.*, pp. 108ff.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
34. "Even if the use of nuclear weapons did not proceed to the end of the spiral, i.e., to a total strategic nuclear war, it would nevertheless lead to massive destruction in Europe and particularly to the destruction of the European populations." *Ibid.*, p. 21. This should be compared with the statements of the current government spokesman, L. Ruehl, who has tried to convince the West Germans of the desirability of "rearmament" with the argument that "the use of isolated tactical nuclear weapons will not fully destroy West Germany, and it would still be worth the effort to preserve as much as possible." *Frankfurter Rundschau*, September 15, 1981.
35. Cf. D. Holloway, "Military Technology," in R. Amman and J.M. Cooper, eds., *The Technological Level of Soviet Industry* (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 458, 462.
36. It is assumed here that the Warsaw Pact does not have a military superiority over NATO.
37. Thompson, "Exterminism," *op.cit.*, pp. 33ff.

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power *requires* a certain threat of war in order to maintain its power and prestige and to legitimate its priorities and to silence the opposition, to maintain social order and to detract public attention from the open irrationality of their actions."[38]

The belief that "naturally *two* aggressive parties" are required for exterminism does not seem valid. In times of peace it is true that an external enemy was required to legitimate the setting of armament priorities, but this bears no relation to the existence of an actual threat. Clearest is the example of the arms race as a qualitative "contest." Mary Kaldor summarized America's part in this conflict in the following way: "Since Russia has always been considered technologically inferior, all improvements in construction were compared with an imaginary enemy. This sort of subjective thinking is at the root of the 'analysis of the worst possible case.' "[39]

One's own real — or desired — capacity formed a gauge for the capacities ascribed to that enemy and, in turn, new, more powerful retaliatory measures were developed. Not surprisingly, this process would continue to escalate endlessly without any threat from outside (although this makes for a nice explanation to the taxpayers).[40]

These one-sided exterministic powers could easily erupt in a nuclear war. In 1945, the United States proved it was prepared to employ nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear country in certain situations, and that, with the necessary propaganda, domestic politics would not suffer from such action. From the very beginning of NATO, the threat has existed that the United States, threatened by conventional attack, would answer with a nuclear first strike. Thus prepared (their capacity to do so was proven by the Tonkin incident in 1964) and without having to fear the initiation of its own destruction, one is led to suspect the existence of unilateral exterminism.

How can the concept of exterminism help us understand the change in American foreign policy? Thompson's explanation may be summarized in the following manner: (1) The military establishment, in the broadest meaning of the word, has become the prime motive force for political and social development, leaving its mark on all other aspects of society. The distinction between this and the old concept of military-industrial complex is that while before the military and the arms industries, acting as political pressure groups, were able to influence and distort political decisions, now these attitudes have become dominant in society as a whole. (2) Both superpowers have developed "isomorphic" structures: exterministic structures whose interplay determines the dynamics of the development of industrial society. (3) The place where this exterministic confrontation on both sides will take place is — Europe.

The first critical point to be made regarding Thompson's argument concerns the unclear transformation of the U.S. system from the "military-industrial complex" comprised of the military, arms industry, ideologues and politicians influenced by "pressure groups" (whose existence no one doubts) to the general basis of society itself. Considering Thompson's bipolar structure of the exterministic system, such a transition is absolutely necessary: the "cold war" is much older than the American military-industrial complex;[41] it began with the October Revolution of 1917 and the American leadership's refusal to accept the resulting government as a legitimate part of the international order. Thus, it seems more plausible that both the cold war and the military-industrial complex are products of a third, underlying socio-economic

38. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

39. M. Kaldor, *Rüstungsbarock* (Berlin, 1981), p. 53.

40. Cf. D. Senghass, *Abschreckung und Frieden. Studien zur Kritik organisierter Friedlosigkeit* (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 170ff.

41. Cf. R.J. Barnet, *Der amerikanische Rüstungswahn oder die Oekonomie des Todes* (Reinbek, 1971), pp. 49ff, and 80ff.

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structure of U.S. society. In the second place, the nature of the transformation is unclear. What does it mean to say that the weapons system and its social basis "dictate priorities" to society as a whole, or "influence the course of social growth"? It is supposed to be something more than merely a "pressure group." At the same time, this is not supposed to constitute a new mode of production.[42] This argument can only be understood in its negative form: a sector of U.S. society specializing in destruction and incomprehensible in terms of capitalist theory, has taken power and now acts independently, subject to no form of reason or interest except the all-encompassing move towards total destruction. Anyone who attempts to explain this destructive force rationally has not understood this new quality or trivializes the danger, since no one, not even a leading politician, would consciously and rationally plan his own destruction. Yet, we face the total destruction of Northern civilization.[43] Bahro and Vester extend Thompson's analysis on this point: "the reduction of the causes of armament to rationally deducible capital and power interests has itself degenerated into a source of false consciousness and has become the medium of a sterile demystification polemic."

This does not imply that popular support of armament is the result of a pathological learning process of invented and real historical experience leading to paranoid delusions about the "evil nature" of the enemy.[44] Bahro and Vester are referring to the thoughts and actions of the leaders themselves: "Even those members and officials belonging to the ruling classes and following their interests rationally could not set their stakes on modern war, for in all likelihood they themselves would be destroyed in such a war."[45]

Although no one today believes in a reductionist theory of political processes, this argument does not show that capital and power interests are not at work here. This argument is only valid as long as one ignores the distinction between political weapons and weapons of war. This distinction is fundamental to an understanding of all nuclear armament: nuclear weapons are "political weapons" and as such, their production, perfection and stationing have the goal of increasing the price for *not* implementing them. The more believable their ultimate use becomes, the higher the price goes. As a result, calculation about nuclear war (which actually is calculation of the *threat* of this war) does *not* contradict the rational explanation of following the interest of those in power. For this reason, an appeal to the self-interest of those members of the ruling class would be in vain. The present period is exceptionally dangerous because, although the demarcation between threatened and actual use is high, it is not absolute (nor can it ever be) and in fact it sinks a little every time the person ordering deployment of nuclear weapons believes it is possible to keep his country out of the conflict.

Is there any clear basis for the present U.S. foreign policy? The fact that U.S. companies who produce weapons are interested in increasing armament goes without saying, but this does not explain much. The key question is why present politics supports the special interests of these groups. It is likewise too easy simply to

42. Thompson, "Exterminism," *op.cit.*, p. 33.

43. Thompson insists that we understand the "cold war as the irrational result of colliding formations and purposes," and "recognize the present as the irrational result of conflicting tendencies and therefore prepare ourselves for an increasing irrationality." *Ibid.*, pp. 13ff.

44. Cf. Guha, *Der Tod in der Grauzone, op.cit*; Senghaas, *op.cit.*, pp. 176ff. The taking of the American hostages in Tehran was a concrete case of a fatal learning process. It greatly facilitated the transition to a new policy of intervention.

45. R. Bahro and M. Vester, "This Concept Breaks Seven Taboos and Suggests a Perspective," in this issue of *Telos*.

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demonstrate the existence of personal ties between these groups and administration officials (such as Haig and Weinberger); this explains neither the continuity of the new policy nor how the present administration could have come to power in the first place. The question must be posed: Can present U.S. politics be understood as a "rational" expression of predominant interests in this society? Since this change in American policy came about as a result of efforts by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the adviser to Carter, it is appropriate to quote him here. In his estimation, the United States faces three crises: "a *strategic crisis* that the Soviets possess similar and sometimes superior military capacities compared to our own;" "a *geopolitical crisis*, that the Far East and Western Europe, and now, more recently, a third zone, the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, are of essential strategic importance to the United States;" and "a *global crisis* that (after two world wars and the Great Depression) we have experienced a great emancipation, but no international system has been developed to take care of the pre-existing concentration of political, financial and economic power above all in Western Europe.... The result of all these developments indicates less danger of a *pax sovietica* — the Soviet Union is too weak in my opinion to rule the world — than simply of global anarchy which the Soviets very easily could encourage in order to use it for their own benefit."[46]

It is difficult to see how the "strategic crisis" could represent the decisive factor, as the exterminism model would suggest. It would be clearer simply to admit that the sense of crisis corresponds to very real experiences, such as the loss in Vietnam and the incalculable nature of developments in the Middle East — with all the resulting implications for Western oil supplies — the collapse of the remaining Portuguese influence in Africa, the revolution in Zimbabwe, the growing instability of South African allies, the increasing unrest in Central America and the ineffectiveness of multinational concerns and their military-state partners to establish new power bases. If that were the case, the talk of a strategic crisis would take on a whole new meaning. Brzezinski justified Presidential Directive 59 in the following manner: "I assumed that our pre-existing doctrine of threatened mutual destruction only made sense while we were in a superior position over the Soviets. We could scare them with this doctrine, because in practice it meant: We will destroy you, but you cannot destroy us. As the situation grew more equal, this doctrine became less convincing."[47]

But what was this scare supposed to keep the Soviets from doing? Brzezinski, at least in this interview, had no answer to this, apart from confused references to "Soviet expansionism." Haig found clearer words in his address to the U.S. Senate. When asked about his list of priorities he commented, after mentioning Poland and Afghanistan, "the problems of the Third World." "The problems of developing countries, the necessity for building a meaningful relationship with them and for increased efforts toward satisfying the most urgent human needs of the people of these developing countries — all require at least political cooperation. *Above all else, however, we must control existing unrest* as well as the causes for this unrest, which provide such fertile ground for external influences."[48]

Anyone who thought the reference to "human needs" showed some insight will be bitterly disappointed by now. One can expect little else from the secretary of state of a president whose favorites in the Third World constitute a veritable chamber of horrors. "In my opinion, the worldwide increase in terrorism presents an increasing

46. *Der Spiegel*, April 13, 1981, p. 160.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
48. In Senate hearings January 9-14, 1981, on Haig's appointment as secretary of state.

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problem, to which the Western countries must turn their efforts."[49] Under the term "terrorism," Haig includes the "so-called liberation armies." The opposition to the Soviet Union arose in this context, leading Haig to say: "I would like to mention another closely associated theme — that of Soviet activities concerning training, financial support and armament of terrorists. International terrorism takes its place among our concerns as the highest disregard for human rights."[50]

Whether Haig personally believes that "in the entire Third World Soviet-supported conflicts are constantly taking place" is irrelevant. The important point here is that, along the lines of Brzezinski's talk of "global crisis," the following program was formulated: (1) Repressive regimes in the Third World would be supported if they seemed likely to back U.S. interests — a policy that effectively put an end to experiments such as Carter's human rights campaign.[51] (2) The question of direct U.S. intervention to aid the military repression of revolutionary movements would remain an open question.[52] (3) In the event of a successful revolution, the country involved would be "shielded" from cooperation with the Soviet Union and efforts would be made to force the Soviets to "behave."

This third point seems to contain "lessons from Vietnam" learned by former Nixon people in the current administration (Haig, Van Cleave and Anderson). Perhaps this connection between interventionist policies in the Third World and efforts to weaken internal liberation movements in order to "neutralize" the Soviet Union can best be understood in relation to plans that have been developed for the Gulf region.[53] The Republican platform itself insisted: "The Republicans are convinced that the re-establishment of order and stability in this region [the Middle East and the Persian Gulf] must be based on the recognition of the inner relation between radical Palestinian and Soviet goals, the fundamental requirements of a stable economic development and marketing of the area's resources, and the increasing unrest among radical Islamic groups. The Republicans are of the opinion that an intelligent and believable American politics must make clear that our greatest interest is in a long-term, peaceful development of all states of the region and not simply the exploitation of their resources to serve our own interests."[54] When asked about NATO's position on this point, Haig explained: "In the four and a half years I served at NATO, I repeatedly tried to direct the attention of our allies towards the dangers that this community faces which are no longer limited to the central region of NATO in Europe but are also related to problems in developing countries, for example, access to raw materials, not simply crude oil but also other vital minerals. The focus of our concerns is not limited merely to the Gulf region but the entire African continent." When asked what would happen if NATO allies were uncooperative, Haig replied: "If this were not to happen [American-West European-Japanese consensus], in my opinion, we must be prepared to act as a nation — even if it were one-sided — in order to ensure access to these vital resources." The essence of this is extraordinarily simple: to control unrest in the Third

49. H. Gerlach, "Präsident Ronald Reagan. Konturen seines aussenpolitischen Profils," in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschehen*, February 7, 1981, p. 10.

50. *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik* (1981), p. 370.

51. The platform of the Republican Party speaks to this point: "The conscious effort to impose American values and the understanding of democracy onto various friendly states has undermined them and led to an expansion fo Soviet influence in recent years in Asia, the Near East, Africa and the Western hemisphere." *Ibid.*, p.1048.

52. Gerlach, *op.cit.*, pp. 10ff.

53. Cf. U. Albrecht, "Zur entspannungspolitischen Lage," in *Aufrüsten, um abzurüsten* (Reinbek, 1980), pp. 12ff.

54. *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, op.cit.*, p. 1040.

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World that would endanger American interests, the United States intends to keep all options open, including direct military intervention. In order to weaken opponents, the "terrorist liberation movements," and to avoid a disaster similar to Vietnam, access to supplies must be cut off. In order to overcome a "lack of restraint on the part of the Soviet Union," the threat of nuclear blackmail is justified.[55]

The simultaneous organization of the "rapid deployment force," the new American military vanguard, and the preparations for armament with tactical missiles are not merely a coincidence. They represent complementary parts of a unified military strategy. Thus, the Republican platform explains: "An effective strategy based on two points: first, a long-term presence in the area in question [the Persian Gulf] in conjunction with the obvious capacity to strengthen armed forces at a moment's notice, and secondly, the consideration of military measures from other perspectives in places where the Soviet Union is most vulnerable."

The Collaboration of European NATO Partners

The question why European NATO members more or less cooperate with such politics is not clear. Exterminism offers no explanation — it explains the arms race as a structural change in both superpowers and certainly could not easily be extended to European countries (with the notable exception of arms producers in West Germany). Since Thompson sees rearmament as the direct preparation for a war that will destroy Europe, he considers the cooperation of Western European NATO politicians "inexplicable."[56] Bahro and Vester speak metaphorically of the "sorcerer's apprentice who can no longer manage to control the spirits that he has conjured up."

This argument is only partially correct because it leaves out an historical analysis of the development of NATO policies; NATO was founded so that (in contrast to World War I), U.S. troops would be guaranteed a place on European soil while the strongest European power in this alliance — at least until implementation of Brandt's *Ostpolitik* — could make territorial claims against the Warsaw Pact countries.[57] It is important to recall that, since the transition to the doctrine of "flexible response" (which occurred in the United States in 1962 and NATO in 1967) as the official NATO policy, a "tactical" nuclear war, limited to Europe, has become a strategic possibility.

Two issues remain to be explained. Why have NATO powers cooperated with such a doctrine for more than 15 years now; and why now, with this new step in the escalation of nuclear arms after 20 years of relative peace, does a fierce opposition suddenly emerge that reaches to the very generals and prominent European power figures involved?

The first question cannot be answered easily. The following points, however, seem to bear on it: (1) The assumption that a conventionally superior Soviet Union has expansionist desires for Western Europe and that such desires would not be stopped by conventionally equipped Western European forces. Therefore, a "nuclear shield" provided by the United States is necessary. Especially if, as was argued above, talk of a Soviet "threat" was largely a fiction (as many politicians sincerely believed), it would

55. In his highly instructive analysis, Bittorf comes to the following conclusion: "the planners in Washington are primarily concerned with mechanisms and threats to silence the Soviet Union, even if the 'worst case' should develop in the Middle East, i.e., if the United States and its oil-dependent allies were to be forced by further anti-Western uprisings to initiate a super-Vietnam throughout the Persian Gulf. . . . The new tactical nuclear weapons, the Pershing II and the cruise missiles, are designed as a flanking threat potential directed at Moscow." Cf. W. Bittorf, " 'Schiessplatz der Supermächte," in *Der Spiegel,* 30 (1981), p. 125.

56. Thompson, "Exterminism," *op.cit.,* p. 22.

57. Schmidt, *Verteidigung, op.cit.,* p. 193.

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be easier to play along with it, since it seemed that the price for these nuclear threats would never have to be paid. (2) The Soviet external threat was useful to provide domestic stability. (3) For West Germany, there was a special situation: on the one hand, very real territorial claims that could never be satisfied by military means alone and, on the other hand, the actual threat to West Berlin in the blockade of 1948, which would have been difficult for West Germany to manage on its own. (4) For the European NATO partners, the association of West Germany with the United States brought about the possibility of keeping a rapidly growing Germany under control, with the control of nuclear weapons in U.S. hands. (5) Within this constellation, considering the nuclear-strategic stalemate between the two superpowers since the beginning of the 1960s, only "limited, tactical" use of nuclear weapons made them a viable political threat.

As a result of previously mentioned reasons, this amounted to playing with fire: France withdrew its own atomic strike capacity, while the NATO states refused to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons in Norway and Denmark (during peacetime). Apart from these struggles, nuclear armament continued over the last 20 years relatively unchallenged. What has changed now? First, the new weapons appear suited for an offensive attack. This represents a change from political weaponry to weaponry of war in a political poker game that risks the atomic destruction of Europe. In the second place, this armament must be seen in conjunction with U.S. attempts to prevent social and political change to protect its own interest. Even if the NATO powers shared these interests, economic and political differences as well as disagreement as to the most effective methods could not be excluded. Even where these differences go unseen or are denied, a certain division of labor cannot be ruled out. Hans Apel, responsible for the West German commitment to armament, represents this position. At an arms convention in February 1981, he presented the following observations under the title "Security Politics of the 1980s": "(1) The interests of the NATO states in the stability of the Third World should be the same, if only because of their complex economic interdependence. (2) For a country like West Germany, the third largest user of raw materials in the Western world and nearly 100 percent dependent on imports not only of crude oil, but iron ore, copper, tin, aluminum as well, seemingly small shortages could cause high disturbances in the economy and endanger millions of jobs. (3) It can no longer be assumed. . . that we can take for granted the natural flow of oil. Developments in the Third World directly affect our security more and more; already in the 1980s disagreements over the distribution of ever dwindling resources are occurring. (4) Soviet strength in Europe is clearly increasing and will continue to do so. (5) The Soviet Union continues its expansionist politics in parts of the Third World." [58]

These arguments are similar to Brzezinski's and Haig's concerning the arms race: on the basis of the (undoubtedly correct) statement that NATO states are dependent upon import of raw materials, an imperative is developed to maintain social structures and political systems in the Third World that supply crude oil to 17 percent of the world's population, which accounts for 64 percent of the world's total consumption of oil (by 1985). The global economic situation should be supported in which the metal use in 1975 in extremely import-dependent countries such as the United States and the European community is guaranteed at a per capita rate of $200 and $120 respectively, while in Asia and Africa the metal use per person annually is between $4 and $8.[59]

58. *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung,* February 25, 1981, pp. 163-169.

59. *Global 2000* (Frankfurt, 1980).

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Along with a shared interest in the stabilization of these relations,[60] the NATO partners also agree that "the Third World policies of the Soviet Union threaten the long-term vital interests of the West and will transform the East-West opposition into a North-South opposition."[61] Naturally, this represents a grotesque distortion of the facts on the part of a U.S. government that perceives a Soviet agent behind every nationalist democrat. But in no way does Apel's speech represent a departure from Haig and the others. Apel continues: "For our security policies this has the following consequences: in order to preserve peace in the world the Soviet leadership will be shown *by our capacity for military action* that such policies are not acceptable to the West and in the long term are *not without a calculated risk* for the Soviet Union." In response to the two pillars of the new U.S. foreign policy: interventionist politics and "neutralization" of the Soviet Union with increased military power, there is widespread agreement, especially with the second, which is decisive for the question of armament. The differences are only in the methods by which stability can be attained in the Third World: "The avoidance and, if necessary, control of conflicts in the Third World and the securing of 'raw materials'...are more political than military problems. In the long term, it would be impossible to secure oil supplies on the basis of military means."[62]

The last argument is correct: it is difficult to imagine how Western Europe, requiring nearly two thirds of its oil imports from the Middle East (414 million barrels in 1978), could maintain its supply if this region were sunk in a civil war or a war of intervention. The United States is in a much better position in this regard, and, as a result, can choose more freely between different options.[63] The fact that Apel is generally against the extension of the NATO sphere of influence does not simply imply the acceptance of the United States in its role as "world sheriff" with a recognition of the historically diminished military capacities of West Germany. Rather, it signals something else: without any military ventures (excluding small French and British action), the proportion of world trade of the European Community has continually increased. To terminate this policy and go directly into interventionist wars bears many hidden dangers, including the risk of destroying inner stability in the home country with only uncertain gains. Clearly, such action cannot be avoided forever (according to Apel the assurance of security should be "primarily" through political and economic cooperation — in other words, not entirely through those means).[64] Thus, the European Community is obligated to the United States: the Europeans cannot take over the American role in world politics, but they are dependent on the outcome of those politics. This service has its cost: loyalty to NATO, protection of the European front and assumption of a part of the burden of defense. The stationing of

60. It would be inadequate to assume that the struggle only concerns those resources that are in short supply on the globe. Beyond the conflict for oil in the gulf, it is equally a matter of stabilizing those structures that guarantee profits for international firms. Unfortunately, this essay cannot treat that aspect. On this level, too, differences between the Common Market countries and the United States could be demonstrated.

61. *Der Spiegel,* April 13, 1981, p. 166.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 167.

63. Cf. A. Riklin, "Audiatur et altera pars," in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschehen,* January 17, 1981, p. 6.

64. Characteristic is an article in the West German *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau,* 30:4 (1981), on "Rapid Deployment Force — Eingreiftruppe der Vereinigten Staaten," by H. Schauer. With no criticism at all, possible "areas of intervention" are listed, including Southeastern Europe, the Mediterranean, Africa and parts of southeast Asia and Australia. The assumed opponent would be "strong, modern, native [!] units." *Ibid.*, p. 121.

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the new tactical missiles is a part of this obligation. *As long as* these tactical weapons are used only for their potential to threaten (as has been the case for the last 25 or so years), the political price has not appeared too high. With the specific qualities of these weapons in the hands of a U.S. leadership bent on demonstrating its military supremacy, though, the border between weapons of politics and weapons of war is in danger of being violated. It comes as no surprise that those forces whose entire politics depends on the existence of the present structure of world economics and the current strategic situation would be the last to realize this.

Thompson and Bahro are attempting to change this logic by means of pressure from outside the institutions. Clearly the "official political powers of Western Europe" must not only be driven to use their reason,[65] but also to be willing to sacrifice some of their interests. In no way is it "obvious on closer examination," as Bahro claims, "that the confrontation of blocs in the Northern hemisphere with its consequences, the arms race, is the world's number one problem." Rather, this confrontation represents the indirect result of the position of Europe in the world economic order, which can only be maintained by force. Those who desire a "neutral," "bloc-free" Europe must consider the ramifications for such an entity that would be the greatest economic power in the world.[66] More concretely — with respect to the conflict which increasingly dominates the thoughts of U.S. foreign policy makers: the stability of Persian Gulf oil supplies — is it valid to develop an alternative to NATO policy? Since the Iran revolution, the strongest and most reliable alliance partner, in the beginning of 1979, the United States has been preparing itself for direct military intervention in the event of a similar development in Saudi Arabia. The establishment of "rapid deployment forces" occurred a few months after this revolution (before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan), with the stated goal of no longer tolerating a further shrinking of the Western sphere of influence. Thus, a new Vietnam is in the planning stage, with the military officials desiring from the outset to cut off the supplies (this time from China instead of the Soviet Union) with a combination of political and military pressure.[67] This war, should it come to that, would also be waged on behalf of "West European interests." Western European governments would be expected to contribute by strengthening NATO in Central Europe, allowing installation of cruise missiles and supporting the military dictatorship in Turkey. At the same time, they (justifiably) hesitate to attempt such a wary, drawing out the conflict instead with a faint-hearted Near East policy in the hopes of lessening or perhaps relieving such a war altogether. That it is possible to lessen the consequences is seen in the example of Libya, while the ineffectiveness of the opposite, i.e., military intervention to insure oil supplies, is apparent even to the present West Germany defense minister. As a consequence, "securing the interests" of Western Europe demands a much more complicated solution towards American foreign policy than simply opposing the installation of the new missile systems.

65. Cf. Thompson, "Exterminism," p. 41.

66. In 1975 the Gross National Product of Western Europe amounted to $1.598 billion, as compared with that of the United States, at $1.509 billion and the Soviet Union, at $0.666 billion. Cf. *Global 2000, op.cit.*, p. 48.

67. This seems to be the basis for the military strategists' excitement (assuming it is authentic) over the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The terrain is hardly amenable to a further invasion toward Iran, but it would be ideal as the hinterland for a guerrilla war against an American invasion (currently Soviet soldiers are experiencing the difference between the two forms of warfare).

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Is the Soviet Union an Exterminist Power?

Up to this point the Soviet Union has been treated almost exclusively as a passive object and straw man in the Western discussion. This was necessary to argue against the interpretation of an increasingly critical international situation as the dynamic of exterminist drives that allegedly dominate both superpowers. It has been demonstrated that (1) U.S. exterminism can be explained without the existence of a similar exterminist antagonist; (2) exterminism is rooted in global power interests and a politics of stabilizing those interests, i.e., it has its own "rationality" and is not driven by an autonomous machinery of destruction; and (3) exterminism is linked to West European interests. The question remains as to the character of Soviet participation in all this.

Thompson bases his claim that the Soviet Union — like the United States — is a military-industrial complex,[68] both on domestic social factors as well as on Soviet foreign policy. Before discussing this, it is important to recognize what questions would have to be answered to support the thesis of a military-industrial complex in the Soviet Union.[69] A coherent argument would have to demonstrate: (1) that there is an industrial, military and scientific weapons system in the Soviet Union; (2) that this system and its agents articulate specific interests; (3) that this "leading sector," as Thompson puts it, imposes its priorities on society and influences the direction of growth; (4) that the "leading position" of this weapons system has historical and structural roots in the overall composition of the society and state; and (5) that the policies pursued by this weapons system are irrational in terms of the predominant social interests and can only be explained in terms of the logical imperatives of the exterminst powers.

The first point is undeniable. Of course there is a fully developed weapons system in the Soviet Union with all the key components.[70] On the second point, Thompson's argument is unclear. On the one hand, he claims that "it would be a mistake to consider the Soviet military an autonomous 'interest,' " since that would ignore the mediating role of the party. On the other hand, he postulates that "the military 'interest' dominates the entire Soviet Union."[71] Since this latter point cannot apply unless a military interest exists, the simultaneity of the two positions is rather confusing. Yet, despite Thompson's ambivalence, one can assert that at least the army represents a separate complex of interests and values within Soviet society — with its own professional ethics, its own codes of honor and discipline and its own internal power hierarchy.[72] Two problems remain: first, whether the army (or even a military-industrial complex) pursues a *unified* interest *vis-à-vis* the rest of society. Although there are points where the functional position of the army would seem to provide such unity *a priori*, there are reasons for doubt. For example, an examination of the budget allocations for the arms sector and the army in the Krushchev reforms of 1960 shows that within the army there is a wing that accepts or even promotes reductions in military spending, while another wing opposes them radically.[73] This

68. Thompson, "Exterminism," *op.cit.*, p. 35.

69. Cf. E. Jahn, "Die Rolle des Rüstungskomplexes in der Sowjetgesellschaft," and V.V. Aspaturian, "Gibt es einen militärisch-industriellen Komplex in der Sowjet-Union?" in Lutz, ed., *Die Rüstung der Sowjet-Union, op.cit.*

70. Cf. F. Walter, "Rüstung und Wirtschaftswachstum in der UdSSR," in *Sowjetunion 1978-79. Ereignisse, Probleme, Perspektiven* (Munich and Vienna, 1979), pp. 168-170.

71. Thompson, "Exterminism," *op.cit.*, pp. 30-31.

72. Cf. R. Kolkowicz, "Die Militärs," in H.G. Skilling and F. Griffiths, ed., *Pressure Groups in der Sowjetunion* (Vienna, 1974), pp. 129-164.

73. *Ibid.*, pp. 143ff.; K.-D. Schwarz, "Sowjetische Militärstrategie," in his *Sicherheitspolitik* (Bad Honnef-Erpel, 1978), pp. 380ff.

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suggests that overall political differences have been linked to factions within the army (in this case, "traditionalists" versus nuclear specialists), and that this link is stronger than military group loyalty.[74] Secondly, there is the question of whether this military "interest group" pursues overall social goals beyond its own limited function. Thompson's position (i.e., the answer to questions 3 and 4) has already been cited in part. He proves the predominance of the military interest by pointing out that heavy industry with a "military accent" has been given priority since the 1930s, that the arms sector enjoys privileges in the distribution of material resources and skilled labor and that it is the technically most advanced part of Soviet industry. All these arguments are plausible,[75] but are not sufficient to support the center of his claim — because ultimately these conditions could reflect a particular *political* priority of the party. Three perspectives are particularly important. First, Thompson overlooks that the privileging of the arms industry is only the reverse of the qualitative desolation of the civilian industry. An army that had to make do with the product quality that Soviet consumers must put up with every day would hardly be functional. In the age of atomic weaons, it would be downright dangerous. Therefore, the institutional protection and economic privileging of the arms sector is probably related primarily to the functional need of the military for the system's continuity. Obviously, this privileging simultaneously reinforces the regressiveness of the civilian sector.

Secondly, it should not be denied that this privilege (and the continuous expansion of the military sector) is a result of army activity as a pressure group. However, the direction of this institution is largely inward, i.e., it is "egocentric." Kolkowicz has described it in the following terms: "It is basically a guild-like structure that isolates itself from the outside world. It lives according to certain orthodox rules and customs and constantly watches over its own interests and rights. As long as its most important interests and needs are satisfied, the military is prepared to tolerate any political leadership."[76] It is undoubtedly not without danger for a leading politician to enter into conflict with this institution, but it is not impossible. Krushchev was able to prove both that, despite the military's protests, it was possible to curtail its sphere of interest and that one need not be defeated even if the party apparatus and the central state bureaucracy join the opposition. Between a grouping that is capable of effective opposition and a politically leading grouping there is a major difference.

This leads to the third perspective. Despite its strong position in the political system (or perhaps precisely because of it), the military has been kept away from the center of political power. It is not represented in the Politburo, which is responsible for basic strategic questions.[77] Its representation in the party's Central Committee has gradually declined from 11 percent in 1952 to 7 percent in 1976.[78] Of course, this is only one indicator, but it seems to suggest that the thesis of the military predominance in Soviet politics lacks a strong foundation.[79] However, these points are no reason for

74. Subsequently there has been no similarly open split of the military in this question, probably because the political leadership has avoided tampering with the military budget.

75. Cf. Kaldor, *op.cit.*, pp. 94-98; D. Holloway, *op.cit.*, pp. 203ff and 210ff.; Aspaturian, *op.cit.*, p. 255; V. Zaslavsky, 'The Regime and the Working Class in the USSR," in *Telos*, 42 (Winter 1979-80), pp. 15-17.

76. Kolkowicz, p. 162.

77. There are two exceptions to this rule: Marshal Zukhov, who was a member for four months in 1957 and was then removed for "Bonapartist tendencies," and Marshal Gretkho, who was a full member of the Politburo from 1973 until his death in 1976. Cf. A. von Borcke, "Das April Plenum 1973" in *Osteuropa,* 23:12, p. 924f.

78. Kolkowicz, *op.cit.*, p. 163.

79. *Länderberichte Osteuropa. Sowjetunion* (Munich and Vienna, 1979), p. 62; Holloway, *op.cit.*, p. 226.

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complacency. Even if the Soviet military does not dominate the party state, it is powerful enough to resist interventions into its sphere of interest, and this is dangerous enough in a historical period which demands fundamental reconsiderations and political reorientations.

This brings us to the fifth question: does the Soviet weapons system pursue a policy that cannot be explained in terms of domestic causes but only as a result of the exterminist dynamic? This is obviously the key point for Thompson. He proves it with the following arguments: (a) The strong position of the defense sector, which can be explained historically, has become independent owing to the bureaucratic inertia of the political leadership. The earlier "reaction to Western aggression" is now repeated in terms of the domestic constellation. In other words: the external threat is largely a product of the ideologues of the weapons system, who have to justify its existence and who dominate the communications media in the Soviet Union. In addition to the fact that this argument does not recognize the character of NATO policy, its estimation of published opinion in the Soviet Union regarding the Western threat may also be inadequate. A recent investigation evaluated several Soviet journals in terms of their accounts of the new Soviet policy on the West in 1969. The results contradict Thompson in two ways. First, it is false to assume a monolithic reaction to the external world in the Soviet leadership. For example, while the readers of the journal published by the Institute for World Economy and International Relations — which is very close to the party's Central Committee and the government — learned that the possibilities for "peaceful cooperation with the European peoples. . . has increased immeasurably," the readers of the Defense Ministry's publications are warned that "an increase in the aggressive plans of the regional Western powers is expected." [80] Secondly, while the sense of threat, as expressed in this military journal, indeed does correspond to Thompson's expectations, it is important to recognize that this position was not predominant in the international affairs of the Soviet Union; in the context of the new Western policies, a series of international treaties were prepared and signed. This constellation was repeated within the arms sector itself; during the SALT negotiations, the Soviet military was at first very skeptical but in the course of time came around to a cooperative stance.[81] Again, this is no cause for relief, since the cost for this acceptance of the Politburo's line was the unquestioned continuation of the ongoing arms projects of the Soviet military.[82] It was a matter of a compromise politics in which political and economic interests dominated but were not realizable without important concessions to the military.

(b) The real behavior of the Soviet Union, as evident in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1980, is the expression of the "aggressive tenets of ideology and strategy." [83] It is undeniable that the Soviet Union practices a great power politics against the will of the overwhelming majority of the populations. However, is this proof of an autonomous exterminism? More plausible would be an interpretation of these events as expressions of a security policy based on the establishment of buffer zones between the Soviet Union and "hostile foreign powers." This would allow a foreign invasion to be opposed on foreign soil, in contrast to the situation during World War II. To the extent that subversive influences in the Soviet Union itself were to be

80. Kolkowicz, *op.cit.*, p. 140.

81. Cf. R.L. Garthoff, "The Soviet Military and SALT," in J. Baylis and G. Segal, eds., *Soviet Strategy* (London, 1981), pp. 154-182.

82. Cf. M. Leitenberg, "Warum sind die SALT II Grenzen so hoch oder Wie stark sind die Sowjets wirklich?" in *Technologie und Politik*, 4 (1976), pp. 49-70.

83. Thompson, "Exterminism," *op.cit.*, p. 32.

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prevented — as in the case of Czechoslovakia and perhaps with Afghanistan — the relation to the ruling interests in the Soviet Union is clear. That, however, is precisely the opposite of an autonomous "exterminism."

(c) Finally, some time after "the installation of the first intercontinental missiles... the absurd and decisive step was taken with the decision to counterpose every weapons system with a double and thereby to maintain 'parity.' " This is Thompson's strongest argument, but here too he does not live up to his own postulate that the Left should confront the facts more consistently, because he is all too quickly satisfied with the epithet "absurd," without attempting to ferret out the sense in the nonsense. Yet, even if one cannot accept the exterminism thesis, this point must be clarified, since otherwise the chances and the potential resistance to the peace movement will remain unclear.

Soviet Military Doctrine

In one way or another, many authors have criticized Soviet arms policy. While Thompson criticizes the attempt to reach "parity," Albrecht and others speak of an armament "that lies beyond what would be rationally necessary for defense" [84] — of course without saying how much would be "rationally necessary." Clear proof of this argument seems to be offered in the accumulation of nuclear weapons with multiple overkill capacities. According to Thompson, these weapons do not contribute to Soviet security but rather represent a threat and are therefore not compatible with a defense strategy. It must, however, be asked what importance nuclear weapons are given in the Soviet military doctrine. It is important, furthermore, to differentiate between two phases: 1945 to the beginning of the 1960s, and from the beginning of the 1960s to the present. These phases do not only correspond to the NATO strategies of "massive retaliation" and "flexible response" but also to Soviet possession of first a very limited number of nuclear weapons and later a nearly unlimited amount.

During the first phase, the Soviet leadership had to face the problem that the United States possessed a monopoly on nuclear weapons and had — in the war with Japan — demonstrated its willingness to use them. In principle, there were several possible reactions to this situation: (1) To institute a worldwide ban on atomic weapons. The Russian proposal in the United Nations in June 1946, the Gromyko plan, was rejected. [85] (2) To trust the United States not to use the new weapon. Such an assumption was no longer possible after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. [86] (3) To develop atomic weapons and reach security via "deterrence." In the context of the American and the German programs, a corresponding Russian project was begun in 1943 but not treated with significant urgency. After the American detonations in Japan, Stalin accelerated the project, as Zhukov reported in his memoirs, published in 1969. [87] In 1949, the first Soviet atomic weapon was detonated. However, since at that point there was no carrier system, the problem of deterrence was far from being solved. (4) To plan the usage of conventional weapons and forces in such a way as to substitute for the lacking nuclear deterrent. During the first phase of the post-war period, Soviet military policy was largely based on this fourth possibility. Fundamentally, the doctrine was based on "preventing a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union... with

84. U. Albrecht, A. Joxe and M. Kaldor, "Gegen den Alarmismus!" in *Aufrüsten, um abzurüsten? op.cit.*, p. 140.

85. Cf. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Rüstung und Abrüstung im Atomzeitalter* (Reinbek, 1976), p. 256.

86. Even the first atomic bomb was used as a political weapon against the Soviet Union. Cf. G. Alperovitz, *Atomare Diplomatie — Hiroshima und Potsdam* (Munich, 1966).

87. Cf. Holloway, pp. 451-452.

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the threat of a [conventional] attack against Western Europe."[88] This transformed the character of the *cordon sanitaire* of "friendly states," which had been conceded by the Western allies.[89] If these states previously represented a sort of buffer zone against enemy attack, now they were more closely tied to the Soviet Union as the advanced positions of the Soviet army, whose elite units were stationed there so that in case of an attack, the war could be carried onto the territory of the aggressor or its allies.[90]

The end of this first phase was reached when the Soviet Union attained the ability for nuclear counter-attack at the end of the 1950s; this ability was demonstrated to the whole world with the success of Sputnik 1. The Soviet leadership reacted rather quickly to the new situation. In January of 1960, Krushchev announced a new military doctrine according to which Soviet military power would rely on intercontinental missiles for deterrence. Simultaneously a reduction of Soviet land forces by 1.2 million men was announced.[91] As early as September 1959, a Soviet plan for general and total disarmament within four years was presented which, according to Schmidt,[92] put the West on the defensive. If there was ever a chance over the last 35 years to achieve total disarmament, it was probably at this point. Of course, Soviet policy was anything but consistent. Krushchev believed, for example, that a grotesque bluff regarding the nuclear strength of the Soviet Union could force the United States to the negotiating table.[93] Instead, in 1960 Kennedy was able to win the presidential election with the help of the "missile gap" — a total fiction constructed by the American intelligence agencies, and to initiate a massive armament program. That put an end to the attempts at strategic detente. The Soviet Union returned to its military doctrine in expanded form, i.e., including civilian defense and the development of a navy.[94] In 1962, Defense Secretary McNamara announced the transition to "flexible response." At that point began the arms race that continues today.

The military-strategic sense for the participation of the Soviet Union in the arms race includes two elements: First, the Cuba crisis of 1962 demonstrated that in a superpower conflict, the strategic weapons would cancel each other out and the decision would rest with the stronger conventional presence. This destroyed the assumption that nuclear arms alone could guarantee security. However, secondly, "flexible response" and tactical nuclear weapons placed the Soviet Union in an unfavorable situation. Certainly, the fear of a first strike against the Soviet Union had declined.[95] Yet, simultaneously the fear grew — particularly in the state bureaucracies of Eastern Europe allied with the Soviet Union — that NATO forces might attempt to annex individual states.[96] The strategy of flexible response was understood by the Soviets as the corollary to such a limited attack. Since the leading Western power would have spared its own territory, the possibility of such a conflict must have seemed all the more plausible. An independent defensive strategy on the

88. S. Tiedtke, "Militärische Planung und MBFR-Politik der Sowjetunion," in *Osteuropa*, 30 (1980), p. 306.

89. Cf. D. Horowitz, *Kalter Krieg. Hintergründe der US-Aussenpolitik von Jalta bis Vietnam*, Vol. I (Berlin, 1969), p. 49.

90. Cf. Lutz, "Die Rüstungsanstrengungen," *op.cit.*, pp. 72, 80. Conversely, once the European states had become hostages, they became tied all the more strongly to the United States and its "atomic shield."

91. Kaldor, *op.cit.*, p. 80; Schmidt, *Verteidigung, op.cit.*, p. 66.

92. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *Rüstung, op.cit.*, pp. 257ff.

93. Cf. his speech on January 14, 1960, in *Dokumentation zur Abrüstung, op.cit.*, p. 479.

94. Cf. Baylis and Segal, *op.cit.*, p. 14.

95. Cf. S. Tiedtke, *Rüstungskontrolle aus sowjetischer Sicht* (Frankfurt, 1980), p. 22.

96. Cf. Tiedtke, *Militärische Planung*, p. 306.

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part of the Soviets could not have solved the dilemma: "If the Soviet Union had adopted a defensive strategy, then it would have given its opponent a signal that it accepted the rules of nuclear war (i.e., the possibility of a 'limited' nuclear war). It would have thereby undermined the intentions of its own strategy which was designed to prevent the United States from calculating the costs of European war based on flexible response." [97]

By maintaining its offensive strategy, the Soviet leadership indicated that it was not prepared to accept such an agreement. Instead, it underscored that in case of war an escalation that would involve the home territory would be unavoidable. This preparedness for escalation was further demonstrated by the integration of nuclear weapons of all magnitudes into the Soviet army. [98] It is hardly possible to determine if the full extent of Soviet armament was necessary to carry out this strategy. [99] A simple, military measurement of "overkill" capacity tells us little, since these weapons too had their "political" dimension. In the context of this deterrence logic, it is a matter of making the Soviet threat credible that it would respond to a limited war with escalation. There lies the fundamental difference to the strategy which NATO has pursued since the early 1960s. For NATO strategy, European armament is designed to demonstrate the credibility of its threat in terms of the ability to carry out a limited war, while the Soviet military policy attempts to deny the possibility of a limitation and therefore to make any war unthinkable.

This doctrine can represent an effective deterrence only as long as it is believed by the opponent. Its credibility suffers not merely from the improvement in precision of the American missiles. In addition, the component of Soviet strategy that would have initiated an automatic escalation has gradually been neutralized: a counter-offensive in Central Europe. The key military instrument of such an offensive would be the Soviet tank divisions. It is beyond doubt that the Warsaw Pact is considerably superior to NATO in terms of tank forces. [100] However, the chances for such an offensive, even without nuclear arms, have decreased markedly. NATO anti-tank weapons have drastically reduced the Soviet tanks' potential. Their precision has reached 60 to 85 percent at a distance of 1 to 2.5 kilometers. In 1976, U.S. forces had more than 72,000 anti-tank missiles. [101] Between 1978 and 1981, the West German army was equipped with more than 100,000 such weapons. [102] The Soviet military has not yet developed an adequate response to this development. In addition to the expansion of its mechanized infantry troops and the heightened production of airplanes to support ground forces, [103] it has emphasized the quantitative growth of its tank units. Given the assumption that peace in Europe has been based on the credibility of mutual threats, this development too is worrisome. A threat of counter-attack without credibility can

97. *Ibid.*, p. 307.

98. Cf. M. McGwire, "The Rationale for the Development of Soviet Seapower," in Baylis and Segal, *op.cit.*, pp. 210-254.

99. Baylis and Segal warn against projecting the Western notion of deterrence onto the Soviet leadership. The Soviets are pursuing a policy of "deterrence by denial," i.e., deterrence through the demonstrative ability to respond successfully to a potential attacker on all levels. This differs from the flexible response position in its assumption that every war with Western Europe or the United States must necessarily escalate to a total nuclear war. This is, of course, a very opportune position for the military "pressure group," because it gives every branch of the military the necessary legitimation for budget allocations.

100. In the middle of 1976, 27,000 Warsaw Pact tanks were opposed in Europe by 12,000 NATO tanks (including France). Cf. Lutz, *op.cit.*, p. 83.

101. Cf. Tiedtke, "Militärische Planung," *op.cit.*, pp. 309-310.

102. Cf. H. Scheer in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, August 20, 1981.

103. Cf. Schwarz, *op.cit.*, p. 388.

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lead to greater risk-taking on the one side and hysterical reactions on the other. It is possible that the SS-20s actually represent the attempt to deviate from traditional military doctrine and to develop a "limited" and therefore "credible" threat potential. The message that Eppler carried back from Moscow that these missiles carry a load of only 10 to 15 megatons and not, as had been assumed, 250 megatons, is in this sense alarming.[104] Even if these missiles are not meant to be used in a "limited" nuclear war in Europe — and there is no indication of such intentions on the part of the Soviets[105] — they might well be interpreted as indicating such an option by the other side. In nuclear war planning, what one side really does is less important than the designs that are projected onto it.

Sources of the Soviet Military Doctrine

Up to this point, it has been argued that "the Soviet Union has accepted and adopted the Western culture of armament."[106] The basic elements of this culture include: (1) the organization of a specialized apparatus of destruction, separated from the rest of social productivity and organized into a vertical hierarchy; (2) the composition of this apparatus in industrial machinery designed to destroy the greatest possible number of individuals and amount of property; and (3) the development of a military leadership as a specialized purview beyond "civilian" influence. The bases for this culture were of course present in Russia before the revolution, and they were readopted and extended in the Red Army during the interventions and the civil war of 1918-1921. Nevertheless, guerrilla units played an important role during this war, and the 8th Party Congress of 1919 discussed the transition to a militia system integrated into the overall social reproduction. During the 1920s, the army and military doctrine represented a compromise solution[107] between the two forms of organization: on the one hand, a regular army existed as the center of the defensive strategy, on the other, there was a strong militia and military planning envisioned waging a future war as a war of the whole of society. Therefore, the continuous existence of a specialized sector of an arms industry was less important than the conversion capability of factories in case of war. The size of the standing army had less significance than the possibility for mobilization when necessary. The development of motorized units was not as important as the ability and willingness of the peasants to provide horses during a war, to participate in lines of support and even to organize themselves into guerrilla units. With the "forced industrialization" and, especially, the compulsory collectivization of the peasantry, the basis for this sort of military strategy was thoroughly destroyed.[108]

The economic and political upheavals of this phase from the end of the 1920s to the middle of the 1930s, during which the bases for Stalinism as a form of domination were constructed, had an immediate impact on the manner in which the Soviet Union prepared for war. While the result was an army and a military policy that were little different from those of the West, the collapse of the earlier compromise was a result of

104. Cf. *Der Tagesspiegel,* September 3, 1981.

105. Schwarz, *op.cit.,* p. 384.

106. Kaldor, *op.cit.,* p. 75.

107. As military commissar, Trotsky described the development of the army as a compromise with the militia system caused by the material poverty of the Soviet Union. "The Red Army was from the start a forced compromise of two systems, with the predominance of the barracks.... The relation between regular troops and militia is not a bad indicator of the real progress toward socialism." L. Trotsky, *Verratene Revolution* (Frankfurt, 1968), pp. 211ff.

108. Cf. M. von Boetticher, *Industrialisierungspolitik und Verteidigungspolitik der UdSSR 1926-1930* (Düsseldorf, 1979).

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specifically Soviet conditions.[109] The fundamental process of this period was the deepening of the division between society and state in the form of the subordination of society to the state and its ruling party. In terms of military policy, this process led first of all to the predominance of regular troops in barracks. In the course of one year, the percentage of these troops rose from 26 percent at the beginning of 1935 to 77 percent (and reached 100 percent in 1938).[110] This represented the decisive step in the split between army and society. This process was bolstered by measures designed to heighten the social status of the leadership cadre of the army, while demeaning the representatives of society within the army, i.e., the "common soldiers." The holders of military command positions were now allowed to decorate themselves with titles (from lieutenant to marshal), which had been abolished in 1917; the "obligatory military salute," which had been abolished in the first decree of the revolution, was reintroduced; "great military leaders" of the czarist period were purposefully integrated into the tradition of the army, and the distribution of medals and honors was expanded, etc.[111] The leadership cadre of the army regressed to an "officers' caste," further underscoring the division of army and society. Parallel to this development, the fundamental obligation of the soldier shifted from the social *revolution to state loyalty. This change was particularly clear in the reformulation of* the oath of allegiance in January 1939. The earlier version read: "I, son of the working people, citizen of the Soviet Union, am becoming a soldier in the Red Army of workers and peasants. To the working classes and to the whole world, I pledge to carry this name with honor and to learn the military skills conscientiously." In contrast, the new version read: "I, citizen of the Soviet Union, offer this oath on entering the Red Army, and oblige myself to be a loyal, brave, disciplined and eager soldier and strictly to guard military and state secrets, to fulfill military rules without discussion and to follow the orders of officers and leaders."[112]

The economic transformations that led to the development of an important industrial arms sector began earlier,[113] and had a double effect. During the 1920s, the basic program emphasized the conversion capability of "civilian" production, i.e., to further a balanced and proportional economic growth, and therefore *not* to ascribe priority to the arms sector in relation to overall industrial production. The destruction of the inner proportionality of industry due to the "forced industrialization" and the desolate state of industry that followed, cast serious doubt on the plausibility of conversion in case of war. Consequently, the specialization of an arms sector was now emphasized, which worked under privileged conditions and was exempted from the general qualitative decline of industrial production. Conversely, this specialization and the general process of industrialization throughout the country (characterized by tremendous quantitative progress) made possible the mass production of war materiel. In addition, this transformation was supported by the emergence of an "offensive strategy" which necessitated the availability of large quantities of materiel *before* the outbreak of war.

109. This structural transformation cannot be explained simply by the threat of German fascism. First of all, the decisive change took place as early as 1929-30 and, secondly, as Boetticher has shown, it led initially to a real weakening of the Soviet Union's defense potential.

116. Trotsky, *op.cit.*, p. 214. Trotsky bases this in part on the unrest the collectivization caused within the Red Army.

111. Cf. F. Lieb, *Russland unterwegs* (Berne, 1945), pp. 274, 277; B. Souvarine, *Stalin. Anmerkungen zur Geschichte des Bolschewismus* (Munich, 1980), p. 555.

112. Cited in Lieb, *op.cit.*, p. 276.

113. Cf. K.E. Bailes, *Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin* (Princeton, 1978), chapter 14.

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This industrialization process was carried out with the aid of a political ideology that reduced social emancipation to industrial development. The "superiority" of the "socialist" society was to be seen in its level of productive technology. It was logical to extend this argument to the arms sector, i.e., to document the Soviet army's superiority in terms of its technical equipment; in addition, this equipment was now produced with precisely that technology of mass production that allegedly could reach its full potential solely in a Soviet social system.

Finally, a further element of the earlier strategy had disappeared: the massive resources of peasant Russia (and the Ukraine). It had become obvious that a key contribution of the peasants — the means of transportation — had been obliterated by the slaughter of half the horses during collectivization.[114] However, the problem was deeper, since collectivization had transformed peasants from allies into potential opponents of the system.[115] One immediate consequence was the increased motorization of the army. In terms of military strategy, this implied a shift toward the offensive, of course not with militia units but with a professional army equipped with the technical means necessary for rapid advances.[116]

To return to the present: the Soviet offensive strategy is surely still dominant not only owing to the leadership but also because the whole Soviet population is adamantly opposed to a repetition of the terrible experiences of World War II — a war fought out on its own territory. Furthermore, this strategy is wrapped in a context that will prevent even a gradual change or a general Soviet rejection of the arms race, without major structural changes in the ruling system. As an alternative mode of defense, the "militia system" has already been mentioned. If, as Trotsky wrote, the spread of this system is an indicator of the proximity of a society to socialism, then the converse is also true: the conditions for the introduction of such a system (which, due to certain technical developments, is now more plausible than ever) have hardly improved despite the massive changes in the Soviet Union since the 1930s. Even if the bitterness in the peasantry over collectivization has declined, the advanced positions in the Warsaw Pact are hardly reliable bastions. It would, for example, be rather audacious for the Soviets to rely on the willingness of the population of East Germany not to cooperate with an invading enemy. In addition, the Soviet military sector naturally has its own considerable weight. Although it is false to contend that it dominates Soviet politics, and although its participation in the arms race is largely a matter of a quantitative acceleration of production — studies show that qualitative technological changes are due to the interventions of the system's political leadership[117] — it is nevertheless clear that it would strongly resist any reduction of its privileges. In terms of the system, such resistance would be in part justified; an equalization of military and civilian industrial sectors to the level of the latter could endanger the security of the country. In addition to the functional arguments hostile to a restructuring of the relation between the military system and society, the social differences between the two would also resist such change: the "officers' caste" is part of an apparatus of domination that fears a restriction of its privileges. A reduction in the social status of

114. Cf. J. Stalin, *Werke* (Berlin, 1950), Vol. 13, pp. 286ff.

115. Cf. M. Lewing, "Die Auseinandersetzung in der Agrarfrage und die Wirklichkeit in der UdSSR 1928-1940," in P. Hennicke, ed. *Probleme des Sozialismus und der Uebergangsgesellschaften* (Frankfurt, 1973), pp. 332-364.

116. Indeed, World War II took place largely on Soviet territory, but this was a result of the fact that the fascist attack was directed against a Soviet army that was radically weakened by the purges.

117. Cf. Kaldor, *op.cit.*, p. 94; Holloway, *op.cit.*, pp. 222, 224.

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that group might endanger the overall system [118]

By now, of course, no one believes that the productive forces — including the military destructive forces — of "really existing socialism" are superior to those of capitalism. However, no alternative ideology of emancipation, except for a certain statism, is in sight. Therefore, the ruling party-state will probably continue to pursue its own postulated superiority. Yet, one positive aspect must be added: in Soviet opinion, the "historical superiority" is evident above all in the level of production and consumption a society attains. The chances of a conversion of the arms industry into a socially useful industry are at least in one sense higher in the Soviet Union than in the capitalist countries; although it would be opposed by the social and political resistance of the army, such a conversion would not only be useful for social reproduction, it could also be instituted without major repercussions. The end of the Vietnam war led to the bankruptcy of many U.S. firms that had been active in the arms industry.[119] Due to the interlocking of military and civilian sectors, such a reduction of state contracts could lead to a general economic crisis. The Soviet economy is free of such problems. If military products were replaced by industrial goods and durable consumer items, no disturbance of the reproduction mechanisms would necessarily ensue. On the contrary, certain material bottlenecks would disappear, the quality of consumer offerings in the civilian sector would improve, and workers' motivation would rise.

Unfortunately, this is still a pipe dream. A final point must be discussed, which has arisen as an additional problem since the 1930s. The Soviet Union has become a superpower, both in terms of its domestic growth and owing to its power politics *vis-à-vis* other states. The invasions of Poland and Finland at the beginning of the war, the establishment of a buffer zone of friendly states after the war and, finally, the invasion of Afghanistan document the Soviet readiness to give its own security interests absolute priority. Simultaneously, they indicate a fundamental weakness in the system. It tends to secure cooperation with military means, because, unlike capitalism, it has no economic or social means to transform the "partner country" into a reliable ally with structural reciprocal interests.

As developments in Comecon states have shown, this system is only capable of reproducing itself.[120] Despite all the rhetoric of a socialist division of labor, this process of doubling does not lead to any substantial cooperative relations. Rather, these "partners" tend, depending on their level of economic development, to reorient themselves toward the capitalist world market. Next to military might, the central force for cohesion is the non-competitiveness of socialist products on the world market — but that would be changed by an industrialization policy. However, even this dynamic is an insufficient explanation, as is proven by the history of Soviet-Chinese relations. During the first decade after the revolution, the Chinese not only copied the Soviet model of industrial administration (and, with certain modifications, the political system too), but they also entered into strong economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. That did not prevent the radical break in the early 1960s. By extrapolation, this argument suggests that there can be no real "global Soviet expansionism," i.e., a penetration of the world in terms of the Soviet model. Both the

118. For example, under Krushchev a reduction of the officers corps led to a wave of protest; the affected officers considered it a "social degradation." Cf. Kolkowicz, *op.cit.*, pp. 156ff.

119. Cf. Kaldor, *op.cit.*, pp. 61ff.

120. Cf. the instructive example of Romania: S. Welzk, "Entwicklungspolitische Lernprozesse: Rumänische Erfahrungen," in *Befreiung*, 19-20, pp. 70-118.

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basis for such a penetration and the necessary economic force are absent.[121] The rational kernel in such contentions includes (1) the presence of a global (although defensive) military strategy of the Soviet Union and (2) the preference of certain "developing nations," whose development was blocked by an integration into the capitalist world market,[122] for a planned trade relation with the Soviet Union or one of the Comecon countries. Less competition, compensatory contracts and long-term delivery agreements, etc., permit the planning of an independent development policy. That such trade relations are motivated in part by Soviet economic interests is as little a conclusive proof of "Soviet expansionism" as is the fact that the Soviet Union at times uses such agreements in order to improve its own vulnerable geopolitical situation. Such "successes" are extremely unstable, as has been seen in recent years (Egypt, Somalia); they do not represent a "socialist world system" as an alternative to the "first world." Therefore, the notion of a "communist world state"[123] can be banished to the realm of political mythology. Yet, a tendency toward militarization of foreign policy within the Soviet camp and at its borders is unquestionable.

Conclusion

First: the two major phases of NATO strategy — massive retaliation and flexible response — correspond to differing relations between the superpowers in terms of available military potentials. Massive retaliation was a politically effective threat as long as it was the monopoly of one side. On the other hand, reciprocal destruction is no threat but an absurdity, not even taken seriously by the military. Flexible response was an attempt to make the threat credible once again and to reinstate nuclear weapons as political weapons. The current rearmament corresponds above all to the perfection of the appropriate military-technological means. Threats are effective only if they are based on a recognizable will to act. New tactical nuclear weapons (and the neutron bomb) demonstrate this will in a frighteningly credible way.

Second: it is highly unlikely that the stationing of these weapons is intended to prepare for a surprise American first-blow attack against the Warsaw Pact — such a plan would involve too many uncertainties, even for the military. Nevertheless, these missiles represent a major danger because (1) even if they fail to make the American risk predictable, it becomes "more predictable;" (2) due to the extremely short early warning time (especially of the Pershing II), possible accidents become irreversible (the last false alarm in the United States lasted just as long as it would take the Pershing II to reach Moscow); (3) the border between "political" and "practical" weapons is purposely obscured and therefore the dangerous series of assumptions regarding counter-assumptions to initial assumptions, which would precede the

121. Ultra-conservatives often point to this deficit of the Soviet system. In order to uphold the thesis of Soviet expansionism, auxiliary theories must be developed. For example, an important role has been played in recent years by the allegation, first made in the spring of 1977, that Soviet oil resources were being depleted and that the Soviets would soon depend on oil from the gulf. It is hardly an accident that this prognosis was first published just before the first announcement of plans for the rapid deployment force. In the meantime, developments in this matter have undergone considerable progress, and the Defense Intelligence Agency has publicly announced that Soviet oil production will be greatly increased by the 1990s at the latest. "It is beyond doubt that the Soviet Union could become one of the important oil exporting countries of the future." Cf. *Die Zeit*, September 11, 1981. On the CIA prognosis, see L.T. Caldwell and W. Diebold, *Soviet-American Relations in the 1980s* (New York, 1980), pp. 47, 173.

122. Cf. D. Senghaas, "Dissoziation und autozentrierte Entwicklung. Eine Entwicklungspolitische Alternative für die Dritte Welt," in Senghaas, ed., *Kapitalistische Weltökonomie* (Frankfurt, 1979), pp. 376-412.

123. First press conference of President Reagan, January 29, 1981.

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"major attack," becomes increasingly impenetrable and less controllable; and (4) they represent a major step toward attainment of a first-strike capability.

Third: the United States and Western European governments are prepared to engage in the rearmament because what seems to be an irresponsible risk in fact promises them heightened political effectiveness; they are not concerned with security on the European border but with stability elsewhere. They are no longer willing to accept the spread of non-capitalist developmental dictatorships while renouncing the use of military force. The turning point was not Afghanistan, but Iran. The relation to the Soviet Union is indirect: it is to be neutralized in order to gain a free hand elsewhere and to avoid a disaster such as Vietnam. Due to the recent growth of Soviet military power, the force required for this purpose must be correspondingly massive.

Fourth: the Soviet Union's foreign policy is defensive but characteristic of a superpower. It lacks the structural prerequisites for a transformation of the world on its own terms, and it probably lacks the interest in such a transformation, since it would lose more than it would gain. As the Chinese example shows, it would probably risk the stability of its leadership in its bloc and subsequently its own domestic stability would be threatened. That does not imply, however, that it lacks the ability and will to pursue its own security interests ruthlessly on an international scale. Its politics are "imperial" but not imperialistic.

Fifth: important historical and domestic social factors contribute to the Soviet Union's participation in Western armament "culture." The decisive step was taken during the phase of Stalinization during the first half of the 1930s. The military sector was adapted to the autonomous apparatus of domination and, parallel to the dominant ideology, technocratically transformed. Since then, a "military pressure group" has developed, which is not politically dominant but whose interests must be respected by the political leadership, since it does not want to risk a conflict that might destabilize the overall system of domination.

Sixth: Soviet military doctrine is a combination of flexible response (readiness to respond on all levels), massive destruction (ineluctable escalation to a general nuclear war), and the specific Soviet strategy of an offensive military policy. While this doctrine reflects the general interest of the military (as a total of the interests of the separate divisions of the military), it also represents the attempt to make the trauma of World War II unrepeatable and to demonstrate a credible willingness to escalate in order to deter the enemy from smaller attacks.

Seventh: a decisive component of this doctrine — the threat of an offensive response in Central Europe — became increasingly unbelievable in the course of the 1970s. Perhaps the SS-20 is designed to compensate for this lack, and the strategy of deterrence via a general escalation mechanism has perhaps been replaced by the idea of a "limited" nuclear war. This, however, is not necessarily the case (evidence against it includes clear statements by the Soviet leadership and the fact that the Soviet Union — unlike the United States — would not remain untouched by a European "theater" war). In any case, the situation would become more dangerous as soon as the other side incorrectly imputes that the Soviet Union is prepared to adopt a strategy of flexible response.

Implications for the Peace Movement

These considerations lead to the following implications for the peace movement:

First: it is necessary to argue for unilateral nuclear disarmament, as demanded by the British movement. This is important, on the one hand, because the slogan of bilateral disarmament over the last three decades provided the mystifying ideology

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behind which armament was carried out. The elastic clause of bilateralism privileges the "experts," who generally represent interests contrary to those of the peace movement. On the other hand, the demand for unilateral disarmament is correct because the two systems are primarily involved in an arms race with themselves, and the United States is about five to ten years ahead. Furthermore, the goal of the American leadership is to obtain the necessary means to establish its predominance without resistance throughout the world. The realization of this goal may be a utopia, but the path to it may be fatal for us all.

Second: the Eurocentric limitation of the peace movement should be overcome. It is not improbable that Europe may be the site of an eventual explosion, but the roots of the conflict will lie outside Europe, in the contradiction between the First and the Third Worlds. Solidarity with liberation movements in the Third World must become an integral moment in the West European peace movement. (Such solidarity can no longer — as during the Vietnam era — naively posit the identity of political and social goals in Europe and the Third World; the common interest is a matter of the establishment of the prerequisites for paths of independent development.)

Third: the demand for a total nuclear disarmament in Europe (and for the Western movement that means primarily in Western Europe) needs no further justification. There can be no defense of Western Europe with nuclear weapons, since such a defense, in which the object to be defended is itself destroyed, is insane; its only sense lies outside of Europe. This demand is probably only realizable if NATO dissolves or splits. In this context, the peace movement must be prepared to face two problems. On the one hand, a nuclear-free Europe, including the Soviet Union, is not imaginable as long as the United States has nuclear weapons, since the Soviet Union is both a European and a world power. This means that the possibility of nuclear blackmail cannot be ignored. This risk must be accepted. Forms of resistance must be developed that would make such blackmail appear unattractive owing to its high political costs. On the other hand, the danger exists that the peace movement could become the ground for a "movement" with which it would have little in common: a European "nationalism," that — if it were to succeed — would be the bearer of a "European nuclear force." Whoever doubts such a possibility should examine Mitterrand's policies. The only defense against such a development can be clarity concerning goals. Precisely because of this danger, the peace movement can expect no support from the Soviet Union — despite what the ideologues of the social democrats claim — in its efforts toward European independence.

Fourth: even if the thesis of Soviet expansionism is false, the offensive strategy is a fact. A movement that intends to appeal to a majority in West Germany must recognize this. It must therefore participate in the development of an alternative defense policy.

Fifth: 1983 and 1984 are close at hand. Since it is a matter of preventing the realization of interests of domination, the domestic political struggle and the fight against exterminist insanity are two sides of the same coin.

Sixth: the attempt to place rearmament in a broader context does not imply a denial of the size of the very real threat. Because this is really a step toward nuclear Armageddon, all those who recognize the danger should unite, regardless of political, religious, or other motivations and independent of any long-term perspectives. The size of the threat implies an opportunity: since millions have realized for the first time that Europe is stuffed full of atomic warheads, the movement against rearmament could become a movement against nuclear weapons in Europe in general. Three years ago such a vision would have seemed altogether unrealistic. Today it at least has a chance.

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INTRODUCTION TO MARY KALDOR AND THE ENGLISH PEACE MOVEMENT

by John Mason

The following interview with Mary Kaldor was broadcast as one in a series of interviews and debates concerning the West European disarmament movement that were produced by the Europe-In-Formation group for WBAI, the listener-sponsored radio station of the Pacifica network in New York. The interview was recorded in late November 1981 at the close of an American speaking tour by Kaldor, editor of the Bulletin of the European Disarmament Campaign in England, and by other European "peace researchers." It was broadcast three weeks later back to back with an interview with Cornelius Castoriadis, recorded last summer in Paris. The broadcast — which occurred on December 13, just hours before the Polish military coup — was followed by commentaries from Andrew Arato of *Telos* and Gordon Adams of the Council on Economic Priorities.

The text appears here as edited for broadcast. Because it was meant to be heard and not read, the radio text is edited to remove those reservations and qualifications that make statements too complex for rapid, one-shot comprehension. Since this interview was broadcast towards the end of a series of discussions with German activists and English representatives of the European Disarmament Campaign, the listening audience already possessed enough background information to allow the elimination of some programmatic and organizational details. The interview itself was designed to address a set of political questions that had been raised earlier in the series. The series included not only advocates of the campaign and its program, but also interviews with French critics of the English and German movements, such as Pierre Hassner and Dominic Moissey.[1] The interview with Mary Kaldor was the second with a member of the steering committee of the English END, and was framed in terms of the critical points raised by Castoriadis in his *Devant la guerre*, against the strategic and political assumptions of the campaign and its founder, Edward Thompson.[2]

The Europe-In-Formation group was organized in the fall of 1980 by Dick Howard, Tom Whelan and myself. It has since grown into a working collective of a dozen researchers and students in the New York area, who, together with five associates overseas, have been producing a monthly radio magazine for the last year and a half. The group has attempted to define a critical format for radio that would offer something other than a left-sectarian alternative to the commercial media and yet remain accessible to a general audience in a way that small-circulation reviews sometimes are not. This approach was inspired by a shared experience with a common circumstance of intellectual tourism: the political discussion with European leftists which is quickly derailed by the absence of common frames of meaning, and the lack of relevant information on both sides. The group has sought to raise this experience of foreign misadventure to the status of method; seeking to use the questions Europeans ask of their own political traditions to sharpen the questions Americans can ask themselves. This stance has been harder to define, and difficult to maintain, especially in a setting such as that of WBAI.

1. Pierre Hassner has published several critiques of the END. See *Esprit*, 6 (May 1981), and 4 (April 1982).

2. The core of Castoriadis' argument in "Facing the War" was published in *Telos*, 46 (Winter 1980-81), pp. 43-61.

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WBAI remains to some degree a 1960s counter-institution; a community charged by its staff, and by its audience of listener-sponsors, with the mission of conserving the Left political culture defined during the last wave of American activism. It aims at continuing the forms of political intervention and advocacy journalism typical of that period into the current one. Predictably, a fair amount of its international programming is characterized by a fierce attachment to a revolutionary anti-imperialist politics that leads to an enduring fixation on the "beloved communities" under construction by liberation movements in the Third World countries and to an instinctive "two camps" definition of the world, which sometimes slips into a pro-Sovietism worthy of the period of High Stalinism. In this context, EIF has been faced with a twofold agenda: on the one hand, to address the void left by the impoverished coverage of European issues and movements in the mainstream media, and, on the other, to play a critical role *vis-à-vis* the current idols of the sectarian Left. I might add that this attempt at critical intervention has often been interpreted as a political intervention more in the spirit of Radio Free Europe than, say, The National Guardian, especially as far as our treatment of both the Polish and disarmament questions has been concerned.

While the interview with Kaldor speaks for itself, I should specify the questions that EIF brought to that interview coming out of our previous interviews with both advocates and critics of the END, and by so doing also share our impression of where the debate now stands.

We began our series in May 1981 with a simple curiosity about the accuracy of the journalistic description of the European Nuclear Disarmament Campaign's programmatic goals as being "pacifist, neutralist and anti-American." This was a description we took seriously not so much because it was trumpeted by the American press, but primarily because it was a description that French friends endorsed as well.[3] At least as far as the programs of the English END and the Dutch Inter-Church Peace Council seem to go, this description does not withstand close examination. For one thing, Dutch and English peace researchers show an unsaintly fascination with classical strategic doctrine, and with the tactics of unconventional war fighting.[4] It is worth noting that these "peace researchers" have not only provided the broader movement with a great many ideas, but also represent an important link between the social movement and Left party leaderships and official policy makers.[5] They are now actively debating programs of non-nuclear, conventional defense which seek to impose unacceptable costs on any military force attempting the physical occupation of West European territories. At the same time, these non-nuclear programs sometimes include civil defense programs along Swiss or Swedish lines which aim at giving a non-nuclear power some capacity to resist military blackmail by a nuclear superpower.[6] As a "single-issue" movement, the nuclear disarmament campaign

3. I am thinking primarily of Hassner and Castoriadis, but also look at the round-table discussion with Claude Lefort and Gerard Chaliand in *Esprit*, 4 (April 1981), a special issue on strategy.

4. One should look at the volume edited byAdam Roberts, *Civilian Resistance as a National Defense* (London, 1969), and in Anders Boserup and Andrew Mack, *War Without Weapons* (New York, 1975).

5. Kaldor herself is a good example of this kind of intellectual activist. A participant in the Pugwash conference, she is now a member of the University of Sussex Science Policy Research Unit and has good contacts with the British Labor Party.

6. These points reflect conversations with Joylon Howorth, member of the END national steering committee, which Dick Howard and I had last July. They were broadcast by EIS on WBAI August 30, September 13, and September 27, 1981.

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focuses on nuclear weapons almost exclusively, and far from asking a principled commitment to non-violence, often seems to support new approaches to conventional military deterrence (what the French call theories of *dissuasion populaire*).[7] At no point has anyone suggested that all this effort is intended to defend Holland or Norway against a sea invasion by the U.S. Marines.

The question of neutralism also deserves careful examination. As the level of disagreement expressed at the most recent END meeting in Milan suggests, the different national movements are the most united in their insistence on the removal of American and Soviet nuclear weapons from European soil.[8] The consensus becomes more shaky once the question of the English and French national deterrent forces is raised.[9] The most extreme expression of neutralism we have yet encountered is that of the English Committee for Nuclear Disarmament (the old CND), which proposes both unilateral, English nuclear disarmament, and English withdrawal from NATO. However, even this proposal that England go it alone assumes that after England has given the world the benefit of its moral example, it will nevertheless pursue a policy of "armed neutrality" along the lines of Sweden.[10] Otherwise, the program for a "disarmed, non-aligned Europe" frequently takes a distinctly Gaullist twist, albeit minus the *force de frappe*. The English END, for instance, seems to be asking for more than the English withdrawal from the existing system of superpower alliances. Their call for a nuclear-free, non-aligned Europe from Portugal to Poland envisions the dismantling of the system of blocs and the end of relations of diplomatic and military dependence that bind European client states to the central superpowers.[11] In Holland, the call of the Inter-Church Peace Council for the removal of American nuclear weapons and Dutch withdrawal from NATO has been tied to a demand to create an independent European security arrangement.[12] These demands assert the existence of a common European identity that cuts across the political and military divide imposed by the post-war settlement. They envision the restoration of a European cultural and economic space that would reunify Western and Eastern Europe in a common system of exchange.[13]

The trans-European thrust of this project raises immediately the question of the anti-American character of the general movement. Certainly, there is a general sense of frustration and anger over the alienation of national decision-making power over the control of Europe-based nuclear weapons by European governments to the United States and widespread fear about the rationality of American leaders in any military or diplomatic crisis in central Europe that would possibly involve their use.[14] But, at the same time, no one suggests that Europeans need fear that the United States will

7. See Patrick Viveret, "Peace and Liberty," in this issue of *Telos*.

8. This meeting took place a week after the Polish military coup. EIF broadcast a report by Alan Wolfe of the *Nation* on January 31, 1982.

9. Wolfe reported that during the Milan meeting, the French delegates insisted on the breadth and strength of the French national consensus around the *force de frappe*. END proposals for a "nuclear-free zone" running down a central European corridor from Scandinavia to Italy seemed to be drawn so as to avoid this problem.

10. This point reflects our conversation with Howorth.

11. See here the discussion by Alva Myrdal, "Blueprint for END," *European Nuclear Disarmament Bulletin*, 7 (Winter 1981-82).

12. Report by EIF Dutch Associate Gilles de Wildt, broadcast March 28, 1982.

13. Alan Wolfe, "Europe in Search of Autonomy," in *The Nation*, February 27, 1982.

14. Fears of a Reagan leadership and American adventurism are widespread. This is supported by recent polls in Western Europe. For instance, 36 percent of the respondents in a recent Dutch poll commisssioned by the newspaper *De Volkskrant* felt that the United States was a major threat to peace.

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attempt to impose its political will through the military occupation of West European territory (although some German activists are willing to suggest that Germany remains, to some degree, occupied territory).[15] Nowhere is there the sense that the presence of American troops is essential to the preservation of existing political institutions or to the internal order of West European societies. American military troops could be withdrawn from Western Europe tomorrow without affecting the basic social fabric or modifying in any fundamental way the existing system of trans-Atlantic economic, cultural and political exchanges (because the military relation is largely extrinsic to these exchanges).[16] Even in the military realm itself, there is a widespread awareness that once one excludes nuclear weapons from the equation of forces, the contribution of America's wealthy allies represents half of the total NATO expenditures, and that the independent national armies of the European states represent the better part of NATO's total conventional forces.[17] The idea that the states of Western Europe could defend themselves, if they had the political will to do so, is not unthinkable. It does not require a hypothetical rupture in the established institutional structure in order to become possible.

Clearly none of this holds true for the internal orders of Eastern European states or their dependent relation with the Soviet Union. The military relation between the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact is essential to the preservation of both the system of trans-national exchanges within the pact, and the internal orders of the member states. The Soviet Union does not have 'allies'; it has clients.[18] The system of dependency centered on the Soviet Union is an empire in the sense that Soviet troops could not be removed from East Europe without placing the existing regimes there at risk.[19] This situation is perfectly reflected by the balance of forces in the Warsaw Pact; the Red Army represents three quarters of the total force levels, and the Soviet Union contributes all but 10 percent of the total military expenditures.[20] The other Warsaw Pact armies are in fact police forces, and it is an open question as to whether their 60 divisions represent military assets of any strategic worth in a general European conflict.[21]

The demand for a nuclear-free, non-aligned Europe appears radical in the context of Western European politics, but remains thinkable within the conditions of the existing order (perhaps all too thinkable). In Eastern Europe, the demand seems absurdly utopian, divorced from the most elementary understanding of the political realities of Eastern European life. But it may be that there lies its revolutionary character. The vision of a non-aligned Europe assumes that all of Europe, both East

15. This has been widely reported. See our interview with Beatte Seale of *Die Tageszeitung*, broadcast May 31, 1981.

16. These rather elementary points were brought to our attention by Bogdan Denitch of *Dissent* in a round-table discussion with Alan Wolfe and Joylon Howorth broadcast March 28, 1982.

17. *The Costs and Consequences of Reagan's Military Buildup*, Council on Economic Priorities (New York, 1982), pp. 37-38.

18. A description of Soviet client relations is to be found in Immanuel Todd, *La Chute Finale* (Paris, 1976), chapter 4.

19. This point is discussed again by Castoriadis and Paul Thibaud in an interview published in this issue of *Telos*.

20. *The Costs and Consequences of Reagan's Military Buildup, op.cit.* For a French view of the balance of forces, see René Cagnat, Guy Doly and Pascal Fontaine, *Euroshima: Construire l'Europe de la defense* (Paris, 1979), pp. 43-49.

21. This point has been raised by Denitch and Gordon Adams in the December issue of *Democratic Left*.

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and West, were losers in World War II and in the post-war settlement that followed.[22] While this vision tends to define both superpowers as outside usurpers who have imposed a system of limited sovereignty on their European clients, this claim has radically different implications in Western and Eastern Europe. In particular, it refuses to concede to the Soviet system the two cardinal conditions of its hegemony over Eastern Europe: first, the idea that Europe as a whole owes the Soviets an eternal debt for its part in the defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II,[23] and second, the idea that the post-war settlement that divided Europe into socialist and capitalist camps is a permament reality that is irreversible.[24] The demand for a non-aligned Europe need not be seen as a continuation of detente policies pushed into the realm of political fantasy. There is a sense in which this demand tends to undercut the diplomatic recognition of the legality of the Soviet system in Eastern Europe granted by the Western powers in the Helsinki Accords. This is so because this project for a non-aligned Europe sees the post-war division of Europe as both unnatural and historically transitory: an episode that has interrupted the natural course of European development, but which is now drawing to a close.[25] It is not clear why this necessarily represents a contribution to the emergence of a Soviet-dominated Europe for, as Hassner has pointed out, "Finlandization" is a process that can cut two ways.[26]

What stands out in this debate between intellectuals on the European democratic Left is the degree to which critics and advocates of the campaign offer descriptions of the current European situation that run parallel to one another and which raise a common set of political questions. Both sides in this debate insist on the need of the democratic Left to overcome its traditional refusal to take war seriously. We are asked to do something other than reduce the war-fighting capacities of nation states to the status of secondary phenomena that can always be explained in terms of a primary social process located away from the battlefield or parade ground. This attempt to problematize the expansion of military assets is present both in Castoriadis' theory of modern Soviet society as a "stratocracy" and in the Kaldor-Thompson thesis of competing institutions of extermination in the East and the West.[27] This call to address the politics of war owes its urgency to a shared feeling that the current military balance has undergone an important and dangerous alteration. Although the French insist on the Soviet danger to a greater degree than the END thesis of co-responsibility of both superpowers permits, there is a common recognition that the military doctrine and operational planning of the NATO alliance has shifted from a policy of deterrence in the direction of a nuclear war-fighting strategy.[28] This move from Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) to Nuclear Use Theory and Strategy (NUTS) has created a general feeling that a limited nuclear war is a real possibility in a way that seemed unthinkable ten years ago. Both the movement for regional nuclear disarmament and the French policy of strengthening its national deterrent force can

22. Alan Wolfe, "Europe in Search of Autonomy," *The Nation*, February 27, 1982.

23. This point about the function of democratic anti-fascism as a legitimating ideology in Eastern Europe is one of the few valid insights offered by Serge Thion in the course of the Faurisson controversy. See "De l'Exploitation dans les camps à l'exploitation des camps," *La Guerre Sociale*, 3 (Paris, 1981).

24. Paul Thibaud has insisted correctly on the importance of the sense of the irreversibility of the social order in Eastern Europe in the course of his many interventions concerning the Polish crisis over the last two years.

25. This point was made very strongly by Joylon Howorth during the round-table discussion with Denitch and Wolfe, broadcast March 28, 1982.

26. Hassner, *op.cit.*

27. E.P. Thompson, "A Letter to America," in *Protest and Survive* (New York, 1981).

28. Paul Joseph, "From MAD to NUTS," *Socialist Review*, 61 (January-February 1982).

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be understood as different approaches to restoring a lost sense of security.

Both sides of this debate also give a great deal of attention to the modification of the traditional idea of national sovereignty, which has occurred as a consequence of the introduction of nuclear weapons under foreign control onto European territories. The Weberian definition of the modern state as the holder of the legitimate monopoly over the use of force is profoundly altered when nation states become members of alliances controlled by outside powers. These states retain their internal police powers but lose to some degree their classical identity as warfare states. Dominic Mossey argues that the absence of a disarmament campaign in France is largely due to the fact that France is the only state in Western Europe to retain effective responsibility for its own war-making decisions. France's decision to build an independent nuclear force and to divorce itself from the unified command of NATO are credited by him with providing the basis for the maintenance of French national sovereignty at a time when all other European states were alienating theirs to the United States. Seen from this viewpoint, the national government of France is the only one that deserves the full confidence of its citizens because it alone has remained completely sovereign. The rise of the peace movement elsewhere in Europe is seen as a reaction against 30 years of irresponsible governmental resignation to permanent foreign control over essential national issues.[29] Parallel arguments can be heard from English and German defenders of the disarmament campaign who believe that the removal of American nuclear weapons is the first step toward restoring effective European sovereignty over "life and death" questions.[30]

In the interview published here, however, Kaldor defines the issue not as national sovereignty, but rather as one of popular sovereignty. Her position points up what I see as the main line dividing French intellectuals from their northern European counterparts: the questions of the degree of confidence one can place in established political processes and institutions and the role of democratic social movements in the making of defense policy. This question has been addressed mainly with reference to the history of Eastern European satellites, and in particular, the Solidarity movement in Poland. The example of Solidarity has been an important resource that has been used freely by both sides in this debate. The intellectuals of END have continually stressed their organizational contacts with Solidarity and have argued that Solidarity's very existence was proof that mass social movements could play the strategic role END has assigned them on both sides of the Cold War front.[31] Mass pressure in Western Europe to bypass the obstacles of the state to state negotiations through unilateral moves on the part of Western governments makes no sense unless one can also show that the possibility exists for parallel movements to develop in Eastern Europe which will then push their governments into reciprocating moves. The military crackdown was obviously a setback to this END scenario, but even before it occurred, critics were pointing to the limits that existed in the pre-coup situation: Solidarity's inability to raise certain central issues, such as Poland's membership in the Warsaw Pact and its inability to transform concessions into some kind of permanent institutional arrangement.[32] For END, Solidarity was the evidence they needed to demonstrate that mobilizations of public opinion outside of party control were possible even in Eastern Europe. For END's critics in France, Solidarity was the proof that mass social movements depend on the existence of institutions belonging to the liberal public sphere, and that popular democratic change cannot be realized in the absence of

29. Dominic Mossey, EIF interview broadcast August 30, 1981.
30. Howorth, interview of August 30, 1981.
31. Howorth, interview of September 27, 1981.
32. Andrew Arato, EIF interview broadcast December 27, 1981.

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effective national sovereignty.[33] In other words, social movements cannot bypass the established institutions of political democracy because they cannot succeed without them.

There is, however, a deeper link between the French critics' skepticism about social movements and their attachment to national political institutions, which has to do with their view of nuclear arms. However much the absence of social movements may be deplored by French intellectuals, their active endorsement of the French policy of deterrence demands that the control of foreign and military policy remains in the hands of institutional elites and insulated from mass pressure. There may be a strong link between the presence of a national political consensus in favor of the *force de frappe* and the fact that the French Socialist Party retains effective control over the definition of "admissible" political issues to a much greater degree than is the case in England, Holland and West Germany, where the mass parties of the Left have ceded much ground to extra-parliamentary movements. Birnbaum has observed that there is a fundamental difference between the norms of democracy and the norms of strategic diplomacy: the former demands a modicum of openness and participation for legitimacy, the latter a great deal of secrecy and deception for success.[34] One of the conditions of the strategic game is that ordinary citizens give their trust to the goodwill and intelligence of a limited set of institutional actors, and do not ask too many questions. This seems to be a gamble that not a few French intellectuals remain ready to accept and to recommend to their fellow countrymen.

The politics of deterrence (especially in its Gaullist guise of the dissuasion of the stronger by the weaker) modifies the rules of strategic realism to a limited extent, but ends up reaffirming their fundamental validity. Deterrence theories are not strategic in the classic military sense. When nuclear weapons are deployed as instruments of dissuasion, they do not exist as military resources. Since they are never intended to be used, they are never expected to contribute to the military resolution of a strategic conflict. Rather, they are assets only to the degree that they block the possibility of a particular military conflict exceeding a specified threshold of violence. This classification of nuclear weapons as a species of non-strategic assets bends the rules of classical strategic conflict in several important ways. First, it tends to modify the definition of strategic conflicts as "winner take all" situations of absolute antagonism. Policies of total war or unconditional surrender are excluded because no particular interest is so important that it is worth the risk of the breakdown of deterrence. Instead, crises between adversaries are subject to management, arranged in such a way that no party will feel that his central interests are fundamentally threatened. The interest in crisis management tends to displace the field of conflict away from military forms, in their direction of political economic and ideological forms of warfare. Second, deterrence assumes that the usual rules of secrecy and deception must be suspended.[35] In order for adversaries to be deterred it is essential that they understand what one's military capabilities are and where the limits of one's tolerance lie. Otherwise, failure to understand what one can do and why may lead to the breakdown of deterrence.

These modifications of the rules expand the role of state actors in a new setting. The role of state to state diplomacy takes on critical importance, as does the maintenance of sufficient military force to possess the necessary entry ticket into the nuclear bargaining process. This is especially the case for a medium-sized power such as

33. Claude Lefort, "Un Peuple uni et indompte," *Esprit*, 3 (March 1982).
34. Pierre Birnbaum, EIF interview recorded July 1981.
35. Shelford Bidwell, *World War III* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1978), chapter 3.

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France. In order for the French national deterrent to remain persuasive, it must not only be constantly updated, and its commanders left free of unnecessary political checks, but French governments must play a constant game of distance and attachment with one of the major superpowers. France can bargain for its survival only in a context where one or another superpower is convinced that it has the capacity to tip the balance against it or to refrain from doing so.[36] This requires not only a situation of global parity between the superpowers, but also an enormous reliance on the mechanisms of state to state negotiation, and a closed system of military decision-making. It also encourages the definition of political problems from the viewpoint of institutional elites.

The intellectuals of the European Disarmament Campaign refuse to place the same degree of trust in a politics of deterrence which rests ultimately on the rationality of official decision-makers and on mass passivity. This refusal is based on a rejection of the politics of deterrence as being one that is fundamentally hostile to the norms of liberal democracy. The theory of deterrence is based on the acceptance of a mutual suicide pact between peoples. In other words, competing states agree to protect themselves against attack by placing their respective civilian populations at risk. When states agree to defend themselves by offering their populations as hostages to each other, the survival of civil society is subordinated to the sectional interest of the state in its own organizational survival. This has been rejected by the members of END as a policy that breaks the fundamental contract between the liberal state and society, in which citizens given their loyalty in exchange for the state's guarantee of their personal security.[37]

Further, END spokesmen identify a link between nuclear defense policies and social immobility. Nuclear defense policies allow the state to defend itself with a small professional force that does not require mass participation for its effectiveness. The privileged place of weapons systems over armies allows the state leadership to act in crisis situations without the widespread support of the society outside it. Like conservative social and industrial policies that write off whole regions and social groups as liabilities to be sacrificed in the name of economic recovery, nuclear defense policy views most of society as expendable.[38] END spokesmen have suggested that this sense of expendability contributes to the sense of paralysis and passivity that limits citizen commitment to the defense of democratic institutions or national community. Recent polls in France and Germany certainly suggest that nuclear military policies may encourage many individuals to abandon any hope of wartime resistance. Other polls in Norway and Holland suggest that the absence of nuclear weapons may well be related to higher levels of commitment to national resistance in the case of external invasion.[39]

This argument bears directly on the anguished appraisal of some French intellectuals of the nuclear disarmament movement as the ultimate sign of a collapse of the Western European will to resist Soviet hegemony. One might reply with a question as to the role nuclear weapons may have played in that collapse and close with the suggestion that the mobilization of civil society around the new social movements may represent the revival of society's interest in its own defense.[40]

36. Dominic Mossey, interview of August 30, 1981.
37. Howorth, interview of September 27, 1981.
38. Howorth, interview of August 30, 1981.
39. Olivier Mongin discusses these polls and their significance in *Esprit*, 4 (April 1981), pp. 28-38.
40. All of the interviews mentioned above are available in tape cassette form for $5 each from Europe-In-Formation, Sociology Department, Room 901, CUNY Graduate Center, 33 West 42nd Street, New York, NY 10109 USA.

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INTERVIEW WITH MARY KALDOR

MASON: I would like to begin by asking a question concerning the scope of the European Nuclear Disarmament campaign in Western and Eastern Europe.

KALDOR: I should say, first of all, that the European disarmament movement does not go under any single umbrella. It consists of literally thousands of small, local disarmament groups started by people through their own spontaneous efforts in small towns and villages all over Europe. European Nuclear Disarmament was set up in Britain to publicize the European idea in Britain and to help coordinate these groups with other peace movements in Europe. The scope of the movement is extraordinary and I think you can see this when you look at what has happened this fall. We have had demonstrations throughout Europe. We hoped, when we planned these demonstrations, to get a million people on the street. We easily surpassed that. We got a million and a half and still have not had all the demonstrations. There's one on Saturday in Amsterdam and there'll be a multinational demonstration in Brussels, when NATO ministers meet to confer on their decision to deploy cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe. I think that the size of many of the demonstrations took many of us by surprise, particularly in Italy where half a million people demonstrated in Rome. We never expected the movement to grow so quickly in Italy. Indeed, we were told "you'll never get a disarmament movement going in Italy because you only have disarmament movements in Protestant countries." In fact, it turned out not to be true. We also thought that we would never get a movement going unless it was supported by the church and the Communist Party. Well, in fact, this movement is autonomous and the church and the Communist Party are following after.

MASON: I'd like to get a better idea about what kinds of policy proposals the movement is united around. To what degree are demands and policies actually coordinated between these various movements. Are there certain proposals that have gathered a great deal of support?

KALDOR: Well, I think that there are three things on which there is unanimity, things that in a sense are a condition for being part of the movement: (1) the demand for a nuclear-free Europe, both East and West; (2) the demand that NATO should not deploy the cruise and Pershing missiles and that the Soviet Union should halt or move the SS-20 missiles; and (3) opposition to the neutron bomb. These are the three demands around which the movement has coalesced. But every national movement has its own demands because that situation is different, and in our original appeal for a nuclear-free Europe we made it clear that we saw European nuclear disarmament as a process which would be achieved through a myriad of different kinds of disarmament proposals: unilateral, bilateral, multilateral. We would aim to oppose particular categories of weapons like cruise and Pershing missiles, like neutron bombs, like all the thousands of battlefield nuclear weapons and nuclear artillery, atomic demolition mines in Europe. But we also had the idea that we would create geographical spaces free of nuclear weapons and that the idea of the nuclear-free zone could range from small towns to regions to the whole continent. I do not know if you have heard about it, but we have had numerous townships declaring themselves nuclear-free zones. In Britain, for instance, over one hundred municipalities covering more than half the population of Britain have declared themselves nuclear-free zones

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— that is, to say they oppose the presence of nuclear weapons in those municipalities, and some of them also oppose nuclear energy. They refuse to comply with the government's civil defense regulations. They run programs of education, films and meetings in the town hall, evening courses. They see if they can oppose planning commissions' permissions for bases. And now they are also planning to link that to the idea of plans to convert defense facilities in municipalities to the needs of local communities. And we have tried to twin those with other — we have had proposals for twinning between municipalities in England that have declared themselves nuclear-free zones with other municipalities in Europe. Nottingham is officially twinned with Minsk in the Soviet Union, which has an SS-20 base. And the town council of Nottingham having declared itself a nuclear-free zone has sent a formal invitation to the municipality of Minsk to declare itself a nuclear-free zone also. We have also got proposals for countries. We want a nuclear-free Britain. That's one of our campaign demands. There's a proposal for a Nordic nuclear-free zone, too.

MASON: You mentioned three points around which there was unanimity and they were a nuclear-free Europe, non-deployment of American theater weapons and a halt or, I suppose, a recall of the Soviet SS-20s, and no to the neutrom bomb. So, does that mean in terms of your movement there are limits as to who can participate? That is to say, on the one hand, organizations that refuse to criticize the Soviet emplacement of the SS-20s are not considered welcome or part of the movement? Does it mean that organizations, for example like the French Socialist Party, which insist on the need for independent French strategic deterrents, are not welcome to participate? I mean, does this put certain limits on what kinds of organizations are permitted to join in the campaign?

KALDOR: Yes, I believe it does. I think there are really two fundamental principles. One is that of non-alignment. We believe that the United States and the Soviet Union are equally responsible for the arms race. We believe the threat is not from any country. The threat is the threat of limited nuclear war or nuclear war. And the other is that nuclear disarmament is not going to be achieved just through multilateral negotiations. It is going to be achieved through lots of different ways which must, I believe, include a certain amount of unilateral measures.

MASON: So, another dimension of the campaign, which I suppose flows out of the non-alignment principle that you just articulated, is that in general people of the campaign have lost confidence in the state to state arms reduction negotiations that have been going on between the United States and the Soviet Union.

KALDOR: I think that is absolutely true. You must remember that at the end of the 1960s there was a campaign for nuclear disarmament in Europe. It was particularly strong in Britain and Scandinavia and to some extent in Germany. And I think that what in a sense led to the decline of that campaign was the beginning of detente, the beginning of arms control negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Now people feel very betrayed. They feel we have had 20 years of arms control negotiations. There are thousands more nuclear warheads. The nuclear weapons have increased enormously in accuracy and other kinds of technological improvements that make them much more usable. Nuclear strategy has become much more dangerous. It has shifted from what we used to call massive retaliation or pure deterrent to a strategy of actually war fighting and all this has happened despite the arms control agreements. Indeed, our main feeling is that the arms control agreements have actually legitimated present levels of armaments. They've actually legitimated technological improvements because they've only concentrated on quantitative levels. They have legitimated those areas of armaments that are not covered by arms control

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agreements. They have actually had a pernicious effect. This is not to say that we oppose multilateral negotiations. On the contrary, we have said, and we have said this with the agreement of peace groups all over Europe — we have said we welcome the nuclear force negotiations which the United States and Soviet Union are about to begin, but we will regard those negotiations as a sham unless they lead to real reductions in the nuclear weapons on both sides.

MASON: So there is another side of the politics of the movement. It occurs to me that it is a refusal to some degree by European client states to allow life and death decisions to remain in the hands of a superpower partner. That suggests that the movement is organized around issues of national sovereignty.

KALDOR: I do not think it is sovereignty. I think it is democracy. People in Britain were very, very angry when they learned that the decision to deploy cruise and Pershing missiles had been made without consultation with Parliament and with hardly any public information at all, with no public discussion, without the consultation of many politicians. So, people were very angry about that, and about the fact that the decision to fire cruise missiles would be in the hands of an American president whom we have not elected and that there would be no physical way in which the British government could prevent the firing of those nuclear missiles. However, people are just as angry about the fact that the prime minister of Britain, Mrs. Thatcher, who people trust no more than President Reagan, is equally responsible for determining whether the British independent nuclear forces should be used. Indeed, one of the issues I think really set things off as much as the cruise missile issue was the discovery that under the Labor government three people — the prime minister, the minister of defense and the foreign minister — had authorized the improvement of the Polaris nuclear warhead at a cost of one billion pounds, which was the first stage to producing a successive Polaris submarine and missiles and completely contrary to Labor Party politics, completely in secret. And that idea that decisions of this moment can be taken and have been taken over the last 30 years by one or two people was considered a total travesty of democracy. And I think that there is a tremendous sense throughout the movement that this is not about national sovereignty; it is about popular sovereignty and that there is this incredible chasm between political institutions and people's needs. I think in England we have had this expressed very violently in the recent riots that we have had through the summer all over the country, which are riots about unemployment, education, and things that politicians have not listened to. And there is a very strong feeling that disarmament actually is a kind of epitome of all these issues. It is the ultimate issue, because if they are worried about control over our lives, it is absolutely appalling that we do not have control over life itself. So it is not just that control is in the hands of foreigners, we do not want control in the hands of anybody. So I think that — we feel and we have said this very explicitly: This is a movement of peoples against establishment. It is not a movement of nations against nations.

MASON: So, to some degree then, one might say that the nuclear arms question has touched a political nerve, has touched a political incident in the sense that one might argue that the presence of nuclear arms under the direction of a very limited bureaucratic elite in the hands of a very small core of professionals who can sue them more or less without the participation of the rest of society; that that kind of situation has epitomized the degree to which Western society has become depoliticized and this is an issue around which people have mobilized in defense of certain kinds of political rights and political powers.

KALDOR: Absolutely, and I think that what has struck me, moved me most about

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the development of the movement is the way in which people who had never before engaged in politics or felt able to influence events, have gotten involved in this movement.

MASON: I think, however, this emphasis on democracy, this emphasis on the popular recreation of a certain kind of political movement, a certain kind of popular political institution which will present civil society in the face of a state which is alienated from it and threatening its very existence, raises a question about your strategy in Europe as a whole. How do you justify an appeal to public opinion in Eastern Europe? It is part, it seems to me, of the strategy of the campaign to attempt to invoke, to incite the development of reciprocal movements in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe so that those societies will begin to confront their states and state apparatuses and their military policy. Do you think that the structure of Eastern European society and especially the Soviet Union is so similar to the structure of Western European societies that such popular movements, that such appeals to public opinion, are really possible?

KALDOR: Let me say first of all, we have linked peace to democracy in Western Europe. We have also made it very explicit that we do the same in Eastern Europe and that it is time peace and democracy got together. We feel that the movements for human rights in Eastern Europe very often get the situation in the West on its head. They feel that those people who favor Western armaments as somehow on their side, and in the same way, people who work for peace very often feel that the Soviet Union is on their side. And we feel that it is time we got those movements together; that people should realize that democracy will be achieved in a Europe free from blocs and peace will only be achieved in a Europe that is truly democratic. Edward Thompson wrote a letter in reply to a Czech dissident explaining that the hawks in the West, far from really supporting the Czech's cause, supported it only as propaganda, and in fact there is nothing they would like more than an invasion of Poland, because an invasion of Poland would support the case for more armaments. In just the same way, the Soviet Union justifies the suppression of human rights in Eastern Europe on the grounds of defense against the West and that neither human rights nor peace will be achieved unless we get these two things together. We need to recognize that different Eastern European countries are very different. In some societies there is space. In others, there is no space. In Hungary, for instance, and in Poland there is some form of public opinion — not public opinion as we know it, public opinion that involves going to demonstrations and the like. But there is some form of public opinion that even if it is not expressed in newspaper articles or in demonstrations, is filtered through to communist parties and has its way of getting expressed whether it is through cabarets, whether it is through intellectual discussions in universities, and I think that if we start talking to these people, we can have some influence. We can have influence, incidentally, through the Eurocommunist parties. I think there is a move in several of the communist parties in Eastern Europe, in East Germany and in Hungary, and, of course, particularly in Poland, to move towards a Eurocommunist position. We now have a growing correspondence in Hungary, Romania, Poland and East Germany.

MASON: So far I feel myself open to many of the arguments you have made about Eastern Europe, but I have a bigger problem with the Soviet Union itself. I have just been reading through your article on the baroque arsenal in that book. You give a very convincing description of the military-industrial complex in the Soviet Union, which almost seems to represent a separate militarized, social core that is somewhat apart from the rest of society. And you talk about its important functions for the Soviet economy and its links with its American and Western European counterparts. I think you make the argument that the military subsystems in the United States and Western

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Europe have had the function of introducing an element of planning into otherwise decentralized market economies and you made the alternative argument for the Soviet Union, i.e., that the military industrial complex there has had the function of introducing an element of technical innovation and international competition into a bureaucratic, centralized planning process which is otherwise very inefficient. But what emerges from your article is that there is a tremendous political, institutional and I would say economic stake in the Soviet Union in the continuation of military arms production. It is one of the main rationales for the metal eaters, as they are called — all those elements of the Soviet bureaucracy that are committed to the production in heavy industry. It seems to me as though the conversion problems that we face in the West are also faced in the East, with the disadvantage that you have a closed, manipulated public sphere that does not leave open the spaces necessary for the development of independent social movements as they exist in Western Europe and as they exist to some degree in Eastern Europe.

KALDOR: Well, you have summarized my argument pretty well, but you have left out one very important dimension of it and I was arguing that technological innovation in the military sector in the West, while it may have been progressive in World War II and in the years immediately afterward, has taken a wrong direction. I have argued that it is what one might call decadent technology, that it is innovation of technologies that are past their prime, beyond their useful limits. I mean, in a commercial world, it is the market that provides the limits to how far you develop cars; whether you keep on making them able to go faster and faster. There is no such limit in the military world, and the result is we go on making airplanes, missiles, tanks. We go on making technological "improvements" and no longer useful improvements and the result is incredibly complex, elaborate, expensive equipment that neither improves military capabilities nor serves to mobilize technology. On the contrary, it actually erodes the economy and drags technology in the wrong direction, in a direction that neither can fulfill needs or improve economic competition. What the Soviet Union is doing is, if you will, competing with the United States in this decadent technology. In World War II, the kind of military technology that the Soviet Union developed as a result of the war and the competition with Germany for the war was the most modern technology then known: the technology of automobiles, of the internal combustion engine, mass production, Fordist techniques. And that obviously had a tremendously mobilizing role. The Soviet Union has now reached a point in its economic development where it desperately needs to increase productivity. It has absorbed most of the labor into the industrial sector; it has absorbed all its materials; it is coming to the end of available labor. It is coming to the end of available materials. It can only continue to grow through increasing productivity. It desperately needs some kind of boost to its technology and, instead of this kind of boost, it is getting this fearful, degenerate type of technology which may actually be the cause of the negative productivity growth. Added to that, military spending is a tremendous economic burden much, much greater than in the West because the Soviet Union is a poorer country. It is said that military production amounts to something like 25 percent of manufacturing. There is just no way that the Soviet productive system can continue to support military spending on this scale. Therefore, I believe that certain types of changes are going to be forced upon it. It is going to produce divisions within the establishment that may make it possible to bring about certain changes in the Soviet system.

MASON: I would like to push you a little bit on this because it seems to me that, coming out of your argument, there are several points that suggest a certain degree of

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complementarity in the bureaucratic institutional conservatism of both East and West, which represents a tremendous social, institutional, political investment in the continuation of military production in Eastern as well as Western Europe. You have made the argument that the Soviet Union has a tremendous political investment in the legitimacy that was created by the socialist victory or the Soviet victory during World War II, and that has been reflected in a tremendous conservative investment in the technologies that won that war, as you just pointed out. But you also seem to say that it is the same planning and design institutions, the same military plants that were involved in World War II production, which are still involved in military production today. Military production for the Soviet Union plays a very important role in terms of exports. That is to say, we know the Soviet Union produces something like 6,000 tanks per year at its truck and automobile factories — 3,000 or 4,000 of which are sold abroad. Thanks to Western arms industry, perhaps, in terms of competitive exports, that earns hard currency for the Soviet Union. Besides natural resources, arms and weapon systems seem to be about one of the only areas in which they are competitive. It is one of the only sources of hard currency dollars available to them. It seems to me as though there is this tremendous investment and I am wondering what the political mechanism is going to be for getting around it.

KALDOR: Well, I do not really disagree with anything that you are saying, but what I am saying is that there is no way in which the Soviet Union can continue to support this sytem. They are going to get into more and more of, if you like, a vicious circle in which this tremendous dependence on the military sector is going to slow down economic growth. It is going to produce more unhappiness and disaffection which may not be expressed in outright political opposition but it will be expressed in drunkenness and absenteeism and all the things that have come to reflect opposition, and we may even see strikes; we may even see the development — the beginnings of a development — of a sort of Solidarity-type situation. I think the other thing to point out is that, yes, it is true that it is a command system. And yes, it is true that the military has a very great power in the command system. Nevertheless, the party is in control and there are factions within the party and they are not all military factions. And there are factions who favor consumer spending and these factions are growing, I think, because of the fear of what this continued system will do. I think there is a kind of crisis. It is not a kind of crisis that one sees in the West, but it is a crisis that produces opposition groups and the Soviet bureaucracy is no longer a command system in the sense that it was under Stalin. It is a committee system, actually, and it is a pluralistic committee system, if you like. There are different groups within the committee system and I believe those groups are going to grow. Maybe one should not be too optimistic. I think you are right, but I think that unless one sees some kind of opening, there is no where we can work. The point you make about the export of tanks is a very valid point and the importance of foreign currency makes all the stronger the case for encouraging East-West economic cooperation. That is absolutely crucial — should be an absolutely crucial companion to everything we do.

MASON: There are two points that emerge out of this discussion — because I know that this particular debate about the Soviet Union could go on for hours and probably will. One point is that it is critical for us who are concerned with survival questions in the West to try to increase our knowledge and increase the degree of debate about the Soviet Union and what it represents as a social formation in order to try and thrash out some of these questions. Ultimately, we cannot change unless they change, and that means that, in some way, we have to find a way of helping them change. We have to change them in order for us to change ourselves. That, I think, pushes us in the

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direction of bilateral types of moves and bilateral types of strategies — more than in the direction of the unilateral strategy that has been proposed — for example, by the campaign for nuclear disarmament — though I do recognize that there are different choices that different countries can make.

KALDOR: The point about moving in a bilateral direction — I think we have to move in both directions. I think it is absolutely critical that we do both. One of the things that we have been doing is trying to make it clear in our contacts with the Soviet Union that if they want us to make unilateral moves, it is tremendously important that they also make unilateral moves. And I know that Michael Foote, on his visit to the Soviet Union, made that point, and it is a point that we have made in all our contacts with them. I know the Germans have made that point and that was behind Brezhnev's unilateral offer in the autumn of 1979.

MASON: I think that there is another point that emerged from this discussion about the Soviet Union and that has something to do with the technical and industrial characteristics of existing military technologies themselves. Specifically, you seem to be implying that in the East, as well as in the West, the existing focus around certain types of weapon systems is not only leading us into a situation where our survival is at stake, but it is at stake in several different ways. That is to say, not only are we threatened by the use of nuclear weapons in war fighting strategy, but we are also burdened with an accumulation of conventional weapon systems that are becoming increasingly complex, therefore prone to breakdown; therefore, increasingly difficult to maintain, so that as we spend more, our insecurity grows greater, not only in the nuclear field, but also in the conventional field, because a lot of the conventional, classical weapon systems that we are dealing with simply will not work under battlefield conditions. You seem to be saying we are committing ourselves for institutional reasons essentially to systems that will not work and systematically neglecting alternative forms of defense strategies based on other kinds of weapons technologies. I was wondering if you might be able to tell us something about the discussions that have been going on within European Nuclear Disarmament and within the Labor Party concerning the development of alternative defense strategies and what they might look like.

KALDOR: Well, I think that what you said about conventional weaons is true of all weapons, whether nuclear or conventional. They have become so over-elaborate and complex and expensive that they do not work, that they need so many spare parts that it is absolutely inconceivable that you would have so many spare parts in battlefield conditions. I think also that they are tremendously vulnerable. I mean, all of these weapons have become immensely more destructive, immensely more accurate. We saw in the Middle East war situation where during the three weeks of the war one tank was destroyed every fifteen minutes, on the average; an airplane destroyed every hour. Any war is going to involve immense destruction and the idea that you would then put into battle your expensive airplanes and tanks, which may have cost several million dollars each — it is just absurd. The really interesting thing about increasing destructiveness is that a man carrying a small missile or some small guided weapon can inflict perhaps as much damage as someone in one of these over-elaborate tanks or airplanes. This has caused many strategists — not just of the left, but on the right as well, particularly in military circles (and I think here in America in the RAND Corporation) — to suggest that one should have very different kinds of conventional, territorial defense, that one would have a defense based on people hidden behind trees carrying defensive and relatively cheap, effective weapons. In Germany, they call it "techno-guerrillas" who would then be able to inflict a very high rate of attrition on an

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invading force. This kind of defense would be purely defensive. There would not be offensive forces: big tanks, big aircraft, the kinds of things that you would use to counterattack. It would be purely defensive. Now, of course, it would always be entirely possible for an attacking force to saturate all these people with the kinds of hideous weapons that are now available — napalm, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons. This is in a sense exactly what happened in Vietnam and the most successful items were all these small missiles that the Vietnamese used. But what one can do is make it so difficult and costly that any potential invader would think twice about taking it on. We can make it an awful lot harder to invade West Germany, for instance, than to invade Afghanistan.

MASON: What you are talking about here is really what the French call a theory of popular deterrence. That is to say, it is somewhat the strategy the Yugoslavs are talking about, which is that even though they do not have nuclear weapons, they do believe they have the ability to deter attack by making the cost so extremely high to any potential aggressor that the prize of Yugoslavia is not worth the pain involved in trying to take it. The problem with this is that it seems to me as though this consideration of alternative defense strategy brings us back to the political questions that we were considering earlier because it implies a degree of political mobilization, political loyalty. It implies linkages between masses of people and institutional elites that the whole drift of Western economies and Western politics has been moving away during the last 20 or 30 years.

KALDOR: Well, I think that that is true, but I think there are intermediate stages. I mean, I think it is true and I hope it is. I would like to see a popular mobilization. I have actually some hesitations with comparing the model to the Yugoslav one. I actually do not want to see the whole society armed. I think that one of the great achievements of liberal capitalism in Britain was actually not to have an armed society. I would like to see a very low level of conditional defense. I think in Britain we certainly could afford to do that. We could ring the country with defensive weapons and have a relatively small army. I do not want to see a massive mobilization and a massive militarization of society, but what I would like to see ideally would be to create a social and political situation that would also make occupation difficult. One of the lessons we learned from Poland — if one is really thinking about why to now the Soviet Union has not invaded — it is because this is a popular movement. In the case of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, they simply had to remove the government. In the case of Poland it is not going to make any difference. The government has expressed its support for the Soviet Union. They are actually facing a whole society committed to a particular policy, and that is what makes invasion, even though the society is not armed. The Dutch have talked a great deal about this: they call it horizontal resistance. They say "in the war, Hitler invaded us and all he had to do was take over a few centralized institutions, same in a military coup: the radio station, the high echelons of government, and because we operate through a hierarchical, vertical command system, everybody obeyed Hitler. Well, what we have got to do is create a society which is not like that, which is organized horizontally, as it were, in which power is decentralized and there is not a centralized apparatus that you can take over when you invade a country. That is what we are aiming at." And I think that is a very good way of seeing a defense strategy.

MASON: What interests me is precisely the politics of it, because it suggests that a defense strategy that would not involve the absolute destruction, the sacrifice of a third or half of civil society for the defense of its state apparatus, which is what nuclear deterrence seems to imply — that some alternative to that does demand a democratic,

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participatory kind of politics. The problem is, that suggests that in order for this to be a realistic alternative, there has to be a tremendous transformation of the existing social and industrial structures of Western as well as Eastern Europe. And this brings me back to one of the themes we have been playing with, namely, that in order for us to change, we have to change them. In order for them to change, we have to change. It seems to me as though it might be worth pursuing a bit what the links are between this disarmament campaign and alternative defense strategies and broader social and industrial types of policy.

KALDOR: Well, I think that one of the things we often say in the disarmament movement is that we do have to see this movement as it were creating the basis for a post-disarmed world, as well as pursuing specific disarmament proposals and specific alternative defense strategies. We are also pursuing a whole range of strategies which will create that world. We talked about democracy and human rights. There is a whole range of strategies associated with that which people in the disarmament movement are already into: a range of strategies which deal with, for instance, control of the media. We feel we should have decentralized television. We should have many more newspapers. We should have much more access so that people can express the myriad of views that actually exist in our society; we should have a freedom of information act; we should have much more open discussion within government. So there is a whole range of issues associated with what we are really pursuing actively. Then there is a whole range of issues associated with economics. In a way, some of those are the most exciting, because I sometimes feel that the armament sector is a mixture of the worst elements of the two societies: central planning — it has got the conservatism of central planning and the dynamism of capitalism. We could create a mixture of the best elements. We could use the dynamism of capitalism to create change to meet people's needs and we could use the element of planning to make sure that people are not thrown out of work, lose their money, their rights by the process of economic change as happens at present. And I think central to that will be conversion of the arms industry and in Europe, the trade unions have been at the forefront of demands for conversion of the arms industry, and they have started to develop their own plans for meeting alternative means. Some of these plans have been very exciting and in the Labor Party and in other socialist parties we do have proposals for local planning in which consumers get together with local workers and really try to develop plans for what they produce. If we can really get that moving, if we cannot just draw up the plans that we might actually get money, we might actually back these plans by developing cooperatives, for instance. I know that arms workers in Vickers in England are now demanding some of their factories be turned into cooperatives. If we can start doing that kind of thing, we can actually start breaking down what seemed to be to us these hideous monolithic institutions that perpetuate the arms race. And then, I think, as a final point about this, that we are talking about an alternative to a system that is based on states — both domestically and internationally: states that compete with each other internationally, states that suppress popular aspirations nationally. And that means that we are not just talking about creating popular forms of economic and social mobilization on a national level. We are talking about doing this internationally, and the disarmament movement is a mechanism for this — for people in both Eastern and Western Europe to really break down the underlying structure of the Cold War.

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A GERMAN DOCUMENT*

by Herman Gremliza

The author of the following open letter to Leonid Brezhnev is Robert Havemann; the West German signatures were collected by Dr. Peter Brandt. The list comprises almost everyone who deserves attention in the West German Left.

Does one note that I am once more in opposition? After all, I have been writing against nuclear arming for years, even when no one wanted to hear about it. I have signed the Krefeld appeal, the Bielefeld convocation and the SPD-land board of managers of Schleswig-Holstein; in view of the danger and of the opponent, I care nothing about sectarianism. I am for the peace movement, for the grand alliance in the struggle against the greatest evil: atomic warfare. Socialists and communists were the first; so much the better when Christians, too, bourgeois and even German nationalists (of the German-National Peoples Party) support the fight for peace.

But I will not be Christianized because a few peace-loving pastors of both confessions have found themselves ready to atone for the historical guilt of weapons-blessing military bishops and field chaplains. Nor will I be converted to existentialism because a few insightful bourgeois have come to realize that atomic warfare knows no hinterland. And lastly I will not be hornswoggled by members of the German National Peoples Party because they are on an anti-American toot.

Since the publication of the Krefeld Appeal, the peace movement has succeeded in lifting somewhat the anti-Communist blinders of many West Germany bourgeois and of spreading a few important facts: that the United States under Reagan, Haig and Weinberger has launched its last battle for political and economic world hegemony; that they require military supremacy for this; that they wish to out-arm to death its global opponent, the Soviet Union, not in order to annex Siberia but to eliminate its adversary in the countries of the Third World; that atomic arming is an evil in every time and every place but that here and now it is the United States (and its allies) who are urging on atomic armament and preventing disarmament. It is true that no consensus existed in the past in the peace movement and none exists now, but there was and still is a direction in its discussions and there was and still is a realistic goal: No more arms, no new rockets in Western Europe.

And now just listen to Havemann and Brandt: "the reason for this competitive arming consists mainly in this: that neither side any longer believes that the other one has purely defensive aims." The "competitive arming" — as though it was a kind of deflationary downward wage-and-price spiral that is no one's fault (or, what amounts to the same thing, the fault of both parties). If there are no causes for and effects of arming, then we get an opposition movement without an opponent. "Competitive arming" thus becomes fate: and because the arming parties stumble so beautifully into it, we get a truly German fate: "In this sharpening of the military confrontation in Europe, the partition of Germany plays an essential role.... For if the nuclear inferno one day overwhelms us" — here the music of Verdi's Requiem should be hummed — "it will be because the East-West confrontation will make the two German states the basis of deployment and the nuclear spearhead of one against the other. The partition of Germany did not create security but became the condition for the most lethal threat that has ever struck Europe."

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Everywhere dark powers, anonymous and draining? The "competitive arming" that comes from distrust, the "sharpening of the confrontation" that results from Germany's division, the "inferno" that will come from somewhere above us, the "nuclear spearhead." (Did the confrontation itself mount the explosive warheads?) The "condition for the most lethal threat," in turn, comes once more from the partition of Germany. Do not ask for perpetrator and victim, for the attacker and the attacked, for name and address. Otherwise Peter Robert Lohengrin, Ph.D., will leave you in the lurch. Politics as national opera and in the center of it all, the eternally innocent victim, "we Germans," humiliated it is true, but always on the lookout for a place in the sun which, as Karl Kraus put it, is always setting by the time "we" are about to reach for it. And to think that more than *one* signer was found for this statement: "As to how we Germans are going to solve our national problem, that must be left to us:" may God help us!

"We Germans" will know how to do it; "we" have the experience; "we" have the national tradition; "we" no longer know about parties and surely not about classes. With our "economic strength, which, as you know, "we" Havemanns here and "we" Brandts there, have at our disposal, Europe will thrive tomorrow and the entire world the day after. What is all this about socialism, about capitalism? We are *Deutschland über alles!*

Every sentence is a bad world-political joke. "The global antagonism of the superpowers" is the "main driving force for the danger of war." The antagonism is the main driving force! Or, the two German states again threatening to become the mere object of the quarrel between the superpowers! This little word "again," how I love it! The two German states, after solving their national problem as subject of these quarrels — well, only praying will do. "We" here cannot prevent the eviction of an occupied house nor there the exile of a verse-maker, but "we" shall solve the national problem, scatter the horn of plenty all over Europe and we will manipulate world politics. Or, in the final analysis, does the "we" refer to the "we" who allow tenants to be evicted? Of course not. "We" are both: the "good Germans" and the other Germans at the same time.

Capital and labor, Krupp and Krause, in national embrace and this tripe of classlessness is dished out to us as politics, as "left" politics! It is too German not to be true!

Many things are fought over in the peace movement and many controversies are left open in order not to split the alliance. But the slogan reads: "No new atomic missiles," rather than "open the gates." For we already know, mind you, who will be coming in from the outside. Who else? And speaking of the U.S. cultural imperialists, they will surely turn off the "nigger music!"

By the way, the "national problems from the left" is nothing new. Rudi Dutschke already posed it about five years ago when he asked: Why is the Socialist Left so weak in West Germany? Because East Germany offers such a frightening example of Socialist reality. And if the Left here wishes to become stronger, East Germany must first be made to dance a jig. For this the Left has some pretty pennies, a few wished for and many others. At the time, Dutschke was applauded in a paper that called itself "Left" by a certain Henning, who later turned out to be a propagandist for the NPD Youth. These and similar experiences, but also a profound aversion for national sounds and, yes — we really do feel that way — the realization of a few historical parallels, did at the time quickly put an end to the "national problem from the Left." Now some of their philosophers seem to have discovered in the peace movement a useful vehicle for their rancid cargo. For, let us come out with it: Dr. Peter Brandt did

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not really care a farthing for the peace movement, for the Pershing II and the cruise missiles, until he one day discovered, with Havemann's help, that at the peace celebration there was a little corner for his National Court. Or did it escape my notice that Brandt Jr. belonged to the initiators of the Krefeld Appeal?

But let us forget about Havemann and Brandt and their addressee Brezhnev and all the fuss that the former wish to make about the later and the latter about the former, in the side-by-side pan-German setup. Let us abandon the idea of unhinging the entire world and let us do what we can: oppose atomic arming, fight the so-called "post-arming," hinder the stationing of cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe. Let us stick modestly to this megalomaniac goal instead of chewing the national cud.

To the Chairman of the Presidium
Of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev:

Honorable Mr. Leonid Brezhnev:

Filled with concern over the future of Europe and world peace, we turn to you with the hope that your visit to West Germany expected in the fall and your meeting with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt will open a way that will lead out of the present dangerous development.

More and more people fear that after a 30-year peace in Europe there is now the danger of the total destruction of our continent in a nuclear world war. In Western Europe such fear is concretized particularly in the opposition to the stationing of new American medium-range rockets, the building of the neutron bomb as well as the storage of atomic weapons in Europe. If these weapons are ever used they will convert Europe into a wasteland.

It is well known that the proponents of this policy say the so-called post-armament of NATO is purely defensive; that it is merely a response to the arming by the countries of the Warsaw Pact with the new and equally far-reaching Soviet medium-range SS-20 missiles and of the great numerical superiority of Soviet tanks.

In view of the greatness of the danger threatening us, it appears to us vain to pose the question of whether such escalation of terror has still other reasons: How can the mounting of rockets, cruise missiles and the neutron bomb be prevented? How can Europe, an area of the world that now has the largest accumulation of nuclear warheads, be converted into a zone free of nuclear weapons?

Although the signers of the present letter evaluate differently the causes for such dangerous development, we do not wish to imply that either NATO or the Warsaw Pact was initially pursuing any aims other than purely defensive ones. Unfortunately, however, in the course of the years, the terrifying competitive armament on both sides has led to the point that at the demarcation line in Europe today, two weapons-studded military machines are opposing each other. At their disposal is a destructive potential that is enough to annihilate all of humanity not only once, but five or ten times. The reason for this competitive arming consists mainly in this: that neither side any longer believes that the other one has purely defensive aims.

Moreover, both sides are convinced that a growing danger must be met by ever new arming efforts. The dangers involved in this hardly need to be pointed out. In this sharpening of the military confrontation in Europe, the partition of Germany plays an essential role. Originally, such partition seemed to deprive a dangerous aggressor of

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power forever, thus securing peace in Europe. But the consequence was the very opposite. For if the nuclear inferno one day overwhelms us, it will be because the East-West confrontation will make the two German states the basis of deployment and the nuclear spearhead of one against the other. The partition of Germany did not create security but became the condition for the most lethal threat that has ever struck Europe.

Every bomb, every missile — indeed, every weapon — brought to Germany by our protectors does not secure peace but brings us nearer to doom. We do not need arming, we need disarmament. We have no need for the strength of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, but rather the continuation of the worldwide policy of detente, so that NATO and the Warsaw Pact will one day become superfluous. Europe's security is not created by weapons of war, but by their removal.

It is particularly important to withdraw the two parts of Germany from the confrontation of the two blocs. In that connection, it should be recalled that up to the 1960s, the Soviet Union came out for the demilitarization and neutralization of all of Germany. Thirty-six years after the end of the war, it has now become an urgent necessity to conclude the peace treaties and to pull back the occupying troops from both parts of Germany. (Of course, the position of West Berlin should remain secured.) As to how we Germans are going to solve our national problem, that must be left to us; certainly no one should fear this more than they do the prospect of an atomic war.

This goal appears to many Germans worth aspiring for, but utopian for the time being. They cannot imagine that the Soviet Union could be ready to renounce their military base in East Germany. We are of the opinion, however, that this is indeed possible if the U.S. military bases in West Germany were disbanded at the same time that they were disbanded elsewhere in Europe. Simultaneously, a peace treaty would stipulate — and the superpowers guarantee — that never again would an aggressive military potential be created in Germany.

Honorable Mr. Brezhnev, we turn to you, perhaps in this last hour, with the plea to weigh these proposals seriously. We are convinced that no West German government will further insist on the stationing of new U.S. nuclear weapons if the government of the Soviet Union declares itself ready to negotiate on such a proposal for loosening tensions in Europe and if, moreover, it facilitates such negotiations on its part by renouncing any intention of extending what medium-range arms are already deployed against Western Europe.

Considering that your country lost 20 million in the Second World War, initiated by Germany, and considering the 5 million of our people that the war left dead, security and safeguarding the peace must be the highest commandment of policy, especially for our two peoples.

With our highest esteem,

(signed) Heinrich Albertz, Carl Amery, Gert Bastian, Jurek Becker, Joseph Beuys, Wolf Biermann, Hans Christoph Buch, Ingeborg Drewitz, Axel Eggebrecht, Jürgen Fuchs, Hellmut Gollwitzer, Peter Härtling, Wolfgang Fritz Haug, Horst Herrmann, Rolf Hochhuth, Willi Hoss, Walter Jens, Robert Jungk, Petra Kelly, Hans-Ulrich Klose, Dieter Lattmann, Margarete Mitscherlich, Uta Ranke-Heinemann, Louise Rinser, Peter Rühmkorf, Kurt Scharf, Otto Schily, Romy Schneider, Alice Schwarzer, Wolfgang Seiffert, Dorothee Sölle, Holger Strohm, Klaus Traube, Margarethe von Trotta, Martin Walser, Peter-Paul Zahl, Gerhard Zwerenz

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PEACE AND LIBERTY*

by Patrick Viveret

Has the struggle of Europeans for peace — or, to be more modest — the struggle against war, come to contradict the struggle for liberty? At any rate, it raises the question concerning the two currents of opinion resulting from the intensification of international tension. This antithesis cuts across political categories in each country. Giscard d'Estaing concentrated a large part of his electoral campaign on peace by appealing to his record on Soviet policy. In that respect, his best ally was the French Communist Party, while Mitterrand and the core of the Socialist Left were with part of the traditional Right in denouncing complaisance toward the Soviet empire. In Great Britain, one of the main causes of the rift in the Labor Party was the support for unilateral nuclear disarmament by a majority of the delegates. In Germany, Helmut Schmidt confronts a Left section of his party on the question of the deployment of the Pershing II missiles in West Germany, but he is being criticized by others who reproach him for a too timid *Ostpolitik* toward the Soviet Union.

These examples could be multiplied. The important thing, however, is to disentangle the basic tendency of these two great currents in order to examine their relevance. Both trends give priority to the relation to the Soviet Union. The trend emphasizing peace seeks above all to protect Europe against a nuclear war by maintaining a position of compromise and the status quo with the Soviet Union. The second trend denounces the risk of Finlandization or self-Finlandization implicit in such an attitude, recalls the example of Munich to demonstrate its dangers and — by choice or resignation — accepts the logic of rearmament and a strengthening of the Western camp.

Arguments Against Limited Warfare

If the debate today is so intense it is because, unlike as in preceding decades, the hypothesis of a nuclear war with Europe being once more the theater (or one of the theaters) is no longer taken merely as a theoretical case, but as a possibility both by military leaders as well as politicians. Several causes have brought about such a dramatic development.

First, after Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, there is the reappearance of a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, which had not been the case since the 1963 Cuban crisis. Of course, the Afghan invasion is not the only explanation for this. Yet, it clearly marks the U.S. crisis of confidence regarding detente. It intensifies a very strong feeling among Americans that the Soviet Union is about to gain military superiority and engenders the political conditions — proved afterward by Reagan's election — for a resumption of the arms race.

The second source of tension is a result of the failure, during the last 20 years, in the struggle against underdevelopment. Instead of being overcome, underdevelopment has become even worse, thus increasing tension in the Third World favoring the rise of dictatorships or totalitarian political systems that see in war the best relief for internal problems. There has been a rebalancing of powers between the industrial countries and the Third World oil-producing countries. This has worsened the situation of those Third World countries deprived of that precious raw material, and has resulted in an even more explosive state of affairs. Dom Helder Camara has

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correctly called this the danger of the "M bomb," i.e., the misery bomb. As these conflicts become less and less controllable and more and more a stake in the struggle between Soviets and Americans, tension between the two superpowers has increased.

The most serious aspect — and here is the third source of tension — is that all of this comes about in a period marked by a fairly deep crisis in what may be called nuclear deterrence. Not that such deterrence has ever worked in a pure form. Soviet strategy has remained based more on the concept of the possible use of nuclear weapons than on that of deterrence. The United States has for some time now abandoned the strategy of automatic massive retaliation and has developed the idea of "flexible" and "graduated" responses suited to the nature of the threats and aggressions. But, on the whole, governments as well as public opinion have held on to the idea that the enormity of human and material destruction brought on by a nuclear war guaranteed suicide to any aggressor. Subsequent retaliation would rule out recourse to such extreme measures.

I am not discussing here the earlier merits of this thesis of peace by balance of terror, to which I have never adhered. I am merely noting that for years now, this system has entered into a state of crisis and one increasingly hears political and military authorities raise the possibilities of a "limited nuclear war" without thereby being thought dangerous and mad. What is involved here is the uncertainty concerning the threshold separating nuclear from conventional arms since the appearance of tactical nuclear weapons. As usual, military strategy had to follow technology: the miniaturization and the precision of the new nuclear weapons have given greater credibility to "anti-forces" strategies; i.e., based on the destruction of the adversary's military rather than the human potential. On the other hand, people's protection and civil defense, which seems not only inconceivable but contrary to the logic of deterrence — each country offering, as it were, their civilians as hostages to the adversary to prove their non-aggressive aims — have now become indispensable: Americans try to make up for their delay in that regard over the Soviets. Even the French Right, which, when it was in power had always refused to pose this problem, later uneasily discovered that Sweden and Switzerland were better prepared to protect their peoples from nuclear fallout. In short, everything is happening as if American and Soviet political and military leaders had followed the directives suggested by Raymond Aron in 1962 in *Paix et guerre entre les nations*. "It is war that must be saved," he stated then, "in other words, the possibility of a test of the armed forces among the states, and not perpetual peace that must be set up by the constant threat of thermo-nuclear holocaust."

The whole problem was to know the meaning and the extent of that limited nuclear war that was part of the U.S. strategy outlined by Henry Kissinger in his book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* and which has more recently been addressed by Alexander Haig. As usual, the strategy coasts along utopia, imagining to the limit "clean" nuclear wars that would result in fewer human victims than in the last world war. This is the eternal ideal error in strategy that believes that a war can be carried out rationally and which fails to consider passion, accidents, misunderstandings and errors of judgment. Who can state that a nuclear war, co-called limited at the outset, would not quickly degenerate because of the difficulty, politically and militarily, of controlling the escalation? More than in any other form of conflict, the law of missing to extremes as defined by Clausewitz risks not having any counterpoint, at least so long as one of the powers should feel that it can carry off a decisive advantage — or escape the risk of defeat — by employing a higher escalation.

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It is conceivable that, confronted by rising dangers, important tendencies may arise in that Europe already torn up by two world wars, to stand up to the risk of another butchery. The trouble is that this fight against war appears to limit its scope to preaching a status quo that well serves Soviet interests. This means in effect to back up its intervention in Afghanistan and the deployment of the SS-20s capable of destroying in a first strike the basic military potentials of Western Europe. Moreover, a number of public polls have detected a defeatist climate among the French. Organized by the journal *Actuel*, such polls have revealed that "in case of a Soviet invasion of France," 63 percent of those interviewed would prefer negotiations to resistance.

Attitudes such as these feed, not without reason, reactions recalling Munich and emphasizing that capitulation increases the risks of war by encouraging the adversary to feel that he can push his advantage with impunity. "Finlandization" or "self-Finlandization" of Western Europe, the theme of "defeat without war" — the assertion that an entire civilization based on liberty is threatened — are the strong points of an argument which, Left and Right, defines itself as anti-Munich. Thus the two arguments (the reality of the risk of war and the reality of capitulation or self-Finlandization in the face of totalitarianism) only worsen the tragic dimension of the previously mentioned dilemma: peace or liberty. Yet, this dilemma is far from being as well-founded and exclusive as the present public debate makes it out to be, and I believe that a determined fight for the defense and extension of democratic achievements needs to be supported by a parallel effort to limit the risks of war.

Capitulation or Rearmament? A False Alternative

The reference to Munich is well founded only if the will for peace is interpreted as blindness to the Soviet totalitarian situation. In such a case, moral capitulation may precede political or politico-military Finlandization. There is reason for uneasiness if one realizes to what an extent the notion of a Soviet Union "encircled and on the defensive" still informs a considerable part of the European Left. However, as Hassner has noted, "the complaint of encirclement, a specialty of the Soviet Union since its establishment . . . changes its meaning according to whether it refers to the situation of a regime involved in a civil war and foreign intervention or to other powers such as China or Europe, which may just as legitimately consider themselves encircled by an empire."[1]

The militant reaction of the Left or the extreme Left against Soviet imperialism in Afghanistan or Eastern Europe has never — for example, in France — reached the fully justified level it did against American intervention in Vietnam or against the U.S. stand on Central America. How far can the Soviet Union be allowed to continue its expansion and oppression for the Left to stop their complaisance toward it? As for the Right, the phenomenon that can lead to the same attitude is even clearer: it is simply fear, inspired by this military giant, which causes the proponents of law and order in their respective countries to wish to get into the good graces of their threatening neighbor.

The anti-Munich argument is thus based on calling for greater vigilance and to remind democracies who may be ready to close an eye on totalitarian oppression that they will buy their ease only at the price of abandoning their liberties. The battle in question should be between democracy and totalitarianism and the means used by democracies in such a struggle should not entail their own destruction by other means. Now these two conditions are clearly not being fulfilled when one examines the

1. See Pierre Hassner's article in *Faire*, 45-46 (July 1980), a special issue devoted to discussions of the Soviet threat. (Copies may be ordered from *Fair*, 48 rue Ste.-Anne, Paris.)

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American version of the anti-Munich position. I apologize for recalling here some banalities, but the systematic and Manichean form of the present debate forces one to smash doors that for so long were thought to be open.

There is a superabundance of facts to prove that democracy is not the principle but the bail bond of American foreign policy. From the destabilization of Allende to support of terrorist dictatorships and totalitarian regimes in Latin America, from Kissinger's Iran policy to Reagan's support of South Africa, it becomes clear that the U.S. does not hesitate to flout democracy every time it appears to run against their interests.

Moreover, the new Reagan administration has hastened to cancel some of the effects produced by Carter's human rights policy, especially in Latin America. In geo-political terms, the American empire's new strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet empire is as effective today as it was yesterday. But this has little to do with the struggle between democracy and totalitarianism. It is more than a little matter, it is indeed what creates the problem, for otherwise it would be best to dismiss both parties, the two imperialisms, and to revive neutralism. The difficulty clearly arises from the fact that there is no pure struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, but the interaction between that struggle and the confrontation between the powers and the empires. But going on from there to place democracy in the Western camp and totalitarianism only in the Soviet camp is an obstacle that is all the more difficult to clear up given the increased Soviet penetration in the Third World — which is itself largely a result of mistakes, blindness and quite often crimes of American policy in most of these countries.

At the outset of our dilemma of peace and liberty, it would therefore be extremely improper to identify the defense — and even more, the extension — of democracy in closing of ranks of a Western camp, the leadership of which has been taken up by the United States. In addition, the only policy proposed to face up to a totalitarianism identified with the Soviet system has been reduced to a military strategy of pure rearmament and to a political strategy of defense of the West. It is here that Left pacifists' arguments are especially strong. For the logic of rearmament, tied to a crisis of deterrence and the possibility of a limited nuclear war, may very well lead the world — and Europe first of all — to catastrophe.

What is the meaning of the hypothesis of a nuclear war from the standpoint of the defense of liberty? Does not carrying on such a way require dictatorial setups? To conduct such a war would mean, first of all, power to decide who will survive when it is realized how feeble or ridiculous is the protection of the civilian population in most Western countries. How can such decisions, to be taken in a matter of a few minutes, preserve the democratic fiber in the very countries claiming to defend liberty? Moreover, what would be the significance of the massacre of several million civilians of a totalitarian state, more so than in a democratic system, as the former may not be considered responsible for their authorities' decision? France is proud, we are told, of the credibility of its strategic nuclear force capable of destroying 150 Soviet cities. Thus, we have reached the acme of absurdity from the standpoint of fighting a totalitarian system: selecting as the first-range target the very victims of that system, its own people. (One may be sure, on the other hand, of the fate of the members of the Soviet military and political leadership — *Nomenklature* — which will have an infinitely greater chance of escaping).

No matter what angle the problem is viewed from — unless one continues to hold to the utopias of "clean" nuclear warfare limited to a simple exchange between military forces — a nuclear war would mean a considerable regression for humanity and for

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democracy. It is therefore useless to investigate further before accepting the false dilemma of a defense of peace leading to capitulation or the defense of liberty resulting in Western rearmament and preparation for war.

How to Fight Totalitarianism

It is wrong to equate the fight for democracy with the strategy of rearming the Western camp. It is wrong to equate the struggle for peace with accepting the future Finlandization of Western Europe. I believe, on the contrary, that the democratic revolts within the totalitarian systems as well as the struggle of national movements against the empires need to develop a limitation of war risks on an international scale. This is so because all positions of East-West confrontation promote not a struggle of liberty versus oppression but a strengthening of the superpowers in their respective fields and the organization of alliances totally foreign to the democratic criteria. One can see well what interests, in terms of power, can cause the United States to set up a chain of alliances ranging from South Africa to China. But unless one sees the world in black and white, such policy has as little to do with democracy as the Soviet support of Cambodia has to do with the humanitarian urge to give people the right to survive or have some land.

It so happens that American interests coincide with the interest in liberty just as Soviet interests serve national liberation movements. But such indirect advantages are weak compared to the negative consequences that are brought about for human rights and peoples' rights by the recrudescence of East-West polarization. Is it not obvious that all worsening of international tension, particularly if it increases the plausibility of nuclear war, strengthens estates, especially dictatorial and totalitarian ones? For such a tension produces fear among people, and such fear is the best argument by the states both in claiming that they are the sole guarantors of the safety of their people and in prohibiting all internal dissidence.

What can a Soviet citizen hostile to his regime do under the risk of nuclear war except to hope that his own state will be able to protect him? Consider the millions of Poles engaged in a terrible fight for liberation against oppression. What can they do in case of a nuclear war? And what would NATO do? Would the heads of state decide to spare Warsaw with its recent revolt but to destroy Budapest and Prague, which have turned into the empire's satellite capitals? It becomes so obvious that it broaches on the absurd when one projects the reality of nuclear scenarios: the fight for liberty cannot develop in a mold of force except dying by the hand of the very ones who claim to defend it.[2]

Detente or, as the Soviets call it, peaceful coexistence, is highly illusory if it is based on the belief of progressive liberalization, carried out by themselves, of Eastern European regimes. It may even bring about moral and political capitulation if it rests on the fear of democratic European nations before the Soviet military colossus and interprets it as the indefinite acceptance of its domination over Eastern Europe. But who forces us to make use of such a defeatist idea of detente? Why not, on the contrary, consider that recoiling from the risks of war in Europe would create a more favorable climate for democratic and national subversion in the Soviet empire? The Soviet Union has never accepted that peaceful coexistence prevented ideological war, the material and political support of anti-imperialist movements. Why should democratic countries choose a strategy of all or nothing?

As Claude Lefort has indicated, an authoritarian system is not so immobile and free

2. This is why I share Paul Thibaud's analysis in using a different interpretation of detente. See *Esprit*, January 1981.

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of contradiction. In the Soviet Union itself, there are struggles involving classes, power, nationalities, culture; even more so in the countries under its yoke. This is precisely why the state cannot forever rely on the excuse of a threat from outside in expanding and asserting itself. A totalitarian state, whether of fascist or Soviet or Latin American stamp, is a system based on a state of permament war inside or outside its border. Everything that shares in the logic of war reinforces this. And everything that causes that risk to recede increases the system's difficulty to contain the many contradictions brought on by its centralization, waste and oppression.

It is striking to note the difference between the sophistication of the Western military strategies and the extreme poverty of their analysis of the Soviet system. This is the more paradoxical today, when we know that the only sector of the Soviet system performing well is the army. In all other areas — economic, social, national, cultural and religion — the regime has shown bitter failures and must face increasing problems.

Without the strategic genius of a Lenin, one may still spell out all of these weak links and outline flexible and decentralizing strategies that contribute to making them even weaker! But no, everything goes on as though the essence of Western strategy nowadays is based on the only truly strong link in the entire setup: the military one. Moreover, we deliberately take the stand that democracies are a priori weaker than totalitarian systems and we neglect the fact that, by its flexible, decentralized character — helped along by diversified and abundant information — a democracy could hold forth excellent means of subversion and destabilization.

A number of American political and military strategists seem to be fascinated by the logic of force and by the advantage gained in that regard by a totalitarian organization of power. It is thus indicative that Kissinger was extraordinarily attracted by a Soviet Union he described as being led by "men of iron will," possessing a "greater moral strength because they were ready to take more risks, both physically and morally," while he accuses the West of being "filled with intellectuals without convictions."[3] Of course, in the matter of pure force a democracy, except by repudiating itself, is less effective because it has to organize various wills, establish a minimal cohesion between means and ends and, in a word, reckon with people — something the totalitarian system, by its nature, can dispense with. But the problem remains to know what we want. Is it the force of a Western empire facing an Eastern one? In that case, Kissinger's or Haig's strategy is probably a good one. But as in *1984,* Orwell's prophetic work, we should not be surprised if at the end "Oceania" is ruled by the same principles as "Eurasia," i.e., by the law of Big Brother.

If, on the contrary, we choose to defend and extend democracy, such a struggle needs a climate of relative stability and, at any rate, international non-war. This is because such fight for liberty cannot be identified with the defense of an alliance or of an empire as totalitarianism is far from being exclusively Sovietic. Furthermore, a democratic and-or national subversion of a totalitarian system or of an empire requires playing on internal contradictions which must not be cancelled by a permanent preparation for war. What this means is that the struggle for peace, or at least a limit on the risks of war, searches for negotiated agreements, the denuclearization of certain areas of the world or, at any rate, a brake on nuclear proliferation, far from contradicting the struggle for liberty, really constitute its essential conditions. Central America cannot escape the alternative of military terrorism or Castroism if

3. On this point, see the analysis by William Shawcross in his book *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia* (New York, 1979).

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every struggle against a Somoza-type dictator immediately becomes part of the American-Soviet conflict.

It is clear that Europe has a decisive card to play in this kind of strategy because it has the opportunity, having lost its empire, to be freer in its movements. Europe can uphold the necessity of a Palestinian state without this calling in question the existence of Israel. It can give economic help to Central America or to Mozambique and at the same time promote Afghan resistance and aid to Poland. In short, Europe may turn its military weakness into a military trump card by favoring with a certain number of Third World countries the creation of an axis that turns chiefly around development, the maintenance of peace and the spread of democracy. All this, of course, concerns objectives and tendencies and I am not naive enough to believe that a European strategy can miraculously escape the logic of power, the weight of empires and the pressure of state interests. But insofar as it is a global tendency, such a policy, which would have the advantage of resting on the double feeling of a yearning for peace and liberty of European public opinion rather than being at cross purposes to it seems to be more realistic and less suicidal than preparation for the next holocaust.

What Forces to Lean On?

I fully realize the difficulties of an international policy that made the limitation of the risk of war not a condition for a nervous status quo but of a much stronger struggle against totalitarianism. Supposing you are right, it could be objected, what forces can one rely on in order to carry out such a policy? And what means would one use, for example, in the matter of defense, if one refuses to play the power game while at the same time claiming to adopt a much stronger attitude toward totalitarianism?

What, then, are the forces one can lean on? First of all, it stands to reason, on such forces, here and now, which have started the struggle against the totalitarianism; and then mainly on the dissident social and cultural movements in Eastern Europe. For, if the democratic struggle will not take the Soviet Union as its only target — one need simply consult a report by Amnesty International to become convinced of this — it is nevertheless the Soviet Union that combines most clearly two phenomena that elsewhere appear separately: imperialism and totalitarianism.

It is also in the Soviet bloc — and this is an additional danger — that the ideological orientation is the strongest, not only to justify the power within the bloc but also to legitimate it outside of it. In most of the countries of the world, the Chilean or Argentine regimes, for example, representing another version of contemporary totalitarianism — a sort of religious-military realignment of fascism — are not taken for anything but what they are. This is not so in the case of the Soviet Union which, thanks to its revolutionary orientation, is supported by way of a formidable network of Communist parties supporting its policies (or at least abating its criticism in what has come to be known as Eurocommunism).

Thus Soviet totalitarianism today is more powerful, more complete, more branched out than any other totalitarian or dictatorial system, whether Chinese, Latin American or African. It is for this reason that the struggles, democratic revolutions or national resistances that shock the very heart of the Soviet empire are in all respects decisive and should receive the active support of all democratic forces in the world. In that respect, it is a matter of organizing resistance, pressure and a solidarity at least as great as was the struggle against the American intervention in Vietnam. Clearly, there is a lot of work ahead!

Setting up such a goal supposes that one knows the forces at work in the civilian societies of democratic countries: public opinion, trade unions, parties, associations,

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etc. The main advantage of the democratic systems is in fact the values of their civil societies that are not fully absorbed or weighed down by the state. Yet, it is paradoxical to note that this potential force is largely immobilized in the struggle against the totalitarian states while the Communist systems that have only three tools for action — the nation-state, the party, and the communist world movement — have learned how to make use of these three instruments for intervening, especially in the area of public opinion and the civil societies of democratic countries. On the other hand, the international policies of the democratic states are most frequently — with rare exceptions such as Sweden — exclusively statist policies, thus condemned to all or nothing strategies: either detente and refusal to attack the status quo or, on the contrary, inter-state crisis and the preparation for war.

Of course, an international strategy cannot be based exclusively on mobilizing public opinion. Here it concerns a field allowed to lie fallow in the struggle against totalitarianism and it is urgent to take up the means of intervening. It is also necessary that the citizens of democratic countries not be left with the feeling that there is a contradiction between their desire for liberty and their rejection of an imminent devastation of war. As long as they fail to understand this basic fact, the "anti-Munichites" would continue to grieve over defeatism or the cowardice of Western public opinion; this will not greatly change the justified fear felt by people concerning nuclear war.

If, on the other hand — and here we come to the policy to be activated by European democratic states — a joint action is carried out in the double areas of limitation of risks of war and support for democratic struggles in the world (including attacking its causes by a new developmental strategy directed at the Third World), there are grounds for actively mobilizing an important part of political and social groups that make up the political and social life of democratic countries.

It is not contradictory to negotiate a SALT agreement and to support the Polish movement. On the contrary, to barter Poland against El Salvador or Cuba, as the Reagan administration seems to be doing today, worsens the situation in El Salvador without doing anything for the Polish struggle. Likewise, a negotiated limitation to the arms race has all the chances of robbing the Soviet Union of its main argument for offering the people it oppresses cannons instead of butter.

One could easily multiply the examples of what could bring about a more subtle Western strategy as soon as these countries understand how to effectively place the defense and the extension of democracy at the center of their international policy. This would certainly assume — and this is the second difficulty — having military policies that are not totally different from this type of goal.

I have mentioned the particularly "counter-productive" character from the standpoint of the defense of democracy, of military strategies based on nuclear armament. It must be added that these types of arms end up by completely demobilizing people with respect to defense problems. The more the strategy is a nuclear one and based on all or nothing, as in France, the stronger the demobilization effect. It is an altogether natural result because people are accustomed to the following alternative, very unlikely to prepare for resistance actions: either one is definitively protected by nuclear deterrence or, if by mischance a nuclear confrontation should come about, one will be vaporized. Thus, there is a considerable imbalance between the power of armaments and a people's feeble will.

Now, the main threat that weighs on people under totalitarianism, one that all dissidents have described, is first of all the threat to the will. The main goal of totali-

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tarianism is to achieve moral capitulation. That is why the Soviet Union meets with such difficulty in subjecting the Poles who, contrary to the French example, manifest a will to fierce resistance — even if their military power is zero. Basically, in wishing to reduce military strategies to the pure logic of power, the leading Western countries have forgotten Clausewitz's fundamental definition of war as "an act of violence intended to force the adversary to submit to your own will."

Democratic Subversion and European Culture

The main strategic problem of democratic countries is to develop a defense system with the dual characteristic of limiting pure force (in particular, everything that deals with the massacre of millions of civilians) and of leaning strongly on the will to resist. This entails a radical reorientation requiring time, a profound change in the means and goals of defense, molding citizens on the Swedish or Yugoslav model, a serious policy of civil defense, protection of the people such as, e.g., in Switzerland.

For nuclear powers, it is a particularly difficult choice because of the nuclear priority during the last 20 years.[4] But for most European countries that will not or cannot acquire nuclear arms — and which do not wish to subject themselves to American protection — there is a choice that appears to be less dangerous and more consistent with democratic logic than the setting up of a European nuclear defense.

The gist of the problem, in the final analysis, is to know what Europe wants to become. Is it a matter of setting up a "third bloc," a new political and military superpower based on the economic prosperity of Western Europe? Or is it to take from the melting pot of nations and cultures ranging from France to Poland the best that Europe can offer to a world in mortal danger that is ours today: one culture. If democratic movements in Eastern Europe have such importance for us, is it not because they are forces of civilization and of democracy arising in a universe increasingly ruled by the law of militarization and totalitarianism? It is necessary, as Jan Patocka stated in the wonderful text written in 1975 before he committed himself entirely to the struggle for liberty in Czechoslovakia, "to get out of the century of war."[5] For man in this end of the 20th century has acquired mastery over his collective annihilation.

"Today definitive violence, the truth of human history, circles more or less like a satellite over your heads, capable in the twinkling of an eye to put an end to all human history if we really wish to do so.... Essentially, our planetary society, with all of humanity at last gathered together for the first time, finds itself in the same condition as did the most fragile and deprived primitive societies. It may at any time end in self-destruction." These words were written by René Girard. In my opinion, he provides the gauge of the radically new way the problem of nuclear world war has to be posed: war is no longer merely a war of man against other men, but of mankind against mankind, with humanity as the material and spiritual stakes.

In this connection, the destruction of humanity by totalitarianism and-or by war sets off the same principle. And in the face of such danger, the true struggle for liberty is one that has founded humanity and cannot as of now enter into the deadly game of the pure logic of war. On this ground, the democratic subversion against totalitarianism is at one and the same time a rejection of war and the acceptance of a culture that teaches us not to despair of man.

4. Although won over recently to nuclear deterrence, the French Socialist Left in power will, I hope, show imagination and courage in this regard.

5. Jan Patocka, "Wars of the 20th Century and the 20th Century as War," *Telos*, 30 (Winter 1976-1977), pp. 116-126.

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DEFENSE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DETENTE: A DIALOGUE WITH VIVERET*

by Pierre Hassner

Viveret's article calls forth an almost general and sometimes enthusiastic agreement, as well as a certain feeling of uneasiness or even irritation. Agreements naturally have to do with objectives and general direction. How can we disagree with Viveret about the need to fight for both peace and liberty or about solidarity with the oppressed in both the Third World and Eastern Europe? But he goes beyond this. Viveret denounces the intellectual and moral laziness of a right-wing Reaganism that cannot conceive of any other rebuttal to the Soviet Union other than a military one; or that of a Left which refuses to recognize the totalitarian phenomenon and its Soviet embodiment; or that of a French political consensus around a nuclear strategy that has always been immoral and that is becoming less and less credible.

Yet, Viveret seems to have left aside what constitutes the international order: the equilibrium and disequilibrium of power. Now, here as elsewhere, one does not command nature except by obeying her, and one does not exorcise hostile constraints except by recognizing them. If the Left has so often been without an international policy it is because the international domain, founded on inequality and the conflict of interests, is fundamentally contrary to the Left's values of equality, universality and brotherhood. Making these structures more pliable to our values by taking advantage of their faults, their interstices and their weakest links, implies the search for a strategy that can weigh the forces and the currents on which it leans, the alliances and compromises one has to accept. An argument that escapes into historical responsibilities and long-term perspectives risks failing this task if it cannot answer clearly the political question: "What is to be done, here and now?"

Here uneasiness tends to become irritation. Beyond its anti-totalitarianism and solidarity with Eastern Europe, Viveret's discourse risks obscuring a fundamental reality: the growing power of Soviet imperialism and its increasingly expansionist character, manifested in the Afghan invasion and in the immense military effort — especially nuclear — symbolized by the SS-20 missiles and carried out with more vigor than ever during the 11 years of negotiations concerning arms reductions. As a result, Viveret seems almost to suggest that the efforts to re-establish an equilibrium — especially concerning medium-range missiles — constitutes a danger to peace. In the German and Dutch debates concerning the Pershing II and cruise missiles, he seems to favor the immense campaign for unilateral disarmament which throws together unconditional pacifists and pro-Russian elements — although all the messages we receive from victims of the Russians disagree with this.

This does not mean that these messages are necesarily right. Neither should the incontestible popularity in Eastern Europe of Reagan's attitude toward the Soviet Union blind us to the danger that the American stance in Central America might provide the Soviets with an alibi. But all these reports should simply remind us of Machiavelli's warning concerning unarmed prophets. To be weaker but to talk louder can satisfy both our anti-militarist and anti-totalitarian consciences but serves neither to save our peace, defend our liberty, nor help others achieve theirs. This is the lesson that Carter's failures teach us — even if Reagan's "successes" manage to make us regret them.

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The following points are thus meant to supplement, rather than criticize, Viveret's article:

Concerning the "Graduated Defense of Human Rights"

The first point refers to the support of tyrannical regimes in the Third World. Here, however, one must also be aware of the complexity of a problem where the North-South dimension and the East-West dimension, the anti-colonial revolution, the multinationals' imperialism and Soviet totalitarianism, human rights and geopolitical equilibrium oppose one another and are inextricably intermingled.

Everyone in the West and, in any case, all the governments not blinded by narrow Manicheanism and egotism, and all of the democratic Left would prefer to see in the Third World governments which would at the same time apply themselves to economic development, respect human rights and not ally themselves with the Soviet Union. Such governments are rather rare. Whether this is largely due to the West's past and present errors of whether the Third World's political objectives should be to correct the situation in order to escape a triple dilemma — regimes that are (1) pro-Western but archaic and tyrannical; (2) independent but anarchistic and fanatic; (3) modernizing but bureaucratic and pro-Soviet. In the meantime, here and now (a particularly pressing here and now, for instance, in the case of Pakistan or the Persian Gulf, Oman or Saudi Arabia, or certain African regimes), the West, Europe and France find themselves dependent for their energy supplies or their military security on feudal regimes that are both repressive and fragile, and which are doomed in the long run but whose successor in the near future would very well resemble, if not Karmal, at least Khomeini or Khaddafy. Should we perhaps stand by disinterestedly and let history take its course? Should we support them — and against whom? Against the Soviets, against their regional rivals, against a popular revolution? Or should we, on the contrary, take the lead in supporting the latter? I do not see any a priori and universal response that would be satisfactory.

In any case, I see two responses that should be discussed and which bring us back to the problems of Eastern Europe. For a long time there has been in the Left a historicist response that is still the favorite of communists and other Third World theorists; attacks on human rights should be condemned if they are the action of reactionary regimes; they are excusable or unavoidable for regimes that have either not yet built a state — and therefore have no law (Regis Debray's argument) — or are already building a socialist state (the communists' argument).

Today, the Reagan administration is proposing a right-wing version of this theory. Starting from Hannah Arendt's justified distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, this theory justifies the support of right-wing dictatorships even when they violate human rights, with the idea that they are partial, fragile and destined to be left behind by economic progress; and justifies unconditional opposition to any communist regimes with the idea that, being totalitarian, they are irreversible and unable either to evolve or be overthrown.

To right-wing and left-wing historicism, one must of course oppose an unconditional defense of human rights under all regimes and all latitudes. On the political level, one cannot abstract the nature of regimes, nor can one identify a terrorist regime such as that of El Salvador or of Guatemala, engaged in the extermination of its own population, with authoritarian conservative regimes, such as those of Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany or even of Caetano's Portugal. Neither can one identify a declining and threatened communist regime, such as Poland's or Hungary's, with a totalitarianism such as Stalin's or Hitler's.

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If movements have the responsibility to denounce impartially all failings in human rights, governments must apply, in the words of Jean-Pierre Cot, a "graduated defense of human rights." This, however, should take place within the framework of a political evaluation of the distinction between at least four types of regimes: communist or anti-communist among the non-democratic regimes, and terrorist tyrannies or conservative oligarchies found among the first as well as the second.

Finally, this defense cannot avoid somehow taking into account the geopolitical factor. It is clear that a government's range of action in human rights varies according to the degree of military or economic dependence on the one vis-à-vis the other. The West's range of action on its own allies or on the periphery of the Soviet camp depends in large part on capitalist aid. They are not the same as those possible towards an ally (like Saudi Arabia) or an adversary (like the Soviet Union), whose strategic position, resources or power permits them to resist or retort by counter-blackmail.

Relativizing Deterrence

This evocation of constraints of equilibrium leads to the second point, that of nuclear deterrence. I agree with Viveret in deeming nuclear deterrence by means of "demographic" reprisals, i.e., the threat of the willful murder of innocent populations — an extremely serious problem of both morality and credibility. The French consensus on the matter has demobilizing effects on the French will to defend themselves and it is all the more suspect in that it is based on the least defensible version of deterrence (because also the most abstract and rigid version). This version is based on massive nuclear retaliation against all attacks, even conventional ones. The idea of even posing the question of what would happen should deterrence fail is considered a crime.

The present stage of military technology (progress in precision, thus in counterforce capacity) and political relations (the intensification of the East-West conflict) leads increasingly to pose the problem of nuclear arms in terms of use strategy, which is one of the resaons for the rebirth in numerous countries of movements advocating unilateral nuclear disarmament.

Each of these points, however, expresses only one side of nuclear deterrence, or of what Aron calls the antinomies of deterrence. In each case, forgetting the other term leads to a dogmatism as dangerous as that of the claims of official doctrine. First, deterrence through hostages or reciprocal destruction is probably impossible to accept in the long run as a basis for world security. Yet, up to now it has effectively prevented World War III. If, unlike the war between the two Koreas and that between the two Vietnams (to the conclusion of which, however, a certain nuclear threat seems to have played a role), the war between the two Germanies did not take place and if, unlike Africa and Asia, Europe remained the continent of peace, how can we not think the presence of nuclear arms did not have a hand in this?

Secondly, the French doctrine of nuclear deterrence may rest on bluffing and suffers in its canonical form from neglect of what the English historian Michael Howard calls the forgotten dimensions of strategy (especially the social dimension). One could not, however, accuse it of being responsible for the French lack of a will to defend themselves. If a well-known poll by the weekly *Point* shows that while accepting the power of deterrence the French are hostile not only to a president using it, but also to him threatening to do so, a no less well-known poll in *Actuel* shows that they feel equal repugnance towards an armed resistance of a Soviet invasion. In addition, it is precisely in the non-nuclear countries of Northern Europe that military budgets diminish and anti-militarism develops, while in France, corresponding tendencies are

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practically absent.

Compounded with the Soviet Union's large conventional arms superiority is the fact that their military strategy, combining nuclear arms with classical weapons, dooms the idea of a purely conventional defense of France and Europe, whether in a "World War II-type" or a "guerrilla" type war. Neither from the viewpoint of geographic conditions nor from that of the population's attitude is Europe comparable to Algeria, Vietnam or Afghanistan.

Thirdly, Viveret seems to exaggerate\both the novelty and plausibility of the risks of a limited nuclear war. Conceptually, he falls into the same error as the defenders of the French nuclear orthodoxy, by radically separating deterrence from use — although the foundation of deterrence is the credibility of usage should deterrence fail. As for the Soviets, they have never separated one from the other. Contrary to what certain alarmist Americans, such as Richard Pipes, suggest, this does not mean that the Soviets are preparing to unleash a nuclear war to win it. It does mean, however, that they think that the best way to prevent a nuclear war and thus the best deterrence, consists in being the strongest and in having the possibility of winning such a war. Put simply, their effective possibilities are beginning to dangerously approximate their conceptions.

If, after having tried for 20 years to convert the Russians to their own conceptions, the Americans tend today towards adopting the Soviets' doctrine, one result can be a dangerous race towards superiority, but also a higher credibility in deterrence. In any case, historically the idea of a limited nuclear war dates back to the end of the American nuclear monopoly, i.e., from the beginning of the 1950s (Kissinger's book that Viveret quotes was published in 1957). It is the inevitable corollary of the double refusal of capitulation and suicide. With Viveret, I think it is a utopia, but (considering progress in precision asnd control) less so than yesterday and, perhaps, more than tomorrow.

Contrary to Soviet propaganda, in the immediate future the deployment in Germany of American missiles capable of striking the Soviet Union re-establishes the liaison between the territory of the two powers and the two Europes and thus the credibility of escalation. Far from making more a limited nuclear war more probable in Europe, it re-establishes deterrence.

In the longer run, in a world where nuclear proliferation cannot help but increase over the coming years, nuclear arms cannot be eliminated either in general or in the defense of France and of Europe. Their role, however, can be reduced. Instead of being the alpha and omega of strategy, suicide or mutual genocide can and must be pushed back to the level of the ultimate limit, both ineliminable and irrational, of deterrence. Deterrence itself should come to rest more and more on other formulas of equilibrium, especially active defense (anti-missiles) and passive defense (civil), nuclear defense becoming the final recourse at the end of escalation which, nevertheless, from a French or European viewpoint, is necessarily more rapid and unavoidable than from an American one.

Here I agree with Viveret in thinking that negotiations concerning the reduction of strategic arms and, more generally, arms control, are indispensable. But he is outrageously optimistic about their efficacy. I find totally unacceptable the sentences where he considers Western rearmament as a factor of war and a "negotiated limitation of the arms race" has having "all the chances of robbing the Soviet Union of its main argument for offering the people it oppresses cannons instead of butter." These words simply ignore the fact that these negotiations have been going on since 1969, that during this period the American strategic budget decreased spectacularly from

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1965 to 1976 while the Soviet budget increased regularly, that the only disarmament agreement successfully concluded (though only temporariliy) concerns a weapons system, the anti-missiles, that the Americans could deploy more effectively than the Soviets, and that, on the contrary, Carter's unilateral rejection of the B-1 bomber or of the neutrom bomb were not followed by any similar measures on the part of the Soviet Union. How can we not conclude, with Helmut Schmidt, that the only chance for negotiations with the Soviets is to deploy in a credible manner the armaments that the talks are supposed to reduce or eliminate?

Towards a Conditional Detente

This brings us to the third problem: the relation between defensive military equilibrium — Western or European — and what interests us the most, *active or offensive detente* toward Eastern Europe. Viveret argues against a European nuclear defense that he sees as the beginning of a third bloc, of a new "political and military superpower." I am tempted to exclaim: Were it only so! If the only danger for Europe was in its strength and not its weakness! Viveret would like to turn this weakness into a strength on a moral and cultural level and have it contribute to an active or offensive detente, coming at the destabilization of the Eastern totalitarian system. But he does not seem to realize that the condition for an offensive action is to have the rear ranks protected.

I have argued elsewhere that the best way for Europe to avoid Finlandization is to work for the Finlandization of Eastern Europe. But it is equally true that, when concerned with the Finlandization of others, one must begin by not being Finlandized oneself. Finland is a courageous country that has managed to maintain a democratic regime in a geopolitically unfavorable situation. On the one hand, it can do so only under the shelter of a Nordic, European and Atlantic equilibrium maintained by others. On the other, the precariousness of the situation prevents the Finns from doing anything that would be interpreted as a provocation to the Soviets. Far from spreading the good word in communist countries, it finds itself unable to publish translations of Solzhenitsyn.

Viveret seems to believe that Western Europe can compensate for a deficit in military power with a surplus of offensive political audacity. In fact, that would quickly lead to injunctions from the big neighbor against these provocations or unfriendly actions — as in the case of Nicaragua's proselytizing in Central America in the face of the Reagan administration. While the maintenance or the restoration of military equilibrium in Europe (as well as independence from the energy supplies of the East) seems inadequate yet absolutely necessary for a peaceful commitment in the evolution of Eastern Europe, I agree with Viveret that this has a greater chance of succeeding in an atmosphere of detente than in one of confrontation.

If what deters the Soviet Union the most from invading Poland is the Polish people's resistance, it is also the fear that the United States will profit from it by, e.g., invading Cuba. But it is probably also the desire not to lose the political and economic advantage that detente offers them, especially in relation to West Germany and France.

On the other side, contacts between societies beyond the wall and the iron curtain, the circulation of goods, men and ideas, that play an undeniable role in the evolution of a country such as Poland, or in the internal situation of East Germany, are, in a similarly undeniable manner, facilitated by detente. To a certain extent, this justifies the anxiety, particularly strong in Germany, to preserve this against wind and tides. This anxiety inspires the notion of split detente: a separate European detente that

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Schmidt and Giscard envisioned the day after the invasion of Afghanistan and which was immediately seized upon by Soviet propaganda.

Viveret seems to find some virtues in this notion. I find it acceptable only to the extent that its conditional character is strongly emphasized and that even this is made an instrument of political influence. Put otherwise, our attitude toward detente should not be fixed once and for all, either in one direction or the other. In particular, it should not be totally independent of Soviet behavior outside of Europe, nor, even less, in Eastern Europe.

For conflicts outside of Europe, it is clear that Western Europeans cannot hope to generalize them in the name of an indiscriminate globalization such as the Reagan administration seems to want to practice, nor ignore them through provincial indifference or out of fear for themselves or indeed for the oppressed of Eastern Europe. "One cannot punish the Russians in Berlin for what they did in Kabul," said Egon Bahr in June 1980. But the real question is whether fear of being punished (us, or the East Germans) in Berlin or elsewhere should prevent us from reacting to the invasion of Kabul by aiding Afghan resistance or by demanding an account from the Soviet Union.

If one claims, as did a very interesting text published by KOR, that the Afghan invasion is the sign of a Soviet expansionism that constitutes the main threat to world peace, one can conclude with it that "it is futile to hope to preserve islands of detente in the midst of local aggressions," that "a local detente in Europe is impossible because the Soviet Union is a global power that pursues a global strategy" and that the priority of priorities is to make them withdraw, even if in the short run the oppressed populations of Eastern Europe will suffer because of it."[1]

Between this heroic position and the opposite attitude so well described by Goethe,[2] there is room for a policy aiming at maintaining and consolidating both detente in Europe and world equilibrium, on which the European security rests. This policy must seek both to aid Afghan or Eritrean resistance and also maintain the European dialogue with the Soviet Union as well as cooperation with the countries of the East, but also showing, by our firmness on the first point, that we will not hesitate to question the second policy in relation to Soviet action in Europe.

It is precisely this last aspect that poses the most delicate problem. Once we have a priori set aside the attitude of those people (more numerous in the Western Right than one thanks) who hope that nothing budges in Eastern Europe or that, if things go too far, the Soviet Union will intervene so as to leave no doubt concerning the totalitarian nature of communism and the illusory character of detente, two attitudes remain which seem dangerous: The first, symmetrical to the preceding one, is that embraced by many socialists and social-democrats, particularly in Germany but also in France, for whom anything that irritates the Soviets (whether Western rearmament or a popular movement in the East) is going to automatically threaten the long-term

1. "Saving World Peace," in *Informational Bulletin of KOR*, 1;35 (1980).
2. "Another citizen:
   There's nothing better, for Sunday or a holiday
   Than talk about war and war's alarms,
   When off in Turkey people up in arms
   Are battling in a far-off frey.
   You sip your glass, stand by the window side,
   And down the river watch the painted vessels glide,
   Then come home in the evening, all at ease,
   Blessing peace and the times of peace."
From Goethe's *Faust*, Part I, translated by Charles E. Passage (Indianapolis, 1965), p. 35.

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prospects for peace and the progress of freedom. They hope that, on both sides, nothing moves — at least not too openly. The other, held by Viveret, consists in profiting from detente to destabilize the Soviet regimes and, in the final analysis, the Soviet empire. If the first attitude is the most agreeable to the Soviet Union, the second is the one they fear and denounce the most — the one that would lead them to react, certainly against Eastern Europeans but also against Western Europeans, especially if they were militarily vulnerable.

Through an excess of egoistic prudence or generous adventurism, both attitudes risk compromising peace as well as liberty. As Viveret put it, these ideals can only be defended together, but with a policy that, while remaining faithful to his motives, pays more attention to the Soviet power — in its defensive as well as in its offensive aspect.

Here we are at the crucial point, that of concrete measures. What are our options in aiding the struggle of Eastern European people? Here Viveret seems to be somewhat unfair in his criticism and vague in his propositions. Quite rightly, he considers that "the main advantage of democratic systems is in effect the richness of their civil societies that are not totally absorbed by the state." Strangely, however, he finds that "the international politics of democratic states are often — with rare exceptions such as Sweden — exclusively state-directed and are doomed, as a result, to strategies of all or nothing." One need not subscribe to American capitalist demonologies to recognize how many non-state resources are employed by them, how much influence — either that of the United States or of the West — is exerted, directly or indirectly, through the thousands of economic and social channels, from the activities of large foundations, such as the Ford and the Rockefeller foundations, or the unions, to the diffuse effect of cultural models through the media and mass consumption. In Eastern Europe alone, how can we forget the essential role of Radio Free Europe or the social effect of rock groups in Czechoslovakia or East Germany? On a diplomatic level, the achievements of Helsinki are this third element, whose significance is the irruption of civil society in international negotiations.

Certainly, all of this is inadequate, especially concerning the level on which Viveret justly insists, that of the mobilization of public opinion. On the level of governments, progress has been made (if one considers the attitude of Westerners toward Poland in 1980 and toward Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968), but still lack a strategy that links coherently security, economic interdependence and human rights. I think that the central element, of which Viveret almost never speaks, is the economy. It can serve three functions: weaving ties favoring the opening up of societies, according advantages but linking them discreetly to reforms and threatening sanctions in case of repression. What is essential is to make a political tool out of it, rather than being its prisoners.

As for our own role, for those of us who have no access to state decision centers, it is both more modest and more ambitious than that of the states. We can and must, more than they do, address ourselves directly to the moral, social and political forces of the East beyond the "legal country." Finally, between the prudence of states, the ignorance of public opinion, and the risk of indifference, we must remind ourselves every instant of the relevance of the following pronouncement: "As long as Western Europe had full self-confidence and the future seemed only as a continuation of her progress, she could permit herself not to be bothered by Eastern Europe; but today she finds herself in a completely different situation." It was written by Herzen in 1850.

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ON THE GERMAN NON-RESPONSE TO THE POLISH CRISIS: AN INTERVIEW WITH ANDRE GORZ*

QUESTION: Mr. Gorz, the military putsch in Poland has thrown the European Left into deep confusion. The French Left, which earlier stood close to the communists, is today taking a very strong anti-communist position. Since December 13, the German Left, which earlier was criticized by the French for its anti-communism, is showing a great deal of appreciation for the problems of the communist sector of the world. How do you explain this?

GORZ: I disagree with your statement that the putsch in Poland has thrown the European Left into a state of confusion. I do see, however, that the communist parties of Spain and Italy have practically split with Moscow. That is the end of Eurocommunism.

QUESTION: Why?

GORZ: Because these two communist parties have broken with the old tradition of considering the Soviet Union as a socialist country that has something to offer the working class of Western nations. With the Warsaw military putsch came the death of the October revolution. That is what Berlinguer said.

QUESTION: Do you think he is right?

GORZ: I further believe he was somewhat late in making this observation. Carrillo was saying that some time ago, then stopped for a while, and is now saying it again.

QUSTION: We did, though, want to compare France and Germany and the problems each poses for the other regarding the Polish affair. French socialists strongly condemned the Polish putsch while the German Social Democrats exercised much more caution. How can we account for these different reactions?

GORZ: I regret that the French Socialist Party was not quicker in its condemnation of the putsch. Anyway, it still took them 24 hours to develop a clear line on the matter. And then only after CFDT, the pro-Socialist labor union, demonstrated against the putsch. That was when the party jumped on the bandwagon.

QUESTION: But they did eventually jump aboard. So, from your standpoint, the German Social Democrats are not even fellow travelers.

GORZ: Reasons for that can be established in historical, cultural and geographical contexts. In German history, the missing element is a cultural relation to freedom.

QUESTION: What do you mean by that?

GORZ: There are nations whose destiny is connected with the idea of freedom, such as Poland, France, Great Britain, and, in spite of everything, the United States. And there are nations whose destiny is not linked to the idea of freedom.

QUESTION: We can imagine what country you have in mind.

GORZ: Such nations stand for no universal values. Their identity is simply based on the love of the fatherland and self-glorification and thus, as in Switzerland, on national egoism and provinciality. People of other countries pay little attention to these nations.

QUESTION: Doesn't the history of the German Social Democrats partly prove that this thesis is erroneous? Social Democracy was an expression of political and social liberation.

*This interview was conducted by Dieter Wild, Helmut Sorge and Gustave Stern. Originally published in *Der Spiegel,* No. 4 (1982). Translated by Harry Hoffman.

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GORZ: As German Social Democracy developed its liberating tendencies, it was internationalist, therefore anti-nationalist, even anti-national. The same holds true for German culture of the 18th and 19th centuries. Thus, when it looks beyond its immediate self-interests, Germany can by all means be a beacon of freedom. But when it thinks only of itself, it never allies itself with a concern for freedom.

QUESTION: In your opinion, then, this is now manifested in the particular German attitude to Poland.

GORZ: Naturally, and I do not mean only the attitude of the German administration, but all political forces in Germany, including "alternative" and pacifist movements. In this respect, the only cultural forces that have not disgraced themselves are the representatives of the Christian Left and some bishops. But in the political sphere: nothing.

QUESTION: So that explains the great irritation which France is experiencing over Germany: *Le Monde* maintains that "a very dismal picture of modern Germany is beginning to develop." The left-leaning *Matin* concludes that "Western Europe is now feeling the first perverse effects of the famous *Ostpolitik*." Jean Popern, second in command of the Socialist Party, already sees a "Finlandized" Germany on the horizon, and your own *Nouvel Observateur* believes that Germany must decide "whether or not it still is in the Western alliance." Does a left-leaning Frenchman such as yourself, who follows the development, see how extremely exaggerated such statements are?

GORZ: I do not consider these statements exaggerated, but distorted. Based on my own education, I am certainly able to imagine myself in the Germans' position. It is not true that the French have a false picture of Germany based on some psychological peculiarity. The issue is more definitely the objective reality of German behavior as seen from a distance.

QUESTION: That is then perhaps a subjective reality...

GORZ: No. For some time now, the leading political notion of all West German political or para-political expression has been not to spoil things with the Soviet Union. Everything was dependent on not offending Soviet sensitivity and stepping in as mediator between the Kremlin and Western countries.

QUESTION: The Germans themselves know that such a role would exceed their power. They do not desire that.

GORZ: I thoroughly understand that a long-range perspective does exist for guaranteeing the existence of a German nation, for emancipation from under American influence and for the return to national unity. But if I were Brezhnev, I would have no respect for people who can mobilize against the new airport runways in Frankfurt, the nuclear plant in Brokdorf and the Pershing II missiles, but who remain silent about the genocide in Afghanistan, Soviet biological weapons, the SS-20s, torture in Czechoslovakia, and the Warsaw putsch, but want Siberian natural gas on top of all this. What respect can neighbors have for such behavior?

QUESTION: You seem to make it too simple regarding Brezhnev, since the Kremlin could certainly find respect for a nation that dares to stand up against its great American protector.

GORZ: But only under the stipulation that it opposes every form of repression, even beyond its own borders, and uses the same energy to rebuke intimidation from the other side. But that is exactly what West Germany is not doing. I have heard no protest against the Russian fleet in the Baltic, while there is a lot of protest against NATO bases.

QUESTION: When we focus on verbal indignation in France and the restraint in Germany with regard to Poland, it would seem that both lead to the same conclusion:

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no real help can be given the democratic movement in Poland. Why, then, do the French sound the alarm on the Germans?

GORZ: There is one substantial difference. Ideological battles are enormously important. A socialist or social democratic party cannot maintain its identity, its belief in itself or its mission of freeing all peoples from all forms of oppression unless it clearly and decisively states its open abhorrence of such deeds.

QUESTION: But the French were already uneasy about Germany even before the events in Poland, such as when, to their amazement, a strong pacifist movement arose in Germany. Should not the French feel fortunate that they need now only deal with peaceful as opposed to warlike Germans?

GORZ: Germany and France have differing historical experiences. In the 1930s, France preferred the life of freedom. Here things were written such as "Should we die for Austria?" "Should we risk our lives for the Sudeten?" "Must we die for Danzig?" In the end, France lost everything, including its self-esteem, but learned from this that freedom cannot be founded on the acceptance of the oppression of other nations. We charge that the Germans are now making the mistakes we made 50 years ago, and are treating the Russians as we did Hitler in 1938.

QUESTION: But certainly France did stand by Poland in declaring war on Hitler's Germany...

GORZ: ...but by then it was far too late. Didn't Churchill say that those who choose peace above honor will get dishonor, then war?

QUESTION: The lesson the Germans have drawn from that is: "Never again war."

GORZ: Exactly. Again they are placing life ahead of freedom. They did that in a certain respect in 1933 as well. National Socialism was also a glorification of life, of the lively values embodied by Germanness at the time. Then as today, they are leaving the idea of freedom out of the value of life.

QUESTION: And a leftist Frenchman now says: "Better dead than red."

GORZ: If reduced to this simple level, yes.

QUESTION: But it must be evident to you that the German youth do not want to die in war.

GORZ: It is evident, and in itself the neo-pacifist movement has a certain greatness in the sense that people are now saying, "We want to shape our own lives, we want to be the subject of new social relations, new forms of work, etc." The movement opposes each form of a technocratic and state directed planning and battles with admirable dedication the mega-technologies and bio-mechanical monsters that the military and bureaucratic machinery embodies. We're dealing here with the birth of a new post-industrial, post-capitalist and post-socialist culture, which in the long run is very effective but in the short run and at the political level, is not capable of mastering the complexity of the objective situation. The movement continually faces the risk and the temptation to become an instrument of Soviet policy. This can only be avoided by opposing on all sides the policies of the superpowers and by feeling a bond with all those who are now fighting against state bureaucratic despotism, including those in Prague, Leningrad and Warsaw.

QUESTION: But it would seem so much easier to publicly expose such failures abroad than at home.

GORZ: To that I can only say: It's apparently possible to draw 10,000 people into the streets when Alexander Haig visits, but only a few thousand turn up for a visit by Brezhnev in Bonn. They apparently accept living in the shadow of the SS-20s, but not the deployment of Pershing II missiles, which don't even exist yet.

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QUESTION: It does seem that something has really changed in Germany: Many feel more threatened by their strongest defender than by their strongest enemy. There must be a reason for that.

GORZ: There are a number, for that matter. For instance, the resistance of youths to their elders, who with their hatred for the Russians and their submissive pro-American policies, have passed up any opportunity to reunite Germany. This, of course, is a subjective reason. I see an objective reason in the fact that Germany is the hostage of the Soviet Union. The unification of Germany can only be gained with the cooperation of the Soviet Union, not with the Americans.

QUESTION: Do you wish to imply that this dependence on the Russians is totally undeserved?

GORZ: It is a historical fact: the Soviet Union possesses the key for the future of Germany. But it will never give it up. It is being used in the same way one uses bread to tease the hungry: only shown, never given.

QUESTION: The German youth are not bent on the reunification of Germany as you seem to believe.

GORZ: In the neo-pacifist movements, there is one strain I find appealing, represented by Peter Brandt, for example. This correctly strives for German reunification as well as for withdrawal from military blocs.

QUESTION: But a reunification of Germany would be totally unacceptable to the surrounding countries.

GORZ: That depends on what such a Germany and such a Europe would look like.

QUESTION: Regardless as to how such a Germany is perceived, its mere existence, even with neutrality, would be an intolerable threat to the European balance.

GORZ: That again depends on how the external dangers to Europe are evaluated.

QUESTION: So you believe the famous "Finlandization" of a united Germany would be possible.

GORZ: At the moment, we're even moving towards a possible "Finlandization" of Europe.

QUESTION: Isn't it just the other way around? Developments in Poland indicated that the central thesis of detente formulated by Egon Bahr as "change through rapprochement" threatens the system of the East, and not the West. The demands, raised even by President Mitterrand, to finally overcome Yalta are incredibly threatening to the East. How can one wish to overcome Yalta and at the same time not be afraid of German unity?

GORZ: Mitterrand did say that Yalta must be overcome, but he also said that what is desirable is not necessarily possible. For the moment, the conditions do not exist that would make it possible to overcome Yalta, but they could perhaps be created.

QUESTION: Mr. Gorz, you yourself wrote: "The victors over Germany have finally reached their goal. Instead of conquerors, they have bred good Germans who would have others lay their lives on the line for them, but do not wish to risk their own, either for themselves or others." Does this statement contain a note of regret or even reproach?

GORZ: This critique is meant for the Western allies who have spent too much time humiliating the Germans, denying them the quality of a nation. West Germany's European partners have also done nothing to aid Germany's release from American domination. It should be a priority of French politics, even militarily speaking, to aid Germany's process of emancipation from America; and I am not the only one who thinks this way.

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QUESTION: Just such a process is now developing, but one does not get the impression that the French are helping Germany.
GORZ: One cannot be emancipated from American domination by relying on the Soviets and making deals with them.
QUESTION: But West Germany has not joined the Warsaw Pact yet.
GORZ: No, but German public opinion underestimates the dynamics of Soviet armament. Many questions regarding America are asked, but not one as to the reasons for the Soviets' gigantic armament effort. The Soviet Union is no longer even a civil society, but is instead potentially a military state. The party is as corrupt as the one in Poland was. The army is becoming the most significant force in the country, and its influence, following the death of Brezhnev, will not be balanced by any political power.
QUESTION: Coming from a leftist, such an analysis is very surprising. But you have also written that the peace movements in Germany would turn out to be an objective advantage for the Soviet Union. Exactly the same thing is being said by those on the Right, whether they are from France, Germany, or the United States. Doesn't this type of company strike you as compromising?
GORZ: To that I can only say that one may not leave good ideas to one's opponents. The anti-Sovietism on the French Left is now more radical the further left one moves, and that is justifiable. If the Left and the "alternative" movements in Germany leave it to the Right alone to reject totally and unqualifiedly regimes of the Soviet type, then the Left is on the losing path.
QUESTION: The danger in France is such that it is possible for the Left to out-do the Right. You are certainly familiar with the caricature in *Express*, where Helmut Schmidt is polishing the shoes of Brezhnev while in the background Hitler and Stalin are shaking hands. What does this caricature tell you?
GORZ: It confirms my opinion that caricatures are very crude, but to some extent they do contain a kernel of truth.
QUESTION: When the French encounter problems understanding the Germans, Germans also have problems dealing with the French, who do not understand that the West Germans want normal relations with East Germans without necessarily having reunification in the back of their minds. Is that not enough to explain the moderate position on the Polish crisis taken, for instance, by the SPD?
GORZ: It is one thing to affirm intra-German relations, which is what German statesmen are realistically attempting. It is another matter when Social Democrats explain, as was done in Paris last October, that "detente will balance out past or future defeats." Was that directed at Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Polish communists who had to flee their countries? They were also told not to act "like sectarians." That means nothing but, "You dear oppressed peoples of the East, don't get on our nerves with your talk of freedom. We want detente." I call that provincial egoism.
QUESTION: Once again the Germans can do nothing right by the French. They still charge that a policy of detente is maintained only to protect their flourishing trade with the East...
GORZ: Really, the Germans seem to be saying to themselves, if we do not get Russian natural gas, we have an energy problem, and if we do not furnish them the pipeline, we have no market. The Soviets say nothing of the kind. If they are economically, demographically and strategically inferior, then they are dependent on their trade partners both as suppliers and as customers. If there were a balance in Europe with the Soviet bloc, then naturally we all could develop all kinds of trade without feeling a

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need for dependence.

QUESTION: The French would also like to establish trade relations with the East. It was noted in Paris that Chancellor Schmidt was in East Germany at the inception of the Polish military dictatorship, but the fact that the French foreign trade minister, Jobert, was negotiating in Moscow at the same time was repressed. Do you believe, then, that France would join an American boycott against the Soviet Union?

GORZ: I cannot speak for Mitterrand nor do I intend to defend French *Realpolitik*. I believe that a people that is not prepared to make sacrifices for its ideas relinquishes respect and credibility.

QUESTION: Mr. Gorz, is this deep mistrust, which is now developing in France against Germany, perhaps based on the fact that contemporary Germany no longer fits the traditional French image of Germany?

GORZ: The French have generally overestimated German strength in terms of technology, economics and demography. There has actually always been mistrust based on a lack of understanding.

QUESTION: As the Germans now surprise the French with their militant pacifism, they confuse the French in regard to Poland with two traits counted as part of France's own cultural heritage: moderation and rationalism. Could the bitter reaction by the French be explained partly as the feeling that the Germans are claiming something that France, the land of Cartesian reason, has reserved to itself?

GORZ: I see it completely different, not as German reasonableness, but as German willingness to accept despotism. Fifty years ago, this willingness took on a "heroic" form; today its form is a *Realpolitik* that you call "reasonable." It troubles me further that Soviet despotism, which is so reasonably tolerated in Germany, does not fundamentally differ from that of the Third Reich. The Soviet Union has nothing to offer other peoples but military oppression.

QUESTION: For a long time now, the French have used the strong points of post-war Germany, e.g., economic stability and social peace, to reveal their own weaknesses in these areas. Is there not now a certain sense of satisfaction in finding that the German model is no longer so overpowering?

GORZ: I see no such satisfaction. The economic crisis affects Germany and the rest of the world. I do not see why we should be happy about that.

QUESTION: It appears that French intellectuals, with few exceptions, have never really understood Germany. Earlier they always exaggerated the strength of Germany. Now they tend to exaggerate its weaknesses. Must we then conclude that French intellectuals have never taken the trouble to really confront the German phenomenon? That apparently holds even for such a universal spirit as your mentor, Jean-Paul Sartre.

GORZ: Sartre never really concerned himself much with other countries. To the substance of your question: There is such a thing as a French cultural egocentrism. France considers itself as the navel of the world, and parts of the world consider France their own navel. That is grounded in history. Nation, people and freedom were always tightly linked, and the French intelligentsia has never doubted its universal mission, even if it could not measure up to it.

QUESTION: Mr. Gorz, thank you for the interview.

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RAPALLO — WHY NOT? REPLY TO GORZ*

by Rudolf Bahro

I have just read — with sympathy, I might add — the new book by André Gorz, *Abschied vom Proletariat*. Gorz's recent remarks in the interview, however, come as a total shock to me. Initially, I read this book uncritically, not out of prejudice but in order to appreciate the strongest points. Thus, I never bothered to ask myself where this book falters.

Since then, I don't have to read the book again to answer this question. It is the result of the political reaction to the crisis of the systems after World War II and of the decline of the two superpowers. That Gorz turns at this point against the Germans and, what is most scandalous, against the West German peace movement, could also tempt one to attribute it to French chauvinism, such as is more typical of those who are French by choice than by birth. What a superficiality! The essence of the accusations is that Germans are no longer willing to defend the "free West" from the "totalitarian East." It is this wonderful constellation that from the beginning made it so much easier for democratic socialists of every stripe to repress the anti-imperialist, i.e., anti-colonialist character of the Russian revolution.

Although the Russia of old was at one time colonialist and today's Soviet Union has in turn become even more colonialist than ever, even toward the West, the October Revolution meant the beginning of the rise of the periphery against the metropolis. And without the existence of the Soviet Union, Carter would never have confronted the Iranian challenge with his pitiful helicopter expedition. From this, the last — but not least significant — residue of this original agenda became evident.

Oh, I understand full well that France is much more European, much more metropolitan than Germany, which even today has not won its Aquitaine and left the tribal stage. If your great nation is the heart of European culture, then surely this heart must now be trembling, given that, without drastic change, it is no longer relevant to the rest of humanity. Germany is — probably not as such, but in the older historical context of Central and Northern European Protestantism — simply less colonialist.

No, let me correct myself: it doesn't *function* as colonially, at least in the ideological and cultural context. The strength of the world market will give radical ecologism, which seriously hopes to undermine it, a run for its money. The last catastrophe brought West Germany into a particular situation. Its vital interests are such that the Europeanization of Europe, for good or ill, would be the end of its colonial power. You think we want to rid ourselves of atomic weapons out of fear of Russia. Although it would have to be put more precisely, this is also a reason.

We postulate that the Soviet empire finds itself in a situation where it will no longer threaten Western Europe with nuclear weapons if it is no longer likewise threatened from here. Since it needs its troops to keep watch over the subjugated peoples in the entire *cordon sanitaire* — as in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1956 and 1981 — a conventional offense is unthinkable and it is absurd to count Soviet tanks and soldiers. Against the Russians, European atomic weapons are useless for defense other than as a last stand. They do not have that direct function anyway, as a

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like-minded rightist comrade of the leftist Gorz has also claimed.

Moreover, without these rockets, the Soviets could blackmail us not to intervene in the Persian Gulf with the Americans (or perhaps instead of the Americans?) over "our oil." Europe without atomic weapons, once it has no raw materials to speak of, would be disarmed not so much relative to the East as to the South. It would then have to work towards changing its production and lifestyle to feed, clothe and maintain the health of its people by using local resources.

The new peace movements want to free Europe of the conquistador (which translated in modern terms is industrial dynamics). In every respect — proliferation of the bomb in the South and "Global 2000" — this is the harbinger of destruction. If you want to continue in Europe as before, give each French worker his Citroën, so that we can be certain that each year hundreds more starving children will die in the Third World, just as each year of World War II brought more deaths (including Auschwitz and Hiroshima-Nagasaki).

Gorz accuses the Germans and the peace movement of having no relation to freedom. *Within* the European context of today, this is an accurate statement. But it explains almost nothing about the reaction to Poland, at least not regarding the hesitancy among the youth, the Left and the "Greens." This reproach basically means only that the Germans, by virtue of their geographic position and cultural function in the Holy Roman Empire on the north-south axis of the continent, had no French or English history.

Just such adaptibility to the French national model was sought by the long-lost Bismarck Empire. We do not want another quasi-French national state, at least not those of us within the West German ecology and peace movements. And if you want to read what such East German authors as Christa Wolf, Günther de Bruy, Franz Fuhmann, Heiner Müller, Volker Braun, Stephen Hermlin — the best of the other German state — said in East Berlin recently, even they would not dream of such a thing. We feel the same as they do.

Is it not a projection from your national state tradition when, faced with a German movement for freedom and disarmament — and, let me add, for military *and* industrial disarmament — nothing else comes to your minds but fear of German reunification? But the notion of freedom from which Gorz uncritically starts — as if the French Revolution did not take place in just that Europe, which has been imperialist since the crusades — carries with it a considerable chunk of colonialist impudence. I cannot imagine what could be more European — that is, colonial — in regard to the rest of the world, than applying the principles of the French Revolution arbitrarily to countries with non-capitalist, non-European traditions.

What Bolshevik infamy the Soviets dare to have, in not furnishing us with the expected substitute for our own socialist revolution! And that they do not subject their military machine to self-government, whereas now François Mitterrand, and thus the common citizenry, is in command of the *Force de frappe*. The further left, the more anti-Soviet the French become, Gorz says. Here I must run the risk of being called a Communist Party mole: this means the end of the Left in France, it means that the Left is hopelessly limited to a structure within the schema of European bourgeois society.

To be sure, I did not just begin to suspect yesterday that here the institutions of the Left thoroughly belong to the institutional agencies of the status quo, the ruling apparatus of the metro-political power structure. The secret of Western socialism has never been clearer than when its representatives took part in the conference of the Trilateral Commission.

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Poland, of course, is a critical case, because it belongs to Europe, to the part of the world in which French criteria are relatively applicable. Regarding the repression exerted there by Soviet imperial despotism, they even have absolute validity, while in the meantime Soviet hegemony has lost all indirect perspective. In Poland, all power had to belong to Solidarity (*and* to the farmers, one must add, insofar as the labor union takes the position of the city as opposed to the countryside). And there is no solution to the global social crisis there without complete independence from Moscow.

What we must consider in this case is how we can keep the Soviet economic and political structures from forever influencing East Europe, where *its* function is colonialist — the counterpart to metropolitan colonialism. If Western colonialism is the ultimate cause of the dilemma, being based on unlimited industrial capitalist accumulation, the metropolitan cancer that will kill humanity, then the main question is: How must Western Europe appear, how must it be transformed, so that the Russian bear can withdraw its paws from the Eastern Europe trap that has caught hold of them.

There is talk of Rapallo. Then, why not? But that does not have to be a German undertaking, "apart from Western Europe." We are not in the 1920s. Today all of Western Europe finds itself in the middle position in which earleir Germany had always found itself alone. A new Rapallo would break Western Europe from North America, as Albert Schweitzer envisioned some 25 years ago, and Eastern Europe perhaps from the Soviet Union. Western Europe alone would be both economically and culturally stronger than each of the superpowers. It might indeed have a Gaullist component, but without a *Force de frappe*.

Generally, because the arms race will annihilate us, if not in the literal sense, then indirectly. Specifically, for this reason (in case there is no intention of removing the Soviet Union completely as a power factor), the arms race can only be reversed from Europe through the creation of conditions under which the Soviet Union could respond to *our* reliving its burdens by removing from us the burden of its tanks. Gorz's political antagonism toward Moscow is the best method to perpetuate military domination there. It strengthens its structural power (which does not have just internal causes) until the Reich collapses, to the detriment of its 270 million people and with unforeseeable consequences for us.

I do not entirely consider it a coincidence that this bellicose anti-Soviet Left has nothing to say when one asks them why they do not just come out and say they endorse the Reagan concept. It is groundless self-righteousness, it is an objectively hypocritical position, to condemn the Soviet internal political structure as the number one threat to the world while giving not one thought to the grotesque and fatal dialectic through which the impulse of the October Revolution — which Berlinguer finally admits is used up — lost itself in the militarization of the Soviet regime.

No one sees that it is that unrelenting Western industrial system which drives not only the Russian Revolution, but every attempt at an alternative to the non-capitalist world, into a blind alley. No one sees that the entire political structure of Europe, along with civil liberties, are part of the luxury that is only to be found in the colonial metropolis.

I cannot but feel disgusted when I see how a certain strain of the Western Europe Left, completely social-democratized in world politics, belatedly has the same reaction as the "European democrats" of 1918-1919 to the Russian Revolution. Apparently you are prepared to dispense with the old Marxism, but the bacteria are buried together with the corpse. They do not get up and pass on the immortal spark.

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WHAT, THEN, IS FREEDOM? REPLY TO BAHRO*

by André Gorz

It came as quite a surprise to read that Rudolf Bahro, in replying to my interview, in effect admitted I was right in the four points of my statement. This may not have been his intention, but I want to welcome it nonetheless in responding to it here.

1. As far as Poland is concerned, he concedes that "it belongs to Europe, to that region of the world in which the French criteria. . .indeed have absolute validity. . . . There can be no solution of the overall social crisis there without full independence from Moscow." It has been my main reproach to opposition groups that they have not stressed this; they have not felt united with Solidarity; and they have not been willing to demonstrate for it. As a member of the French opposition, I turned to them and not to the federal goverment as spokesman of the French state. I do not cultivate relations with governments.

When Bahro thus immediately accused me of chauvinism, although I had no kind word for French politics, he demonstrated his ignorance of the consciousness-raising task that radical intellectuals here have set for themselves and which is expressed also in relentless criticism of "our" public attitude. The starting point for such criticism is always a relation to values, even when these values cannot be immediately converted into state actions. Criticism and protest have first of all an ethical function of awakening consciousness or of keeping it alive. Marx and even Lenin already knew this — not to mention Max Weber and Adorno. Unlike Heinrich Böll or Freimut Duve, etc., Bahro no longer knows this. Oh, how sensitive all of you are! Even in Israel, where people would have reason to be sensitive, they take more calmly than your people criticism from foreign intellectuals.

2. Bahro further confirms that "within the European context," it is accurate to say that the Germans and the peace movement have no relation to freedom. That is exactly what I meant, except I was referring to the Germans as a nation. But then Bahro continues: "But the notion of freedom from which Gorz uncritically starts. . . carries with it a considerable chunk of colonialist impudence." For Europe has been a *conquistador* ever since the Crusades. That our concept of freedom has been stamped by imperialism in such a way that "the entire political structure of Europe, along with civil liberties, are part of the luxury that is only to be found in the colonial metropolis."

This is most astonishing, coming from a Marxist! For (a) by freedom I understand, and so has all of Western culture since Socrates, including the Czechs and the Poles, which was my point, the objective and subjective capacity for individual and collective self-determination; it concerns here philosophical and not merely political insights. Without the concept of freedom innate in Western philosophy, there is no sense to the Marxist concepts of alienation, reappropriation, emancipation — see Bahro's own writings — of the "universally developed individual."

(b) The modern concepts of civil liberties and basic liberties have their roots, respectively, in the Renaissance and in Protestantism. Such concepts are found wherever a bourgeois revolution has taken place (e.g., in the Netherlands, Denmark, Czechoslovakia, etc.) and-or where the tenant peasants were able to free themselves from feudal rule (the miners were the first to succeed, e.g., in Switzerland, Northern

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Italy, Croatia, Norway, etc.). In all cases, civil liberties and the reference to freedom are older than colonial rule which (e.g., in Spain, Portugal, Russia, Japan as well as China, Morocco, Turkey) knew how to develop even without any civil liberties and even without mercantilism.

The present-day "alternative" movements in Scandinavia especially demonstrate to what extent the uncompromising defense of freedom can go hand in hand everywhere with the creation of developmental alternatives and active solidarity with the Third World.

3. Bahro characterizes the Soviet regime in almost the same terms I do: he refers to "Soviet imperialist despotism," whose "hegemony has in the meanwhile also lost all indirect perspective." It is such statements that I wished to be able to hear from neo-pacifists, the "Greens," as well as left Social-Democrats. For to distance oneself ideologically from such imperial despotism is, in my opinion — as well as that of Berlinguer — the indispensable task of the Western Left if it is to develop a credible alternative to capitalism. In this connection, I stated: "The further left one is in France, the more anti-Soviet." In France, as is well known, the French Communist Party continues to demonstrate its fraternal admiration for the lords in the Kremlin, Warsaw or Kabul. In my remark, Bahro immediately sees a military-political statement. But my words did not carry such military-political considerations. I only made the following general remarks:

4. The peace movement apparently feels threatened by the NATO weapons, which are still on the drawing board and posed only as a subject for negotiations — but apparently they don't feel threatened by the SS-20s that are already pointed at us. Bahro has confirmed this. The SS-20s, in his opinion, are only defensive; the lords of "imperialist Soviet despotism will not be an atomic threat to Western Europe if they are no longer threatened from here." So, then, we junk the short-range rockets, which are obsolete anyway and which can barely reach Leningrad. This would induce the "Soviet empire" to likewise scrap its SS-20s and the like and to dismantle its long-term, preprogrammed gigantic armament industry. For, after all, Bahro thinks, the lords in the Kremlin were merely afraid of us, and we in the West should allow "the Russian bear [to] withdraw its paws from the Eastern Europe trap," as it would like to do.

Now isn't this touching! The poor bear is so clumsy that its paws always (even in Afghanistan) manage to stumble into the traps (set by whom?). That's what we are to believe in order to help him out of the trap and to save ourselves. But what can lead us to believe this? Do not the lords of Soviet imperialism perhaps feel more threatened by the example of an independent trade union movement or of independent intellectuals (e.g., in Prague), who demand basic rights, than by our pig-headed military apparatus so alienating our peoples? Is there any reason to believe that the "Russian bear," in the framework of a neutral and atomic-weapons-free Europe, would accord the longed-for civil liberties to their neighboring peoples? Or does Bahro consider this question irrelevant inasmuch as civil liberties are anyway only an imperialist luxury that we should perhaps abandon in the interests of peace and understanding?

Your response, dear Bahro, opens up so many questions that I ask myself what it really responds to. I no longer can see what you basically stand for, i.e., what values make you find life worth living. But I do not therefore despise you. The scorn that you finally hurled at me in your response poses another question instead: Why are political activists so boundlessly aggressive in their discussions? Is not the cause of peace and the protection of life lost anyway when the "battle" (sic) for it is carried on with murderous words?

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OLYMPICS OF NATIONALISM: NOTES ON THE GORZ-BAHRO CONTROVERSY*

by Dan Diner

It is surprising and alarming to see how quickly and unimpededly the combination of the peace movement and the Polish crisis has caused nationalism to flare up in Europe. The Left has been no exception. On the contrary, it seems to feel called on to set the pace for the permissible extent of ethnocentric and particularistic patterns of argument. Never since the origin of the New Left has there been so little communication and discussion, so little transnational contact. The Left, too, has — who could have foreseen this a few years ago? — become nationalized.

Examples of this lack of communication are the interview with André Gorz and Rudolf Bahro's reply. Both men are quite typical of the prevalent consciousness of the Left in their countries, and cannot be dismissed as wild eccentrics and unrepresentative grumblers. Both Gorz and Bahro thematize and strengthen the national identifications which are intensified by the ever stronger Europeanization of Europe as the bipolarity of the post-war order crumbles.

That national differences in Europe have become a problem is no misfortune; it is better for them to be out in the open than repressed. What is problematic in these two standpoints is the expressed identification with the respective national collectivity and its real or purported history. Both Gorz and Bahro thus become the defenders of mutual collective resentments. Yet, in the two articles, especially in Bahro's, what is explicitly said is not as important as what remains unsaid. Here are just a few basic points.

Anti-German Diatribes and a Manichean World View

In the Gorz interview, one thing becomes clear: History and political behavior repeat, or are oriented directly toward, the past, like the proverbial behavior of generals who allegedly tend to apply past wars and what they learned from them to new situations, as if they were still dealing with the old ones. To learn from history it is necessary to have a situation that is comparable to the past one. The equation of the past with the present is suggested to Gorz — if I understand him correctly — via the comparison of the Soviet Union with Hitler's Germany. His expressed analogies between current events and the years 1936-1939, i.e., the Western Powers' policy of surrender ("appeasement") to Hitler, which only confirmed and strengthened him in his expansionist strivings, cannot be understood otherwise. "We accuse the Germans of today" — Gorz says of the West German stance toward the crushing of Solidarity — "of falling into the errors we committed 50 years ago and behaving toward the Russians as we behaved toward Hitler in 1938," since "Soviet despotism is no different than the Third Reich's." Not that the superpowers are all alike, or should be judged to be morally alike, in their behavior toward third parties today — no, what is being equated is Hitler's Germany, which aroused a world coalition against itself and waged premeditated wars of expansion and destruction, and the Soviet Union. Yet, to reject such a comparison is not to defend the Soviet Union! It is rather a matter of the very possibility of politics today, which is completely blocked by such a comparison and its utterly Manichean lack of alternatives. If such an absolute standard is applied, as it is

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by Gorz, then what we have today is an existential and ideological struggle with all its implicit practical consequences — defense of the arms race and a thoroughly justifiable "just war."

The good to be defended in this ideological encounter is "freedom" — a freedom that emerged from those societies which, each for itself and in different form, produced a bourgeois revolution. The Germans, Gorz claims, lack such a tradition. Historically, that is certainly not false and we have stressed it again and again in the campaign against repression. It is also not false that it is in principle worthwhile, indeed urgent, to defend democratic liberties and to help them to a breakthrough, especially in societies of "real socialism," in East and Central Europe. The movement in Poland was, once again, an example of this.

But the emphatic concept of "freedom" cannot be unconditionally identified with those illustrious democratic rights. It conceals rather a worldview that requires more, or ultimately something other than democratic rights and the social principle of self-organization — namely, "freedom and democracy." Thus, the Cold War spirit hides, with worldwide validity, behind the supposedly universal postulate of "freedom": identification with one world bloc, or submission.

Precisely the latter is what Gorz accuses the Germans of as a collectivity. Crass material interests, culminating in the natural-gas deal, led them to submit to Moscow, Ideological freedom is contrasted with political detente, according to the motto that everything repeats itself, all men remain the same. What is problematic in Gorz's interpretation is the element of national collective attribution of social and even political traits. It is not as if no continuities had resulted from the historically different implementation of a particular social formation. What is questionable, however, is that such statements lose all dimension of politics and possible social change, of politics as the expression of social coercion, of historical necessity, and also of the freedom to act under such forces. Gorz's return to historically and nationally stamped attribution of collective deliberate behavior — however differentially this may be meant — destroys precisely what he means to advocate: internationalism. And an internationalism that is not just misunderstood as solidarity with the revolts of other nations, but internationalism as a supra-national, concerted thought and action of the repressed and exploited.

What remains after reading the Gorz interview is uneasiness that the increasing Europeanization of Europe inclines to atavistic nationalisms and revives old believes that were overcome long ago. Gorz, whether he admits it or not, starts with a national character of the Germans and thus erects barriers that block understanding and change. He does not seem to want to understand what the objective motives of the peace movement in Germany are. He does not want to understand that it is the expression of social processes whose outcome is still open and which aim for deep changes. This blindness allows him to resort to ideological patterns one would previously not have suspected of him.

Distortion of History as a Trapdoor to Nationalism

These doubts, unfortunately, are confirmed by Bahro in his reply. They are confirmed in the sense that the process of the re-Europeanization of Europe also redefines "the German question." Bahro must absolutely be reproached with dealing very loosely and unhistorically with history, especially recent history. This is not a matter of Bahro's positions concerning the anti-imperialist character of the October Revolution, the comprehensive meaning of the peace movement, and the need for a deep social change to prevent a military and ecological catastrophe; these points are

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quite well taken. The problems arise with those parts of his statements that at first sight seem unimportant and secondary, elements one is inclined to neglect. That they are put under the spotlight here has to do precisely with something the Left does not like to talk about but which is spreading just below the surface: nationalism.

Let us take up just a few inflammatory phrases in their context. It begins already with Bahro's personal frontal attack on Gorz, where Gorz is accused of "French chauvinism, such as is more typical of those who are French by choice than by birth." Two things are clear from this: first, that Bahro overlooks the fact that Gorz's choice to become a Frenchman was not made because France had such a great attraction for him, but because of German history and his ancestry, which was incompatible with it (his father was a Jew; see his biography *The Traitor*). He was expelled from his Viennese homeland — and that was not the worst. That he selected French nationality and identity touches on the second factor and symbolizes precisely what Bahro seems to have in mind in his broadside: the character of the French nation, which emerged from the Great Revolution with its originally universalistic claim. This nation, precisely on the basis of its abstract character, which Bahro monitors, relates to people of other ancestry more openly and is more ready to receive them than are the Germans. The Germans, on the contrary — indeed, even the German constitution — place descent, i.e., belonging to a nation, in the foreground of citizenship.

And precisely that fine distinction is now reversed by Bahro and denounced as colonialist. "Germany is," according to his comparison, "probably not as such, but in the older historical context of Central and Northern European Protestantism — simply less colonialist." Astonishing! Not a word about German imperialism, nothing about National Socialism, no enslavement and subjugation of other nations! Yes, implicitly Bahro surely implied much and really wanted precisely to brand bourgeois society, which establishes the world market, as "imperialist." He means it in terms of formation and historico-philosophically, but speaks philosophically. Attributions in terms of formation, when related politically to current affairs, tilt very rapidly in the direction of the attribution of national traits. Again, a contrast which was believed long ago forgotten: Fichte versus Napoleon?

Bahro merely brushes up against what for the sake of historical justice and current political effect he should have addressed directly, i.e., German National Socialism. Though "ultra-imperialist," National Socialism bristled with all kinds of "anti-imperialist," anti-Western motives, whose origin, at least in Germany, can be traced back to the French revolution or its Romantic countermovement, for he speaks euphemistically only of the "previous catastrophe" — this purported natural event that took social form and which even today still seems to have no name. Is the time passed when the Left was on guard against linguistic camouflage of the reaction, in order not to relegate that history to the Hades of oblivion?

Apology for Germany's Special Way?

Bahro is fighting windmills if he thinks that a man such as Gorz represents the spreading of the "principles of the French Revolution in countries of non-capitalist, non-European tradition." Gorz was practically one of the first to introduce the ecological dimension into the critique of imperialism. Moreover, the principles of the French Revolution — freedom, equality, brotherhood — do not mean just what they have represented historically, i.e., simple formal equality before the law and the freedom of commodity exchange, but also the spread of the political tradition of a revolutionary idea. Radical democrats, the labor movement, and, not least of all, the October Revolution, are based on this. But as a negative comparative argument on Germany and German history, it loses its objective innocence and functions apologetically.

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The anti-French images in Bahro's argument seem to reflect elements of East Germany's historical consciousness. There, the anti-Napoleonic alliance between Prussia and Russia becomes the historical forerunner of developments east of the Elbe after 1945. The lack of understanding for the fears and resentments in Europe, when a lot is being said again in Germany about Germany, can perhaps be explained by the fact that East Germany fabricates the claim to have belonged to the anti-Hitler coalition; that its history and thus the history of its people begins with the zero hour of its founding. Socialists who for oppositional reasons, real or imagined, switch from East to West Germany, whether by force or voluntarily, are inclined to look upon this just as a territorial or political shift. They often develop little sense for the fact that their consciousness, stamped in East Germany, including its national components, here develops in a different milieu, and they thereby find themselves at a still greater distance from Germany's true reality. In view of a Europeanization of Europe that ought to be sped up, to speak today of a new Rapallo — even metaphorically, as Bahro does — while simply ignoring Germany's increasing significance in Central Europe and as the European middle, means not to care a damn for the necessarily internationalist form of the peace movement. If this dimension is not preserved, or, as the case may be, regained, then such hopefully anachronistic attitudes, reflecting 19th century forms of consciousness, as can be noted in Gorz and Bahro, can be resurrected. May we be spared this!

POLAND, OF COURSE, IS A CRITICAL CASE!*

by Günter Frankenberg

Left organizations have seldom succeeded in acting together in what is morally required and politically wise. Collective actions always presuppose some agreement concerning concrete historical situations as well as some moral principles irreducible to strategic or tactical calculations. This agreement is commensurate with a minimal distance from a specific political tradition, i.e., self-criticism. In other words, claims excluding theoretical consideration, the primacy of tactics over principles, make it difficult to build a community of interests. Thus, Left organizations frequently have not been able to develop lasting alliances. Furthermore, in Germany there has also always been the controversy as to who should be the protector of the holy grail of Marxism, while official state anti-communism in West Germany and the "real socialism" of East Germany have always polarized the West German Left.

More recently, however, the Left seemed to be changing. It seemed as if the ideological mini-war between socialists and radical democrats as well as between pacifists and ecologists was coming to a long-overdue end. The peace movement seemed to be in the process of overcoming reservations and prejudices. The madness of a competitive nuclear arms race made it possible to develop impressive collective actions and even a common program. The totality and immediacy of the threat pushed into the background the query as to *which* imperialism was worse. Are we near the end of Left theoretical debates and approaching a grand synthesis of various traditions?

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An optimist may reply: not yet. The ominous state of emergency in Poland has brought things back to normal. Old oppositions and prejudices die hard when "real socialism" in Eastern Europe is in trouble, and all unity has been thrown overboard. What happened? A process of democratization within the "socialist" camp has been interrupted through martial law. The aim of the military putsch was and is to prevent Solidarity's emancipation of Polish society and to supplant the peaceful but military revolution "from below" by the militarily-supported domination "from above." Without massive pressure from the Soviet Union, recent developments in Poland would be inconceivable. Thus Poland is a classic example of masked intervention.[1]

The reaction of the West German Left has been rather hesitant and reserved. Reactions have ranged from dumb perplexity to impotent rhetorical advice concerning Solidarity's strategic mistakes. This is neither new nor original: West German communists adhering to the model of "really existing socialism" have always shown restraint in such matters. Following Carl Schmitt, they see every conflict in terms of the dichotomy friend-or-foe. Long before December 13, *Unsere Zeit*, the organ of the German Communist Party, saw in Poland the ominous work of "anti-socialist" forces. Thus, sooner or later, socialist order had to be restored. That this took place with military means was merely an error in form. The dictatorship of the proletariat in uniform was a blemish. Very likely this will be healed when the ever-weary party will reassert its leadership.

Anti-revisionist groups have also not been moved by the Polish events. Since they condemn to failure every non-revolutionary action and for them the revolution must begin with a call to arms, they guaranteed the end of Solidarity even before the military putsch. Accordingly, they felt it appropriate to teach Solidarity a lesson on appropriate strategic procedures. Nothing new there.

Being further removed from "actual" socialism in Eastern Europe, West German trade unions and Social Democrats had more room for criticism. Of course, in the case of Social Democrats, this is curbed by the imperatives of *Realpolitik*, which they see as an integral component of running the country. Since trade unionism was on the agenda in Poland and Solidarity's "reformist middle of the road" strategy seemed to fall between violent revolutionary overthrow and resigned acceptance of the status quo, they should have reacted vehemently and condemned the military intervention without reservation. Yet, their reactions seemed guided more by ritual than principle. The response of the trade unions and the party base was also one of "practical" moderation. Even a considerable part of the Left and liberal public opinion in West Germany sacrificed criticism on the altar of detente. Moreover, discussions were not always free from the conspiracy explanation provided by the military regime's apologists. In view of the CIA's possible activities, who could dismiss the notion that the United States was managing to split the socialist camp?

In the meantime, the morally based and principled condemnation of the military putsch was usurped by the conservatives.

Those who allow themselves to be trapped into such a double-bind will always be in the awkward position whereby good arguments have been "pre-empted" by political opponents. The crocodile tears of notorious enemies of trade unionism and opponents of all freedoms other than those of possessive individualism should not cause the Left any embarrassment. Rather than falling in line with the program of the "New Right" *and* the old party line, an unholy alliance has formed between willing and unwilling

1. Cf. Zdenek Mlynar, "Poland seen without Blinders," in *Listy*, 9 (January 1982).

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apologists of the military putsch. The policy of moderation, the Left appeasement, requires justification.

First, it was frequently heard, "change through proximity" between East and West was being endangered. Presumably, the Polish people were not served by public criticism of the military regime and of the Soviet Union becamse criticism only hardened political fronts. *Second*, statements such as those of the French socialists or of Berlinguer, involving a final reckoning with the Soviet Union, were not really useful. At best, they were seen as acts of moral self-righteousness by Left intellectuals. *Third,* criticism of the military dictatorship in Poland would play into the hands of anti-communism. Moreover, *fourth*, in West Germany and elsewhere in the West, it was a matter of avoiding being turned awy from the struggle for peace and disarmament, and to become dispersed by reactionary forces.

But this is not the whole truth. Most of the "Greens," the Socialist Büro, the Committee for Basic Rights and Democracy, church organizations involved in the peace movement and prominent figures in the peace movement, such as Heinrich Böll, as well as a numbler of dissidents in the trade unions, in the Social Democratic Party, and even in the Communist Party, did not participate in this appeasement. Early on, they sharply condemned martial law and the arrests. Those who chose appeasement reproached dissidents with the charge of political irresponsibility. As Ridden put it, they were "third roaders" whose "eccentric worldview made a cult out of their unreal socialism." [2]

This reproach could also extend to André Gorz, who has criticized the West German Left and Germans in general for opportunistic and shameful behavior. "If I were Brezhnev, I would have no respect for people who can mobilize against the new airport runways in Frankfurt, the nuclear plant in Brokdorf and the Pershing II missiles, but who remain silent about the genocide in Afghanistan, Soviet biological weapons, the SS-20s, torture in Czechoslovakia, and the Warsaw putsch, but want Siberian natural gas on top of all this. What respect can neighbors have for such behavior?" [3] The deeper cause for this attitude Gorz sees in the lack of a libertarian tradition that permitted Germans in doubt to prefer peace and life to honor, and to cultivate a "provincial egotism," including a readiness to accept Soviet despotism. Gorz's reprimand is nothing new. What makes it explosive, however, is the context: Poland, and the anti-Soviet turn.

Not surprisingly, this reprimand provoked sharp reactions, especially from Rudolf Bahro. Unfortunately, only one aspect stands out in his reply: petulance, and not amazement. "With dismay" Bahro acknowledges the critique of the man who is French "by choice" (Bahro) and the differences between France and Germany.[4] Thoughtfulness may have been more suitable than dismay, though. Having restrained his emotions when the democratic movement in Poland was smashed, Bahro had no trouble unleashing them in replying to a correct evaluation of the Polish situation. Condescendingly, Bahro sought to protect the peace movement from moral criticism and the Soviet Union from anti-Sovietism. Wavering between abstract criticism and apology for Soviet "colonialism," Bahro focused first on anti-Sovietism. Gorz's formula, "the more Left, the more anti-Soviet," he saw as merely bourgeois. The

2. H. Ridden, "The Poland Song of the Crocodiles," in *Blatter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 1 (1982), pp. 7ff. Ridder's polemic is especially drawn out and linguistically quite foggy, but nevertheless it typifies the defense of appeasement, which in essence does not contain any strategic political evaluation, but is rather an expression of puzzlement.

3. See André Gorz, "Interview," in this issue of *Telos*.

4. Rudolf Bahro, "Rapallo — Why Not?" in this issue of *Telos*.

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October Revolution for him remains the "uprising of the periphery against the metropolis." And although he does not deny Soviet colonialism and militarism, he blames them on the "irresistible Western industrial system." The persecution of dissidents or the liquidation of basic democratic movements is not a political characteristic of Stalinist or post-Stalinist Russia, but merely reactions to the capitalist system. Does this make Poland merely an element in the "foreign policy" of Western colonialism?

As far as the main issue is concerned, Bahro has little to say. Poland merits only a short, awkward paragraph qualified by a rhetorical flourish: "Poland, of course, is a critical case..." There is no clearer expression of the socialists' inability to criticize socialism.

What is the sense, then, of Gorz's attitude, shared by Berlinguer and the French socialists? To give final burial to the myth of the October Revolution? To show solidarity with an endangered socialist movement? To insist on the inextricable connection between freedom, self-determination and socialism? To challenge the legitimacy of the Soviet Union's hegemony?

Gorz argues that: "Ideological battles are enormously important. A socialist or social democratic party cannot maintain its identity, its belief in itself or its mission of freeing all peoples from all forms of oppression unless it clearly and decisively states its open abhorrence of such deeds" — i.e., the suppression of the democratic movement in Poland. Therefore, to protest remilitarization of Polish society and attempts to suppress social self-organization is not necessarily an expression of political impotence or ineffective self-righteousness, or falling into the trap of anti-communism. These protests are expressions of a political identity which has not yet degenerated into mere tactical calculations. They are also part of a politics that has preserved a universal concept of freedom and self-determination. Of course, Berlinguer's coming to terms with the Soviets is not detente. Similarly, the French socialists' vehement condemnation of the military putsch has not helped the Polish people and has not freed those imprisoned. Theoretical discussions regarding the practices of "real socialism" have another objective. By publicly challenging socialist legitimation to the military regime and by challenging the Soviet Union, they continue Solidarity's criticism of authoritarian socialism. They also weaken attempts to subsequently delegitimize Solidarity as an "anti-socialist" movement.

Ideological battles have their internal effects. Open and principled criticism of the Polish regime and of Soviet pressure protects socialists' political identity and credibility. At the same time, such ideological battles preserve political culture from a creeping atrophy. Ability and readiness for criticism and indignation — even in cases involving one's own political tradition — stamps the political culture just as it does, in a negative way, the authoritarian injunction against thinking and criticism. If critical evaluations of "real socialism" and criticism in general are subordinated to the state of things — be it the status of social power relations, tactical relations, etc. — the Left will not succeed in advocating socialism as a libertarian alternative.

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THE WEST GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENT*

by Joachim Hirsch

The evaluations that the West German peace movement is receiving internationally are manifold and confusing. Both the opposition parties in Bonn and the U.S. secretary of defense view it as a fifth column, financed and directed by Moscow; the French Left considers it the expresion of the German inability to fight (and to die?) for freedom. It is deemed a forerunner of a West German neutrality course, a signpost of the "Finlandization" of Central Europe and even the symptom of a reawakened German nationalism. One thing is common to these judgments: the inability, if not the unwillingness, to take into consideration the social and political development of West Germany in recent years, without which it is absolutely impossible to discuss this "movement," its complexity and its significance in terms of the development of social conflicts.

The peace movement in West Germany does indeed have a history. Its beginnings lie in the opposition to rearmament in the 1950s and the Easter March movement against nuclear armament which, although unsuccessful, had considerable political significance. The "new" peace movement cannot be understood independently of these precursors. That the earlier movements receded at the end of the 1960s is closely connected with the change in government initiated in 1966 and the establishment of the Social-Democratic-Liberal coalition. Its initial successes with detente and *Ostpolitik* temporarily shifted to the back burner the fear that Central Europe was sitting on a nuclear powder keg. In spite of the steadily increasing weapons arsenals, there seemed to be a real basis for hope of a peaceful balance of interests, detente and disarmament.

The 1979 NATO rearmament decision and the shift in American foreign policy initiated by the Reagan administration brought an end to that hope. That the efforts to achieve an alleged nuclear parity really aimed for the military superiority of the West *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union, with its dangerously destabilizing effects on the international system, is confirmed by many experts. At any rate, this would make it technically and politically possible to envision a limited nuclear war on European territory. A result is a drastic increase in the risk of war, especially given the declared intention of the U.S. government to push back and weaken the Soviet Union wherever possible and to retain its control over the dependent countries of the Third World — especially the oil regions of the Near East — if need be by means of military intervention. All this thrusts the acute danger of armament and war into general consciousness. Indeed, the threat has become more acute than ever now that Central Europe could in fact be declared the battlefield of the great powers and thus disappear in nuclear annihilation.

In order to gauge the political position of the West German peace movement, it must be remembered that West Germany is the West European country where, despite a recent decline, the NATO alliance is most popular. Thus, the simultaneous presence of a vigorous anti-war movement appears paradoxical only initially. First of all, this movement (or at least parts of it) is not fully anti-American or neutral; it is primarily the expression of a deep-seated insecurity regarding traditional world views and

*Translated by David Berger.

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political modes of thought. Secondly, it is also a symptom of a domestic social and political polarization. The West German peace movement must be seen not only in its world-political context but also as a response to specific social-structural causes and conditions.

More than any comparable country, post-war Germany has undergone a dramatic and increasingly rapid transformation of economic and social structures. The chief characteristics of the "German model" are an assertive integration into the world market on the basis of extensive technological innovation and a state-regulated capitalization of the entire society. This development is the basis for the relative imperialistic hegemony position of West Germany. The economic strength, evident in a sharpened competitive relation to the United States, simultaneously brought about unforeseen social consequences: serious environmental problems, the desolation of the cities, the rise of overloaded population centers, labor intensification, massive disqualifications, structural unemployment and an increase in physical and psychological disturbances. Structural economic changes and forced social mobility have led to clear social phenomena of disintegration: the dissolution of familial, neighborhood and communal structures as well as the destruction of traditional social ties characterize an extremely atomized society whose historical consciousness (which was broken already) is weakened and whose value consensus is brittle. Its cohesion must be vouchsafed more and more by a perfectly functioning and extensive state bureaucracy. In recent years this has been intensified by the increasingly visible tendency toward a cleavage of society into a "core" tied to the world market, oriented toward growing productivity and regulated by the state and, on the other hand, a marginalized "periphery." This bifurcation is a result of the socio-economic logic of the German model. The core contains the industrial sectors integrated into the world market and the finance and service sectors connected with them, as well as essential parts of the — male, native German — skilled workers and civil service personnel. This is counterposed by a growing periphery of the unemployed, unskilled, youths robbed of their career possibilities, drop-outs, those no longer employable, and members of the ecological and alternative subculture. This is quite a new experience for West Germany, with its initially quite homogeneous social structure.

Behind these tendencies towards social disintegration and division lie the incisive changes in the political system: the transformation of the pluralistically structured mass parties into bureaucratized quasi-state apparatuses separated from their social base as well as the bureaucratization and growing impenetrability of the trade unions. The well-established parliamentary parties have become interlaced with the trade unions into a corporative block which in fact functions more and more as the political organization of the social core, and at the same time politically excluding and repressively controlling the periphery. As a consequence, basic political topics, such as the future of labor, the long-term perspectives for industrial growth as well as the conditions for peace and security, are excluded from the established political apparatus. At best, these themes only reappear in response to the non-institutional grass-roots movements. The formerly more or less pluralist mass integration system is turning into an apparatus of selective political and social exclusion. Of course, what distinguishes the West German society from the American, in spite of all the "Americanization" of the former, is above all the encompassing significance of the state, both in the enforcement of socio-economic modernization processes destined for the world market as well as in the regulation of their social consequences. The success of the German model is essentially based on this political structure.

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This, in a nutshell, is the socio-economic context in which so-called "new social movements" arose and attained their present political significance. They represent essentially a reaction against tendencies toward capitalization, disintegration and bifurcation: a rebellion against abstract commodification and administratively enforced normalization. Ultimately, this concerns the struggle for human forms of social relations and, related to it, a changed attitude to nature, against alienated and deleterious labor, against the oppression of women and of "deviant" minorities. After the political neutralization of the labor movement (begun under fascism and completed in the German model) and the subsequent ossification of its organizations into bureaucratic agencies selectively administering career opportunities, these "new social movements" have become the main carriers of social conflict in West Germany. What has been designated as the peace movement is largely a constituent of these new social movements: ecology, the feminists, the alternative subculture and the so-called youth movement. It cannot be understood outside of such a context.

This is most clear in the conformity of their topics. The fight of the ecology movement is directed both against "peaceful" atomic plants and missile bases. Its criticism of the independent large-scale technology takes into account the armament dynamics from which it surely cannot be separated. The connection between the form of the metropolitan growth of the economy and the military oppression of the Third World is at least tendentially reflected and, last but not least, the connection between the militarization of society and the oppression of women is fully recognized. In other words: the "peace movement" is not to be understood as a phenomenon separate from other movements and conflicts, either in terms of its social basis or its political subject matter. It is rather a specific political focus of the new social movements as a whole and the "memberships" overlap frequently. For example, many of the participants in the militant protests against the expansion of the Frankfurt airport also took part in the large peace demonstration in Bonn in the fall of 1981. Only in this manner can the breadth, diversity, strength and mobilizing power of this movement be understood. From that base it extends into the parties, unions and churches and activates other segments of the population. It would therefore be wrong to regard the peace movement as an ideologically pacifist or even as a church-based religion movement. Of course, church groups form a substantial constituency, and they also provide a large part of the continuity between the old and the new peace movements. However, that the Lutheran Church as an institution plays a significant role in the movement is certainly not owing to the church leadership but rather to the fact that in view of the corporativistically corrupted and rigidly compartmentalized parties and trade unions, the church organizations were the only ones to offer the movement support and free space. For example, the fact that a church organization took on the organizational responsibility for the Bonn demonstration must be understood merely as a service provided for a movement that is very decentralized and lacks its own strong organizational cohesion. Similarly, the Hamburg Lutheran Meeting was a forum rather than the starting point for a broad pacifist-political debate.

Just as complex as its social base and interest structure is the relation of the peace movement to the ruling economic and political power groupings. The German model is an expression of a capital strategy essentially relying on civilian-technological progress, unimpeded world trade, free access (based on exchange) to raw materials, investment and sales, and a peaceful penetration of the world market and the Third World. In this program, the industrializing "threshold countries" of Eastern Europe as well as of the Third World play an essential role for West Germany and its industrial

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capacity. The economic strength of West German capital depends on the success of such world-market strategy, which was secured domestically, as far as the structural changes and the social consensus are concerned, by a corporativistic class compromise. It rests in a certain sense on the maintenance of external as well as internal peace. Hence, the present U.S. policy is not only to be regarded as a confrontation strategy *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union but at the same time as an attack on the imperialist competitors in Europe and Japan. A universally successful penetration of a military confrontation and rearmament policy, the transition from a welfare to a warfare state, could restore the U.S. imperialist hegemony on account of its military-technological superiority and its military capacity to control economically important regions of the world. This could decisively weaken, if not destroy, the economic and social basis of the German model in terms of both civilian-technological resources as well as the material capacity necessary to guarantee social consensus.

This explains the oscillation of the West German government between loyalty to the Atlantic alliance and conflict with the United States, its attempts to rescue to the policy of detente, the difference on the Polish question and its deviating Central American and Near Eastern policies. Viewed from an international context, the aims of the peace movement and the policy of the present Federal German government are thus not altogether diametrically opposed. Such relative coincidence also explains in part why the peace movement could not be brutally criminalized and marginalized and why it has led to a comparatively broad resonance within the established political systems, especially in the Social Democratic Party, engendering sharp conflicts. It is certainly true, though, that this concurrence between the peace movement and West German capital does not go very far. First of all, in view of the economic crisis which has now begun to affect the German model, one can no longer talk of an unequivocal policy of capital. One can therefore not at all rule out a radical change in the domineering capital strategies with their concomitant hegemonial rearrangements. Secondly, the peace movement, with its radical aspects and its intimate connection with the social and economic criticism of the new social movements, goes far beyond the framework of the German model. Its "pacifism" refers not merely to the military sphere but also includes a renunciation of the principles of capital industrial society. The peace movement will therefore remain a fundamental and radical oppositional movement, which will hardly be of use for the dominant economic and political groups. Nevertheless, it remains true that in terms of its objective significance and the power relations it influences, it supports a socio-economic model of capitalist development that quite basically differs from that which the United States now wants to establish on a worldwide basis.

The peace movement is not only located objectively in a very contradictory situation; its own social basis and interest structure is also extremely intricate. Pacifist and religious currents converge with undogmatic leftists and champions of a rather vague "third way" between capitalism and socialism. The strictly Moscow-true German Communist Party plays a relatively modest role, naturally restricting its disarmament considerations to the West. In addition, the peace movement attracts the Green Party, ecologists outside of any party, church groups, citizen initiatives, feminist groups and representatives of the alternative subculture. Under the cover of anti-Americanism — and anti-Sovietism — there is doubtless also room for nationalist currents, but there is as well a clearly defined line dividing the movement from the radical right. In the absence of a clearly defined, detailed political program and a strong organizational structure, the peace movement takes on the characteristic form

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of the new social movements: grass-roots, spontaneous, decentralized, anti-institutional and rather heterogeneous politically. This permits very differentiated motives to participate in it politically. That the contradictions and varying interests are not homogenized and controlled is, of course, the prerequisite for the conflicts to be settled openly, for experiences to be worked out and for learning processes to take place. All this has been clearly demonstrated in the discussions over Poland, the social character of "true socialism," the policy of the Soviet Union, non-violence, civil defense and the relation to militant liberation movements in the Third World, the legitimacy of gradual and pragmatic disarmament and detente, and the relation between armament and capitalism. It is exactly because something is "in motion" here that one cannot slap an unequivocal political label on the peace movement. And it is also so much easier to pick out individual factors of its extensive political spectrum and utilize them for propaganda purposes.

In light of developing trends, one can nevertheless suggest a few general features that politically characterize the West German peace movement.

1. The peace movement is surely not a nationalist movement. What argues against this — at least on the European level — is its internationalist direction, its overall rather leftist orientation, its anti-statism and its distrust of any form of super-power policy. Of course, starts of a peace movement in East Germany are regarded sympathetically, and it is clear that in the long term, a policy of peace and security must question the post-war division of Europe. Yet, at the same time, a statist reunification of Germany has not been thematized because the very real fear of a resurgence of a German superpower policy in line with historical experience is still very present. If there is anything that is problematic in the peace movement, it is rather a certain tendency to maintain the social status quo, the restriction to battling the threatening "outgrowths" of the dominant social form with the simultaneous abstention from radical social analysis. Thus, it at times appears to be a movement by people who wish to be left alone by all possible dangerous forces and who should like to defend their own sound little world. In brief: it shows traits of petty-bourgeois tranquillity mixed with a moral rigor and a fundamentalist radical aspect. This ambivalence of radicalism, abnegation and accommodation is perhaps most clearly expressed in the slogan: "What if there was a war and no one came. . ." Certainly, the realization that war approaches even those who do not go to it and that this is connected with the existing social structures cannot be fully obscured.

2. What might develop in the peace movement is something like a new patriotism, a feeling of common vulnerability, solidarity and responsibility for the future of society. Insofar as this is based on ideas of a peaceful coexistence of peoples, of liberty, equality and tolerance, there is here a clear difference from what nationalism has until recently meant in this country. When one views German history of the past hundred years and considers the difficulties in still developing the germs for a common political identity in West Germany in view of the revolutionary and destructive social and structural changes in recent decades, such a new patriotism could have a thoroughly progressive impact. At any rate, the rise of a national feeling no longer based on subjection, obedience, the state, chauvinism and internal and external aggression would be something new for Germany. The peace movement does bear seeds of this, but not much more.

3. It is unlikely that the peace movement will deflect attention from the domestic to the international plane and thus have a pacifying and depoliticizing effect. It is true that there is such a tendency, both in the extreme anti-Americanism and in the idea

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that basic social problems can be reduced to armament and disarmament and solved through peace. However, a full spectrum of circumstances counteracts these tendencies and prevents their realization. Among these are the close involvement of the peace movement with other social movements and conflict zones that make it impossible to separate the fight against rearmament and war from the questions of radical social changes. For ecologists, feminists as well as many trade unionists, their commitment to the peace movement is less a result of an abstract moral engagement or a diffuse fear than the realization that the maintenance of peace and the struggle against the militarization of society are now some of the most decisive conditions for attaining their own goals. On the other hand, the state of the political system in West Germany with its parties and trade unions transformed into quasi-state apparatuses will make sure that the peace movement does not easily lose its character as a fundamentally oppositional civil rights movement. In view of the developing structure of an authoritarian security state, the peace movement's struggle also represents a permanent struggle for the maintenance of democratic rights and liberties because it has questioned the corporatively institutionalized forms of channeling interests and the carefully defended political monopoly of the parties. It is therefore no wonder that even an active commitment as conscientious objector, i.e., the invocation of a basic constitutional right, can suffice to elicit a *Berufsverbot*.

The peace movement is surely not a purely leftist movement, but the West German left, despite its factionalization, forms an important part of it. At least for the undogmatic New Left, such a relation is in no way tactical or instrumental, precisely because it has learned something from it, as well as from the ecology and the feminist movements. Most importantly, the New Left has begun to recover an internationalist orientation, which tended to disappear after Vietnam, and a theoretical-political debate on imperialism has again begun. The peace movement is of central significance for Left, because it directly opposes the development of an imperialist world system at the end of which, whether in a cold or hot war, a regional or global war, there might be another historical defeat for emancipatory movements as occurred in 1914 or 1933-1939. Such a development is the result of a worldwide crisis of the capital utilization process, i.e., although it is propelled politically by the United States on the basis of its special position in the imperialist chain, its causes lie not just there. It is true that the value scale of the peace movement is not exhausted in a defensive attitude. Although it is not at all a social-revolutionary movement, it does imply a whole series of emancipatory possibilities. Above all, in the present inter-imperialist discussion, it supports a more liberal, more social and more peaceful developmental variant of capitalist society that allows for democratic and social progress, social experiment and practical changes in the everyday world, initiated "from the bottom up."

At the same time, it remains an open question as to whether this "reformist" capitalist alternative has any real chance at all. There is no doubt that, in view of existing international power relations, it could be realized only in an extensive European form, supported by cooperative relations with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Third World. Not lastly, therefore, since the emergence of the peace movement, ideas of a political-economic decoupling of Europe from the United States and of an independent socio-economic road have grown considerably, particularly on the Left. The objections to this are clear: what argues against it are deep-seated inter-European conflicts that, not the least, are connected with the economic hegemonial position of West Germany within the West European framework, expressed, for

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example, in the difference between the West German and the French governments in their relation to the United States and the Soviet Union. What also argues against it is that, in view of the secular crisis into which it has fallen, there is hardly any worldwide alternative left to capital except the re-establishment of the internally and externally aggressive warfare state. For surely the peace movement in its present form, together with the "reformist" left perspectives allied with it, would hardly offer enough. However, this question cannot be answered theoretically, but only through practical politics. What unites the old and the new Left, ecologists, church groups and all other adherents of the peace movement is the quite immediate necessity of fighting for mere physical survival. This is at the top of the agenda, at least for Europeans.

OPPOSITION TO REARMAMENT AND WEST GERMAN CULTURE

by Russell Berman

West German opposition toward the NATO rearmament plans has developed rapidly into an important mass movement that has begun to reach sectors of the population outside of the traditional leftist subculture and which is posing an increasing threat to the stability of the social-liberal coalition government. In September some 50,000 demonstrators gathered in West Berlin to protest the visit of Alexander Haig, and commentators did not fail to draw the obvious contrast with the Kennedy visit two decades earlier, which attracted large, pro-American crowds. In October the participants in an anti-war rally in Bonn numbered over 250,000, and Reagan's planned trip to the Federal Republic in June is certain to lead to further demonstrations against United States foreign policy. On the surface, this popular opposition has concentrated on the stationing of American tactical nuclear weapons (Cruise and Pershing missiles) in the Federal Republic; more generally, the overall aggressive character of the Reagan administration's foreign policy, especially in Europe and Latin America, has readily evoked widespread hostility in West Germany, one of the focal points of détente during the 1970s. Beneath the rejection of Washington's strident anti-Russian rhetoric, however, the new climate of West German opinion also corresponds to divergent commitments and interests: the growing dependence of West German capital on the Soviet economy ("Finlandization") and the exigencies of industrial rationalization in the context of a bitter international competition.[1]

Analyses of the economic, geopolitical and military-technological reverberations of the peace movement point out the central issue at stake. While journalistic common knowledge has assumed that the rearmament debate has placed critical strains on the ties between the United States and West Germany, in fact the relationship is reversed: the economic and international emergence of the Federal Republic from American tutelage has found its mass cultural expression in the peace movement, i.e., the central motor of the peace movement is less survival and arms limitation than the vision of national autonomy. This implicit nationalism, which can refer either specifically to the German questions as in the Havemann letter and Bahro's reply to

1. Cf. Piccone and Zaslavsky-Arato, in *Telos* 50. Also Joachim Hirsch, "The West German Peace Movement," in this issue.

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Gorz,[2] or to an expanded Gaullism "from Poland to Portugal," as a third force between the superpowers, explains the spread of anti-Americanism. Conservative politicians who are committed to the Atlantic alliance have of course eagerly seized on anti-American elements in the peace movement in order to defame it. However, they overlook the fact that anti-Americanism has spread far beyond the peace movement and, via the publications of popular authors such as Joachim Fernau, has developed a large, conservative following.[3] Thus, to the extent that the peace movement can be characterized as anti-American, it is so as a manifestation of an awakened nationalism and as a reflection of the objective economic importance of West Germany's successful *Ostpolitik*.

The contention that the opposition to rearmament has less to do with nuclear arms than with the readjustment of German-American ties (in the context of which the cruise missiles become saliently charged symbols) helps to explain an apparent paradox. The West German critique of American arms policy (like its critique of American economic policy) seems to have gone through an about-face in recent years. While current critics of the NATO rearmament plan portray it as an American attempt to foist on Europe a weapons system which would threaten the Soviet Union in a fundamentally new manner, the history behind the NATO discussion was marked by a very different set of interests. In the course of the SALT negotiations during the late 70s, in fact, it seemed as if the Carter administration was prepared to accept the Soviet proposal to limit the modernization of tactical nuclear arms in Western Europe.[4] The Western Europeans perceived this possibility as the establishment of a superpower agreement which would guarantee the security of the American and Russian homelands, while leaving Europe vulnerable to the Russian SS-20 arsenal. Consequently, it was the Western European governments who insisted on the stationing of the new arms systems, fearing that otherwise Western Europe would become subject to Soviet military pressure or eventually serve as the battlefield in a limited nuclear war which would not affect the superpowers themselves. Curiously, one finds that precisely the same motif reappears in the current critique of rearmament: the popular assumption that the stationing of the Cruise and Pershing missiles will lead to a limited nuclear war in Europe while leaving the United States unharmed. Thus arguments both for and against the rearmament assume that Washington is planning a decoupling of Europe reduced to an expendable pawn in the global strategy of the United States. Consequently, the problem of German or Western European autonomy *vis-à-vis* the United States, which underlies the concerns of both opponents and proponents of the tactical nuclear arms, is the fundamental issue.

National autonomy and nationalist sentiment begin to explain the mediation between the often arcane debate on military technology and the mass character of the peace movement. The objective considerations alone — geopolitical pressures, international economic competition, etc. — cannot account for the importance the rearmament issue has assumed so rapidly in popular consciousness. The burgeoning of the anti-rearmament opposition, meanwhile, is not only threatening the stability of the governing coalition but it is also transforming the character of West German political debate, including the leftist subculture. A close examination of this transformation of public debate can help explain the growth of the peace movement: over the past eight years a new rhetoric has been established, emphasizing the priority

2. Cf. Bahro and Gorz in this issue.

3. Joachim Fernau, *Hallaluja: die Geschichte der USA* (Munich, 1977).

4. Cf. Alex A. Vardamis, "German-American Military Fissures," *Foreign Policy*, 34 (Spring 1979), pp. 87-106, and Feldemeyer, in this issue.

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of autonomy and subjectivity, and the peace movement represents in many ways the politicization of that rhetoric.

The Discourse of Authenticity

In the wake of the collapse of the student movement of the 1960s, the West German left around 1970 was characterized by a theoretical turn toward a very orthodox Marxism-Leninism and an organizational preference for neo-Leninist party formations. Aside from the activities of terrorist groups (another organizational form that emerged from the collapse of the political mode of the 1960s), these many small parties initially seemed to represent the West German left in general, which had allegedly moved beyond the earlier "anti-authoritarian phase," now maligned in a Leninist manner as infantile.[5] However, large sections of the left remained outside these parties, developed a unique subculture and soon launched a major ideological attack on the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy. In particular, the following issues were raised: (1) the priority of sensuous experience over theoretical conceptualization and language, (2) the privileged status of non-mediated being over forms of societal organization (party, state), and therefore a tendential preference for a spontaneous anarchism, and (3) the insistence in the primacy of emotionality ("subjectivity") and the denigration of reason either as superficial or, in a stronger version, as a mechanism of domination. In general, this new discourse was organized around a "cult of immediacy"[6] which rejected theoretical and organizational forms of mediation and implicitly set a primal homogeneity as an ideal.

While the "new subjectivity" developed at first as a critique of the Marxist-Leninist parties (which largely withered away in the later 1970s), its own political consequences led in different directions.[7] First, in the West German context of various repressive administrative and legislative measures (*Berufsverbot,* the anti-terror laws),[8] the anti-statist element engendered a clearly identifiable neo-anarchism, replete with a rediscovery of the anarchist tradition, especially its German representatives, such as Erich Mühsam and Gustav Landauer. Hans-Martin Lohmann's positing a fundamental antinomy of "society versus the state" is typical for this direction, which envisions an organic social realm which could thrive on its own if the external agency of the administrative state — described by Lohman as a metastatic growth — did not interfere.[9] Although Lohmann's main intent is the polemic against the authoritarian state, his argumentation displays elements that elsewhere turn the discussion in unexpected directions: the privileging of a homogeneous model of social organizations and the counterposing of organic growth with a pejoratively described external rationality, leading to the idealization of "acephalous societies" by etymological implication not only a rejection of the state but also an anti-theoretical gesture.

Secondly, the anti-theoretical character of the new subjectivity turned into an outright anti-intellectualism in the short novel, which for many came to represent this shift in West German culture, Peter Schneider's *Lenz* (1973). The representatives of the Marxist orthodoxy, who are the main brunt of Schneider's polemic, are attacked not for specific political reasons nor for the particular character of their social theory; rather, it is their indebtedness to theory at all which Schneider belittles.

5. Cf. my "German Notes," *Telos,* 42 (Winter 1979-80), pp. 120-123.
6. Albrecht Wellmer, "Terrorism and Social Criticism," *Telos,* 48 (Summer 1981), p. 74.
7. Cf. *Der neue Irrationalismus,* ed. Nicolas Born, Jürgen Manthey, Delf Schmidt (Reinbek, 1978), and my review in *New German Critique,* 16 (Winter 1979), pp. 163-169.
8. Cf. Jack Zipes, "From Berufsverbot to Terrorism," *Telos,* 34 (Winter 1977-78), pp. 136-147.
9. Hans-Martin Lohmann, "Society versus the State," *Telos,* 42 (Winter 1979-80), pp. 124-129.

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Conceptualization and language are rejected absolutely as antithetical to authentic being and experience, and therefore Schneider may be considered idiosyncratically leftist — leftist only because his story is placed in the leftist subculture — version of Peter Handke, the central European author who corresponds most closely to the post-structuralist critique of the "logocentricity" of Western metaphysics. The superficial difference between the West German cult of subjectivity and the French attack on the subject should not obscure the fundamental unanimity in the opposition to reason and language, denounced as mechanisms of domination.[10] The critique of language in particular eventually plays a significant role once the discourse of authenticity becomes politicized around the rearmament issue.

Thirdly, the new subjectivity left its mark on the West German women's movement in Verena Stefan's novel *Sheddings* (1978).[11] Aside from the expected privileging of emotion over reason and the general devaluation of theoretical discourse, the novel postulates a presocial femininity which is fully developed before any intersubjective mediation and which provides the authentic basis for female identity. Stefan's version of feminism is characterized by a naturalization of the central critical category, and it is therefore hardly surprising that the novel concludes with a move to the country; even feminist critics have complained of Stefan's "vegetative naturalness."[12] In the debate on *Sheddings,* immediacy, nature and female identity were counterposed to conceptuality, urbanity and political conflict; very similar antinomies eventually come to structure the rearmanent discussion.

While the discourse of authenticity could be integrated into very different political endeavors — Lohmann's critique of repressive legislation, Schneider's attack on Marxism and Stefan's feminism — the overall shift took place simultaneously with a broader conservative tendency: in Germany the end of the reformist optimism that had followed the formation of the social-liberal coalition and elsewhere a shift to the right in, for example, American and British politics. In West Germany, the new subjectivity was therefore appropriated by journalistic criticism and nimble sectors of the publishing industry as a sign of the *Tendenzwende,* a cultural reversal from the political-emancipatory 1960s to an envisioned neo-romantic interiority for the 1970s. Yet despite the conservative attempts to claim the new subjectivist anti-Marxism for itself, which Habermas has described as the alliance of the pre-modern opponents of enlightenment with the post-modern enemies of reason,[13] the political character of the discourse of authenticity remained ambivalent. This may explain the rapidity with which it could be occupied and polarized by the rearmament debate after 1979. This discourse of authenticity — the priority of homogeneity over heterogeneity, the critique of language in the name of immediate experience and the naturalization of the terms of political debate — which had been established extensively in the course of the 1970s, suddenly became the medium that transmitted the message of the peace movement, i.e., a familiar rhetoric became the vehicle to carry a new political opposition. The linking of the new subjectivity with the nuclear arms discussion

10. Michel Rybalka, "Introduction to 'La Nouvelle Philosophie,' " *Telos,* 33 (Fall 1977), pp. 93-94, and the subsequent pieces by Glucksmann, Castoriadis, Gorz, Morin, Debray, Lévy and Rancière.

11. The German original, *Häutungen,* appeared in 1975.

12. Brigitte Classen and Gabriele Goettle, " 'Häutungen' — eine Verwechslung von Anemone und Amazone," in *Die Ueberwindung der Sprachlosigkeit,* ed. Gabriele Dietz (Darmstadt, 1979), p. 56. Cf. also Sara Lennox, "Trends in Literary Theory: The Female Aesthetic and German Women's Writing," *German Quarterly,* 54 (January 1981), pp. 63-75.

13. Jürgen Habermas, "Modernity versus Post-modernity," *New German Critique,* 22 (Winter 1981), p. 14.

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accounts for the rapid spread of the peace movement: no earlier leftist cause, e.g., the critique of the Shah of Iran, the anti-Vietnam protests, the campaign against Springer or the opposition to *Berufsverbot*, managed to speak to as wide a segment of the West German population; indeed, the leftism of the movement may be limited to the superficial citation of traditional leftist positions (anti-militarism and anti-Americanism) while its essence may be far from the historical leftist project. The success of the peace movement can be attributed to its appropriation of the subjectivist rhetoric, as will become clear in the following analyses of some representative texts of the peace movement.

Peace as Authenticity

Given the predominant role played in the West German peace movement by theologians and the Protestant church, it is not surprising to find that its positions are regularly couched in religious terminology. Yet, it appears that the religious formulations often displace political argumentation in order to mobilize a secular public with the aid of religious imagery. Thus Ute Ranke-Heinemann, one of the leading theologians in the movement, began her speech at the October demonstration with the statement that "In April of the year of our Lord 1981, another lord pronounced the order to build the neutron bomb." The obvious implication is that the American president knows no modesty and is attempting to rival God in his lordliness, as if the speaker were concerned less with Reagan in political terms than with excommunicating him. This displacement of political content by religion is reinforced in the contrast between Haig, presented as the "new Alexander," a self-appointed God, and Jesus, the preacher of peace. Ranke-Heinemann thereby attacks the American leadership for its hubris and its non-Christian behavior, not its politics; the godless Americans have replaced the godless Communists as the object of self-righteous antipathy. The religious schema poses the problem in terms of grand sinners counterposed to the innocent victims. Furthermore, the carriers of the threat, who are portrayed as heathen foreigners, are contrasted with the healthy life of the potential victims, heirs to the iconography of the traditional martyr. Thus Ranke-Heinemann comments on press reports that the U.S. government is planning to win a nuclear war: "one third of the American population will be able to be saved: perhaps even two thirds, if the cities are evacuated quickly enough. But we have no Nevada desert available, at least not in peace time. If the government of the USA wants to make the USA number one in the world, it will make us number one in destruction. What we must oppose and prevent is the senseless sacrificial death of our people for foreign military megalomania." The image of the sacrificial death of the innocent martyr at the hands of the heretical strangers corresponds to the political presentation that danger has solely an external source: the homogeneous folk is potrayed as the opposite of an external, diabolic leadership. The democratic distinction between people and elite merges in the rhetorical device with the nationalistic distinction between native and foreign.

Ranke-Heinemann's differentiation between the native and the foreign corresponds to the problem of homogeneity-heterogeneity as it developed in the discourse of autonomy associated with new subjectivity. The link between the peace movement and the rhetoric of new subjectivity is even clearer, however, in an essay by another key anti-rearmament theologian, Dorothee Sölle. "Why I am so one-sided" is a polemical argument for unilateral disarmament, again without a clear political motivation.[14] Rather than contending that a unilateral reduction of American forces in Western

14. *Konkret*, November 1981, p. 16.

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Europe could lead to consequences that she could describe as desirable, she depoliticizes unilateralism by reinterpreting it as the mode of existential action appropriate in cases of "ultimate concern." Bilateralism, on the other hand, is attacked as "superficial rationalism": attempts to negotiate a reduction of nuclear stockpiles, i.e., SALT, are denounced as "forms of bourgeois behavior," foolishly based on the assumption that language and rationality might be adequate responses to the danger of destruction. The denigration of language as an effective path toward a reduction of international tensions corresponds to her insistence that concrete deeds alone will change the status quo: "Something will change only if one of the partners takes a tiny unilateral step forward, if one does something spontaneously and does not only react. Act, do not only negotiate." The privileging of concrete action over abstract language and the disdain for the alleged superficiality of reason are borrowed from the discourse of authenticity (and from the activism of the 1960s, which Adorno criticized for its hostility to theory)[15] and then combined with Sölle's own existentialist Christianity. The inadequacy of conceptualization and the search for spontaneity echo through her essay, translated of course into the debate on rearmament: "I am a unilateralist, i.e., I do not believe that insanity can be transformed into reason, if two agree to participate in it. The new begins unilaterally. Atomic pacifism as a moral-political minimum cannot be negotiated, calculated and measured. The old and the new peacelessness was bilateral." For Sölle, bilateral negotiations represent language, and against the background of the discourse of authenticity, it is therefore clear that bilateralism as language cannot be a successful form of political activity, i.e., Sölle's critique of the rationality of arms negotiations derives directly from Schneider's attack on the conceptuality of Marxism-Leninism: in both cases, an undeniable superiority is ascribed to spontaneity, while forms of intersubjective communication are denounced.

Ranke-Heinemann described the contrast between the authenticity of innocence and the inauthenticity of foreign leadership: nativity and nativism. For Sölle, unilateralism is the preferred mode of praxis; its authenticity is opposed to the superficiality of reason and language. In Robert Havemann's open letter to Brezhnev, the geopolitical consequences of the discourse of authenticity are drawn.[16] The minimally plausible proposal to reduce the concentration of arms in Central Europe is linked to the fully implausible project of the reunification of Germany. As Hermann Gremliz notes in his commentary on the letter, the nationalistic elements in the peace movement again become clear when the issue is posed as a conflict between "us Germans" and nefarious external powers; if the heterogeneous occupation forces were to evacuate Germany, the homogeneous native group would allegedly be able to solve its internal differences with little difficulty. The removal of foreign elements from Germany derives its rhetorical strength less from serious political considerations than from the discursive priority of undifferentiated identity: the geopolitical counterpart to the cult of immediacy. It represents the corollary to Stefan's retreat to the countryside and the nationalistic permutation of Lohmann's organic society. Furthermore the link to the terminology of new subjectivity and the discourse of authenticity distorts the purportedly political analysis to a considerable degree. Thus the letter argues that American and Russian forces occupy their respective sectors of Germany and Europe solely due to their mutual military-strategic interests, i.e., to prevent a Soviet thrust into the West or a Western rollback invasion. Consequently, it can reason that a mutual withdrawal would not seriously damage the balance of power. Given the presence of Marxist signatories to the letter (Wolf Biermann,

15. Theodor W. Adorno, "Resignation," *Telos*, 35 (Spring 1978), pp. 165-168.
16. Cf. this issue of *Telos*.

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Wolfgang Haug), it is particularly surprising that the political-economic function of the occupation forces is not even considered. The historical and ongoing importance of the superpower forces in the maintenance of the domestic status quo in Eastern Europe and Western (particularly Southern) Europe is fully ignored. The misperception of the presence of American and Russian forces solely as technical-strategic factors and the bracketing of their local functions, which any serious analysis of the economic systems would necessarily underscore, are as indicative of the *Tendenzwende* rhetoric as is the cult of national homogeneity.

Nativism also mars Bahro's response to Gorz in a rather ugly manner, when the East German exile points an accusing finger at the immigrant Gorz, who would be less of a Francophile, according to Bahro, if he were a truly native Frenchman.[17] Gorz's critique of the political anatony of the German peace movement is, after all, fundamentally a polemical restatement of the familiar liberal-Marxist argument concerning the traditional underdevelopment of liberal bourgeois culture in Germany.[18] According to Gorz, it is the legacy of the failed democratic revolutions in Germany that explains the willingness of the West German left to accept the undemocratic status quo in Eastern Europe. Other factors may certainly also play a role, including an internalized recognition of the real military presence of the Soviet Union and the appropriation of the critique of the East by conservative forces in the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, Bahro's response with its bitter and resentful tone provides ample evidence of the legitimacy of Gorz's allegations. Bahro does not merely argue for the necessity of disarmament but launches a broadside against the principles of the enlightenment; the "conquistador" mentality which he ascribes to French political culture is designed to suggest a necessary complicity among the bourgeois democratic state, imperialism, reason, industrialization and atomic weaponry. The insistence that the predominant form of Western modernization leads inexorably to nuclear destruction reveals a surprising affinity between Bahro and Heidegger;[19] the general idealization of a return to premodern social forms corresponds to a reactionary irrationalism most often associated with the cinematic imagery of Werner Herzog. It is particularly important to note that Bahro's Francophobic anti-modernism, which leads him to glorify the historical backwardness of the German nation-state, reproduces some of the central terms of contemporary French post-modernist thought, in particular the denunciation of reason as the traditional agent of modernization: Bahro, Herzog and Handke represent counterparts to the work of Foucault and Derrida in their reaction against the enlightenment, and it is precisely the anti-enlightenment rhetoric in both theological and secularized forms that has nourished the growth of the West German peace movement. This ideological constellation seriously calls the progressive character of the movement into question.

As Horkheimer argued in his essay "Egoismus und Freiheitsbewegung," bourgeois mass movements are compelled to adopt a rhetoric that obscures the difference between particular class interests and the popular mobilization necessary to exert real political pressure.[20] To the extent that the competition between American and West German capitals *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union evokes divergent positions on detente, the

17. Cf. this issue of *Telos*.

18. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (New York, 1967), and Oskar Negt, "The Misery of Bourgeois Democracy in Germany," *Telos* 34 (Winter 1977-78), pp. 126-129.

19. Cf. Martin Heidegger, "The Thing," in *Poetry, Language, Thought* (New York, 1975), p. 166.

20. Max Horkheimer, *Traditionelle und kritische Theorie: Vier Aufsätze* (Frankfurt, 1977), pp. 95-161.

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West German peace movement is forced to phrase the conflict in nationalist or naturalist categories: reunification and survival. The explicit anti-Marxism of the discourse of authenticity dovetails well with a rhetoric that is willing to compromise on democratic rights in Eastern Europe and to ignore them in the West by positing an undifferentiated national interest. Indeed, reports from West Germany suggest that the most immediate effect of the disarmament campaign is to draw resources and activists away from various leftist and democratic projects that are then integrated into the depoliticized mass movement in which more radical goals are quickly muffled. The desiccation of the West German left by the peace movement is the price the left must pay for its vacillation on the East.[21] There is, of course, every reason to oppose militarism and imperialism anywhere, but also to insist on the priority of fundamental democratic ideals everywhere.

21. The corollary is represented in Dutschke's vision of a socialist party to the left of the SPD whose viability would depend on its ability to articulate a radical critique of Eastern European societies. See the excerpt from his autobiography, "Aufrecht gehen zu lernen ist nicht leicht," in *Der Spiegel*, 44 (1981), p. 126.

THE WEST GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENT AND ITS CRITICS

by Seyla Benhabib

The criticisms voiced against the German peace movement both in this country and in France are puzzling: they range from attacks on the nationalism of this movement to the lack of democratic institutions and traditions in Germany as a whole, from invocations of the "blond beast" to accusations that the German peace movement, whether willingly or not, serves or reflects the interests of West German capital in maintaining relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc.[1] It is first important to note that no other European peace movement — the British, Dutch, Danish, or Italian — has been attacked with the same animosity and hysteria as the West German one, and in the second place to admit indeed that in the current debate about the rearmament policy of the Atlantic alliance far more is at stake for West Germany than for any other European country. It may therefore be helpful first to outline West Germany's unique situation in NATO. West Germany is exposed unlike any other major industrial democracy: it does not have any nuclear weapons, shares a long border with the Soviet empire (i.e., East Germany), and in any conflict, the separation of Germany into East and West symbolizes the status quo achieved in Europe after World War II. Thus, on the central front of Europe, West Germany is likely to be the first battleground.[2]

1. Cf. John Vinocur's "The German Malaise," *The New York Times Magazine*, November 15, 1981, for the conservative attack on the German peace movement; and André Gorz, Pierre Hassner and Russell Berman (in this issue of *Telos*) for some "Left" perspectives.

2. A new simulation game called the Fulda Gap, marketed by Simulations Publications Inc. of New York, advertises on its cover: "A fascinating future history the time is: the first battle of the next war — if war again comes to Europe, the major Soviet thrust must be aimed at the powerful U.S. forces guarding Southern Germany. In order to break through the NATO defenses and break through into the heart of Europe, the armored columns of the Warsaw Pact must force

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In their article, "Nuclear Weapons and the Alliance," McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara and Gerard Smith summarize the assumptions upon which West Germany's security and defense needs have been conceived by NATO up to the present: "Having decisively rejected a policy of neutrality, the Federal Republic has necessarily relied on the nuclear protection of the United States, and we Americans should recognize that this relationship is not a favor we are doing our German friends, but the best available solution of a common problem. Both nations believe that the Federal Republic must be defended; both believe that the Federal Republic must not have nuclear weapons of its own: both believe that nuclear guarantees of *some sort* are essential; and both believe that only the United States can provide those guarantees in persuasively deterrent peacekeeping form."[3] There are at present no reasons to think that either the NATO command in Brussels nor the military-strategic establishment in the United States or even major West German parties like the CDU-CSU, the SPD leadership, and Helmut Schmidt himself, have ceased to accept this assumption. In this context, it is also important to remember that the NATO two-track decision of December 1979, according to which 572 new American missiles of intermediate range were to be stationed in Europe unless a satisfactory agreement to limit them could be reached in talks with the Soviet Union, was initiated by West Germany. The most commonly cited justification for this move is the need to create a balance of nuclear forces at less than intercontinental levels in view of the emerging parity in long-range strategic systems between the United States and the Soviet Union.[4]

What has taken place since the NATO double-track decision of 1979 is remarkable: while resolutions have been passed in the Dutch, British and Belgian parliaments limiting the possible deployment of new NATO forces in the territories of these countries, the SPD leadership is divided, opposition within the party rank and file is growing, and strains within NATO are increasing. In the meantime, sectors of the German peace movement have begun to question the entire post-war West German foreign, defense and security policy — that West Germany can only be defended by nuclear guarantees of some sort provided for it in "persuasively deterrent form" by the United States within the Atlantic alliance;[5] while the European Nuclear Disarmament Movement (END) has called for a nuclear-free Europe. A seemingly innocent strategic calculation on the modernization of the nuclear forces of NATO

their way through the Fulda Gap." In this game, the designers assume that a limited use of nuclear weapons, as "theater weapons," is possible, and they write, "The rules do not deal with the larger issues of nuclear war, notably the danger that the use of tactical weapons might spark a total nuclear holocaust (which is something that neither side presumably wants)." Those who make game wars and those who make a game out of wars reason alike.

3. In *Foreign Affairs,* 60:4 (Spring 1982), pp. 758ff.

4. The rationale behind the NATO two-track resolution and particularly West Germany's interest in initiating it is still a matter of considerable controversy. While military and strategic critics of this decision — such as the ex-Gen. Gert Bastian and the peace researcher Alfred Mechtersheimer — seriously dispute that it serves West German security interests in any way, Mary Kaldor interprets it as a move initiated by Atlanticists in Europe, such as Helmut Schmidt. The aim of nuclear strategy was to ensure that Europe and America were "in it together," that there was no way in which the United States could exercise control over European lives without also involving American lives. "Limited" nuclear war, far from being a way of decoupling the U.S. strategic guarantee, was in fact a way of ensuring that the United States could not act independently of European interests — because such a war would inevitably escalate. Cf. Mary Kaldor, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," in *Democracy,* 2:1 (January 1982), p. 21. Cf. *Der Spiegel* article on Gert Bastian, Parts I, II and III, in issues 15, 16, and 17 (April 1982) for his views and Alfred Mechtersheimer, ed., *Machrüsten* (Hamburg, 1981), pp. 12-15.

5. Articles by Bahro-Vester and Ammon-Brandt in this issue of *Telos.*

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has created public awareness and opposition to the use and deployment of nuclear weapons altogether. The consequence is a mobilization of citizens and of the public in numbers unprecedented since the "Ban the Bomb" movement of the 1950s. While up to a year ago the anti-nuclear peace movements seemed to be of European extraction only, recently an impressive number of Americans — some 2 million across the country — and a significant number of political representatives have been involved in initiatives calling for a freeze on the production, use and deployment of nuclear weapons.[6]

It is therefore particularly important to ask if, as claimed by some, there are special features of the West German peace movement that should single it out for criticism, and if criticisms of this movement by the Left in particular do not rather reflect a confusion as to what is at stake in the current debate.

West German Economic and Political Interests and the Peace Movement

The most frequent criticism of the West German peace movement is that it serves the current political and economic interests of West German capital. Thus Berman writes, "The economic and international emergence of the Federal Republic from American tutelage has found its mass cultural expression in the peace movement," while Arato detects a "remarkable convergence of attitude of the most extensive social movement in Western Europe with what is assumed (in part mistakenly) to be the short- and long-term interests of European banking and industrial interests."[7] In order to evaluate these claims, it is useful to distinguish between them as they fall into the period of pre- and post-martial law declaration and the general crackdown in Poland.

In the period before December 13, 1981, when martial law was imposed, the West German peace movement was seen by some as pursuing an appeasement policy *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union, quite in line with West German government interests in detente, i.e., in not rocking the boat in such a way as to jeopardize, for example, the natural gas trade with the Soviet Union. This interpretation, however, is severely ill-informed about the internal debates and conflicts in West Germany since the NATO double-track resolution. The official position of the SPD leadership, unchanged until today, is to accept the NATO resolution calling for stationing of 108 middle-range Pershing II missiles and 96 cruise missiles on West German soil, and *at the same time* to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitations, but to further include in any strategic arms limitation agreement limitations on nuclear *middle*-range systems as well.[8]

What unites the broad range of political, civil and religious groups that today constitute the West German peace movement, by contrast, is opposition to the logic of the NATO resolution that calls for negotiations *while insisting* on the need to increase nuclear weapons in Europe. The movement has reflected the security policy upon which detente had been hitherto based, namely, that peace would be achieved through parity of deterrence or equality of threat achieved at ever increasing levels of deadly weapons systems. Far from acknowledging a "collusion of interests," the ruling

6. Edward M. Kennedy and Mark O. Hatfield, *Freeze: How You Can Help Prevent Nuclear War* (New York, April 1982).

7. Berman, "Opposition to Rearmament and West German Culture," in this issue of *Telos*; Andrew Arato, "Empire vs. Civil Society: Poland 1981-82," *Telos*, 50 (Winter 1981-82), p. 19.

8. Helmut Schmidt, lecture delivered at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 28, 1977; Petition of the SPD Party Cremium as accepted in the SPD Party Congress of Berlin, 3-7 December 1979; Speech by Helmut Schmidt at the regional Party Congress of the SPD in Wolfratshausen, May 11, 1981, all in Mechtersheimer, *op.cit.*, pp. 129-134.

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SPD-FPD coalition found it necessary to denounce the appeal of the West German peace movement, the "Krefelder Appell" (signed by two and a half million people) as being "pro-communist." This appeal, which asks the West German government to withdraw its consent to the NATO resolution and to reject stationing of missiles on West German soil,[9] was seen by the SPD leadership to be serving Soviet interests, precisely because it no longer accepted the detente logic of nuclear parity through nuclear rearmament. The German Labor Federation that followed the Bonn Coalition on this question, and which furthermore objected to the presence of the German Communist Party among the organizations sponsoring the Krefeld Appeal, initiated a "peace call" on its own on September 1, 1981.[10] The federation also refused to participate in the Bonn demonstration of October 10, 1981. Trade unions such as IG Metall and the Gewerkschaft für Erziehung und Wissenschaft, which did participate, did so against the explicit decision of their federation.

The collusion of interests view is not only mistaken when applied to the relation betwen the SPD and the peace movement, but also when extended to characterize inner-party positions. Numerous SPD organs, among them the Labor Cooperative of Social-Democratic Women and the Young Socialists, have urged the rejection of the NATO resolution, the resumption of Vienna talks on troop reductions in Europe, the organization of Europe-wide initiatives of disarmament and the creation of a nuclear-free (and partially demilitarized) zone in middle Europe (the "Jusos").[11] Similar demands have been voiced by the FPD politician William Borm and by the German Young Democrats.[12] Among existing West German political parties, the only one whose platform most extensively coincides with the peace movement's demands and which has therefore not been weakened by the emergence of inner-party conflicts and differences is the new Green Party. They add to their opposition to the NATO resolution a demand for worldwide disarmament and arms traffic control; the banning of the production and storing of atomic, chemical and biological weapons, and the creation of a zone in *East and West Europe free of all weapons.*[13] Those who postulate that the West German peace movement intentionally or unintentionally, whether in interest or in attitude, serves the political and economic interests of the SPD-FPD coalition thus seriously underestimates the nature and range of the conflicts in West Germany today and minimizes the challenge that a grass-roots democratic movement, outside established party structures, poses for this coalition's conception of politics and government.

These criticisms assumed a different meaning and dimension after the Polish events. In view of the deplorable lack of solidarity with Solidarity shown by the European peace movement, left intellectuals in this country and in France either accepted the collusion of interests theory or recycled ancient wisdoms about Germany's Prussianism, lack of democratic, libertarian traditions, etc. Gorz's criticism is too general to be illuminating. Not all sectors of the movement were unsupportive of Solidarity — The Greens, Sozialistisches Büro, the Anarchist-Spontis and large sections of the house-squatters scene in Berlin were spontaneous and highly outspoken in their reactions. Nonetheless, the fact remains that in view of the Polish events, the

9. In Mechtersheimer, *op.cit.*, p. 249. The appeal was drafted and written by Bastian and the chairman of the Green Party, Petra Kelley. Cf. *Der Spiegel,* "Der Soldat und die Pazifistin," April 26, 1982, p. 95.

10. Mechtersheimer, *op.cit.*, p. 234.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-136.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 160-170.

13. Excerpt from the Party Program of the Greens, *ibid.*, pp. 196-199.

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West German peace movement did not undertake a rapid and coherent political action.[14]

This is only partly to be explained by the events of December 13-14, 1981. Martial law was declared in Poland shortly before the meeting between the East German chief of state, Eric Honecker, and Helmut Schmidt had come to an end. This meeting had been postponed several times before by East Germany; it was doubtful whether it would ever take place and relations between the two German states were hardening and worsening as exemplified by East Germany's refusal to ease financial demands imposed upon West Germans visiting the East. Predictably, the West German conservatives did not miss the opportunity to argue in the person of Franz Joseph Strauss that the meeting had been postponed by Honecker until the day when Jaruzelski declared martial law in order to create a *de facto* acceptance by the West German government of the events. The general disorientation caused by this turn of events was also reflected in the German Labor Federation's decision to call a march in support of Solidarity only a week after the crackdown. What was the federation waiting for? Or was it not waiting for anything at all but hoping that a compromise between Solidarity and the Polish government would be reached? Hard to say. Demonstrations were called in cities such as Berlin, Frankfurt, Hamburg and Munich, which brought at most 3,000 people onto the streets, the largest being still the belated federation's demonstration, which drew 14,000 in Berlin. Gorz's claims seem true only in one respect: so far the democratic Left in West Germany has been unable to develop a discourse critical of authoritarian state socialism such as to challenge the West German Right's monopoly over this discourse. In a country where the Left can always be told to go "over there" if they don't like it where they are, there are admittedly some special connotations attached to such a discourse. Yet, this does not justify its absence. As Petra Kelley, chairwoman of the Central Committee of the Green Party, made quite clear against the predominant logic of some "friends" of Poland, "To regret events in Poland and to demand more armament is plain hypocrisy. To help Poland means to create conditions that make both NATO and the Warsaw Pact equally superfluous as well as all the other troops in the lands of East and West Europe. Their rejection of nuclear weapons is only the first, but precisely for this reason, indispensable step, on the long march to this goal."[15]

The "German Question"

Whereas Left critics of the West German peace movement view it as serving national interests in detente and accommodation *vis-à-vis* Eastern Europe, conservative critics see behind detente the emergence of a creeping nationalism and annexationism aiming at the unification of the two Germanies. But here we face an irony: precisely those elements of the peace movement most critical of Soviet hegemony are also the ones most likely to be accused of national chauvinism. Ammon and Brandt argue that once Soviet hegemony is challenged, the separation of Germany into two states must be questioned. They distinguish the East and inner-German politics of the Brandt-Scheel era from that of Schmidt-Genscher. Whereas the first period was dominated by the need to maintain the nation's cultural

14. This is all the more surprising in view of the fact that, for many groups, Solidarity was an enthusiastically welcomed example of a grass-roots, anti-authoritarian, experimental and non-violent movement committed to principles of self-management. Both Solidarity and the West German peace movement are different fronts of the mobilization of society against the state. The critique of étatism, although of course from within an established context of civil and political freedoms, is one of the main impulses behind this movement as well.

15. Cited in *Der Spiegel,* April 26, 1982, p. 106.

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and human unity even under conditions of separate state forms, they claim, during the rule of the social-liberal coalition this goal of unity was given up as part of a necessary process of "self-knowledge."[16] This meant accepting Soviet hegemony over East Germany and an implicit confirmation of the division of Europe as the legitimate status quo. Ammon and Brandt argue that the West German Left must raise the German question today in the context of criticizing Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. It would then seem that the West German peace movement is forced into a no-win situation: if the movement is for detente, it is accused of being accommodationist and of ignoring the domination of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union; if the movement criticizes detente, it is accused of nationalism and pursuing the dream of a unified Germany.

Of course, there is a fundamental difference between a peace movement that also makes the right of peoples' to self-determination and freedom from external domination one of its basic principles, and one that views the solution to the German question as one of its major tasks. The Ammon and Brandt position is not widely shared, possibly because it assumes all-too naively that there is a compatibility, if not collusion, between the interests of other European nations in peace and the reunification of the two Germanies — under whatever political form. Particularly in the case of France, this can hardly be assumed to be the case. Second, and more significantly, in their zeal to offer a pragmatic Left *Realpolitik*, they remain satisfied with proposals for increasing economic, legal and human cooperation between the two Germanies and stop short of a fundamental social and political critique. Their proposals fall short of their own goal to criticize both versions of "real-existing" Germanies and succumb, disclaimers notwithstanding, to a version of politics from above. On the question of East Germany, the prevalent attitude in the peace movement is rather one that encourages the emergence of movements of similar types on the other side and which defends the legal right to resist the draft and to substitute civil service for it.

The Problem of Post-War German Collective Identity

The current dispute about the stationing of cruise and Pershing II missiles in West Germany has, in the eyes of the post-World War II generation of West Germans, quickly turned into a symbolic acknowledgement of the statement that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the sons. Since the present highly vulnerable and dependent position of both Germanies is the punishment devised by the victors of World War II against Germany's National-Socialist Fascist past, the prospect of a nuclear holocaust precipitated by the stationing of nuclear warheads on West German soil appears to many as the curse of a destiny they have neither chosen nor accepted nor forgiven. Statements such as the following — by West German Defense Minister Hans Apel — sound like so many re-enactments of *mea culpa*: "The younger people in our country and in Europe have to some extent never learned the lessons of history. They don't know anything about Hitler."[17] Apel's statement unintentionally betrays another assumption, namely, that a Germany freed from the tutelage of the power blocs is a dangerous Germany and that the only way to prevent the re-emergence of another Hitler is maintaining control by the superpowers. This method of dealing with fear of one's past and of the past within oneself, by delegating its administration to another, negates individual and collective future autonomy.

16. See Ammon and Brandt, in this issue of *Telos*.

17. Quoted in *The Washington Star,* March 26, 1981, and cited by Kaldor, "Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance," *op.cit.*, p. 18.

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In challenging the defense, security and foreign policy *status quo* of the post-war era, the West German peace movement thus inevitably points a finger at the problematic and in many ways still traumatic issue of German collective identity. In their article, "Political Culture and the Politics of Social Democratic Government," Volker Gransow and Claus Offe analyze the absence of any identifiable consciousness of collective identity, conceived in terms of class or the nation in West German political culture.[18] Their claim is that the concept of a nation is unable to play this role of providing Germans with a shared sense of their past and a common future orientation not only because of the racist and chauvinist perversions of the concept through National Socialism, but also because of the politics of integration into the European and Atlantic alliance pursued since the 1950s, and the accompanying attempt at normalizing relations with East Germany and the East Bloc in general. This analysis does not fully consider the consequences that the current critique of the post-World War II status quo can have for placing the question of the nation on the agenda again, but it does show that any challenge to this status quo must inevitably confront the problem of collective identity.

Of course, the symbolic-psychological dynamics of dealing with one's past are both subtle and precarious, particularly so in the case of West Germany, since the past cannot be denied by the official ideological appeal to a "struggle against fascism" of the kind perpetrated by the Communist Party of East Germany. The reaction against the unwanted guilt of the past can lead to a hatred of the victim, just as it can tempt one to assume the role of the victim oneself. In the late 1960s, the mindless identification of certain parts of the West German Left with the cause of Palestinian liberation was a clear instance of the first,[19] while certain present tendencies to view West Germany as the privileged victim of American imperialism may well be an instance of the second. If, over and above the very real problems of West Germany's political sovereignty in its relation to the United States in particular and to NATO in general, such sentiments of victimization are mobilized to avoid dealing with the real problem of Germany's collective identity, then indeed the West German peace movement will have continued the pattern of avoiding the question by repressing it. But the hypothetical character of these considerations must be underlined, for so far as the peace movement has cultivated internationalism and has sought to establish alliances of solidarity with all European and American anti-nuclear and grass-roots democratic movements. This was expressed at the October 10, 1981, demonstration in Bonn not only through the invitation extended to Coretta King and to Dutch peace organizers to address the demonstrators (a fact generally played down by the American press) but through the numerous appeals and efforts to join similar demonstrations in other countries in Europe. To accuse the West German peace movement of nationalism at this stage, therefore, would be like accusing the one who has raised a question of affirming the truth of the statement implied by the question. The question of German collective identity is an important symbolic-political dimension in current debate. Whether or not it will be resolved through a nationalist answer depends on the relative success of this movement to make international solidarity, rather than the German nation, a new source of symbolic collective identity.

18. Cf. Volker Gransow and Claus Offe, "Politische Kultur und sozialdemokratische Regierungspolitik," in *Das Argument*, 23:128, pp. 551-564.

19. Cf. Moishe Postone, "Anti-Semitism and National Socialism: Notes on the German Reaction to Holocaust," *New German Critique*, 19 (Winter 1980), pp. 97-116.

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The Politics of the Peace Movement and the Crisis of Statist Modernization

So far what distinguishes the West German peace movement most strikingly from its European counterparts is the extent to which it expresses a novel set of social and political values and attitudes. Called by some "post-industrial," by others "post-materialist," the nature and dimension of this shift in values and attitudes still needs to be analyzed.[20] Habermas' phrase "from problems of distribution to the grammar of forms of life" is perhaps most helpful in naming the substantive concerns entailed by this new turn.[21] In broad terms, this indicates a transition from the demand for an *equal distribution* of industrial goods and services to a concern with *participatory* organizational forms beyond the ever-increasing consumption of industrial goods. This shift calls into question not merely relations of social injustice and exploitation intrinsic to the capital-labor conflict, but the industrial mode of production as such, based on the ever increasing exploitation of humans and of the natural environment through the triple agencies of economic expansion, scientific technology and bureaucratic state administration.

Again, critics of this new trend are quick in their judgments. While Berman pejoratively terms this a "discourse of authenticity"[22] — reminding us, of course, of Adorno's critique of Heidegger — even thoughtful observers such as Stanley Hoffman write: "Many of West Germany's young indulge in a kind of anti-Americanism that is not just a protest against American politics, but also a revolt against the 'Westernization' of post-war Germany; not just a condemnation of capitalism and materialism, but an expression of nostalgia for German purity, culture and distinctiveness."[23] For those who detect in this new trend rather many of the old demands and concerns of the American New Left — an end to the exploitation of inner and outer nature; an end to patriarchy; alternative modes of work and living; rejection of consumerism, professionalism — it is of course strange to hear that this politics is not only anti-American but anti-Western as well. But those who identify the rejection of the industrial mode of production with "anti-Westernism" themselves assume that the legacy of the West is equal to technical-instrumental reason alone. Before dismissing these new developments as a Heideggerian longing for the earth, or as a romantic revolt against the industrial West in the name of the ancient German gods of the forest, one must answer the crucial question: is a rational critique of the industrial-patriarchal West in light of the very legacy of Western practical reason, autonomy and self-determination, not possible?

Much of the current debate in West Germany on so-called fundamental values led by the West Berlin political science professor Richard Löwenthal ignores this question by insisting that the critique of the ideology of industrial growth and nuclear technology may be tantamount to the critique of democracy and the West as such.[24] The Grasnow-Offe and Hirsch articles offer some interesting insights in this respect: they locate the source of the malaise behind the new shift in political values and attutides not in the reaction against "Westernization" but in the disenchantment with a model of statist modernization promoted by the SPD. Grasnow and Offe outline the

20. R. Inglehart, "Wertvandel und politisches Verhalten," *Sozialer Wandel in Westeuropa,* ed. J. Matthes (New York, 1979).

21. J. Habermas, "New Social Movements," *Telos,* 49 (Fall 1981), p. 33.

22. Berman, "Opposition to Rearmament and West German Culture," *op.cit.*

23. Stanley Hoffman, "American Liberals and Europe's Anti-Nuclear Movement," *Dissent* (Spring 1982), p. 150.

24. In several articles this past fall published in *Die Zeit* and the *Frankfurter Rundschau* (November-December 1982), Richard Löwenthal urged the SPD to clarify its commitment to the basic values of enlightenment, democracy, science and modernization.

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dynamics and dialectics of this situation — by no means to be ignored in view of the neo-conservative attack on the welfare state here and the social democratic state there: "What interests us is more the consequence of a form of politics which always conceives of change as administrative intervention and legalization, as the executive prerogative of statist reordering of life-conditions. This particular figure of an emancipation mediated by the state, and therefore to a certain degree 'other-determined,' clearly has on the one hand the advantage of at least partially compensating for the (structural or conjectural) deficiency in the social power of wage laborers and other disadvantaged categories through politically realized and achieved claims and regulations. Such statist correctives of power-relations in society have always the negative effect of supporting what is exactly opposed to their intention, in that those compensated are not only *unburdened,* but are at the same time *deactivated*; that is, they are hindered themselves from conceiving and autonomously realizing their own conceptions of what is needed to improve their lives."[25]

The widespread conflicts between the administrative agencies of social-technical modernization and a public resisting such top-down efforts preceded the emergence of the West German peace movement and supplied it with a network of activists once it started. The opposition to the construction of nuclear energy reactors had already produced clashes between anti-nuclear protesters and state authorities in Whyl, Brockdorff, Gorleben, while the resistance to the construction of Startbahn West and the modernization of the Frankfurt airport culminated in the signing of a petition by one and a half million citizens opposing this plan. The symbolic clash between the old and the new politics was perhaps nowhere more evident than here: in the person of Willy Brandt the SPD leadership lent unconditional solidarity to the decision of the social-liberal coalition in Hessen to go ahead with the construction, thus acknowledging that at stake was more than merely the internal troubles of the Hessen government, but a clash of principles between two kinds of politics.

There is more than a continuity of political actors between the two cases of opposition to the stationing of nuclear weapons on West German soil and the opposition to the construction of Startbahn West — interpreted by a lot of people to be a ploy for an airfield to serve the Rapid Deployment Force. At stake is the clash between expert opinion, represented by politicians' decisions, technocratic advice and bureaucratic intransigence, and the citizens' moral and political common sense. *Vis-à-vis* those affected by their decisions, this condescending expertise privileges abstract structural-functional and strategic calculations over the citizens' concrete life conditions.[26] At stake is the conflict between the imperatives of a technological civilization and a democratic culture of autonomy. While for the politician, who like Hegel's monarch has very often only to place the dot on the i, the best the public can do is acclaim his burden of decision, for the technocrat, the democratic public and citizens' movements are disturbances that interfere with "crisis management." For the decisionist politician, democracy is a source of acclaim, for the technocrat it is dispensable.

25. Gransow and Offe, *op.cit.*

26. Cf. the very astute remarks by H.A. Veiveson, "At the root of the current debate there is, I believe, this division: ordinary citizens, insofar as they are engaged, mostly believe that nuclear weapons can never rationally be used; the experts, for reasons to be explored below, insist that they can be used; and political leaders are willing to go along or perhaps better are carried along with the experts' bluff. Is it possible for the public to impose its common sense — to challenge the technical and doctrinal expertise of the high priests of nuclear theory?" Cf. his "Thinking about Nuclear Weapons," *Dissent* (Spring 1982), p. 184.

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Oppositional Politics in a Nuclear Age

Thus, it is all the more surprising to read that "the European movement, while its deepest impulses are unpolitical or anti-political, nevertheless sees itself as, and wants to be, a political force."[27] If politics means the subtle and perverse logic of balancing mutual threats of destruction and deterrence between states, then the European peace movement is anti-political, for it rejects this conception of politics; if politics means seeking the possible even under the worst imaginable case, as the jargon of nuclear strategists goes, then the European peace movement is unpolitical for it refuses to speak this language. If politics is the sphere in which citizens articulate the vision of a present and future organization of society and define the conditions under which the exercise of power is legitimate and a future form of life desirable, then peace movements are profoundly political, for what they have accomplished is to make clear that positions of power do not grant automatic legitimacy to those who occupy them but that their decisions are criticizable, rejectable and revocable, and that the future must not be abandoned to the creeping error of unintended consequences set in motion by those serving the mega-machine of the arms race.

At this point in the debate the critic will usually object that this is a utopian conception of politics, denying the realities of the Soviet threat, the hard logic of international power relations, leading to a weakening of the will of the West to defend itself, etc. Those objections are beside the point: precisely because of the increasing signs of an impending world political crisis, one should face the realities and horrors of a nuclear war. Those who resort to the Cold War logic of the 1950s to describe and interpret the current world situation are dangerously out of step with the times. Even assuming the worst about Soviet intentions, it would only follow that all the more must be done in the present to prevent the escalation of the current crisis into a nuclear confrontation. It is unnecessary to recapitulate here what the consequences of even a so-called limited nuclear confrontation would be for the world and life on this planet as we know it.[28] In fact, in reading this material, it is hard not to feel that it is all a bad science-fiction novel, and not to be horrified at the callousness of an instrumental reason that in the service of self-preservation is ready to annihilate the material and natural conditions of human civilization. In 1941, Horkheimer wrote: "Reason in this sense is as indispensable in the modern technique of war as it has always been in the event of business. Its features can be summarized as the optimum adaptation of means to ends, thinking as an energy-conserving operation. It is a pragmatic interest oriented to expediency, cold and sober. When even the dictators of today appeal to reason, they mean that they possess the most tanks. They were rational enough to build them; others should be rational enough to yield them."[29] In view of the destructive potential that has accumulated since the end of World War II, Horkheimer's example of the tanks is sadly prosaic. However, his words may serve to remind us that reason in the service of self-preservation triumphs in the world only by destroying the human subjects in whose benefit it was first set into motion as means to an end.

The worldwide peace movements today calling for the abolition, freeze and ban of present and future nuclear weapons indicate that despite the recalcitrant and perverse logic of mechanisms humanity has set into motion, there is still a reservoir of moral and political common sense in every people which has not been completely stultified

27. Hoffman, *op.cit.*, p. 149.

28. Jonathan Shell, *The Fate of the Earth* (New York, 1982).

29. Max Horkheimer, "The End of Reason," in *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, eds. (New York, 1978), p. 28.

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by a reified instrumental logic.[30] To paraphrase Benjamin, the peace movements today are the efforts of an indignant humanity which has pulled the emergency brake to stop the train of history from rushing into its own destruction. As intellectuals we should remember that reason "as the faculty of calling things by their name. . . is more than the alienated life that preserves itself in the destruction of others and of itself."[31] We should resist the current temptation either to act as if we were advisers in the court of the elite of *Realpolitik* or to pretend that our (dubious) insight into the navel of the totality has transported us to heights beyond good and evil from which we can heap contempt on "mass democratic" movements. For those of us who still believe in the tradition of critique, the task is rather to support worldwide oppositional peace movements in the present in their efforts to become emancipatory ones.

30. In a speech made on the occasion of the construction of the hydrogen bomb in 1955, Churchill is reported to have said "Safety might be the sturdy child of terror" and "survival the twin brother of annihilation." Quoted by McGeorge Bundy, "The Missed Chance to Stop the H-Bomb," *New York Review of Books*, May 13, 1982, p. 13. Despite the contempt that Churchill and some dialecticians might heap on "gesunder Menschenverstand" for not grasping the ultimate identity of opposites, it is the right of common sense to point out that the identity of opposites — safety and terror, survival and annihilation — means not a new synthesis, but the elimination of both.

31. Horkheimer, "The End of Reason," *op.cit.*, p. 47.

THE PEACE MOVEMENT AND WESTERN EUROPEAN SOVEREIGNTY

by Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen

The Western European peace movements represent an important new phase of the struggle for social and political democratization. As in the case of the ecology movement and movements for urban autonomy, here too the public thematization of issues traditionally left to the administrative arbitrariness of the state, corporate boards and-or the automatic mechanisms of the market goes hand in hand with the self-constitution of democratic forms of association capable of exerting pressure on various levels of government and administration. The importance of this trend in social movements on a structural level lies in the challenge posed to the historically new degree of irresponsible (non-accountable) administrative intervention into social and economic processes.[1] On a normative level, these movements represent the penetration of a communicatively based democratic process of will formation into the private preserves of technocratic rationality. On an institutional level, the new social movements represent the best current possibilities for preserving, revitalizing and democratizing the heritage of civil society in the West.

The democratic utilization of counter-expertise (engineers, architects, scientists, doctors, military men, etc.) is an important sign of the maturity of the new social

1. Cf. for example the works of Habermas from *Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit* (Berlin, 1962) to *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston, 1975) and those of Touraine from *Post-Industrial Society* (New York, 1971) to *The Voice and the Eye* (New York, 1981).

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movements. This raises the question of the relation of social theory to social movement. The new role for social scientific expertise and for theoretical critique will hardly be fulfilled if intellectuals in sympathy with these movements simply dissolve themselves in their activist role or into the role of tribune, and come to reflect the average positions of large numbers of people in motion. This is not to suggest a "sociological intervention" into social movements geared toward steering them into patterns of action in line with preconceived theoretical positions. Yet, the relation of social theory to new movements must remain one of sympathetic critical examination and communication. In this regard, there are three fundamental tasks: (1) the juxtaposition of social movement and social reform. Social movements tend to be anti-institutional and (unfortunately) suspicious of reformist activity from above, which they justly regard as crisis management. Nevertheless, social movements have a serious chance to realize some of their goals and even to maintain their level of self-organization only under decreasingly authoritarian, hence reformist and modernizing, state forms. It is necessary to subject the institutions of the political system to immanent critique, reflecting on the forms of institutional reform that could best serve to maintain and expand the social space within which social movements act. (2) The elaboration of the structural constraints and the likely unintended consequences of the actions of movements as well as those of their opponents. Related to the first point, the issue here is that even a politically successful combination of reform and movement may have consequences that are totally unexpected and even highly undesirable, in spite of the democratizing potential inherent in such a process. Nowhere is such a danger greater than in the peace movements. Thus it is incumbent on the social theorist to introduce clarity regarding the likely consequences if a particular means is chosen, if issues are formulated in one fashion as opposed to another, if strategy X is chosen over strategy Y. In short, it is essential to choose the ethic of responsibility.[2] (3) The demonstration of fundamental value conflicts within and among social movements. Here, too, it is necessary to analyze the war of gods and indicate the consequence of choosing to follow one god rather than another.

Even before the Polish crisis initiated by the events of December 13, 1981, it was clear that the theorists of the West European peace movements had not really tried to fulfill their ethic of responsibility. The role of critic has dissolved into that of participant. After Jaruzelski's *coup de main*, these theorists' inability to respond politically to the challenge or even to critically re-examine their previous views points to dangers hitherto hardly suspected by anyone sympathetic to the peace movements. While it would be unrealistic to expect that these movements spontaneously reflect on the nature of Soviet society (although they do so regarding the U.S.), it is irresponsible that such a reflection — even after Poland — has either not appeared at all or has cropped up in an illusory, self-deceptive way. The Western European and even American Left has for generations suffered from and was even discredited by crucial misjudgments concerning the nature and dynamics of Soviet society. Today, the peace movement is in the obvious danger of continuing this perilous and self-destructive tradition.

Intellectuals can, of course, participate in movements on an equal basis or address them as experts by providing necessary information and critical perspectives. We are not in the position to do the first with regard to questions concerning the military balance, whether of conventional or nuclear arms. But we would like to challenge and

2. See Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," in Gerth and Mills, eds., *From Max Weber* (New York, 1946).

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criticize the self-interpretations of the German and English peace movements.[3] Our main quarrel can be located on three levels: (1) Theoretically, we cannot accept any of the several English and German perspectives regarding the comparative analysis of the roots of American and Soviet militarism; (2) Strategically, we reject the resulting perspectives for unilateral policies of disarmament; and (3) We sense a deep confusion of values within the peace movements and a corresponding disregard of the value of solidarity with Eastern European democratic movements. Above all, we hope our position on the first and third levels will provide a basis for an alternative strategic suggestion that can link the problem of disarmament to that of democratization, East and West. This will involve a rethinking of the relation between the peace movement as a social movement and the forces of reform from above. This, of course, also relates to the self-understanding of the growing American movement.[4]

There is *apparently* a wide spectrum of views in the German and English peace discussion comparing the imperial and militaristic character of the two superpowers. Orthodox Marxists (or former orthodox Marxists) continue to restrict the concept of imperialism to the United States and to regard the position of the Soviet Union as fundamentally defensive and conservative. This view was recently reinforced by the Medvedev brothers, who argue, furthermore, that the Soviet Union is part of the traditional European state system, "the last survivor of the great European empires," which, to them, apparently signifies a peaceful member of the community of nations.[5] They restrict the extensions of this empire after 1945 to the occupation of ex-enemy states (such as Czechoslovakia and Poland!) and its new world posture is blandly characterized as a "new capacity for preservance and freedom of movement" in some Third World countries. While analyzing the imperium in East Europe less benignly, Bahro also, in his debate with Gorz, considers the Soviet Union as a defender of Third World independence against (only) American imperialism. Hirsch, finally, restricts "imperialism" to capitalist countries. For all of these theorists, expansionism is a negligible dimension of the Soviet state.[6]

The position of other, more critical theorists of the peace movement is somewhat better. E.P. Thompson and his circle — but also Lucio Magri — insist on *two* empires, *two* militarisms, confronting each other in a new, exterminist logic.[7] Magri even notes the adventurist turn of Soviet foreign policy. To Thompson and David Holloway, on whose work he relies, a militarist structure obtains in both Soviet and American societies. While Holloway is uncertain whether or not the Soviet Union has a military-industrial complex, whether perhaps it is a military-industrial state, Thompson forthrightly asserts that both "superpowers" *are* military-industrial complexes of a new type.[8] It can hardly be denied, however, that Thompson's

3. In addition to the positions presented in this issue of *Telos*, we will further draw, in particular, on E.P . Thompson and Dan Smith, eds., *Protest and Survive* (New York, 1981) as well as several relevant issues of *New Left Review*.

4. Cf. Paul Joseph, "From MAD to NUTS: The Growing Danger of Nuclear War," *Socialist Review* (January-February 1982), p. 61; and Alan Wolfe, "Europe in Search of Autonomy," *The Nation*, February 27, 1982.

5. Zhores and Roy Medvedev, "The USSR and the Arms Race," *New Left Review* 130 (November-December 1981).

6. For the opposite perspective, see above all Cornelius Castoriadis, *Devant la guerre* (Paris, 1980; or his "Facing the War," *Telos*, 46 (Winter 1980-81).

7. Lucio Magri, "The Peace Movement and European Socialism," *New Left Review*, 131 (January-February 1982). Of course, Magri is writing in an entirely different context, where the social nature of the Soviet Union has been amply discussed on the Left, unlike in England and Germany.

8. E.P. Thompson, "Notes on Exterminism, the Last Stage of Civilization," *New Left Review*, 121 (May-June 1980), p. 23.

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exterminism thesis is a new, if negative, version of the convergence theory.[9] "However different their origin and character," the two imperial systems, the two modes of production, converge in *what* they produce, and exterminist logic. A perhaps unwanted corollary to this theoretical understanding of the two equally militaristic superpowers is an argument of many in the German peace movement that Western and Eastern Europe, and more specifically West and East Germany, are in an identical position of dependence and heteronomy *vis-à-vis* the corresponding superpower. West Germany is, in short, just as much a colony of the U.S. as is East Germany of the Soviet Union when it comes to issues of sovereignty, fundamental decision-making, and patterns of internal life. Such a simplistic position reflects the movement's worst political tendencies (or, rather apolitical tendencies) and its proponents' lack of theoretical sophistication and awareness.

In a later article, Thompson revises his earlier thesis with an apparent concession to a more orthodox Marxist position that in fact opens the whole question of imperialism anew: "The Russian state is now the most dangerous in relation to its own people and to the people of its client states...the United States (is) more dangerous and provocative in its general military and diplomatic strategies."[10] Here the unilateral strategy, already adopted in the exterminism article, produces its own theoretical rationalization that corresponds to the Medvedevs', Bahro's, and Hirsch's positions on the subject. But another dimension of argument is, for our purposes, more important: the differentiation of the two imperial systems. More than 30 years ago, Hannah Arendt's great essay on "imperialism"[11] produced a peerless theoretical elaboration of the differences between two types of modern imperial systems. *Overseas* empires are systems divided between a nation-state core capable of preserving republican institutions based on rule of law and a free public sphere, and colonies where some of the totalitarian methods of lawless administrative-military rule have been rehearsed already in the late 19th century. While racism alone legitimates such a division, the arrangement can never be stabilized so long as the republican core of the nation-state is preserved. The colonies will almost naturally seek nation-state structures of their own, and they will be protected from some of the worst excesses by the nation state institutions of the mother country itself threatened by the penetration at home of imperial practices and procedures. This has been the case for French and English empires in the 19th century and first half of the 20th, and for the American in the second half of the 20th century. On the other hand, Arendt argues, *continental* empires fully realized by Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia do not know such a division between the institutions of the center and the periphery. Russian history to this day supports this thesis. When from the early 1920s on, when the tsarist "prisonhouse of peoples" was rebuilt under the name "Soviet Union,"[12] a full homogenization of institutional life occurred throughout the new or renewed empire. Itself the core not conveniently separated from the periphery by race *and* geography, it has never since known the rule of law or the medium of a free public sphere. The relation between the forms of domination in the core and the periphery is symbiotic: the necessities of militarizing the periphery at great cost involve similar militarization of the core, and the militarization of the core excludes internal pressures for the dismantling of the empire. Even when the new periphery after 1945 no longer permitted (although this was certainly tried before 1956), the full homogenization of

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 7, 17 especially.
10. E.P. Thompson, "A Letter to America," in *Protest and Survive, op.cit.*, p. 40.
11. See *Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1958), originally published in 1951.
12. Cf. Helène Carrière-d'Encausse, *L'Empire eclaté* (Paris, 1978).

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Soviet and East European institutional life, the division between core and periphery became the reverse of the one in overseas imperial systems such as the U.S.: the core is the more militarized and the least capable of experimenting with representative and public institutions, reforms and social movements.

Applying this analysis to the contemporary differentiation of the two superpowers, this conclusion is inescapable: while the Soviet Union *is* the Soviet empire, the United States is not *just* American imperialism. There are, in short, two Americas: the republican liberal-democratic core (no matter how distorted) and various types of imperial relations and institutions in the periphery. Western Europe, however, is *not* part of the U.S. periphery — only Latin America and parts of the Third World fill this bill. Hence, the sleight of hand on the part of those who "concede" that Europe is menaced and colonized by not one but two superpowers. This is not the place to engage in the rather complex theoretical question of the relation between the competing nation states of Western Europe and the United States. One thing, however, is certain — the fact of the peace movement in Western Europe indicates that its "dependence" on the U.S. is of a far different sort than that of Eastern Europe on the Soviet Union.

To be sure, Frankfurt-type analyses of one-dimensional society, the totally administered world, artificial negativity, or even Arendt's concept of mass society might imply that in the U.S. institutional mechanisms are no longer operating which could check and restrain the increasingly powerful imperial-military-industrial-scientific complex. Such tends to be the view of the Medvedevs who argue (in fact, inconsistently, since they stress the importance of the peace movement on the same page) that the population of both superpowers is *equally* excluded from all significant decision-making processes. Our history tells otherwise. From Vietnam to Watergate, from the eventually successful struggle against the escalation of the Vietnam war by the American peace movement and soldiers, to the even more dramatically victorious fight of press, courts, and electorate against the domestic consequences of militarization (secrecy, surveillance, intimidation),[13] it has become increasingly obvious that under conditions of late capitalism, *both* manipulated and critical public spheres are contemporary developments. The existence of new social movements and, above all, of the peace movement that challenges the most authoritarian and manipulated dimension of our culture, itself dramatically confirms this thesis. Need one point out that there is no independent peace movement in the Soviet Union, that the Soviets have never — with the exception of their insignificant zone in Austria — left a country that they have occupied militarily?

There is, however, another, weaker version of the convergence thesis between the superpowers and their empires that seeks to point to possible Soviet flexibility rather than to American intransigence. The first point made in this regard refers to the possibility of social movements in the East. Solidarity in Poland has, of course, been the key to this line of argumentation.[14] But even if the "new evolutionism" (Michnik) or the "self-limiting revolution" (Kuron) of the democratic Polish movement had been successful in all key aspirations, a challenge to the military system of alliance in which Poland plays a part, to the Soviet occupation of Poland, not to mention Soviet military

13. Ellsberg admits the point concerning Vietnam in his introduction to *Protest and Survive*, *op.cit.*, pp. xv-xvi, while Thompson mentions Watergate in "Exterminism," *op.cit.*, p. 18. In general, Thompson is the only important theorist of the European peace movement who consistently stresses, in contradiction with his underlying convergence thesis, the role of the presence of democratic exposure and publicity in the United States as against the Soviet Union.

14. Cf. Thompson, e.g., in "Letter to America," *op.cit.*, pp. 49-50. But there are similar references in Bahro, Hirsch, Kaldor *et al.*

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policy as such, was carefully excluded from the list of possible demands. At most, some elements in Solidarity — but never the organization as such — made demands about the reduction of the Polish armament budget — here an irrelevant question. In the actual scenario, the Polish democratic movement, instead of being able to offer any assistance to the project of the Western European peace movement, desperately asked (in vain) for some support by the latter to increase its chances of survival.

As is well known, the chances for the foreseeable future of a Solidarity-type movement in the imperial center are slim. It is for this reason that Holloway advises the Western peace movement to cultivate allies among both dissidents and officials. But he also admits that the bulk of the Russian dissidents are themselves nationalists who have no interest in disarmament questions and that, on official levels, there has been little evidence of opposition to Soviet military policy.[15] The Medvedevs report roughly the same thing, with themselves being no exception. The second thesis that supports partial convergence in the direction of Soviet flexibility is, accordingly, structural. If one cannot point to groups or even to a space where they might be forged, one had better stick to structural trends. In particular, Kaldor and Holloway seek to show that the tendencies toward disarmament that need the intermediary of the peace movement in Western Europe can be structurally grounded in the East. Though not strictly speaking a convergence theorist except in terms of the sturdy democratic society she hopes for East and West, Kaldor does, however, locate a converging element in the economic systems of the two superpowers — their respective dominant armament sectors. In this context, each system introduces an element of the other. The American system introduces a dimension of semi-planning, the Soviet, that of consumer sovereignty.[16] The conception of the presence of the military consumer in the process of production has been stressed by several interpreters seeking to explain the relative modernity and efficiency of the Soviet armament sector as against all others in Soviet society.[17] According to Kaldor, semi-planning implies a factor that avoids crisis in the American system but also leads to stagnation and to a freezing of the industrial structure because of the technological shape and production process of modern armaments. In the Soviet system, on the other hand, consumer sovereignty and competition (with the West) are factors of rationality and potential mechanisms for change. The implication here is that, in the context of the present Soviet economic crisis, the solution lies in the imitation of the consumer sovereignty of the armed sector in the form of "democratic planning" that would also transfer priorities to the civil sector. Kaldor forgets to mention that in the one case the consumer is at the very least a part of the bureaucracy or the planning elite that has no interest at all in sharing decision-making power with what could constitute the consumer in the other case, namely, the population. She does not say what mechanisms would lead to such a transference. When not dreaming of the imitation of Nottingham by Minsk, Kaldor apparently trusts objective tendencies of development based on the system's current economic crisis.

A closer examination of the work of Holloway that has been used to sustain the positions of the British CND shows that even here, Kaldor's optimistic projection cannot be sustained. To be sure, he maintains that the logic of the armament sector

15. David Holloway, "War, Militarism and the Soviet State," *Protest and Survive, op.cit.*, pp. 87ff.

16. Kaldor, "Disarmament: The Armament Process in Reverse," *ibid.*, pp. 177, 182ff, 183-184.

17. Cf. Markus' important forthcoming essay in *Dictatorship over Needs* (co-authored with Heller and Feher). A powerful and very different thesis is impressively maintained by C. Castoriadis in *Devant la guerre, op.cit.*

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(maximization of funds for it) is not incompatible with a large-scale decentralizing economic reform that could indeed increase investments for most sectors.[18] He, too, furthermore, maintains on the basis of solid evidence that the truly modern armament sector has been officially held up as a model for the rest of this economy. Could this be a plan for the imitation of the sovereignty of the consumer by the rest of the economy? Holloway does not go so far. It is only a question of imitating its "high-scientific-technical level" and "transmission of its experience, inventions and discoveries." These slogans, in fact, have been the staples of the technocratic-authoritarian "reform" of the last part of the Brezhnev era, representing a replacement of all genuine decentralizing reform attempts. We already know that the results are dismal. The one feature that has been decidedly not transferred to the civilian sector is consumer sovereignty. For this could be accomplished only by a combination of market and democratic planning — a combination certainly incompatible with the system's desperately protected identity. Thus, Holloway returns to the very cautious version of the inevitability of economic reform in the Soviet Union given declining growth rates, shortages, agricultural disasters, etc. His own thesis concerning the relation of the military sector to Soviet society speaks against such an outcome.

According to Holloway, Russian and Soviet history, state socialist ideology, the existence of an empire and contemporary problems of legitimation all predispose the Soviet Union to militarism. It is irrelevant, in this context, whether one considers the armed forces as already structurally dominant (Castoriadis' "stratocracy") or only the key sectoral lobby that always gets the best of everything and its way in almost everything (as Holloway concedes). What is significant is that the Soviet Union is an imperial society that is economically and politically weak but militarily strong, and that in such a context, the military sector, which is the only modern one, has and will have, as both Castoriadis and Holloway stress, the comparative advantage. Even if the military sector itself did not mind economic reform (and here Holloway is not very convincing), the point is that its own hyper-development is already an alternative to it. In an historically deeply militarized society, any reforms based on decentralization and liberalization have become anathema from the viewpoint of the ruling institution, irrespective which stratum we consider dominant in it. This is especially the case if, as after Czechoslovakia in 1968, the dominant strata do not consider the spill-over of reform from the purely economic to the political and cultural realms avoidable. The continued modernization of the military sector alone has no such drawbacks. In a society whose official ideology has become an empty shell, its replacement by the only alternative available, Great Russian nationalism — is more or less inevitable. The new ideology, however, as Holloway repeatedly hints, is intimately tied to militarism and the primacy of the military sector. Thus, as he admits, when dealing with the military sector of the Soviet system, we are not dealing with an aspect that can be surgically removed. Thompson's claim is right, at least as far as the Soviet Union is concerned: it does not *have* a military industrial complex, it *is* one. In other words, the Soviet Union is an historically new type of imperial system that will not be reformed out of existence from above, whatever its structural economic difficulties. This is even more so because today there is an obvious trend in Soviet thinking according to which military power can suitably influence others to help out with some such difficulties, e.g., shortage of investment capital, scarcity of high technology, etc.

The true context of unilateral moves toward Western disarmament is not the hope of Bahro and Vester. When it comes to advanced Soviet armaments, Bahro himself

18. Holloway, *op.cit.*, pp. 85-86.

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fluctuates between two incompatible views: that the SS-20s protect the Third World from European adventures and that they represent no danger at all to anyone unless the Pershing II and cruise missiles are placed in Europe.[19] In either case, he takes the reality of existing Soviet military power for granted. The sub-text reveals that the motive to which he appeals is not the hope of a world without arms but the fear of the Russians who, for better or worse, are armed to the teeth and cannot be influenced by us or the people of Eastern Europe. To be sure, this is only a sub-text. It is a set of common doctrines of the new peace opinion in England and Germany that (1) each movement must struggle for disarmament only in its own country, avoiding all ties to multilateral negotiations concerning mutual reduction; (2) that such movements are possible in Eastern Europe; (3) that the Soviet Union is likely to reciprocate unilateral moves in a disarmament race with the West because of the demonstration effect of "the good" and because of its own rational interest to shift from military to civilian priorities; and (4) that unilateral disarmament in the West unambiguously helps all movements toward democratization in the East.

We have already argued against points 2 and 3. A social system, especially an imperial one, is not likely to risk its own dissolution because of either irrational appeals to supposedly common values or supposedly common rational interests. Let us turn to the strategy of unilateralism and its implications for Eastern Europe, and for Western political-social movements. The immediate motivation for unilateral disarmament campaigns is fear, on the explicit level at least: fear of the arms we point at the Soviet Union, and not vice versa. Exterminism, according to Thompson, needs at least two agents. He proposes, therefore, that the peace movement force one of them out of the competition unto death. At the ideal limiting case of actual unilateral disarmament, we would have therefore nothing to fear, except slavery, i.e., occupation by the Russians, which, however, is defined as a possible basis of future "resurgence and recuperation."[20] Apparently, the existing peace movement in Western Europe, as Gorz argues, tends to glorify mere "life" (not the "good life") as its leading value and to organize itself, as Castoriadis ironically claims, around the zoological interest of mankind. Were this to be the real or only significance of the peace movement, it would have the opposite effect to what we mentioned, i.e., the self-destruction of the public spaces opened up by the movement and the depoliticization of actors motivated not by discussable issues but by fear.

There are two ways of arguing against this. The first is that the Russians are *not* coming, as Bahro repeatedly points out. The second is that the real values of the peace movement are sovereignty (Bahro) and democracy (Kaldor). The second depends on the first, because under Russian occupation neither sovereignty nor democracy would be in very good shape. Are the Russians coming? Recently, Castoriadis has made an extremely persuasive case for expansion as the only possible logic of the new stage of the Russian totalitarian empire. While we do not accept this thesis in its present form and consider expansion only one alternative path of Soviet development, we are highly suspicious of arguments that insist on the relatively cautious, conservative policy of the Soviet Union on the basis of an historical period when the U.S. had absolute military advantage on the nuclear level. When Ellsberg points to thirteen examples of the U.S. using nuclear blackmail against the Soviet Union and its allies,[21] he also reveals the

19. Compare his reply to Gorz in this issue with his article, "The SPD and the Peace Movement" in *New Left Review*, 131 (January-February 1982), p. 22.

20. Thompson, "Letter to America," *op.cit.*, pp. 38-39.

21. See his already cited essay, p. vff. Ellsberg somehow fails to say whether, e.g., the West should allow Berlin to be Sovietized along with all the territories that are as continguous to the

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obvious source of Soviet "reticence" and "conservatism" in the given crises. Today, of course, the days of such nuclear blackmail are over, and the peace movement justifiably fears its revival on the basis of extremely questionable capacities to localize nuclear war. But if this is true, we can no longer even hope to predict Soviet global policy on the basis of the past.

It is certainly more convincing to argue against the possibility of Soviet expansion in Europe on the basis of already existing deep internal difficulties in the empire: Poland, Afghanistan and in the imperial center as well. If the Soviet Union is to resolve these, further expansion may contribute something on the level of nationalist-imperial legitimation only at the cost of new and renewed steering problems on all levels. A more rational goal of Soviet policy would therefore be both to maintain the military foundations of this form of legitimation and to generate some partial solutions for the problems of its economic and social system. Neither disarmament nor military expansion are useful approaches to *both* of these problems. Disarmament would inevitably threaten, along with the new bases of legitimating authoritarian rule, the militarized cohesion of the imperial system; actual expansion would be a danger to its economic, social and political foundations. Western European disarmament, however, along with a general extension of economic relations between advanced capitalist European societies and the Soviet Union together offer an excellent alternative to the economically inferior power that will then be militarily superior on the continent. It can, of course, choose to moderate its own military expenditures, in part. More important, however, it can use the benefits of Western European investments, technical transfers, etc., for a new version of the now bankrupt authoritarian-technocratic reform that might be able to once again slowly increase living standards internally. It will once again be able to indefinitely put off structural reforms that may endanger the system's identity. Moreover, this means that the Soviet Union could make use of its military power without actually using it (though some real uses may not be excluded, given their demonstration effect) to guarantee the continuation of the new relation with a still capitalist but militarily subordinate Western Europe, without troublesome threats, interventions, boycotts, human rights policies, and so on.[22] Indeed, since the Soviet Union has infinite ability to absorb without a trace of improvement external inputs into its economy while avoiding reform, military superiority might be an important guarantee to continue economic relations that will surely one day become unprofitable for the West. This would resolve the potential dilemma the Soviet Union opens itself to by entering into large-scale trade relations with economically advanced societies, itself acting as the supplier of raw materials. New economic ties with the West, absolutely essential for the Soviet Union if it seeks to remain the same, cannot be allowed to degrade the world's first or second military power to the status of a Third World country. But such a fate can be avoided in the context of existing trends only if Western Europe pays the price. But not alone: under this scenario, all Eastern European dreams of the restoration of civil society would be definitely swallowed in an imperialist nightmare.

Of course, the peace movement is in an important part motivated by the values of democracy and sovereignty. The desire to democratically control increasingly

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Soviet empire as Mexico and Canada (hardly American colonies, of course) are contiguous to the United States (see p. x). His implicit if probably unintentional generosity to the Soviet continental empire is apparently conditioned by the map of the world where the Soviet Union has certain advantages. No value could motivate such a procedure — not sovereignty or democracy or self-determination — other than the desire to survive at all costs.

22. Cf. Andrew Arato, "Empire vs. Civil Society," *Telos*, 50 (Winter 1981-82), pp. 19-48.

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independent and authoritarian military-industrial processes and to recapture some of Europe's lost sovereignty from the American superpower are highly defensible goals. But democratic control is above all a matter of public, participatory procedure. No particular outcome, such as unilateral disarmament, is intrinsically linked to it. Only goals such as the end of secrecy and arbitrary decision-making, and the public thematization of all issues on all possible levels are necessarily implied. More important, however, is the deeper, still implicit, concern of new social movements — one that links the peace movement with the ecology movement and other citizen initiatives, i.e., a reposing of the quintessential political question: "What is the good life and how shall we live?" If these movements succeed in expanding the social space in which such questions can be posed, and norms of interaction reinterpreted and reinvented, then the rallying cry of "society against the state" would indeed continue the democratizing process that has instituted and expanded civil society in the West. But if the movements and their critics remain satisfied with the lowest common denominator around which they can mobilize large masses, namely life and fear, if the naiveté regarding the realities of power remain, then the effect of this movement will not be quite so desirable.

Indeed, democracy might suffer. Unilateral disarmament, for example, if ever achieved, would not necessarily have democratic consequences. In Finland, there are some important issues that impinge on the country's relations with the Soviet Union. No one, under any circumstances, would adopt the label of "Finlandization" as a synonym for increasing democracy in the West (the East is a different matter), not to mention sovereignty.[23] For the fate of sovereignty under such a logic could be nothing short of disastrous. At present, the case for American sovereignty in Europe is extremely weak, though with one element of rational residue. Western Europe does not belong to the shrinking American empire. There can be no analogy between the Western and Eastern halves of Europe in this regard. But Americans do have the ability, as Eppler stated, to determine in the last instance when and if Europeans are to die. This element of sovereignty should be restored to every national community of Europe and, hopefully, one day to a united European federation. But unilateral disarmament, or even unilateral moves to disarmament, regain the lost dimension of sovereignty by again surrendering it, perhaps more of it. So, too, would the reconstitution of the sovereignty in a neutral, disarmed form, of the key divided national community of Europe: Germany. Not only will the Soviet Union be in the position to determine, with no danger to itself, when and if Europeans are to die, but tendentially also how to live. Here we cannot generalize from countries such as Sweden and Yugoslavia, which are in any case heavily armed in the conventional sense. Their independence is possible in the interstices of the existing European balance of power.

To understand the new danger regarding sovereignty one need not accept the scenario of the outlined possible Soviet developments. Bahro himself states that the SS-20s already are capable of deterring European military action in the Near East. What about Berlin or Yugoslavia, for example, if they were threatened? If the SS-20s are already capable of deterring some of the action of the European states in the context of some sort of rough military balance, then these states have much more to fear in the context of unilateral disarmament.[24] The peace movement tells us that we

23. Thompson, "Letter to America," *op.cit.*, p. 10.

24. We do not want to enter into the expert discussion concerning the existence or non-existence of this balance on the conventional or nuclear level in Europe and the world. It seems, however, that: (1) there is a rough world balance on the nuclear level; (2) there is also a nuclear balance in Europe, although the SS-20 represents a destabilizing weapon that is at the

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should concentrate not so much on the intentions of the superpowers or even our own belief that no nuclear war can be limited, as on the technologies of the new weapons systems that in themselves imply, for example, the logic of first strike. From this viewpoint, the SS-20s — which technologically speaking are a first-strike weapon in the European context, given its accuracy and relatively small explosive power — become the ideal weapons for the erosion of European sovereignty. Only a real campaign for its removal, with real tactical and strategic implications, combined with the existing campaigns against the installation of the cruise and Pershing missiles, can be made consistent with the self-espoused values of the peace movement. But this would entail a political engagement that has not yet materialized.

All major theorists of the English and German movements view the problem of Soviet armaments and militarism as one that must be dealt with by East European movements. This is the meaning of Bahro's multilateral unilateralism. While they all claim it can only have beneficial effects for movements in Eastern Europe, Alan Wolfe, also a partisan of this strategy, is more honest regarding its price: "Western Europe could not (if nuclearly disarmed) protest Soviet actions in Eastern Europe." According to Wolfe, if one looks at Europe through "military lenses," the choice "comes down to the unpalatable alternatives of seeing all of Europe become more like Poland, or seeing all of Europe become an increasingly vulnerable target for a limited nuclear war." [25] However, Wolfe wants to argue that there is another option for Europe: given its economic strength, presumably the Europeans could respond to Soviet military pressure by somehow using economic ties, thus preserving their independence. This is, of course, the exact opposite of our thesis concerning the new potential relations of military and economic power in the context of a possible unilateral disarmament. At any rate, Wolfe's uncertainty shows between the lines. He does not say how economic power can make up for the loss of sovereignty which he himself concedes when he argues that Western Europeans will have to keep silent (as they already did) when it comes to repression in Eastern Europe.

To be sure, support for East European peace movements or struggles for sovereignty and democracy would have been an essential part of the new internationalism which is so loudly proclaimed by the Western movements. But it is by now obvious that Polish Solidarity did not receive much solidarity from Western pacifists. Moreover, in Germany, many have explicitly rejected such support, even on the level of principles. The self-understanding of the peace movement in the West is, in part, to blame. While sovereignty and democracy are values for some of the social actors involved, mere *life* and its correlate, fear and desire for security, are far more widespread. Certainly, the churches' predominant role in the movement is in part responsible for this orientation. But the latter view ironically takes precisely the standpoint it supposedly rejects: the military world view. On the one hand, one does not want to admit the character of the Soviet empire, thus one must close one's eyes to events that demonstrate this. On the other hand, one knows well enough this character, or at least suspects it, and does not want to do anything that might be provocative. [26] After all,

moment unique; (3) the Soviet Union has conventional superiority in Europe in spite of the advantages the West possesses in some forms of defensive (i.e., anti-tank) weaponry. No conventional defense of Europe is possible without relatively equal offensive capabilities; no war, not even a purely defensive one, could take place on *pure* defensive strategies.

25. Wolfe, *op.cit.*, p. 244.

26. To be sure, there was also a desire not to help Reagan's armament program in any way. But this did not apply to the first days of the crisis, when the American government said and did nothing. It would be more honest to say that the movements did not want to weaken the case for unilateral disarmament in any way.

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the Poles were on the whole being deprived only of sovereignty and democracy, but not of life. But what was truly "social" and "political" about their movement was precisely the goal of dispelling fear as the motive to action, of replacing an intolerable form of life with the good life, and of rejecting the corollary of political life based on fear and the desire for security that Hobbes pointed to so long ago: brutality, nastiness, and authoritarianism. What the peace movement should have realized after December 13 was that what happened in Poland (and even more, their own response to it) was a greater blow to them, and not only on the immediate level but regarding their collective identity, than anything Reagan is about to come up with.

Given our fundamentally different theoretical assessment of the two superpowers, but assuming the West European peace movements' best values, sovereignty and democracy, as values for the Eastern as well as the Western part of Europe, we propose a different strategic orientation. While the peace movement has often portrayed American society as monolithic, its more sensitive spokesmen, such as Thompson, have always recognized the possibility of an appeal to the American public and of the emergence of a serious peace movement in the States. Today not only the population, but the press and the politicians are seriously divided on questions of armaments and disarmament. Even the government's rhetoric is beginning to reflect the existence of a significant peace opinion. This opinion is now organized around the notion of a bilateral freeze to be achieved in negotiations, immensely superior as a starting point to any unilateral strategy, because of its symmetry concerning the superpowers and the link it implies between movement and reform. What Hirsch claims for West Germany, namely, the possibility of a reformist alternative that would both require the intervention of social movements and provide new opportunities for them, could therefore become more a possibility here than there. The realization of such a possibility requires a challenge to the military-industrial complex by forces within and outside the ruling apparatus. The collective identity, goals and even the adversary (the military-industrial complex? capitalism? modernity? U.S. and Soviet political apparatuses?) of the American peace movement is, as yet, unclear. But it *is* clear that if this movement is to be more than a single issue protest action, it must avoid rejecting out of hand political moves initiated from above by reformers, as attempts at cooptation or corruption of the movement. Not only democracy but also plurality of forms of struggle and organization must be a guiding value of the movement in question. To their credit, many American theorists of the fledgling peace movement recognize this.[27] The very fact that *independently* of each other, political actors and the social movement have initiated proposals, strategies and analyses for restricting the arms race and dismantling the irresponsible iron-triangle of the defense complex signals great developmental potential for the extension of the principles of civil society in the West.

However, it is crucial at this stage to attain clarity regarding the most desirable potential identity of the movement as well as the identity of the system which they are in the first instance addressing. The flaw with the exterminism thesis is not only the underlying theme of convergence, but more specifically that it implies that the U.S. is nothing more than an exterminist mode of production or system. Were this so, then only a revolution — entirely illusory today and perhaps undesirable — and not a social movement allied to reform strategies of political actors, could bring about meaningful change. Yet, it is clear that appeals to the American public imply the presence of a public space and institutions that are more than, other than, capitalism plus

27. We are thinking here of the positions of Gordon Adams and Paul Joseph, for example.

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exterminist apparatuses. And the movements in question must understand that they are not acting against all institutions of liberal-democratic mass society, but rather that they are using some of the best institutional possibilities of their society against some of its worst. It is because of this that projects of reform from above emerge with hopes of success and can link up with social movements that radicalize the issues and control even the reformers.

The developmental alternatives of Soviet society are less obvious. Very schematically, we see three: (1) Militarism and expansion. This is the one possibility explored by Castoriadis. (2) Militarism and neo-imperial relation to Western Europe. This is the one discussed, linking it to the strategy of unilateral disarmament and continuation of unconditional detente; (3) social reform and at least partial demilitarization allowing greater pluralism of possibilities in the periphery of the empire. This last one is the possibility toward which we should aim our strategies but which, unfortunately, is the least likely given the identity of the imperial center of the authoritarian socialist system of states. It is certainly not one toward which the Soviet system is inevitably evolving; it needs the intervention of movements from below. Thus, the question is how to proceed? Western militarism reinforces the first tendency; the present strategy of the Western European peace movement, the second. The third alternative is only possible if the Soviet Union learns that it can count on Western economic help and support *only* if it can economically reform itself and if it is willing to tolerate a plurality of developmental possibilities, including social and political reform in Eastern Europe, and if it matches all Western disarmament moves. Linkage here would refer to economic concessions in return for political ones, both within a general framework of multilateral moves toward disarmament. Only such a quid pro quo as against any unilateralist strategy, enforced by the peace movements' willingness to push for sanctions in case of serious violations, can begin to loosen the rigid blocs associated with the name of Yalta in a progressive direction. In this context, it is precisely the omission of the peace movement as to Poland that must be made up for in the development of its future strategy.

While it is clear that Eastern European social movements will know what to do with free spaces created by such an arrangement, it is equally clear from the Polish experience that they cannot contribute much to the realization of a post-Yalta framework. The Western European and American peace movement is the only agency that already has and will have the requisite normative foundations, interests, and hopefully power to contribute to such an outcome. To be able to do so, the movements will have to everywhere drop the unilateral strategy and rhetoric as well as any anti-institutional, anti-reformist bias. The great work of demilitarization itself cannot be accomplished, as Magri and Kaldor realize, without the combination of extra- and intra-parliamentary strategies. To drive the reformists (the "moderate exterminists," according to Bahro!)[28] out of power, or to prevent them from coming to or exercising power (danger in the U.S.) if they do not accept a unilateral perspective would be suicidal for the peace movement. Although no European government or economic interest has today a desirable strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, it is not at all obvious that many could not support this strategy, which, to be sure, is different from either detente or trade at any price. To be sure, neither capital nor governments are interested in Eastern European democratic movements. Nor are they willing to sacrifice some short-run advantages that might be at stake. On the other hand, both detente and the new economic relations would be on firmer foundations on the basis of

28. Cf. his "The SPD and the Peace Movement," *op.cit.*, but also the article, written with Vester, in this issue of *Telos*.

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a "deal" that has the implications of the gradual dismantling of the Soviet empire. The peace movement must therefore do all it can to support Eastern European efforts at democratization and liberalization. European (and American) states must be, accordingly, pressured to undertake entirely new kinds of negotiations with the Soviet Union, establishing new types of military equilibria and economic and political relations. We cannot presume that the changes we want can be achieved through direct action alone (Bahro). There can be no direct action in the field of disarmament vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. If one really wants significant and symmetrical demilitarization in both European blocs, negotiations among the powers cannot be bypassed. But without the pressure of the really existing peace movement and its independent forms of activity, such negotiations can only harden the two militaristic blocs and reinforce their exterminist logic.

ON BERMAN AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

by Paul Breines

These are comments on Russell Berman's "Opposition to Rearmament and West German Culture." Seyla Benhabib offers a different perspective on the West German peace movement, responding along the way to a number of Russell's judgments, and Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato present yet another view. This might give the impression that there are some differences among *Telos* editors. Good: there are. I want here to take up only some methodological matters raised by Russell's remarks, matters of approaching (or not approaching) contemporary social movements, particularly in the West. In the *Telos* scene his positions are symptomatic of some significant problems.

More or less in the vein of Paul Piccone's recent commentaries on social movements in the United States during the past several decades, Russell chooses not to look at the West German peace movement in its contradictory richness, its lurches forward and back, its specific embodiment of the interplay between the intentions of the participants and the larger, structuring contexts in which those intentions are presented. He proceeds instead from a big (negative) premise from which he deduces the movement's main features. The West German peace movement, he argues, is an unwitting yet compliant dancer in a set choreographed by more potent forces, specifically, competition between West German and U.S. capital, the former's quest for autonomy, which in turn points toward *Ostpolitik*, which in further turn requires a new nationalist ideology. This the peace movement is helping to constitute. Its "central motor," Russell writes, "is less survival and arms limitations than the vision of national autonomy;" "the opposition to rearmament has less to do with nuclear arms than with readjustment of German-American ties;" "the problem of German or West European autonomy vis-à-vis the United States, which underlies the concerns of both opponents and proponents of the tactical nuclear arms, is the fundamental issue."

This is a disconcerting way to set out, especially in light of one of Russell's own criticisms of what he calls the West German peace movement's "discourse of authenticity." Part of that discourse, he says, is the tendency to assert the "priority of homogeneity over heterogeneity," the failure, in other words, to develop a differentiated political analysis of its own situation. But Russell's whole way of looking

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at the West German peace movement tends itself to be an exercise in homogenization, a deduction and then a reduction of the movement to its alleged historical essence.

One case in point in Russell's discussion of Verena Stefan's novel, *Shedding*, which he sees as exemplifying the impact of the "new subjectivity" on the West German women's movement. The book, he says, shows the "expected" privileging of emotion over reason, the general devaluation of theoretical discourse, and a presocial femininity. From whom are such impulses "expected"? From women, or feminists, or Germans, or German feminists? Or does expected here mean prejudged? At all events, Russell is not wrong about some of the main values embodied in Stefan's novel. The problem is that he reduces the novel to those values by abstracting them from the pain and artistic power with which Stefan portrays relations between men and women, and women and women in the Left and alternative scenes. And in this sense he partially vindicates the heroine's emergent hostility to a type of theoretical discourse. Yes, the novel ends with a move to the country, but this does not yield the resolution or comfort Russell implies. And as he himself notes in a funny formulation, "even" feminist critics have complained of Stefan's "vegetative naturalness." Why "even"? Is it so surprising that West German feminists take issue with one of the major literary expressions of their own movement? It *is* surprising if you assume a univocal movement, one whose actual existence can be only an expression of some supposedly deep essence. And Russell seems to assume this when he concludes his comments on Stefan by noting that "in the debate on *Shedding*, immediacy, nature and female identity were counterposed to conceptuality, urbanity and political conflict." Where is the debate part? There is only one part here. Where, in fact, is the sense of conceptuality, urbanity and political conflict Russell rhetorically upholds?

He is also unhappy with the apparent reduction of politics to religion by some of the existential Protestant theologians, Ranke-Heinemann and Sölle. He sees their positions, too, as stemming from and feeding into the new nationalist homogeneity, and lacking any understanding of class and politics. There may well be something to this, but I think Russell forces matters; the passages he cites do not confirm the case he wants to make. But even if they did, would Russell make the same case regarding the role of churches and religious imagery in the early Civil Rights movement in this country or, more to the present point, in Poland?

In his criticism of the religious activists of the West German peace movement, Russell offers a revealing aside. Among the activist Protestants, the "privileging of concrete action over abstract language and the disdain for the alleged superficiality of reason are borrowed from the discourse of authenticity (and from the activism of the 1960s which Adorno criticized for its hostility to theory)." So much for a decade of movements which constituted, among other things, the birth canal of this journal. From the start *Telos* has had a tension-ridden relation to social movements, domestic and foreign, and this has been one of the journal's strong points. It has never shied away from skepticism, critique and loyalty to theoretical reflection. I think, though, that the spirit and outlook of Russell's comments, along with a number of other recent articles in these pages, suggest a shift in *Telos'* position. An underlying solidarity with opposition movements seems to be snapping and giving way to a kind of homogeneous hostility to activism in the West, to a politically disenchanted conceptuality. There are grounds for this position. But if you take seriously Russell's approach or Paul Piccone's artificial negativity arguments, it is tempting to ask: how do *they* figure in the grand design of domination? Which of the globally competing segments of capital do *they* unwittingly serve? It is a temptation worth avoiding as long as it is avoided by us all.

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Special Section on the Polish Crisis:

WE ARE ALL HOSTAGES*

by Adam Michnik

This war was not declared. During one Saturday night in December, officials of the security system pounded at our homes, broke down the doors with crowbars, beat us, sprayed us with tear gas, handcuffed us and threw us in prisons. We were the first prisoners in the war of the Communist establishment against its own population. This night action was General Jaruzelski's first successful battle. This is how the decision of the 9th Congress of the Polish United Workers Party against holding concurrent offices was carried out. Jaruzelski, already defense minister, premier and first Party secretary, now also became the head of the Military Council for National Salvation, abbreviated WRONA. In Polish, *wrona* also means crow. From now on, the Polish people will associate this name with the ugly bird, a caricature of the eagle, which appears on the Polish national coat of arms.

Future historians will appreciate the precision of the putsch, the perfect timing, and its able execution. They will describe the resolution with which all enemy resistance was broken, while poets will celebrate the grand military triumphs of that army won in Danzig's streets, in Warsaw's factories, in the steel mills, mines and shipyards. General Jaruzelski also heightened the glory of Polish arms by his clever maneuver to capture the Warsaw radio and television building as well as the telephone system. Ever since King Sobiecki's 1683 battle of Vienna, not a single one of our leaders could boast of such successes. Now composers will write symphonies, painters will immortalize successful attacks, and directors will turn out patriotic films, all to honor that great December night. The state council will undoubtedly order the coinage of a new medal: for participation in the campaign of December 1981....

But let us stop this joking. Although government propaganda does use this language, let us, instead, still dumbstruck and shocked, inquire into the meaning of what has happened in Poland. On the night of December 12-13, the Communist power elite began the desperate defense of its position as the ruling class, of its power and of its related privileges. The status of the power elite — and it is unnecessary to substantiate this in detail — was indeed in danger, not only in Poland but in the entire Communist bloc.

The December putsch did not seek the realization of a communist utopia. Rather, it was a classical counter-revolution directed against workers for the defense of the conservative interests of the *ancien régime*. Contrary to official propaganda, this was not a response to an attempt to assume political power. Solidarity had neither a shadow cabinet nor a program for a *coup d'état*.

The December chaos begins with the basically insoluble conflict between a social movement involving millions of people organized as Solidarity and the totalitarian structure of a Communist state. The very existence of an independent and self-administered institution supported by the people was unacceptable. What was involved, then, was not power as such, but absolute power, i.e., the limits of party officialdom (*Nomenklatura*), the style of the exercise of power. In other words, it concerned the rule of law, the essence of the compromise concluded between rulers and ruled, pluralism in social life and the institution of self-administration in the factories and on a territorial level.

*This article was smuggled out of prison in Poland and has appeared in *Der Spiegel*, March 8, 1982. Translated by David Berger.

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The realization of the reform program comprising all this jeopardized the fundamental principle of Communist rule over state and society. It was clear that the system would not willingly give up one iota of its power and that conflicts were therefore unavoidable. We thought, however, that things would run a different course. We did not believe that the power structure would seek to resolve social conflicts with military force by substituting the argument of force for the force of argument.

This is not the first crisis in the history of Communist states. Nevertheless, in comparing these events occurring at 12-year intervals, in 1956, in the Prague Spring and now the 15-month period in Poland, one should note specific characteristics and significant differences in each crisis, despite some common traits. What was common to all these crises was the desire to extend national and civil rights. The differences lay in the dynamics of the social changes.

In 1956, the reform impulse came from Moscow, from the meeting hall of the party congress of the CPSU where party bureaucrats dispelled the lingering shadow of Stalin and shoved aside the axe the security apparatus held over their heads. That was the source of the movements within the party which shook Poland and Hungary in 1956. In Poland the authority of Gomulka, just released from prison, was sufficient guaranty for both the Kremlin as well as Polish society. To the Kremlin, Gomulka was an inveterate Communist with whom one could nevertheless deal; for Poland, he was a spokesman for its national and democratic desires.

In Hungary the opposition of the Stalinist wing in the power structure led to a situation in which revolt in the streets began to dictate the tempo of changes. The power structure collapsed like a deck of cards. Soviet intervention was the result. In Czechoslovakia in 1968 it was a group in the apparatus within the party who realized that, without deep-rooted reforms, the economic inefficiency of the Communist system and its propensity to wastefulness and obsolescence would worsen. The essence of the conflict in Czechoslovakia lay in the desire of the liberal and victorious Dubcek faction, supported by the entire society, for democratic reforms planned from above, together with loosening of dependence on the Soviet center. "Socialism with a human face" in Czechoslovakia had many aspects: from the apparatchiks' moderate reformism all the way to a pluralistic vision of society in the writings of non-conformist journalists. But the decisive factor was the Czech leaders' resistance to Soviet dictates and their desire to seek legitimation of their power in their own society rather than only in the Kremlin bureaucracy.

It was different in Poland. It is difficult to speak here of "socialism with a human face." It was rather "communism with worn-out teeth"; a commumism that could no longer bite or defend itself against attack by an organized society. Such social pressures had nothing to do with the application of force. Contrary to hysterical declaration concerning "open counter-revolution" or "fascist terror in the factories," no one was killed during the Polish revolution, not a drop of blood shed. Many observers have asked: how can this be explained?

The development of the Polish reform movement — or of the self-limiting Polish revolution, if you will — began outside the institutions of official public life. For many years now, groups of democratic opposition have existed and operated in Poland, supported by public opinion and protected by the effective umbrella of the Roman Catholic church. Under the relative tolerance of the Gierek regime — a tolerance related to ties with the West and political weakness rather than a political liberalism — attempts were made toward self-help and social self-defense. An independent

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intellectual life was organized and uncensored scenarios of a struggle for freedom were outlined.

The core of the program of these oppositional circles — the most popular of which was the Committee for the Defense of Workers (KOR), formed after the June 1976 strikes — lay in the desire to change society and to rebuild social ties outside official structures. The main qustion was not: "how can one reform the system of power?" but "how can one defend oneself against that system?" This approach affected the course of the August strike, the demands, the program, the strategy and the tactics of Solidarity.

The vehement struggle to reform the totalitarian structure lasted 15 months. Its acme was as atypical as its course. The official declaration of war on society emerged from the nature of preceding conflicts. War, said Clausewitz, is the continuation of policies pursued in peacetime by other means. This time it was a war against organized society undertaken by a state that is the instrument of Warsaw Pact political forces. Analyses of the errors committed by Solidarity will be the subject of Polish discussions for a long time. A people and a woman, to cite Marx's apt phrase, will never be forgiven the moment of forgetfulness when they have allowed a blackguard to dominate them.

The union, which was actually a front of national solidarity, bore all of the good and bad features of the society that gave it birth: a society which for 37 long years had been far removed from any democratic institutions, outside of political culture; a society which had been lied to, brainwashed and humiliated; a society which is obstinate and cautious at the same time, where honor, freedom and solidarity are considered the highest values and where compromise is too frequently equated with capitulation and treason.

Solidarity was a democratic movement of workers functioning in an anti-democratic environment, within the totalitarian structures of a system whose sole, generally understood legitimation lay in the decisions of the Yalta Conference. Poles do not have to be reminded of these decisions, as Mr. Nannen did recently; he is apparently of the opinion that only people living west of the Elba River are entitled to human rights while the whip and the barbed wire are reserved for the barbarians in the East, to ensure law and order in public life. Poles have not forgotten Yalta. The problem, however, was to translate the realities of Yalta into a contemporary language. This was not easy.

The powerful, spontaneous movement, without any models, organized itself from one day to the next in the midst of constant conflicts with the power apparatus. It had no unequivocal, precise goals and no clear idea about coexistence with the Communist regime. It allowed itself to be easily provoked into arguments about unimportant matters — and there were many artificial conflicts, great disorders, inefficiency, ignorance of the opponent and his ways.

Solidarity could strike, but it could not wait. It knew how to attack but not how to retreat. It had basic ideas, but no program for systematic action. It was a colossus with steel feet but clay hands. It was powerful in factories, with working people, but helpless at the bargaining table. It confronted opponents who were unable to tell the truth, to keep the economy going or even to maintain their own obligations. But they were able to do one thing: break up the social solidarity. They had learned that art well during the 37 years they had ruled.

That opponent, the power elite, was morally and financially bankrupt. Because of its political weakness, it was unable to carry out any policy. This political weakness was

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understood by Solidarity as a general weakness. What was not understood was that a power apparatus untouched by democratic corrosion can be a useful instrument in the hands of a dictatorial force — especially in the hands of a dictatorship which felt that the place was getting too hot under its feet.

The Communist system in Poland was a colossus with clay feet but steel hands. When Solidarity officials demanded democratic elections to Parliament and to the people's councils, they seemed to forget that these slogans were alarm signals to the rulers and anounced their future demise. To reiterate: Solidarity never sought to expel the Communists from government and to replace the state with a trade union apparatus. And yet, the ruling apparatus read this into Solidarity's statements.

They noticed pressure from below to dissolve party committees in the factories; they were afraid of the specter of elections to the people's councils; they had nightmares about a national referendum concerning self-administration; and they knew that a drastic price increase was due. Their response was the December *coup d'état*: the last response at their disposal. Solidarity did not expect any military putsch, and was taken by surprise. The workers' groups were not responsible for this. It was the responsibility of all those who (like the author), on the basis of their intellectual activity, were called upon to formulate the union's political vision. Parenthetically speaking, theoretical reflection on the theme of changes in the system limped along after the events. Save for some current slogans, there was hardly any political reflection. Practice finally overtook theory, and this was not the first time such a thing has happened in Polish history.

The basic struggle in Solidarity — though never well defined — concerned the tempo of the changes and their extent. At first, those advocating compromise were in the majority but, in time, it became apparent that the power structure saw every inclination toward compromise as a weakness. All concessions had to be backed by strikes or strike threats. Constant strikes, cleverly provoked by authorities, wore down society, which was already exhausted from daily difficulties. The lack of positive results in the form of noticeable improvements in the quality of life led to a polarization and a questioning of the effectiveness of this tactic. Some said: "No more strikes, it doesn't help a thing"; others said: "No more unimportant strikes, what we need is a general strike to force the government to essential concessions." It is difficult to determine which of these two positions was held by the majority, but the proponents of the latter surely were louder. It was the latter too, most of them young workers in large factories, who demanded radical action from Solidarity's leadership. And it became increasingly difficult to prevent that — although Walesa and Kuron tried.

Authorities were looked upon with growing contempt. They were not taken seriously. Almost no one believed that it would be possible to use Polish soldiers to attack Polish workers. Almost no one believed in the possibility of a military putsch. The reason for this was naiveté and wishful thinking, which have a long-standing tradition in Polish history. Thus, the attempt to terrorize Polish society with the aid of the Polish army was hardly conceivable. The preceding months had fixed in the social consciousness an image of the course of conflict between state and society in which there was no room for outright victory. Plans for gallows and lists of proscribed people existed only in the pathological minds of the party notables.

The union knew only one response to an attack by the government: factory occupations. The army's storming of the factories made that tactic ineffective. But awareness of the uselessness of peaceful forms of resistance can have catastrophic results. The bloodshed by the workers in the "Wujek" mine may teach us a constructive

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lesson as to the language one must employ to obtain anything from the government.

What did the Communists think about Solidarity? The August crisis was no surprise to them, although they were shocked by the course of the strike, the maturity of the demands and the discipline and solidarity of the working masses. For the Gierek regime that had come to power in the wake of the bloody rebellion of shipyard workers in December 1970, it was a dogma to avoid armed confrontation with the working class. The recognition of an independent union in 1980 was an act of desperation accompanied by the belief that it would be possible to limit it to the Baltic region, eventually to manipulate and destroy it from within. When the August strikes forced the concession of a consolidated union on a national basis, authorities could only hope to break it down by means of provocation and to split it from within. Solidarity represented a mortal threat: it liquidated the basic tenet of Communist ideology, which was that the Communist Party represented the working class.

The plan to destroy the union by political means failed. Nevertheless, constant conflicts, such as the question of political prisoners, free Saturdays, the registration of a farmer's union, as well as personnel conflicts inspired from the outside, weakened the union. However, this did not improve the status of the power structure. Factionalized and embittered in the battle for power, it now confronted a major problem: the party.

Conceived as the organized community of its members, the party was not even around during the August strike. This instrument, which had earlier been useful to break up social solidarity, this time had failed. In its attempt to revive the party, the power structure opened the proverbial Pandora's box.

On the one hand, they searched for scapegoats and, in so doing, they publicized ever more shocking proofs of the Gierek regime's corruption. On the other hand, rank-and-file party members began to turn in their cards and, what was even worse, organized into "structures from below," demanding a democratic reform of the party, and abolition of the Stalinist model resting on the omnipotence of the power structure.

In the long run, this was the basic difference between the latest events in Poland and the crises of 1956 and 1968. Then Communist leaders (Nagy, Gomulka, Dubcek) were able to win over the confidence of society. Those seeking party reforms from above had broad-based support. In Poland, the entire party dragged behind the changes. It was not the party that stimulated change in society but a social movement outside of it that precipitated changes in the party. The party's reform program — compared to the aims of Solidarity — was a crass anachronism.

Party reformers in Poland did not constitute a unified camp. Among them were such distinct personalities as Andrzej Werblan, one of the ideological dictators of the Gomulka and Gierek era; the well-known journalist Stefan Bratkowski, one of the organizers of a group calling itself Experience and the Future and president of the journalists' association; Wojciech Lamentowicz, a 36-year-old associate at the party school; and Zbigniew Iwanow, party secretary and leader of the August strike in a Torun factory.

In spite of their differences, they were all victims of a paradox typical of Communist reformers everywhere: they demanded reform of a totalitarian party in the name of human freedom and social justice, against a bureaucratic apparatus that suppressed freedom of thought and creativity and preferred mediocrity and corruption. For this reason, they could effectively attack the power structure only if they organized an overall movement and not merely a factional power struggle. As a faction, they automatically loosened their ties with the party. Moreover, in their daily political struggles, they were forced to employ the same practices that they sharply criticized in

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their opponents. The "structures from below" of single party cells were an attempt to square the circle. But they were too weak to win and altogether unacceptable to the apparatus. They could not withstand the massive counter-attack of the party's conservative structures.

Recent Polish party reformers proved to be a mere caricature of their spiritual forebears and older brothers from the days of the Polish October and the Prague Spring. Their reformism appeared less abstract and more rooted in daily life. They did not engage in heated debate over the philosophy of the young Marx, but discussed economic life. They didn't get very far, however. They found no support whatsoever in the intellectual world. It was a follower and at the same time the last stage of the ideological collapse of real communism. Society already used normal speech while the ideas of the party reforms continued to be couched in the vise of Marxist-Leninist "newspeak." For party reformers, the central question was: "How can the party be democratized?" — which was to be the key to the democratization of society. For society, on the other hand, the central question was: "How can the broadest possible area of public life be wrested from party officialdom?"

The party apparatus accused Solidarity of being a political party rather than a trade union. Solidarity suggested to the party that they fight for credibility in society instead of persevering in the position of a *trade union of the members of the power structure.* This was the most precise definition of the social character of the ruling Communist Party. And this was decisive.

The democratic course of the 9th Party Congress changed little: definitely compromised people were democratically elected to the highest posts. Among them was Albin Siwak, who, in due course, should have become a Polish Stakhanov — a model worker — with the credentials of a functionary of the security force in his pocket. With Siwaks in the Politburo, the party could not count on social credibility. The new leadership and the ratified program of the party congress were stillborn. The apparatus could only hope for a split within Solidarity and the mediating role of the church.

The idea was to form a Front for National Understanding, whose pillars were to be the power structure, the church, and Solidarity, symbolized in the meeting of Jaruzelski, Glemp and Walesa. This was the last attempt to outmaneuver the trade union "without any bloodshed." Undoubtedly, the greatest moral authority in Poland — strengthened by the Polish pope, the church was inclined toward compromise. It sought to build bridges for an agreement, lessen tensions and exert a moderating influence on the power structure and Solidarity.

But it was to have been a compromise and not a union renunciation of its principles and goals. And it was indeed such renunciation that was proposed by the power structure in September 1981 with a common slate for municipal elections: the church could not and would not support such a solution. That was the turning point. It became clear to the trade unions that a conflict was unavoidable and the power structure realized that the possibility for compromise had been exhausted.

Aided by the complete absence of any scruples by the perpetrators, the night-action in December came off perfectly. The trade union was "pacified" with tanks and bayonets, and the workers' resistance in factories was broken. This triumph of the apparatus, however, may have unexpected consequences and may turn out to have been politically short-sighted. With bayonets one may spread anxiety, terror, death and strike victorious blows against an unarmed people. But, as Stefan Bratkowski used to quote Talleyrand, one can hardly sit on top of a bayonet. Similarly, the point of a

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bayonet cannot eradicate 15 months of freedom from a people's memory.

We have already earlier sought to answer the question as to how state power succeeded in such a short time in breaking resistance. Besides the shock of surprise and the conviction that the bloodshed was unacceptable to all Poles, there was another factor that decided the course of events: the shadow of Russia. There have been frequent discussions concerning the problem of Soviet intervention. Press reports daily confirm Moscow's unequivocal intentions. We all knew that the Kremlin did not love Solidarity.

The debates centered about evaluating the directions of Soviet policy embroiled in the Afghanistan conflict, in internal difficulties and in a complex international game. None of this was clear. Some of us quietly hoped that it was possible to create a model of Polish-Soviet relations in which there would be room for Poland as an independent partner. We were also of the opinion that Soviet leaders would intervene militarily only in extreme cases such as civil war or an attempted coup. We thought that Polish authorities recklessly used the Soviet bogey to achieve the effect of an intervention without such an intervention.

The course of events shows that these considerations were rational: the Soviet Union did everything possible to disguise its participation in the December coup. The scenario then being played out was an optimal one for the Russians: "Poles have undertaken to solve their own problems." The decree of a state of war must have reminded the people of Targowica, the sombre symbol of national shame. (In the Confederation of Targowica in 1792, Polish magnates decided to band together to fight constitutional reforms, and called on Russian troops for help, which led to the second Polish partition). The specter of Russian intervention in case of Jaruzelski's defeat decided the Poles attitude. I say this, convinced that it indicates rational thought and healthy common sense in this romantic people — a further argument that the Poles not only can fight but also think.

No one in Poland counted on aid from the West, so that the strong reaction of Western public opinion and governments was a rather pleasant surprise. Such response is encouraging and may in time contribute to restraining the repressive ways. The indignation of universal public opinion has an important moral dimension because it emphasizes that democratic values are indivisible and that these values have their defenders all over the world and do not cease being values when they are trampled upon by soldiers' boots. For those who are prisoners and persecuted, this is an injection of hope — a true light in the dark tunnel that is now Polish daily life under martial law.

Government actions have political dimensions: they are part of a broader international strategy in which the Polish question is only one episode. There should be no illusion that things are otherwise. But it is important to consider in greater detail *one* element in that strategy: the demand for economic sanctions. I do not know what President Reagan's motives were. I doubt the contention of official propaganda in Poland — that the sanctions were an expression of his anger that Solidarity did not succeed in restoring capitalism in Poland. If that were the case, then Reagan must be an imbecile.

I believe that the sanctions are an expected Western response to the military coup and that the responsibility for its consequences falls on the coup organizers. Jaruzelski and the military council, and not Reagan or the Pentagon, are guilty of the catastrophic effects of sanctions on Polish families. The economy of Communist states cannot manage without Western technology and raw materials. Liberal credits, on the

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other hand, do not accelerate reform, as the case of Gierek indicates. It is equally impossible to reform the national economy with the aid of bayonets, denunciations and the police. Credits have therefore been dropped. No wonder that is less than an encouraging perspective to the West. Can one fault Western politicians when they wish as a partner a Polish government with a minimum of credibility with its own population? That further credits depend on the restoration of civil rights in Poland?

Official propaganda seeks to present sanctions as an attack against the existence of Poland; it maintains that sanctions prevent democratic reforms and offend Polish sovereignty. I do not advocate sanctions, but it is sheer cowardice on the part of those responsible to deny such responsibility. It was not Reagan who ruined the Polish economy, but those who subordinated the spiritual and material fate of the Polish people to their own narrow selfish interests. What else must happen for these people to realize that the liquidation of independent institutions by a military-police dictatorship will isolate them from their own people and the entire civilized world?

What will be the upshot of all this? Every dinner conversation in Poland turns about a response to that question, and conversations continue in spite of evening curfews. In the night of Dec. 12-13, the ruling Communists returned to their original status of 1945: the position of a relatively small sect whose power rests on bayonets. At that time, it was a sect of pro-Soviet Jacobins; today it is a sect of pro-Soviet mandarins. At that time they defended their program; today they defend their privileges.

Historical experience suggests two different models for relieving such crises. The first is associated with Kadar, the other with Husak. In 1956, Janos Kador began his exercise of power in Hungary as a Soviet governor relying on Soviet tanks. The first years of his rule were characterized by a cruel policy of repression followed by a slow "loosening of the screws" from above. In Czechoslovakia, Gustav Husak stated at the outset that it was his intention to continue the Prague Spring. After the Soviet intervention, all of the previously established institutions of public life continued to function, but slowly underwent a process of liquidation. People were forced to a degrading self-criticism, to denounce their fellow workers. "Extremist" elements were removed and independent institutions liquidated under the pretext that at least the remnants of the reforms had to be saved. And so the Prague Spring was strangled with the hands of its own creators.

The Kadar model consists of a socially destructive repressive action turned toward a policy of paternalistic liberalism. The Husak model, on the contrary, leads from a fictitious continuation of democratic structures to a total sterilization of public life. To Polish Communists, Kadar is a positive hero whose ways they would like to emulate. Court decisions are accompanied by promises of renewal and reform. The scenario is easy to interpret: Solidarity must be destroyed, totalitarian institutions must function once more, and hope for a dignified life must be extirpated from the heart of the people.

Solidarity is to be destroyed by officials who, broken and humiliated, have signed declarations of loyalty. The representatives of the military council sought to persuade Walesa to accept these plans, but they failed. Without Walesa, Bujak and Slowik, Solidarity could only be a dummy concealing an anti-worker policy. A broadly laid out repressive action, fenced off from the protests of Polish and international public opinion, comprises the "pacification" of factories, the arrest of union officials and propaganda slander campaigns. At the same time, claims are continually being made that everything was in excellent condition, that the situation in Poland was growing increasingly normal.

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From the church pulpits, however, the only places where language has not been contaminated, we can hear words of truth about the state of the nation. They talk about repression and relief work for the victims. In other places we hear that there is resistance; that illegal newspapers have appeared and independent institutions are being rebuilt. No, this movement cannot be subdued. Here, in my new "home," under surveillance of armed, uniformed men and surrounded by barbed wire, only bits of news from Poland and the world get through. On the other hand, there is more time for thinking.

These 15 months taught us a lesson of freedom. One can wash off Solidarity from the walls and houses, but not from the people's memory. How often has the trail-blazing character of the Polish experience been emphasized — the Polish struggle without bloodshed and without physical force, consisting in the restoration of social ties outside official structures! That model will continue to function under changed conditions; it can be useful not only for Poland, but also for other societies in this geopolitical zone.

Of course, the mechanism of the Polish *coup d'état* may also become guidelines. Up to now, a military elite has never held power in a Communist system. Ordinarily, a party apparatus holds power, and even in times of intensified terror, it is the state security service that takes over. The military are usually considered only an instrument, and when they sought power, they were eliminated. In that respect, the fate of Marshals Tukachevsky and Zukhov seems to be fairly convincing.

The polish coup can thus set a prcedent. It is interesting to speculate whether Jaruzelski, when he undertook to smash Solidarity, has *notens volens* also destroyed the power of the party apparatus. Until now, the party apparatus ruled while the military functioned as its armed tool. Now, the military apparatus is at the helm while the party is a mere front. A military coup is one of the techniques of social transformation. It is a form that does not necessarily determine content. A military coup brought about dictatorship in Chile, while in Portugal it undertook a road to democracy. As the only fairly sovereign communist structure outside of the party, the military may play various roles. For exmaple, an army involved in an unpopular war against the brave Afghan people — in the 19th century Marx called them the "Poles of Asia" — may play a role quite different than in Poland. In this connection, the Polish example may serve as a useful paradox.

Here, behind bars, every gesture of human solidarity is like a breath of fresh air. For this my colleagues and I are deeply grateful. Every good piece of news helps. But there are also difficult moments. When, for example, a German Social Democrat gives the assurance that the state of internees is satisfactory by quoting the vice president of the People's Republic of Poland, I must with bitterness think of the fate of German Social Democrats 45 years ago and of the reassurances of various foreign statesmen that everything was "okay" in Germany and that the opponents of peace and order were being humanely treated. An acting vice president, appearing as an expert in the matter of his interned opponents, is a grotesque and miserable figure. His German interlocutor must be either cynical or naive.

A few words about internees: We are prisoners without an arrest warrant. Anyone may walk out freely if he is ready to sign a loyalty oath and to act the role of a police informer. A broken man, in the opinion of our guards, is no longer capable of resistance. All of us — workers, peasants, and intellectuals — are hostages. Our fate must be a warning to other colleagues, our status a calling card to the outside world, we oureselves a medium of exchange. Much worse is the plight of those convicted of

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participating in strikes.

As everyone else, we also have come to a new position on account of the "Polish-Jaruzelski War," as a Warsaw saying puts it. It is difficult now to articulate a common formula for action. Every individual must in his own conscience decide how to oppose evil. Each person must decide how to defend human dignity, how to behave in this rare war which — one must always keep this in mind — is a new embodiment of the century-old struggle between truth and lies, between freedom and force, between dignity and humiliation.

Let us therefore repeat: although in this war there are no definitive victories, there are also no definitive defeats. Let us offer this bit of optimism. This belief has induced me to set down these reflections: this is my share in this struggle. I will surely not be able to write again soon. I therefore wish much strength to my friends and especially those fighting and persecuted, so that they may be able to walk through the darkness lying between despair and hope. And also much patience, so that they may learn the difficult art of forgiving.

HOW TO GET OUT OF A DEAD-END SITUATION*

by Jacek Kuron

(1) The state of our economy is beyond description. If one is to believe the perpetrators of the coup when they say they acted in order to save the economy, one must note that the operation was a success but the patient died. According to the report of the most official Central Statistical Office, production in January 1982, the first quiet month in our war, was 13.6 percent lower than in January 1981, marred by strikes (five free Saturdays extorted); and was 17.5 percent lower than in December 1981, the first month of the war. At this rate, we shall go below zero within a few months. Statistics can be easily improved, but can one so easily correct the economy and hold back its agony? To reply to that question, the causes of the catastrophe must be addressed. Among the ones most frequently mentioned are workers' demoralization, the blocking of information brought on by the state of war, and the Western sanctions. These three causes are so evident that they hide another, more important one.

The disintegration of our economy does not go back to December 1981 nor to August 1980. Those who have had the courage to speak out have been pointing to it since 1976. After August 1980 all competent people agreed that our social and economic life was sick unto death from centralized administration, the sole method of organizing social activity. Social forces had no influence on its unfolding and its objectives. That is where the sickness began. Reforming the economy of the state should radically change this.

Now, since December 13, whatever the statements and even the intentions of the putschists, the country has been ruled militarily. This means subjecting the entire socio-economic life to the orders of the general military staff. All of the active population must carry out the orders and report on the situation. This is probably a good way of waging war but it is surely a bad way to manage social life.

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The causes of the mortal sickness that beset us have been stressed to the point of caricature. Even if a miracle should happen, if the Poles threw themselves into frenzied work and if the Western credits reached the heights of the Gierek period, the fruits of this would be spoiled with a speed directly proportional to the militarization of our life.

A Classical Occupation

(2) Society endures the war. Those who have proclaimed it do not dissemble too much for having brought it on. Thanks to the extraordinary discipline of the Poles we have up to now avoided any large-scale bloody confrontations. On the other hand, we are living through a classical occupation, with the censorship of correspondents, curfews, massive raids, house searches, arrests, military courts, collective responsibility, etc. Terror, threats and desperate appeals to calm are the only language of the powers that be.

What does this bring them and what can it bring them? The despair and the hatred of all; fear and submission by some; determination and the will to fight by others. The powers cannot count on the scared ones; their submission will last as long as the terror. The resolute ones will fight; and their resolution will increase in proportion to the ferocity of the repression. The economy in ruins will bring about hunger and misery. Because of this, the ranks of the resolute will increase. Do not let the occupiers be deluded: the divisions of the Polish lands have never been lasting. Partitioning does not destroy the social and economic fiber of the country, but the occupation does.

The references to all of the first post-war years are without foundation. At that time, the communists called for and carried out in part the program of the overall Polish democracy, including that of the peasant party. The country was rebuilt and the Western territories were divided up. It is for this reason that, in spite of an organized resistance, there was no state of war; on the contrary, there were certain, not unimportant, freedoms.

The example of Hungary after 1956 is helpful. That country was bled and the people who undertook to rebuild social life were not at the beginning of the bleeding. Violence begets violence. The least patient ones, the least balanced, tend toward terror, a double-edged sword. Terror breeds terror, but the acme of terror cannot be stopped by terror. Who sows the wind will reap the tempest.

An Error in Calculation

(3) The entire Soviet bloc was deeply shaken by the Polish events. The mortal sickness that I have mentioned is most advanced in Poland but it gnaws at all countries of the bloc. As the economy becomes modernized the aspirations of society and its participation in the international division of labor increase. The imperatives of armaments force socialist bloc countries to modernize their economies. In a sick organism modernization involves massive investments while efficiency stagnates and decreases. This accounts for the increased dependence on the West and even sharper social conflicts.

We know that war was declared in Poland under pressure from the Soviet Union. The partisans of that power have good reason to fear the Polish contagion. But they have clearly made an error in calculation. The sanctions have limited the possibilities for cooperation with the West without which the economy of the bloc cannot function normally and the weight of ever costlier armaments are here and now beyond its powers.

The ruin of the Polish economy has severed an important link in economic cooperation. The countries of the bloc are henceforth forced to help Poland when they

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are hardly able to do so. Their peoples are forced to hold up the weight of such support, a burden that is added to a crisis that is on the increase. Social patience, however, has its limits, and these are already perceptible.

(4) Can Polish society wait for the agony of imperialism? The Czechs have practically exercised patience up to the end of the German occupation, but the war then developed not without their participation, mainly outside of their territory and everyone knew what they were waiting for. At present, the war, and it is war, is developing in Poland, and the agony of imperialism is only a prognosis. No appeal can stop the young who wish to fight. If they are prevented from engaging in other forms of struggle, this would only push them to the impasse that is terrorism. No appeal can diminish that explosive mixture of despair and hatred.

Distress is the product of the state of war, just as terror is. To violence wreaked on it, to misery imposed on it, a society will respond with fighting. It can be unleashed on different fronts. At present, there is only one front. We are in Poland. In that country, history teaches us that it is only at the price of blood and ruins that the oppressor, within an interval of a generation, manages to achieve calm. Appealing to abstention from certain actions, even if the highest authorities undertake it, can be efficacious only if other ways of resolving the crisis are indicated. Now, the occupation has put a leash on all possibilities for peaceful action; they even put a leash on the meaning of conscientious work. As long as the occupation continues, no one has the power to guarantee peace in Poland. The only ones that can assure it are the powers that be by making a compromise with society or it will be society itself, by overthrowing that power. In the latter case, we come face to face with Soviet military power.

The People United as Never Before

(5) National understanding is a *conditio sine qua non* of peace. In order to get there, it is necessary that all citizens agree on at least some values and some basic objectives. Since August 1980 the Polish peole have become united as never before. Our problems were connected with the Soviet menace that obliged society to renounce an essential part of its aspirations. We quarreled about the extend and the contents of that part. We asked for a compromise with people who in Poland represented Soviet interests.

In the name of such compromise, all Poles accepted the preponderant role of these people in the state administration. We asked only to check their action and to assure society true participation in basic decisions. The Soviet men did not wish to compromise. Instead of building at the head of the nation a state, however far from a democratic one, they broke up the economy and the administration. After December 13, they concluded their work by destroying all of the conditions required for a social compromise.

Such a compromise, i.e., a compromise between society and the people in power, is today even less possible than before December 13. But if the occupation continues, the government camp will inescapably lead to catastrophe. If there are conscientious people in that camp, they will ask themselves whether initiating a compromise would have such tragic consequences for them. Such a question is not without basis. Polish society has good reason to ask for an accounting from its occupiers. But the episcopate has come out for a compromise and in Poland it has enormous authority. It will be supported by a majority of the leadership of Solidarity, by men of culture and science, in brief, by all those whose voices count in Poland. What is even more important, initiating a compromise would offer to the government group a social mandate that

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they have been lacking since 1956. It would surely by a risky initiative, but the occupation is a suicidal action.

(6) A massive and well organized resistance is the only chance for the Poles. Only such a movement can be the recipient of a compromise; only such a movement can hold back the wave of terrorism and diminish the risk of Soviet intervention should the absence of a compromise initiative incite the unavoidable social explosion. The power of the occupier rests on his capacity to disorganize society and to move about rapidly small military units of pacification. Contrary to the period before August 1980, we must concentrate about a central nucleus and show proof of absolute discipline with respect to it. It is necessary to organize an efficient information network, knowing full well that it could be blocked at the decisive moment. The concrete objectives and the movement's method of operation must be known to all.

Concessions and Demonstrations

(7) Other than publicity, the movement's activities at the present time are limited to demonstrations ranging from tracts and inscriptions on walls to more or less prolonged strikes, without stopping at various forms of collective demonstrations. All of these forms of protest are very important to uphold the morale of the nation and to exert pressure on the eventual proponents of compromise in the government camp. The ultimate means of exerting pressure and our last chance for compromise would be a general strike. But we must bear in mind that all these forms of resistance are a manifestation of the nation's will *vis-à-vis* people who have deliberately risen up against the nation. If we adhere to all this and proponents of a compromise in the government camp do not appear, we shall not avoid the catastrophe.

Within a dozen weeks, sooner or later perhaps, any local incident can lead to disturbances that may cover the entire territory. The occupier's power would probably be overthrown but at a supreme price and at the risk of Soviet intervention.

Thus, the leadership of the resistance must prepare society at the same time for major concessions for the purpose of a compromise with the powers and for the liquidation of the occupation through a unified, organized demonstration. I believe that such a demonstration can take the form of a simultaneous offensive against the centers of power and information in the entire country. It is necessary that those in power realize that they have an extremely limited time to take up the initiative for a compromise.

While waiting for the worst, it is necessary as of now to do everything possible to make the Soviet leadership understand that with a minimum of goodwill on their part a national agreement on the part of the Poles — even without the participation of the present leaders of the country — would not threaten the military interests of the Soviet Union and would be beneficial as far as economic interests are concerned. On the other hand, an armed intervention would be the lowest action by the Soviet Union.

I am not asserting that an organized demonstration by our country parallel with a declaration of goodwill on the Soviets' part would guarantee safety from the Soviet Union. I merely mean to say that if the occupation continues, such a demonstration would limit the risk to a minimum. For a number of years I have preached abstention from all violence. I am therefore forced to raise my voice to say that at the present time, being prepared to oppose the occupation by means of collective action appears to me the lesser evil.

Bialoleka, February 1982

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THE TOUGHEST AND MOST FRAGILE OF REGIMES*

by Cornelius Castoriadis and Paul Thibaud

THIBAUD: The Polish events, the manner in which the Russians and their representatives in Poland intervened on December 13 against Solidarity, what does this tell us concerning the functioning of the Soviet system and its possibilities?
CASTORIADIS: On the tactical level, it has been clear for a long time that three possibilities were open to the Kremlin: one, direct military intervention; another, a policy attempting and-or provoking the acceleration of decay or decomposition of the popular movement; the third possibility was a putsch making use of Polish elements. What may have been surprising is that the putsch was not made by a "tough" faction of the party, but by the army, which clearly does not play merely a technical role in the matter.

Direct intervention was not employed because it would have been very costly; but it must not be forgotten that it was always on the horizon and that its threat is the ultimate support for Jaruzelski. As for the second method, having reflected for a long time about the degeneration of revolutionary movements, I find it extraordinary that in 16 months, the authorities were unable to divide, corrupt or discourage Solidarity. This goes back, first and foremost, to the unity and the cohesion, the integrity, the wholeness of that society in its opposition to the regime. Secondly, this indicates the decomposition of the authorities and of the Communist Party, the inability of defining and applying any kind of political strategy.

After the military coup, many people told me: this then confirms to the point of caricature your theses on stratocracy. This is clearly wrong. Poland is not in the least a stratocratic society in the sense that Russia is. But the Polish coup confirms the other side of my theses: the failure and the decomposition of the party — which could not do a thing about it — and, beyond this, that of "classical" totalitarianism. One must then draw the consequences of this fact that Stalinist totalitarianism could not follow through what constituted its essence: as a frenzied system. It is true that in Russia the party has hold of society, but it has nothing to propose, it has itself renounced drawing up any perspective, it has no historical project, except expansion by means of brute force. We have learned about the death of Suslov, the regime's so-called "ideologue." Why ideologue? I challenge anyone to mention a single phrase of Suslov's, a cold slogan coined by him — as could be said for Zhdanov. In Russia, that non-entity, that death of communist ideology, is balanced by the emergence of a social sector that does function and is animated by a nationalist-imperial imagination holding up a realizable plan of expansion. The Stalinist type of terror, the "Stalinist transformation of nature," the "creation of a new man," came from delirium; and these were accompanied by the *total disregard of efficiency* as correctly stated by Hannah Arendt: that was characteristic of "classical" totalitarianism. On the other hand, the conquest of the world by Russian stratocracy may be improbable, but it is not a frenzied plan either as far as the objective is concerned or the means employed. The use of the police in order to advance genetics was frenzied.
THIBAUD: To come back to Poland, the army not only provided the means, force, but also the legitimacy of the replacement — a legitimacy that rests largely on its position with respect to the party. The army is something that the Poles prefer to the

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party; its legitimacy is different. But the use of such credit that the army enjoys does not relieve it from brute force; it is political manipulation.

CASTORIADIS: Of course. No regime can acknowledge, especially in conditions of extreme social crisis, that it has nothing but a foundation of brute force. A minimum claim to legitimacy remains necessary. Therefore, there were two reasons to make the army intervene. First of all, the party as an apparatus did not function; it had no hold on anything, not even on itself. And then, a flag was needed. It could no longer be the red flag: the Polish national flag was displayed.

THIBAUD: That doesn't keep this from being a delegitimation of the system. When a communist party is out of breath there are two classical remedies. The Stalinist-Maoist remedy is called the purge or cultural revolution. It consists of using demagogy at the expense of the cadres who are sent to the Gulag for re-education, while the Little Father or the Great Helmsman commences a new youth. This assumes that ideology works...

CASTORIADIS: ...and that society is not altogether opposed to the regime.

THIBAUD: The second procedure is to bring in the secular arm of proletarian internationalism when "national" resources are inadequate. It is then that the Kremlin dissolves the party in question and organizes another one. This happened in 1937 for the Polish Communist Party under conditions totally different from those of today; it happened in Hungary after 1956; and it took place in Czechoslovakia after 1968. The novelty in Jaruzelski's case is that the principle of legitimacy (the interest of the nation, national agreement) is this time outside of the regime's ideology and the communist world.

CASTORIADIS: From the moment that society begins to stir, the party can no longer maintain itself. A condition for the existence of the party is the people's total passivity. The decay of the party is such that it can no longer maintain itself either as an ideological reference or as a directing apparatus or, and this is the acme, as a coalition of interests. This last aspect too should be considered. People who directly benefit from the regime — even if figured at some 10 to 15 percent of the population — are not even capable of enough unity to permit the apparatus to have a hold on society and to find collaborators in it. Since December 13, Jaruzelski has not found a single ally, neither a bishop nor a writer...

THIBAUD: We are confronted with an organism whose wounds no longer heal. One must therefore constantly apply the dressing.

CASTORIADIS: We now come to the perspectives of the present Polish regime. The maintenance of such a military regime appears almost materially impossible in the long run. The state of the Polish economy is well known; one may be sure that it has become aggravated after the coup. In the absence of a Polish society, by default, if you will, how can one start up — or rather regenerate — the productive machine? One cannot see the possibility of a process of Kadarization, this presupposes a less advanced state of decay. The regime cannot be maintained afloat except by siphoning off Russian materials. This renders the attitude of the Western governments even more catastrophic, as they are not doing anything to diminish the Russian possibilities in that regard. Moreover, is it possible to maintain indefinitely a military dictatorship?

THIBAUD: In the system as a whole one can see the multiplication of situations that only military force can check: in Afghanistan; in Czechoslovakia where the presence of the Red Army remains necessary; in Poland, where the direct use of force risks being of long duration. Outside of the zone constituting the Soviet Union and its satellites one can likewise see a series of prolonged military engagements. Does this not

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imply a growing instability?

CASTORIADIS: To be sure, in one sense. A regime that rests only on military force is historically unstable. Now, such is more or less the situation in all pro-Russian communist regimes outside of the Soviet Union.

I would like to return to the question of ideology in order to avoid any false interpretations of what I have said. In contrast to its death within the communist regimes, ideology remains as an export item, as a means of penetration. This is so especially in the Third World, where the total inability of the liberal-capitalist West to provide a solution to the dramatic problems of those countries — and surely also the inability of these countries to find such solutions — and the support that it gives to regimes of extreme exploitation and military-police terror, bring about a state of permanent social, economic and political crisis. In such situations, if one introduces these two enzymes or the double enzyme: a simplified "Marxist" ideology and the military-political, Leninist-Stalinist organization, they will prove to have considerable virulence.

THIBAUD: Even so, there is a retreat. The metallurgists of Sao Paulo, at the request of "Lula," observed a minute of silence for Solidarity.

CASTORIADIS: Since Afghanistan, there has indeed been something moving in Latin America in that regard. It appears that people are coming out of the dilemma: to be with the Russians against the Americans, or vice versa. Once installed, however, "progressive" regimes maintain themselves only militarily whether in Cuba or Angola or Ethiopia. This means that they are in need of constant help from Russia and especially military assistance. This, in turn, increases the burden of the military in Russia proper. How far can this go and to what point can it continue? Can Russia with its deplorable economic conditions support several Cubas, a second Poland? Indications of internal decline in Russian society have multiplied (increase in alcoholism, impressive rise in infant mortality rates, etc.). One gets a picture of the regime as something tough and at the same time brittle.

THIBAUD: Glass!

CASTORIADIS: Glass, however, is too fragile to give us a true image. It concerns something extremely hard, rigid, sharp and heavy — and which can crack horribly at any moment. There are Russian dissidents who believe that the breakdown could be something frightful that would not in the least resemble the 16 months of Solidarity in Poland.

I am convinced that there is no other way out for the regime; it will pursue the present course or it will explode. Which of the two will it be? This clearly depends, above all, on the Russian population and others. And there is not a thing that we can say about this, not only because of a lack of information, but also for the general reason of the unpredictability of social explosions. I believe that the answer we are looking for is being worked out in the depths of Russian society. The question has not yet been settled as to what an extent the regime has transformed the people into sub-muzhiks or rather Zinovian people and to what point the society can resist that continuous destructive pressure that simply is laid down by the necessities of life and survival under that type of system. We do not have the answer: it is not that we lack some good sociological inquires; it has not yet come into play.

THIBAUD: In the same field of ideas, among the ways of humbling the people, one should also mention the policy of exile, of clearing away people and skills toward the great Western capitals. This is at once a way of solving political difficulties and a shameful proof of weakness: a regime that has exerted an immense seduction for

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Western elites has now become repellent to all creative minds.

CASTORIADIS: Nevertheless, it should be noted that if emigration, forced or induced, follows great crises (Hungary, Czechoslovakia and now Poland), it is not voluntarily encouraged in Russia: they did not get rid of Sakharov. I believe that if one muzzles this issue it is to convince people that there is no alternative, no other reality to be looked forward to except the one they are subjected to: this is your life, real socialism is here and will continue indefinitely — as Brezhnev has stated, the historical period from the installment of true socialism to that of communism is of "indeterminate duration." You cannot get out of it, you are here for "an eternity," as Kopelev titled his book [*A conserver pour l'éternite*].

THIBAUD: In the case of the Polish, they figure that after they have tried it once, twice, three times, the people will be convinced that it is unattainable. In my opinion, it is the main responsibility of intellectuals, East and West together, to fight against the notion of historical inescapability.

From that standpoint, one may hope that what they count on winning will fail them. That cynicism, that manner of encouraging despair should induce rejection on the part of those who, although not direct victims of the system, help them in their misdeeds. December 13, 1981, is perhaps a historical date that marks the moment in Europe when every sensible and moral person must declare himself an active enemy of these regimes. One may hope for a deep movement of rejection of a regime that openly states that it only counts on people's despair.

CASTORIADIS: Yes, but thoughts are not at all decisive. Take the case of Poland. A terrible shock for the Kremlin driven to the three solutions we have already mentioned, one of which is a "good" one, and being able to choose only the least of the evils. Nevertheless, from that shock — it did not get out of it on December 13, for it is not yet finished — the Kremlin just the same manages to garner two considerable advantages: a new demonstration of the inevitability of the fate of those subjected to the Russian yoke; a new series of bickerings and discord between Western "allies." Let us say a few words about the situation in Western countries. It is true that one can observe a clear decline of the dominant strata and of their devices for managing society; but one can also note what is much more important still, a decline of society, the classes being all mixed up; a decline which is probably irreversible but here and now already reaches a critical point. In one sense, society breaks up into interest groups, into lobbies. In one sense, too, the limit of that process is being realized by the peace movements: groupings having zoological interests, *better red than dead*, one does not want to croak, it does not matter what else happens.

The slogans apparently most "serious and political" — the "de-nuclearization of Europe from Poland to Portugal" — are politically weak and morally untenable. What does it matter that the Russians and Americans annihilate one another with atomic weapons so long as we Europeans survive! Everything takes place as if for people of Western societies there is nothing left worth paying for, paying with one's person, risking one's life.

The ideological seduction has actually come to an end, but I am sure that in the West *vis-à-vis* Russia another, very important factor is involved, more powerful, more sinister, more archaic: the deep, obscure and abject fascination exerted by force. It is this fascination that at the outset of the German occupation the people were so much attracted by Nazism, not by its ideology, but because it showed the apparent invincibility of the military-social machine. I am not referring to the calculations of opportunists, but instead to the unconscious.

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THIBAUD: All this is quite clear and serious; perhaps it may even mean the crisis of democracy. But why not forecast the rallying of conscience, let us call it a Churchillian reaction by democracies? It is a sure thing that democracy itself stirs everyone to defend his own interests but people know full well that if democracy is threatened, they must mobilize even when it involves divergent interests because only democracy guarantees them. Not to mention that totalitarian cynicism destroys the illusion that democracy is something taken for granted without any reason to pay for it, as you said.
CASTORIADIS: The comparison with 1940 is conclusive. Aside from the fact that the Nazi enterprise did not have the means at its disposal that the Communist enterprise has, the political machinery that made it possible for the liberal capitalist regimes to work for war is at the present time out of gear, as are apparently the social mechanisms that assured popular support.

The decay of the control mechanisms is clear in the economic sphere; the same is true of military-strategic planning. The only response of the Reagan government to Russian expansion is a program of rearmament that is economically and socially ruinous and intrinsically — militarily and strategically — absurd. The fact that, caught as it is in a situation so difficult for it, as the Polish situation is, the Kremlin nevertheless manages to minimize its losses, demonstrates the Western governments' inability to maneuver. Of course, the Kremlin also makes mistakes and perhaps even big ones, but one must see what lies ahead.
THIBAUD: Such fascination and such fear when confronted by force are immeasurably stressed by a fact that is very paralyzing to the imagination and to the will: the existence of nuclear arms. The rational anti-Soviets often come up against this objection: what you are saying may lead to war. And, indeed, one cannot be sure that a policy of confrontation will in no case lead to the danger of war.
CASTORIADIS: There is a way of guaranteeing against the danger of war; it is to invite the Russians to install themselves in all countries. This way, one is sure to avoid war, at least in the form of foreign war. But the objection that you raised does not mean very much. The risk of war is increased when the Russians are strengthened in their belief that they can permit themselves anything with impunity — for there is nevertheless a touchy point beyond which an American reaction becomes probable; it is increased when one increases the discouragement and the despair of the peoples in the satellite countries and in Russia proper by helping their overlords to show themselves irresistible.

Having said that, the question in effect is this: How does one live "in the face of nuclear war?" How does one live in the face of death? For the first time perhaps one expresses in a massive and atrocious manner the fact that we are *always* living in the face of death. It is the only gift that we bring with us when we come into the world: the promise of death. It is only after one has understood this, once one has already counted oneself legally dead, that one can really begin to truly live, to be unencumbered of that killing anguish, getting along with it, at least. That is just the time for political action.

In such action today, two points are immediate and urgent. First of all, resistance to the Russian regime, the help that one can bring to the Polish fighters. Then, a veritable struggle against war that has nothing to do with "pacifism" and "neutralism," that requires a much vaster and much clearer enterprise: a popular movement for universal and total disarmament. I trust that we shall be able to talk about this in a more precise manner when the second volume of *Devant la guerre* appears.

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Notes and Commentaries:

THE FOUCAULT CONFERENCE

by William R. Hackman

Despite some notable tensions and a few disappointments, the conference on the works of Michel Foucault, held during the last three days of October 1981 at the University of Southern California, was a lively and entertaining affair. And unlike most such events, the USC conference was a media event, attracting not only tiresome academics (of which there were plenty), but representatives of such estimable publications as *Time* magazine and some punkish looking undergraduates hoping to videotape the proceedings. The media folks had some problems, though, as the USC people insisted that ideas *were* commodities to be bought and sold and guarded their wares like merchants on the lookout for shoplifters.

Billed as "Knowledge, Power, History. Interdisciplinary Approaches to the Works of Michel Foucault," the conference included historians, philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists and literary theorists. But it was precisely this diversity that led to most of the tensions. At the risk of oversimplifying, the participants seemed to fall into two camps: those interested in Foucault's work as a way out of the current impasse in critical theory; and those interested in elegant interpretations of the world as a series of ironic "fictions." It was not simply the "lit-crit" types who fell into the second category. Indeed, there were some notable exceptions among the literature folks. The tensions had peaked by the time Foucault himself spoke on Halloween afternoon. But, trapped as we are in the prison of chronological thinking, first things first.

The conference opened with an evening performance by Stanford philosopher Ian Hacking and UC Irvine historian Mark Poster. Hacking is an Oxford-bred analytic type whose demeanor suggests Jack Lemon playing an absent-minded, lovable college professor. His talk on "The Avalanche of Numbers" was a presumably Foucauldian analysis of the growth of statistics in mid-19th century social bureaucracies. Beyond that, no one we spoke with afterward could make heads or tails of what Hacking said, and what it had to do with anything else was largely a mystery. Poster, on the other hand, followed with a critique of Marxism based on what he considers to be Foucault's *more* historical, *more* materialist analysis of "knowledge-power." In short, Poster attempted to rescue historical materialism from itself by rejecting its ontological privileging of labor and its traces of liberal progressivism. Alluding to works by Sahlins and others, Poster challenged the concept of need as employed by Marxists to demonstrate the universal character of labor. Instead, he argued that social domination operates through a network of discourses and that those who control these discourses wield power. Such an analysis, Poster maintained, succeeded where Marxism failed: in confronting racism, sexism and other forms of domination not based on productive relations. Titled "Mode of Production, Mode of Information," Poster's talk concluded by appealing to the circumstances of advanced capitalism as historical verification. American capitalism, says Poster, has shifted from labor-intensive heavy industry to capital-intensive information industries. Controlling the flow of information would ultimately prove identical with controlling the means of production since production of knowledge, and *not* of simple commodities, was at the heart of advanced capitalist society. Poster's presentation was provocative, but not without problems. For starters, it was not entirely clear that Foucault's considerations on discourses and power really have much to do with the growth of the information

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society. Poster too quickly brushes aside the fact that the view from California (where information technologies are an essential component of the economy) may not be entirely representative of the world economy. Labor-intensive industry has not disappeared; it has moved to the Third World, where labor is cheap and unorganized. Moreover, while the U.S. economy has made much of the new technologies (and the U.S. continues to hold a slight edge over Japan in semi-conductors and related technologies), it is precisely in such areas as automobile and steel production that Japan and West Germany have outpaced the U.S. Poster responds to such objections by pointing out that Marx himself analyzed the most advanced tendencies of capitalism, not the most predominant.

In the same spirit, the following morning David Hoy delivered a talk entitled "Power, Repression, Progress: Foucault and the Frankfurt School." The title may be misleading, however, since Hoy's actual purpose was to defend Foucault from Habermas' criticisms (as expressed in the latter's "Adorno Lecture"). Habermas sees Foucault as one of the "new conservatives" whose anti-humanist and non-teleological theorizing leads down an intellectual and political *cul-de-sac*. According to Hoy, however, Habermas misreads Foucault, or reads him correctly and is simply wrong in his conclusions about where such thinking goes. For Hoy, one of the first and most critical differences between Foucault and the Frankfurt School has to do with the problem of false consciousness. The Frankfurt School's reliance on the traditional Marxist concept of ideology implies a belief in a non-ideological, true consciousness, something Foucault flatly rejects. Foucault dispenses with the notion of disinterested knowledge, and thus with the possibility of any "real" truth lying beyond actual power struggles. As a corollary proposition, Foucault denies the purely negative understanding of power implicit in the Frankfurt School's writings. Indeed, this is the crux of Foucault's "knowledge-power" correlation — all knowledge is power, and power is a relation or an activity, not a property or a privilege.

As Hoy points out, several problems plague such formulations of knowledge and power. In the first instance, there is the theoretical difficulty of conceptualizing a more "humane" world since there are no standards by which to decide what that would mean; and, secondly, such a notion of power is so broad as to be politically empty. Hoy responds that Foucault could just as easily answer that liberal and Marxist notions of liberty and self-determination are empty abstractions lacking historical substance and therefore inadequate as foundations for political struggles. Hoy characterizes Foucault's position as "pragmatic nominalism," referring only to concrete power relations rather than to any transcendent values. Foucault has not given up the idea of emancipation but only the belief that emancipation results from the progressive realization of objective truth.

Hoy was followed by Mary Lydon, who delivered what was surely the most elegant talk at the conference. "The Question of Sexuality" was actually a Foucauldian critique of women's studies programs. Lydon was critical of both the form and content of such programs, regarding them as anathema to the actual liberation of women from the conceptual bonds that confine them in a disciplinary society. Just as "man" was an invention of the 19th century a device that facilitated social control, so, too, according to Lydon, is "woman" becoming an object of knowledge-power to be identified and controlled by the disciplinary logic of academic discourse. Moreover, the techniques of power were exactly as Foucault described them, relying most importantly on the "confession." As Foucault has pointed out again and again, the confession, whether it occurs in the church, in the courtroom, or in the psychiatrist's

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office, transfers power from the speaker to the interlocutor; in revealing what was previously obscured, the individual becomes both subject and object. Lydon found significance in the proliferation of the confessional mode in women's literature and history.

Lydon noted that women were constituting themselves as subjects precisely when the subject was vanishing from the theoretical and political horizon. Similarly, she observed that women were pouring into the university precisely when the university seemed on the verge of literal and figurative bankruptcy. Contrary to the law of the sea, women today are being invited on board a sinking ship. Summoning Foucault's categories on the history of sexuality, Lydon cited the need for women scholars to abandon the disciplinary *scientia sexualis* and to reconstitute an *ars erotica*. Not surprisingly, Lydon's talk provoked a number of women in the audience, who saw the current situation for women quite differently. Turning Lydon's observations around, some asked why is the "subject" being abandoned precisely when women are struggling to constitute themselves as subjects? Additionally, the "irony" and "seduction" of Lydon's presentation was criticized for recapitulating the very same techniques of power that have traditionally been used to exclude women from academic discourse.

The enthusiasm generated by the morning session quickly disappeared during the two disappointing talks that afternoon. Michel de Certeau's "Panoptic Discourse and Micro-Techniques" was a fairly tedious rendering of Foucault's methodology that almost everyone seemed to have snoozed through. Certeau has located an irony in Foucault's texts; they tend to universalize their truths (a "panoptic discourse") even as they seek to particularize (through "micro-techniques"). With the audience already reeling from this, Paul Rabinow delivered the knockout blow with his talk on the politics of architecture and planned cities under the *ancien regime*. Despite Rabinow's insistence on the innovation of his approach, it was hard to see how it differed from more "traditional" accounts of the politics of space. Given Rabinow's high visibility during the previous sessions, at which he seemed to designate himself Foucault's official spokesman, his talk was perhaps the conference's major disappointment.

Saturday morning's meeting belied the notion that the essential difference between the various participants could be reduced to their academic disciplines. Irvine literature professors Frank Lentricchia and David Carroll demonstrated that there *is* life after literary criticism. Indeed, the speakers seemed to make some of the lit-crit folks in the audience nervous. Lentricchia, especially, assailed the de-politicized hermeticism that dominates academic literary theory under the fancy rubric "deconstruction." He alluded to that circle of Dante's inferno reserved for the self-serving and the uncommitted — a realm which, Lentricchia noted, Eliot called the "waste land" but which we may have to call the "university." In order to avoid an eternity in that particular hell, he insisted, the literary intellectual must learn to take sides. Quoth Lentricchia, "One may, or one may not, be aware of the political dimensions of one's theories, but one cannot help but be aware of one's refusal to take sides."

More broadly, Lentricchia's talk could be read as a kind of response to Poster's; a neo-Marxist critique of Foucault instead of a Foucauldian critique of neo-Marxism. Citing Gramsci as a counter-example, Lentricchia examined Foucault's treatment of discipline and resistance and found them wanting. For all of Foucault's talk about the disciplinary society, he seldom if ever relates this mode to the requirements of capitalist production. Foucault has written about the asylum, the hospital, the prison and the church — but never about the factory. The omission has probably been

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deliberate and provocative; Foucault has sought to undermine the reductive economism of so much Marxist theory, and Lentricchia acknowledged the validity of such a strategy, especially insofar as it illustrates the absurdity of the base-superstructure orthodoxy. Nonetheless, said Lentricchia, one can fall into the trap, as Foucault seems to, of ignoring some rather fundamental divisions in modern societies — that is, class divisions. By divorcing discipline from its context within capitalist relations, Foucault robs the concept of its critical content; power circulates in an uninterrupted flow through the body social. It is for this reason that Foucault cannot formulate a meaningful concept of resistance; everyone, worker and capitalist alike, participates — blindly, as it were — in the disciplinary society. The idea of conflicting interests and opposition is alien here. Foucault, said Lentricchia, looks at human beings and sees only bodies. Gramsci, on the other hand, sees bodies and minds. In short, Lentricchia wants to reintroduce the notion of a critical consciousness capable of recognizing its own interests and of resisting a system of power that would deny those interests.

David Carroll stayed somewhat closer to the ideas and methods generally associated with literary criticism, though the object of his talk did not. Carroll offered a critique of Foucault's "methodology asnd critical strategies" of some relevance to the general problem of critical theory today. Like Certeau, he reveals an irony in Foucault's critique of reason — that of a privileged epistemological position in a theory that denies the possibility of such a position. In analyzing the discourse of reason, says Carroll, Foucault assigns particular importance to writers on the margins of their respective "epistemes." Sade, Nietzsche and Artaud, among others, refuse to judge madness from the lofty heights of Reason, and this is the basis of their appeal for Foucault. It is, says Carroll, a primarily aesthetic appeal — and this is a source of difficulty for Foucault's critique. Foucault relies on the aesthetic appeal of such "disruptive texts" as those of the above authors to carry the burden of his critical argument at important points. This, notes Carroll, is a cop-out that undermines the force of Foucault's critique. Foucault systematically avoids a direct confrontation with psychoanalysis or Marxism or any other critical method; he seeks to escape the knowledge-power nexus of modern history. In so doing, his argument loses much of its force by opting for an aesthetic solution to serious philosophical and political problems.

Before moving on to a discussion of Foucault's own talk, it is worth reflecting for a moment on the growing tensions. The conference that took place on the podium was not always as interesting as the one taking place in the audience, though it was almost always more interesting than anything that went on in the "workshops." In fact, there seemed to be several conferences meeting under one roof, distinguished less by academic fields than by political intentions. There are, no doubt, as many historians and social scientists as literary critics occupying Lentricchia's special circle of hell. Nor does a familiarity with political theory necessarily prevent one from falling into this abyss; recent years have witnessed an astonishing number of irrelevant books and journals devoted to critical theory and neo-Marxism, as well as to semiotics and deconstruction. Why should the Foucault conference have been any different? In fact, it was about equal parts of serious political discussion, interesting but dubious philosophical speculation, and unbearable nonsense. Nowhere was this more evident than in the question and answer periods after each round of speeches. More than anything else, these seemed to serve as showcases for intellectual one-upsmanship, with appropriately obscure questions asked with just the right among of condescension to make it all

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worthwhile. Then, too, there were the gratuitous displays of righteous indignation over such matters as the size of the conference room and the shape of the microphones (one woman professed anxiety over speaking into a "voice-deforming penis" — perhaps this Lacanian-inspired feminist would have been more comfortable with a megaphone). On the other hand, some questioners were often right on target, pointing out, for example, that the prison was arguably the most disastrous of all modern socio-political institutions, and that using it as a model for the "disciplinary society" was highly problematic. Such references to reality seemed to catch many people off guard and for the most part discussions tended not to stray too far from comfortable abstractions.

The "workshops" were not dramatically different in tone from the question and answer periods. Some apparently went better than others but the general impression was that they ran the gamut from the ridiculous to the supine. Noteworthy in this respect was the social theory workshop led by Martin Jay and Robert D'Amico. Since several participants had come under the impression that they were to deliver papers, Jay and D'Amico let them do just that, effectively eliminating the possibility of any real discussion. The most illuminating moment of this fiasco came after a rather provocative talk by a young woman (handing out freebies of a journal called *Tabloid*, spiritual kin to *Cultural Correspondence*) about the politics of popular culture today. The group was clearly dumbfounded by this presentation, which had included 3-D postcards and allusions to avant-garde composers beyond the ken of anyone present. D'Amico responded with some off-the-wall comment about Quine's critique of Frege and Russell, which left everyone even more puzzled than before — and then on to the next paper.

By the time the crowd had assembled for Foucault's talk, the tensions between the contending factions were self-evident. Taking a cue from Adorno's essay on Bach, someone ought to write a piece entitled "Michel Foucault Defended from his Devotees." A few of the cognoscenti complained afterwards that Foucault had directed his remarks to the great unwashed. And, in fact, Foucault *did* opt for a less esoteric paper when he learned the size of the crowd he was to address — a sort of outline of what he sees as the trajectory of his own theoretical and political project over the last 15 or so years. Be that as it may, the talk had the virtue of relative clarity, free of the maddening jargon that had characterized a few of the earlier talks. Foucault, who over the last few years had indicated that the object of his studies was the "micro-techniques of power," announced that this appraisal was mistaken. His goal has not been an analysis or theory of power, he explained, but rather a "history of the different modes by which a human being becomes a subject." His earlier works had emphasized the modes of linguistics, economics and biology while his most recent efforts focused on sexuality. This, however, is not to ignore the analysis of power; the human subject emerges from a web of power relations and cannot be understood apart from these. Moreover, we need an ongoing analysis and critique of two "disastrous" but "resilient" "pathological forms of power": fascism and Stalinism. Are they, asks Foucault, no more than a response to a particular situation, or do our societies have an innate tendency toward these forms? What is required, he responds, is an "economy of power relations."

Since Kant, Foucault says, the role of philosophy has been to prevent reason from exceeding the limits of experience *and* (what is often left unstated) to watch over the power of political relations. This leads us to the problem of rationalization and excesses of political power. If this sounds familiar, it should. Foucault admits that the

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Frankfurt School has already trodden much of this same ground. But, he adds, the Frankfurt School theorists sought to analyze the rationalization process at work in all of modern culture since the enlightenment, whereas he seeks to specify the activities of this process in several fields, each of which refers to a "fundamental experience" — madness, sexuality, etc. "Even if *Aufklärung* has been important," argues Foucault, "we have to refer to more remote processes if we are to understand our history." Furthermore, he has sought to analyze power through its antagonisms — through the resistance it provokes — rather than through its internal logic or rationality. Thus, he has turned his attention to "local" struggles, such as sexual politics, prisoners' rights and the anti-psychiatry movement. Foucault claims that these struggles "assert the right to be different" and thus insist on "what makes the individual truly individual." Conversely, he notes, "they oppose what separates individuals from one another. They are not struggles *for* or *against* the individual." Rather, "they attack a technique or form of power in everyday life — a form that regulates the individual and imposes a kind of knowledge on him." It subjugates — that is, creates subjects.

Historically, Foucault sees three general types of struggles: against "domination"; against "exploitation"; and against "subjection." If earlier centuries were characterized by, say, religious or ethnic domination and the 19th century was characterized by economic exploitation, the present era is characterized by subjection. With this observation, Foucault turned briefly to the relation between the individual, the Christian Church and the modern state. State power, he said, is both individualizing and totalizing. This form of power originated in the pastoral tradition of the church — in a form Foucault has dubbed "pastoral power." The pastor's function was both to tend his flock and to establish the personal link between the individual believer and Christ; the fundamental techniques were sacrifice and confession. Just as the modern state has taken over the church's promise of salvation, Foucault maintained, so too has pastoral power been transferred to the social workers and psychiatrists.

Foucault closed with a reference to Kant's essay, "Was ist Aufklärung?" Unlike the Cartesian "Who am I?" Kant's question is historical and is, for that reason, the sort of question we should be asking today: "What are we and what could we be? What new forms of subjectivity can we create that will not originate in subjection?"

If simplicity was one of the chief virtues of Foucault's talk, it may also have been one of its biggest problems. Coming from one who has regularly decried the totalizing impulse among social theorists, the discussion relied rather heavily on broad generalizations, rarely straying into the particulars that Foucault claims are essential. Still, it managed to silence a lot of the nonsense: none of the ironic fictionalizers who had dominated the earlier question and answer periods cared to address themselves directly to the master — at least not with others watching. No one asked about "bio-power" or "grids of intelligibility." That, presumably, was saved for Foucault's appearance at the social theory workshop afterward, where the good shepherd held a special Mass for the faithful. Pastoral power, indeed.

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THE GENESIS OF THE CLERICAL STATE IN IRAN

by Rasoul Nafisi

The religious state that has emerged in revolutionary Iran poses serious questions that, because of the rapidity of developments, have remained unanswered. In the media and some academic circles, the revolution in Iran is mainly acknowledged as a backlash of the fast modernization, or as the crisis of affluence caused by oil revenues, and sometimes simply as another mistake committed by President Carter's administration. This type of approach tends to be ahistorical and static.

On the other hand, the Iranian left views the revolution as a petty bourgeois liberation movement generating a petty bourgeois state. Then, some factions of the left argue that the new regime in Iran is just another superstructure for the dependent bourgeoisie, since the petty bourgeoisie is unable to create its own state: the state is either bourgeois or non-bourgeois. The problem with the latter approach is that it cannot differentiate between the shah's regime and its successor. Also, there is a difficulty with both arguments: they reduce the state to a mere tool in the hands of a particular class. But at least in the case of the last two regimes in Iran, the state's relative independence from classes is evident.

The present clerical state in Iran is, to some extent, the end result of a struggle within the power elite. While the ideology of this state is necessarily medieval religion, this does not mean that the clerical state mainly represents the clergy's interests. In order to understand the Iranian revolution and the emergence of the clerical state, therefore, it is necessary to analyze the revolution's genesis, its course, its aftermath and, most importantly, the clergy's role as a key sector of the power elite and its alliances.

Historically, Iranian society has been wracked by conflicting tendencies between centralization and decentralization. Furthermore, the road from the Persian Empire to underdeveloped Iran is paved with the rubble of devastation caused by external invasions and internal conflicts. Two major outside attacks by Arabs in the sixth century and the Mongols in the 13th century changed the country and its world importance. Along with other Middle Eastern societies, however, the country's real decline occurred in the 19th century with the penetration of European imperialism.

At the time of Shah Abbas the Great in the 16th century, Iranian economic and political life thrived. During that period, Iran was a partner of European powers rather than a subject. Small commodity production was self-centered, and the commercial achievements of this period can be seen in the sophisticated architecture of the city of Isfahan. The importance of foreign trade was due to Iran's location as a trading link between East and West and the production of raw silk for European factories. The discovery of new routes along South Africa and the invention of artificial silk ruined the Iranian commercial bourgeoisie. With few exceptions, Iranian history after Shah Abbas is one of surrender to British and Russian imperialism. While foreign traders were allowed to operate tax-free in the economy's most profitable sectors, Iranian merchants were heavily taxed and restricted. Thus, the national bourgeoisie lost out to its Western partners in their first contact.

While the persistence of precapitalist modes of production in Iran can be linked to its isolation from capitalist countries,[1] neo-colonialism can also be seen at the root of

1. Keddi and Halliday argue that Iran's distance from Europe was one of the major factors in its lack of development, even when compared with other societies in the Middle East. According

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the present economic and cultural chaos. That Iran was never officially colonized does not minimize the fact that it was subjected very early to neo-colonialism as a result of its proximity to India and Russia. Later developments in Iran are related to the chaos generated by neo-colonialism.

In the 16th century, under Shah Abbas the Great, Iranian nationalism adopted Shiism as its ideology. This placed Iran in opposition to the Ottoman Empire, which followed Sunni Islam. Subsequently, religion became closely integrated into the power structure and made some religious leaders as important as other political authorities. At any rate, the clergy consolidated its power bases during the Qajars Dynasty and the influence of neo-colonialism (1795-1925). According to Shiite laws, the clergy benefited from religious taxation, the *Vagf* (the permanent donation of property to sacred shrines and other religious institutions) and its control over law and education. These privileges and an unrestricted access to the common people made the clergy independent of the state and a dominant force in Iran's power elite.[2]

With the Tobacco Treaty (1890), control of the entire tobacco industry was given to a Briton, thus generating considerable local protest which ended with the treaty's abolition. In this revolt, the clergy joined in after it had already started in the Bazaar, then quickly assumed leadership[3] — a pattern which would be repeated in the 1978-79 revolution. While a cleric issued a sacred order (*fatva*) prohibiting the use of tobacco as the means of protest, the charismatic Seyyed Jamal-ed-din Assad-Abadi "Al-Afghani" was active behind the scenes.[4] Later, one of Al-Afghani's followers assassinated the shah. This revolt climaxed the national bourgeoisie's campaign against foreign domination and feudalism. It was a national uprising triggering the emergence of the nation-state and the clergy's rise as a rival to the state.[5]

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to Halliday, Iranian underdevelopment was the result of its "being too far from the mainstream of capitalist development and too near to the path of strategic rivalry between great powers." While they take for granted the role of colonialism in the development of precapitalist formations, these analyses pay too little attention to the impact of colonialism and neo-colonialism on their stagnation. Dependency theorists argue the contrary. They find proximity to the European "center" as the major detriment to Third World countries, or the "periphery." Thus, Amin contends that the misery of Arabic societies is caused by their nearness to European societies and their reliance on foreign trade. See Nikkie Keddi, "The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914, and its Political Impact: An Overview," in *Iranian Studies*, V:2-3 (1972); Fred Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development* (London, 1979), and Samir Amin, *Unequal Development* (New York, 1976).

2. Hodgkin argues that *Jihad, Ijtihad* and *Zuhd* (activism, responsibility, and austerity) are the foundation of Islam as a revolutionary ideology for Third World countries. These principles, however, are part of other religions as well -- especially Middle Eastern ones. See Thomas Hodgkin, "The Evolutionary Tradition in Islam," *Race and Class*, XXI:3 (1980). According to Algar and Keddi, Shiites believe that, since the hidden Iman (Mahdi) is the only legitimate ruler and will someday come to rule on earth, every other ruler is an usurper. Keddi and Algar argue that this is the basis of the rejection of shahs and keeps the clergy as the opposition to such rulers. Keddi and Algar, referred to in Saiid Amir Arjomand's "Religion, Political Action and Legitimate Domination in Iran: Fourteenth to Eighteenth Centuries A.D.," *European Journal of Sociology*, XX:1 (1979). But, as Arjomand shows, the Shiite sect traditionally has been a conservative one on the side of rulers while other sects, such as the Hanbalis, are more gifted with the revolutionary heritage of Islam.

3. Feridoon Adamiat, "Ideology e Nehzat e Mashrouteh" ("The Ideology of the Constitutional Revolution") (Tehran, 1977).

4. Al-Afghani was an adventurer, a philosopher, and a theologian whose religious beliefs were doubted by many of his contemporaries. He dreamed of a united Islamic (*ommah*) community resulting from a holy war (*jihad*) against Western domination, particularly that of Russia. Al-Afghani envisaged the Moslem clergy (*ulama*) as the agents of change.

5. Lucien Rey, "Persia in Perspective," *New Left Review*, 19-20 (June 1963).

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When the Constitutional Revolution broke out in late 1905, the national bourgeoisie demanded complete control of the state. The intelligentsia, the merchants and the clergy jointly led this revolution. Intrigued by the intelligentsia's modernizing ideas and outraged by the Qajars' inefficiency and tyranny, the urban population protested with peaceful sit-ins. The merchants and the intelligentsia demanded parliamentary rule and freedom, while the clergy focused on *Edalat khaneh*, or the house of justice. This appeal for more "Islamization" meant increased clerical power.[6] Although the clergy was allocated a number of permanent seats to check the newly ratified laws against Islamic codes, efforts to establish a religious state were defeated in the Constitutional Revolution and the resulting state was liberal and secular. The emergence of Reza Shah in 1925, however, put an end to the liberal bourgeoisie's consolidation of political power. The new military despot destroyed all opposition[7] and became the biggest latifundia owner in the country. Unified and modernized, the new ruling army developed a gigantic bureaucracy around the dictator, which remained intact up to the last days of the last shah, Mohammad Reza.

Because he sided with Nazi Germany, allied forces forced Reza Shah to abdicate in 1941 and enthroned his son, Mohamad Reza, to continue his father's policies. With the emergence of new opposition forces and of Iran's role as guardian of the West's interests in the Persian Gulf, the army's hegemony was transferred to the secret police. With the consolidation of his dictatorship, Mohamad Reza eventually abandoned the very limited traditional routes of communication between the monarchy and the populace, and dismissed the few members of Parliament who represented different factions of Iranian society.[8] In so doing, he also alienated the clergy.

In Pahlavi's Iran, it was not economic interests that shaped politics, but political decision that gave direction to the economy, with the determining factor being the maintenance of the shah's dictatorship.[9] Its "guided" economy focused on the development of a non-productive sector heavily subsidized by oil revenues. A selected few surrounding the royal family harvested the lion's share of profits. Big business was given priority and foreign capital emphasized at the expense of small crafts and industries.[10] This process damaged the national bourgeoisie, while favoring the highest echelons of the bureaucracy.

6. Some clerics, however, sided with intellectual and liberal ideas against the clergy's ideals. While the clergy was demanding a religious state, some dissident enlightened clerics defended the secular state and warned against "religious despotism."

7. Mossadegh, the representative of the intelligentsia and the national bourgeoisie, and Modarress, a representative of the enlightened clergy, both opposed parliament's transfer of power from the Qajars to Reza Shah. Mossadegh was later imprisoned by Reza Shah and Modarress was murdered. Hossein Makki, "Tarikh e bist saleh e Iran" (Twenty Years of Contemporary Iranian History") (Tehran).

8. See Ervand Abrahamian, "Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution," *MERIP Reports* (May 1980), p. 87; and Bijan Jazani, "The Socio-Economic Analysis of a Dependent State," *Iran Committee* (London, 1973). Representation in the shah's government was practically non-existent. The top officials, including the members of the two parliamentary houses, were all hand-picked by the shah. Halliday's claim that the shah actually represented the bourgeoisie is untenable.

9. Mahdavi has shown how oil revenues made other sources of income unnecessary for the ruler, allowing him immunity from any pressure from taxpayers and other economic interests. Hussein Mahdavi, "The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran" in *Studies in the History of the Middle East,* edited by M.A. Cook (New York, 1970).

10. Nikkie Keddie, "Oil, Economic Policy and Social Conflict," in *Race and Class*, XXI:1 (1979).

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The national bourgeoisie had been decisive at the beginning of the shah's reign. It was almost strong enough to dethrone the shah in 1953. Mossadegh, the leader of the national bourgeoisie and of the intelligentsia, revitalized the traditional coalition with the clergy, nationalized Iranian oil (at that time controlled by the British Petroleum Company) and exiled the shah. The clergy conditionally supported Mossadegh up to the point when he showed his radicalism. Its withdrawal of support contributed to his fall, and when the shah was returned in 1953 with the aid of the CIA, the clergy's upper echelons acquiesced while the rest remained silent.

In 1962, a series of reforms were encouraged by the Kennedy administration to integrate Iran into the international capitalist system and to pre-empt revolution in rural areas. The national bourgeoisie sought political concessions by approving the reforms, while the clergy rejected them. When in 1963 the shah finally granted extraterritorial rights to the U.S. military mission, the clergy arose against the shah.[11] Khomeini at the time was a philosophy instructor at a theological school who strongly advocated the clergy's political interests. As a leader of this uprising, he was exiled when the revolt was suppressed.

Khomeini was the youngest son of a cleric murdered by a local landlord. He was raised in a small provincial town and attended theology school in Qom. Although most high clerics were affluent, Khomeini never displayed much interest in wealth, and remained anti-shah, anti-modern, and anti-Western. According to him, the law of God as expressed in Islam must become institutionalized in the state. His philosophy basically was that of Al-Afghani, which contained messianism, pan-Islamism and holy war. But while Al-Afghani sought the help of Great Britain against Russia to emancipate the Moslem community, Khomeini hated anything alien to his beliefs.

Between 1963 and 1977 there were no major political movements and the university remained the focus of national protest. The outbreak of urban guerrilla movements such as the Fedayeen (Marxist) and the Mojahedeen (Islamic socialist) and the quadrupling of oil prices (1973) coincided with the shah's system reaching the peak of terror and suppression. In the meantime, religion was becoming politicized in urban areas through Shariati's liberal interpretation of Islam, which was closer to the Mojahedeen than to traditional Islam, and therefore not welcomed by the clergy.[12]

What needs to be explained concerning the Iranian revolution is not why it happened, but why it happened at that particular time and in a religious form. In the 1970s, the economic system was totally dependent on the world market to export oil and import agricultural products and manufactured goods. Consequently, the 1976-1977 world recession badly damaged the Iranian economy primarily because of inflationary spending of oil revenue in the non-productive sectors at the expense of "self-centered" national production. The 1962 land reform and the 1973 oil price increase which were supposed to alleviate the misery of the peasantry and urban poor worked to their detriment. Both groups suffered in the slums of Tehran. The land reform only benefited 10 percent of the middle peasantry, and the oil price increase

11. This concession took three years and $200 million in the form of a loan to the Iranian government. See Richard Fal, "The Legal Status of American Forces in Iran," *The Middle East Journal*, 28:2 (Spring 1974). Some of the reforms, such as women's voting rights, clashed with the clergy's patriarchal views. The clergy's opposition to the reforms, however, was based on more fundamental issues: the development of a dependent bureuacratic apparatus would weaken the clergy's feudal and mercantilistic ideology.

12. This phenomenon was so widespread that in 1976 and 1977 religious publications exceeded all secular ones combined: in Tehran alone there were 2,300 religious associations. See Sharif Arani, "Iran: From the Shah's Dictatorship to Khomeini's Demagogic Theocracy," *Dissent* (Winter 1980).

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caused economic hardships for the urban dwellers in terms of housing and food prices. The peasants' mass exodus to the cities resulting from these two events played a critical role in spreading religious ideology. The subjugation of the remaining rural people to prevailing political authorities remains an important component of rural culture, which saw the shah's bureaucrats as more respectable than the turbaned clergymen who had lived directly off their labor. The absence of peasant participation[13] in the revolutionary uprising also shows that religion was not the primary motive behind the revolution.

The change in attitude of the shah's international supporters was significant in his downfall. This is even acknowledged in the introduction of the country's new constitution. The shah complained about the lack of support from the U.S. and the British embassies to the last days of his life. The kind of support he had in mind is not clear, but obviously the human rights advocates inside and outside of the U.S. State Department became a major obsession. This change of attitude toward the shah in the U.S. had a tremendous importance in igniting the revolution. Another major factor was the shah's poor health. He had concentrated absolute power around himself so much that when, due to his illness, he was no longer able to operate effectively, the system was greatly weakened — especially since the shah's removal had become the main task of the revolution.

Eventually, the revolution erupted in every urban center in 1978. The first killed were people who had built shanty houses on the Tehran outskirts where construction was prohibited. Intellectuals also shook the system with their street demonstrations and "nights of poetry reading" devoted to reciting revolutionary literature. Later, new government workers paralyzed the bureaucracy with a general strike. The remnants of Mossadegh's National Front first squabbled over the selection of a leader but, having done so, eventually managed to mobilize a number of street demonstrations independent of the clergy. In the end, the Front's major element kissed Khomeini's hands in Paris. The right-wing faction of the Front — the section which had been most enthusiastic about the shah's land reform — accepted the shah and gave him his last prime minister.

The clergy followed the old pattern: they joined the movement after it had already started and took over leadership as an independent force. Shariati's politicized religion had won widespread support and the clergy did nothing to oppose it. Only after the revolution did the clergy announce its own version of Islam: the Islam of 1400 years ago, with no modifications.

The working class has no specific organization to represent it and was dispersed among various organizations. Yet, it was able to strike the last blow to the shah's system in the oil fields with its unified strike. The left, consisting mainly of people released from prison during the revolution, were not effective organizers. The urban guerrillas called themselves the "armed hand of the revolution," while millions of people dismantled the shah's apparatus by peaceful means. Eventually they did organize the masses to take over the army barracks and that changed the course of the revolution.

Following a traditional pattern in Iran, rebellion concentrated on eliminating the old order through massive urban demonstrations. Plans for constructing a new society for the future were postponed. During such a revolution, the nihilistic and

13. The peasantry in the villages did not participate in the revolution. Some of these peasants, in fact, were recruited by the government to serve as thugs to attack demonstrators. Their lack of support for the revolution may be explained by their satisfaction with land reforms, which destroyed the feudal composition of the villages and helped the middle peasantry.

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adventuristic clergy provided the perfect leadership. They had no clear policy, but a strong hatred for the shah's rule. Today, it is still difficult to determine the patterns of clerical rule from its day-to-day responses to problems. Since it has no program, the clergy seems to have chosen the road of adventurism.

The urban poor have remained faithful to the clergy and many of them have been recruited into the new coercive apparatus: the Guardians of Revolution, the Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed, and the infamous *Hezb Allah* (the Party of God), whose members resemble Nazi storm troopers. Many of the merchants who supported the revolution have benefited from the demise of the bureaucratic apparatus. Some have even gained political power and have profited from the hyper-inflation, estimated to be between 30 and 100 percent.

During the revolution, international capital and the local bourgeoisie felt very uneasy about the fall of the shah. Thus, it turned to figures such as Bazargan, who advocated the "same system but without the shah." Due to pressures from the left, when he became the first prime minister of the revolutionary government, Bazargan shifted increasingly to the right. An industrial entrepreneur with no ties to foreign capital, Bazargan became a staunch supporter of a dependent economic system. At the same time, he and his administration ingored the clergy. The seizure of the American hostages was the turning point. Not only did this allow the clergy to remove the Bazargan administration, but it also provided them with a revolutionary and anti-imperialist image.

The quick victory over the shah's system, for which the clergy took full credit, added to their pride and resulted in an increasingly adventuristic posture. The shutdown of the higher education system is an example of the anti-modernism which also led it to reject all kinds of national or international alliances. The rejection of Westernization as "Westernomania" brought about an unproductive approach to development. Attacking Western culture as "evil" is a good common tactic for revolutionary mobilization. But after the victory, when revolutionary governments are forced to live with the achievements of that same culture, the boundary between evil and non-evil becomes arbitrary. Thus, the Iranian clergy now label "Westernomania" all non-clerical trends, from the National Front's nationalism to the Mojahedeen's religious socialism and the Fedayeen's Marxism.

Unable to motivate the masses rationally, the clergy appeal to emotions. This explains the overemphasis on religion and constant street demonstrations. The mythology of the unity of politics and religion in Islam has resulted in the practical subordination of religion to the clergy's politics, to the point that it is now an ideology of oppression.

The clergy's anti-imperialism is ambiguous. The universities were shut down on the pretext of purifying the educational system from imperialist influences, and there has never been any hesitation to apply the label "imperialist" to democracy or social freedom. Earlier, Khomeini had attacked only the United States as imperialist. Later, he extended the label to the USSR as the "imperialist of the East." Bani-Sadr wanted Iran to look for friends in Western Europe and Japan as "capitalist" but "non-imperialist" societies. The clerical state, however, continues to postpone international alliances since it has not yet begun rebuilding the country's infrastructures. Thus, its anti-imperialism cannot be long-lasting or effective. As a ruling class, the clergy has no reason to stay away from political or economic alliances with international capital, even though it has been anti-imperialist during its struggle for power. This can be deferred only as long as the clerical state avoids any clear

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political and economic strategy. As soon as such a strategy develops, past moral objections to imperialism will give way to more realistic calculations. The anti-imperialist rhetoric will remain, but alongside massive exchanges of oil for consumer goods.

The clergy realizes that a functioning economic and political system requires its own technocrats and bureaucrats. This is why it prefers a state of chaos. Still, Khomeini's rule remains conditionally the rule of the people. But this only goes to show that the people cannot really rule without intellectuals and bureaucrats. The clerical state is determined to reverse history. But to do so it will have to unleash repressive programs ten times harsher than those of its predecessor, who only wanted to safeguard the status quo. These nihilistic policies will continue as long as no new revolutionary force emerges to change the course of Iranian history once again.

Besides the hyperinflation and national bankruptcy, four major events have drastically affected present-day Iran: the war with Iraq, Bani-Sadr's ouster, the mass slaughter of revolutionary youth in Iran, and the clergy's dominance over political institutions. While the war was obviously a result of the Iraqi attack on Iran, it was encouraged by two adventuristic acts by the Iranian clergy: the hostage crisis, which isolated Iran and made it vulnerable to outside attack, and the provocation by Iraqi Shiites against Baghdad to create another "Islamic Republic." The clergy initiated these actions hastily and defensively. Bani-Sadr's infiltration of the clerical state and subsequent attacks on the clergy created considerable disillusionment, which strengthened the opposition movement. As a result, the clergy abruptly put an end to any post-revolutionary liberalism and established a full-fledged clerical dictatorship. Although the clerical elites can still manipulate religious feelings, and its brutality is still interpreted as a religious necessity or revolutionary decisiveness, it is losing ground rapidly. The Islamic Republic's slogan of "neither West nor East" is proving to be hollow given its ever increasing dependency on commodities from both the West and the East.

Social and political polarization is intensifying. A number of Marxist groups, such as the Tudeh Party and Fedayeen (the Majority section) have sided with the clergy on the basis of the Zhdanovian line of "two camps," whereby anything against imperialism is on the side of socialism and progress. Thus, the clerical state is seen as progressive because of its anti-Americanism. The fact that the clerical state has ruined the material and cultural basis for any progress in the country is seen by these groups as mere mistakes due to the inexperience of the newly established regime. These Marxist apologists disregard the slaughter machine designed to silence any voice not in total accord with its medieval tone, thus documenting once again the deep crisis of institutionalized Marxism in the Third World.

On the other side, the Mojahedeen movement (originally an urban guerrilla organization that branched out of the religious wing of the National Front in 1974) has confronted the clerical state. Its ideology is a combination of Marxist methodology and Islamic rhetoric. It enjoys the support of educated urban youth, the intelligentsia, and the middle classes. Its tactics have been mainly terroristic and have turned out to be particularly unsuccessful in that it has excluded Khomeini as a target, thus leaving intact the main source of the system's legitimacy and regeneration. In a sense, Bani-Sadr's defeat and his eventual alliance with the Mojahedeen was unavoidable. As a symbol of emerging emancipatory forces, he could neither collaborate with the clerical state nor win it over. He did the best he could by infiltrating the system and exposing it from within as long as possible.

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After expelling Bani-Sadr, the clerical state has not attained the level of cohesion it had expected. The permanent feuding among members of the ruling clergy is one of the major obstacles to the system's stability.

Earlier, Ayatollah Shariatmadari and lately a cleric named Tehrani were the major critics of the clerical dictatorship. They are both silenced now. The uprising of the clerics and young theologians in the holy city of Qom in September 1980 testified to the emerging gap between the ruling clergy and other clerics. The ruling clergy themselves are divided over a number of issues, including the succession of Ayatollah Khomeini, private ownership of land, nationalization of foreign trade, international relations, and so on. On the question of a successor to Khomeini, there has been a long-standing but covert feuding among the clergy. Some preferred Ayatollah Montazeri, while others demanded a council of *Faqihs*. As far as private ownership of land was concerned, top clergymen such as the late Beheshti and Meshkini asked for a radical redistribution of agricultural land according to Koranic laws, which claim that land belongs only to God. But others wanted a more moderate land reform, or none at all. The end result, ratified by the Islamic *Majlis*, is very much a continuation of the shah's land reform. The takeover of the foreign trade by the state also was resisted by some clerics inside and outside the *Majlis*. Now that it is being ratified, the extent of its application and effectiveness remains to be seen, with regard to the shortages management faces and the lack of a nationwide distribution network. But the mere fact that the state has decided to operate foreign trade — the main source of profit for bazaar merchants — discredits one of the commonly held left views, which sees the state as a meer tool of the commercial bourgeoisie. Once again, in Iran political decision-making gives shape to the economic processes and act in relative independence of economic classes.

Another area of major disagreement within the ruling clergy is the direction of international relations. It is widely believed that Khomeini and his clique are in favor of closer ties to the Soviet Union, while another powerful group of insiders (Anjoman é Hojjatieh Society) is more interested in closer ties to the United States and Western Europe. By any account, relations with the Soviet Union have improved, but not to the extent claimed by the Western media, seeking to prove the Russian menace in Iran. The Soviets have opened their waterways to Iran and trade has reached a record level of $1,100 million in 1981, 30 percent higher than in 1978, the last year of the shah's rule. On the other hand, export of natural gas to the Soviet Union is not resumed yet, and the Soviets recently complained of the hostile attitude of some "extremist members" of the Iranian government.[14]

To be sure, Iran has broken out of the monopoly of the U.S. and West European market. While in the fiscal year 1977-1978 the proportion of imports from the West was 74 percent of total imports as against 8 percent from COMECON, in 1980 it changed to 60 percent and 15 percent, respectively. But changes in foreign trade are mainly based on pragmatic rather than ideological considerations. Western economic sanctions against Iran and better deals and availability of credit, oil barter for commodity and the supply of arms from the Eastern bloc explain the improvement of trade with COMECON countries. In spite of diversification of the sources of trade, however, dependency on foreign trade is increased due to the drop in Iran's GNP, which hardly reached two-thirds of the amount seen during the shah's regime.

The end of the war against Iraq would be a turning point in Iranian politics, and

14. *Iran Times,* XII:1 (March 16, 1982).

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much more so than the death of Khomeini, for which the ruling clergy is preparing. If Iran were to win — which seems likely — the ruling clergy would do their best to prevent the army from deriving much credit. Activities are under way to strengthen the Organization for the Mobilization of the Oppressed and the Guardians of the Revolution. These two militia organizations outnumber the army and are taking over the army's sophisticated weapons. Once the war is over, the ruling clergy may try to marginalize the army and locate its own military apparatuses inside the urban barracks. Therefore, the army, enraged by these actions and harassed by relentless purges, may enter into open conflict against the ruling clergy. At that point, the army can count on its national credibility. It is likely, however, that the clergy may continue the Iraqi war to the point that its own military machine becomes mature enough to engulf the regular army.

Winning the war would affect the opposition forces in two contradictory ways: a victorious clergy would not hesitate to unleash even harsher oppression, but it would also lose the state of emergency and would have no more alibis for its protracted social, political, and economic inertia. This would provide the opposition forces with better arguments. The growing coalition forces under the leadership of the Mojahedeen may eventually make a difference then. The fact that the Mojahedeen has resorted to terrorism, however, indicates it is far from creating a mass movement. The regime also may mobilize the urban youth, as volunteers, or by direct and indirect force, to go to the war-damaged areas for reconstruction, which would avoid a conflict with unemployed and frustrated forces. Nevertheless, the spectre of the 1979 revolution continues to haunt the new Iranian rulers, who have not succeeded in removing most of its structural causes.

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Reviews:

Fredric Jameson. *The Political Unconscious.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981. 305 pages.

According to the dust jacket, Jameson is "now the leading Marxist critic in America." Discussions of Marx are expected, yet Jameson often prefers references to Hegel. The book is packed with notes on unhappy consciousness, negation of the negation, etc. Jameson even makes a bow, early on, to the wisdom of the "traditional dialectic," which "teaches us" many things. As a teacher, however, the dialectic turns out not to be very dependable. Here is what it taught Jameson: "...the path of the object and the path of the subject, the historical origins of the things themselves and that more intangible historicity of the concepts and categories by which we attempt to understand those things...only ultimately meet in the same place" (p. 9). Whether it is the teacher's fault or not, Jameson has it all wrong. Continuing the metaphor of the path, absolute knowledge would be the form of thought in which the subject discovers that it itself is the path. On this basis, dialectics is a process of gaining self-knowledge in the other. Jameson holds, however, that the subject and object are fundamentally divided. "We are thus confronted with a choice" between the study of the objective structure of a work and "the interpretive categories or codes through which we read and receive the text." Since "we never confront a thing in itself" a grim choice is ahead. "For better or for worse," Jameson decides for the second path; he will study the codes and not the texts (p. 9). This cancels the possibility of dialectical knowledge.

Hegel had a better sense of humor about philosophical problems. Kant, he wrote somewhere, must never have seen how a grazing cow deals with the thing in itself: the cow gobbles it right up. Hegel's fun would confirm Adorno's critique of the positive side of the Hegelian dialectic. It is the belly turned mind. Jameson has garbled the dialectic but he is dedicated to a version of its spirit: "We" wrote this book; "we" have chosen the second path; "we" never confront a thing in itself.

But if subject and object are fully distinct, are united only ultimately, then what is the basis of this "we"? Suspicions of this nature of the author's gregariousness are aroused by his offer to monogram the reader's bath towels: e.g., "when your epistemological break begins to displace itself in time according to your own current interests" (p. 18). The assumed gap between subject and object may be bridged only by the hand of the salesman on the customer's shoulder: the "we" is exerted methodologically. As Jameson puts it, this presupposition that "we never really confront a text...as a thing in itself...dictates the use of a method." But, again, this skews the dialectic. It could not support an external method, let alone one that is dictated. Dialectics must do without methodology per se, because it gains its method from its object. Jameson, in contrast, points to the dialectic while claiming that the object is out of reach and begins the book with a hundred pages on methodology. They must be discussed first. If there is a sense that the discussion of the "political unconscious" is missing, the fault lies elsewhere. In the book's 300 pages, the phrase only occurs some 15 times and it no where receives more than a couple of lines at once. Jameson's theory of the "political unconscious" is mainly the book's title. What it means, however, will eventually be clarified.

On Method

"I have tried to maintain an essentially historicist perspective, in which our readings of the past are vitally dependent on our experiences of the present" (p. 11). The past will only regain its "original urgency," its "life and warmth," if it is retold "within the

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unity of a great collective story." This story is "the collective struggle to wrest a realm of Freedom from a realm of necessity." He quotes twice from Marx to explain what this means: Freedom consists in "socialized men...rationally regulating their interchange with Nature...instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature" — the realm of necessity (p. 19). The "single vast unfinished plot" of the story of freedom is the history of class struggle in which oppressor and oppressed "carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight" which ended in revolution or ruin of the contenders. Parts of the narrative of this story have been "repressed" during the struggle. Jameson will interpretively reconstruct this lost dialogue by means of a theory of the political unconscious.

If human history were described in one story it would be too soggy to be worth reading. A story is not "vast" nor, as Benjamin says in "The Storyteller," can one story exclude others. The idea of "one story" conflicts with the lines that Jameson has quoted from Marx. The dominated class remains within natural necessity; this is the limit to the freedom of the dominating class. This may be one history but its presentation would require at least two stories. A further conclusion from Marx is that humanity is nature which frees itself from blind nature historically; humanity is potentially free nature which would have to be described in terms of a natural history. This would be a dialectical problem. But in spite of his eagerness for dialectics, Jameson concludes that, "History is the experience of Necessity." History is what "refuses desire," reverses intentions and sets limits (p. 104). Jameson does not recognize that this definition wipes out his grand story. If history is not also the experience of freedom, the overcoming of necessity, then history and blind nature are identical.

This might not be too disturbing for Jameson, though, because it is not certain that he is so interested in writing the grand story. In the same early pages where he claims that his interpretations will restore the past to "life and warmth," he also claims that literary history today is — using a phrase that will be seen to be essential to this book — "at one" with Althusser's intention "not to elaborate some achieved and lifelike simulacrum of its supposed object, but rather to 'produce' the latter's 'concept' " (p. 12). Interpretation and the production of an object's concept are contradictory projects. Jameson argues, however, that there is a form of interpretation compatible with Althusser's critique of interpretation.

Jameson begins to elucidate what this form of interpretation would be by presenting Althusser's critical opposition between Hegel's and Marx's concepts of totality and the form of causality that is appropriate for explaining the latter. He agrees with the substance of Althusser's critique of Hegel's expressive causality, but believes that Althusser's own theory of social instances suffers an "ambiguity" in determining the relationship of the semi-autonomous levels to one another; they tend towards complete autonomy and thereby to potentially support "the reified specialization of the bourgeois academic disciplines" (pp. 38-39). Yet Althusser could not have meant to encourage this reification of levels and still have insisted on structural causality.

The source of the problem is that Althusser mistakenly rejected, along with expressive causality, the concept of mediation, "the classical dialectical term of the establishment of relationship." Althusser failed to realize that mediation does not have to produce a precipitous identity of levels. Rather, mediation is the "invention of a set of terms...a device of the analyst, whereby the fragmentation and autonomization, the compartmentalization and specialization of social life...is at least locally overcome." Althusser should not have rejected mediation *tout court* but rather "mechanistic" theories such as Goldmann's which establishes arbitrary homologies. It is Goldmann's theory and not Hegelian mediation which is the proper object of

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Althusser's critique of expressive causality. Althusser's polemic target is "at one" with that of Hegel's, i.e., insufficient mediation.

It is not a serious argument to claim that Althusser's critique of expressive causality accidentally hit mediation while he should have been aiming at mechanistic theories. The problem of the semi-autonomy or autonomy of levels is much more substantial than an "ambiguity" that could be resolved into a hitherto unrecognized oneness of Althusser and Hegel. Althusser's theory required a radical distinction of levels on the basis of fundamental commitments, two of which are immediately apparent. First, Althusser's allegiance to the PCF required a theory that could defend the argument that the Soviet economy is socialist even though its culture is not. Second, his Bachelardian epistemology determined a model of social structure which would not impinge on the possibility of a break between theory and other levels, particularly of ideology. Althusser correctly recognized that "mediation" in the "classical sense" would puncture the semi-autonomy of these levels. Their tendency towards autonomy is therefore objective and not an "ambiguity."

While Jameson has hardly shown how Althusser could have maintained the concept of mediation, he gives such a different picture of the concept that it is a question what "classic" of dialectics he has in mind. Jameson describes mediation as a code for unifying divergent objects. That is not mediation in Hegel's sense. Mediation could not be a third term that is applied from the outside, for in an expressive totality every element is mediatory; it is the process by which the concept realizes itself and as such this process could only be obscured by the "inventions" of an analyst.

Yet Jameson is immediately dissatisfied with his definition of mediation, for an invented code, he complains, would establish a unity that would be no more than a "methodological fiction." But how can mediation be more than a fiction and yet maintain intact the extreme social differentiation required by Althusser's theory? Jameson seems not to notice the problem and simply tries to shake off the fictionality in the spirit of a narrative "we"; a humanity which is "one story;" an Althusser and Hegel who are "at one" in their polemic target: mediation is only a fiction if one fails to understand "that social life is in its fundamental reality one and indivisible, a seamless web, a single inconceivable and transhistorical process." Although he just defined mediation as "the invention of a set of terms," he now claims that "there is no need to invent ways of linking language events and social upheavals or economic contradiction because. . . they were never separate from one another." Now society is "one." Therefore, "the realm of separation, of fragmentation, of the explosion of codes and the multiplicity of disciplines is merely the reality of appearance" (p. 40).

This is a national anthem, not social theory. Jameson is talking himself to sleep. Society is not "one and indivisible," it is hacked up and fissured, a place where people play for keeps and use real bullets. The argument is a rationalization. It begins by proposing an abstract theory of mediation to overcome the tendency towards reified autonomy, "fragmentation. . . autonomization. . . compartmentalization. . . and specialization" in daily life and Althusser's theory. Jameson recognized, however, that the fictionality of his theory of mediation fails to resolve fragmentation. To wipe out the fictionality of mediation he abstractly unified society. This unification requires, however, wiping out the counter evidence, the experience of fragmentation which was the momentum of the argument in the first place. The argument buries itself. Jameson tries to cloud up the form of his argument by calling, as usual, on Hegel to take credit for the thought that fragmentation is only "appearance": fragmentation "exists, as Hegel would put it, not so much *in itself* but *for us*" (p. 40). But it is hardly a Hegelian

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perspective in which the world is "one" whereas appearance is just a fad. The depersonalized character of the phrase "merely the reality of appearance" expresses the opposite of what it says. The thought follows the same arc as the impulse to put a lacerated finger into the mouth. If it won't be so frightening so long as it can't be seen, then appearance has gained a magical edge over the wound.

This characterizes Jameson's thought throughout the book. Problems are stated and then excluded by gutting the reality of experience, usually by appealing to some form of unity. He writes, for instance, at the top of one page that the distinction of public and private "maims our existence as individual subjects," but at the bottom of the same page, that the attempt to escape into privacy is "purely individual, a merely psychological project of salvation." These attempts fail to understand that "everything is 'in the last analysis' political" (p. 20). Again, a virtually metaphysical unity dissolves experience.

It is not Hegel and Althusser who are joined in all this. In Hegel's *Phenomenology*, truth is achieved on the basis of a *reine Zusehen*. It is, rather, Jameson and Althusser who agree in the rejection of the truth value of experience, which they identify with ideology, "the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence" (p. 181). The subject does not create these imaginings: rather, the system of ideology constitutes a subject who has these thoughts on whose basis the subject may adequately function within the requirements of the social system. It is therefore not possible to produce knowledge of the system within experience, but only by making a clean break from it. The object of knowledge must be held fully distinct from the experiential object. According to Althusser's often quoted phrase: the idea of the circle must be completely distinguished from the real circle. The end of experience is raised to the level of an epistemological doctrine.

Interpretation and the Political Unconscious

Jameson was going to show how interpretation is coherent with Althusser's critique. It is surprising, then, that at the end of the section on Althusser, without developing Althusser's critique of interpretation, he simply praises "the originality of Althusserian interpretation, particularly as it is developed in Macherey's work" (p. 57). Macherey, who developed an Althusserian form of literary criticism, explicitly rejects interpretation. This rejection is based on the denial of any epistemological value to experience — a conclusion to which Jameson has also come. If experience has no truth value then interpretation must fall to the same criticism which Plato directed at art: it is only a copy of appearance which impedes thought's trajectory towards the concept. Rather than interpreting a work, Macherey takes it apart to explain its social precondition. Jameson, then, is both right and wrong when he continues that the "originality" of this type of interpretation is that it "may be formulated. . . as a deductive operation." It is deductive, evidently in the sense of a transcendental deduction which determines an object's preconditions. But, the most original aspect of this type of interpretation is that it is not interpretive. In contrast to psychoanalytic interpretation, which must begin with the most conscious layer of thought and constantly return to it, a transcendental deduction begins with an object and determines its conceptual necessities. It goes in the opposite direction from experience. It is in the interest of this type of analysis that Jameson admires "the concept of the text," which "liberates us from the empirical object — whether institution, event or individual work — by displacing our attention to its constitution as an object" (p. 297).

This relationship between structuralism and Kantian analysis is evident in Lévi-

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Strauss' important essay, "The Structuralist Analysis of Myth," which is the background to Jameson's theory of the political unconscious. Whereas Kant determined the logical structure of an object and showed that the highest principle of thought is reason's principle of totality, Lévi-Strauss analyzes the logical structure of cultural objects and argues that the most unifying and intelligible cultural form is myth. This form is a mental structure, the mind's, the *pensée sauvage*'s most powerful logical tool for resolving its most difficult problems. According to Lévi-Strauss, this structure is "unconscious."

This idea, along with the method for analyzing structures, is fundamental to Jameson's theory of the political unconscious. Jameson even refers to the political unconscious as the "historical pensée sauvage" (p. 167). Where Jameson's theory can be deciphered, the political unconscious is held to be a structure that solves social problems in literature on a symbolic level. Jameson shows several ways in which this structure works in the novels of Balzac, Gissing, and Conrad, each of whom receives a chapter. The primary form of analysis, however, uses Greimas' modification of Lévi-Strauss' formula of myth to analyze the ideology of novels. A novel has a fundamental antinomy which is a symptom of a social contradiction. The antinomical terms generate their opposite which sets up a four-term oppositional system. The mind attempts to resolve the tension of this system by combining the terms; these combinations are the novels' characters, who are therefore "effects" of the system (p. 243). The character system is an ideological symbolic act that manages a social problem.

It is not worth repeating in detail any of these analyses, which are based on an obviously a-historical psychological model of what Jameson calls "ideological closure." The analyses are generally unable to define more than four characters or groups in a novel and are not convincing. The analysis of Conrad's *Lord Jim*, for instance, fails to include central characters (Stein, Marlow, Dain Warus) in the system and claims that Jim is the "ideal synthesis" of the antinomy of activity and ethical value; he is the unity of the energy of capitalism and organic immanence of religion. It is only possible, however, to see Jim as this ideal unity so long as his own experience in the novel is not permitted to disturb the novel's transcendental core. Jim gets shot as a necessity of his character, a point which Jameson fails to mention. His character is not an ideal unity, but one more mechanism of fate with which Conrad's novels are concerned. Jameson separates the plot from the character system, just as he divided the experience of fragmentation from society's "oneness." This is, again, within the framework of the Kantian dualism of form and content.

After showing how the work is a symbolic act, it is considered as a parole of the general antagonistic class dialogue which is a *langue* composed of *ideologemes*, "the smallest intelligible unit of essentially antagonistic collective discourse" (p. 76). After the *langue* has been reconstructed along with the repressed sections of the dialogue of the dominated class, then the work is taken as a force field in which various modes of production appear, each admitting a characteristic message in the struggle of cultural revolution.

This analysis, however, can hardly be begun. Jameson does not explain how to differentiate the smallest from any other size of ideology. The discussion of ideologemes is therefore primarily a pseudo-structuralist flourish. Since it would not be possible to construct a *langue* without figuring out what these smallest parts are, it is not surprising that no *langue* of class conflict is determined.

Taking the Greimasian model, as Jameson modifies it, as the core of his textual

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analysis (and apparently of the political unconscious), how can he claim to have described an unconscious in Freud's sense (p. 282)? The characters are the "effect" of conflict within this unconscious. But what is opposed to the unconscious? According to Freud, the unconscious and the conscious, the id and the ego, only exist in so far as they are in conflict with one another and the super ego. The ego is not the effect of the unconscious except when it collapses. The unconscious requires the ego in order to be unconscious. There is no unconscious without repression and no repression without an ego. But no ego is involved in Jameson's theory. If the unconscious is simply a mechanism that generates characters who are ideological knots, then it is no more unconscious than the workings of a radio. Analyzing this type of unconscious could describe circuitry but not recover repressed memories. This is the crucial issue. Jameson's analyses do not and could not free any material from repression. The claim made at the beginning of the book to recover dialogue is not only not realized, but hardly attempted.

Where he does take up the problem of repression and tries to distinguish the surface of a work from its depth, he is unable to describe the tension. He turns up analyses which actually claim such things as that an element of a story has been "repressed" because it is "too well known and stereotypical to need representation" (p. 139). This hardly requires comment. Something which is too well known is not repressed. The least coherent attempt at describing repression, however, one which threatens to unravel the whole book, concludes a discussion of Conrad. High modernism, Jameson claims, including writers such as Kafka and Beckett, "represses History." "At that point. . . the political, no longer visible. . . has at last become a genuine Unconscious" (p. 280). Jameson capitalizes history and the unconscious the way that 'folk music' written in the 1960s thickens the harmony when it is most critically unable to achieve any intensity. But even if the hieroglyphic regression does not belie the concepts, the thought undermines each of the book's analyses. If there was no "genuine" political unconscious prior to high modernism, then what was the political unconscious which Jameson analyzes in terms of character systems, etc., in the earlier chapters on Balzac, Gissing and Conrad? Does this mean that genuine repression also does not exist prior to high modernism? How does Jameson justify the claim that it "is not the object of this book to consider" high modernism if this is the point at which the book's topic properly begins (p. 280)?

Desire, the Self and Narration

"Realism and Desire: Balzac and the Problem of the Subject," chapter 3, discusses the transformation of desire, the self and narration between the early 19th and early 20th century. The history, which is developed by comparing the subject in Balzac with the modern subject in Dreiser, is both wrong and misrepresents both authors. Jameson argues that there is no hero or privileged point of view in Balzac's novels; the self is not yet "mature" or "centered." The narrative rotates through the characters. Desire remains anonymous and therefore utopic as an allegory for all desire. In Dreiser's *Sister Carrie*, however, the self is a point of view, a sealed "closed monad, henceforth governed by the laws of psychology," whose desire is purely private.

Leibniz described the self as a monad in 1710; a history which claims that it first became a monad in the 20th century requires the exclusion of history. But not only is the history implausible, neither has Jameson accurately described a monad. Though it is self-enclosed, it is not purely private in the derogatory sense of *privatus*. Rather, a monad is a spiritual force which contains a mirror of totality seen from a certain perspective in the chain of being. Monads group together into larger monads and are

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coordinated with one another by God's predetermined harmony. This model of the self would more accurately describe characters of liberal capitalism and their relations in Balzac's *Les Illusions Perdues* than modern subjectivity. In Balzac's novel, characters struggle individually, sometimes as couples, with no obvious external order, yet ultimately one couple, who has been most diligent and reasonable, ends up moderately content and wealthy and able to bear the losses sustained on the way.

What distinguishes these characters and makes them increasingly astonishing from the modern perspective is that they actually exert themselves to do what they have decided to do. Desire and will are relatively coordinated as is the activity of individuals among themselves in spite of the chaotic struggle. This, according to Erich Kahler, is the basis of Balzac's narrative sweep; it is a monadology of liberal capitalism written at the completion, not during the formation, of bourgeois individuality. Not only are the individuals absolute, yet substantial, in the autonomy of their struggles, but the narrative self, the omniscient narrator, allows no trace of the work's construction to disturb the phantasmagorical illusion of the work's autonomy. Jameson's claim that Balzac's novels predate the 'centered self' is as obscure as Althusser's contention that Hegel discovered history has no subject. Both delete the absolute subject.

Individuality requires the perception of intention as having an internal origin. The usual adulation of the sweep of Balzac's narrative overlooks how the breadth of narrative predicates the loss of this perception. As Erich Kahler also points out, characters who only achieve significance through the detailed representation of their whole lives are characters who tend towards meaninglessness in the instant. Individuality loses its substance as its conflict with society intensifies. Desire becomes increasingly objective, not subjective, to the subject who cannot realize it. The coordination of desire and the will dissolves along with the competitive possibilities of liberal capitalism. This is the early history of modern subjectivity.

The subjects who appear in *Sister Carrie* are neither individuals nor monads in Leibniz's or Jameson's sense. In a scene towards the end of the novel, a crowd of beggars is waiting to be led off to a flop house. As their fear of being bedless for the night decreases, "they begin leaning towards sociability. Politics, religion, the state of government, some newspaper sensations, and the more notorious facts of the world over, found mouthpieces and auditors" (Dreiser, 1972, p. 447). This is not only the fate of people at the bottom. Hurstwood, who eventually runs off with Carrie, is initially a wealthy banker. In the course of the novel his desire for Carrie, which is sexus and not eros, results in his financial and personal ruin. "The movement of his lips aroused him. He wondered whether he had really spoken. The next time he noticed anything of the sort he really did talk" (*ibid.*, p. 46). The relationship of these men to what they say is the same as that between Jameson's character system and the empirical characters who are its "effects." The self does not mediate events but has become their occasion, just as it becomes the occasion of the need for sleep and conversation.

Jameson confuses individuality with enfeebled subjectivity and misconstrues the scenes when the novel presents the possibility of overcoming the latter. A winter scene from the beginning of the novel is a good instance. Carrie, who is poor, a country girl on her own trying to find work in Chicago, rides across town in an open carriage at dusk. Through the windows of the passing houses she catches glimpses of interiors lit by the "mellow radiance" of lamps. Their light dissolves the embalmed rigor of middle-class furniture on display: "Now it was a chair, now a table, now an ornate corner which met her eye, but it appealed to her as almost nothing else could.... She

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imagined that across these richly carved entrance ways, where the globed and crystalled lamps shone upon panelled doors set with stained and designed panes of glass, was neither care nor unsatisfied desire." The carriages speed, constantly narrowing and increasing the distance of these interiors, gives sight the form of a wish. "Such childish fancies as she had had of fairy palaces and kingly quarters now came back.... She was perfectly certain that here was happiness." Jameson quotes this scene at length but understands it from the opposite perspective from which it has just been presented. He describes Carrie's longing as "the tawdriness of...hunger for trinkets...commodity lust." Her wish is "private" and she has become a point of view which is a textual devise that produces the "centered subject of the age of reification." The utopian impulse has been reified and "driven back inside the monad," where it becomes "a merely psychological experience" (p. 160).

Jameson's rejection of the "merely psychological" is necessarily subjectivistic. It suffers from the same limitation as does his theory of the unconscious. Just as the concept of the unconscious requires that of consciousness, so objectivity requires subjectivity. Jameson's inclination to try to correct the failure to achieve objectivity by the exclusion of one side of the relationship is an aspect of his identification of art as a four term model of ideological closure. It would fail to understand a conversation between Carrie and a friend who convinces her to give up vaudeville for the serious drama at which she ultimately succeeds. Ames says to her, " 'The first time I saw you I thought you were about to cry.' 'How odd,' said Carrie.... She looked away...longing to be equal to this feeling written on her face" (Dreiser, pp. 458-459). She does not look away to cry. Rather, as the narrator explains of Carrie, who becomes allegorical of artistic development in the course of the novel, her future "was forever to be the pursuit of that radiance of delight which tints the distant hilltops of the world." Art that is adequate to the expression of the face achieves something more than that. From this perspective, objective reason is still subjective. The ego's strength includes the possibility of its own suspension. Art's force, as Adorno would argue, is the explosion of the ideological.

Ideology and Utopia

Jameson has an altogether different view of ideology and art. This is explained in the book's last chapter, which proposes a "non-instrumental" Marxist hermeneutic. It would resist the reduction of thought and culture to economic interests. To develop the key thought of this hermeneutic Jameson works over Benjamin's famous line that there is "no document of civilization which is not at one and the same time a document of barbarism." Jameson finds this thought insufficiently dialectical. A "dialectical reversal" is required which in this case means resolving the tension in Benjamin's thought into Jameson's own preferred form, Brahma: the ideological is in fact "one with utopia" and utopia is "one with the ideological" (p. 286). The basis of this identity is that all ideology, which is the form of class consciousness, "expresses the unity of a collectivity" and is therefore "utopian" — as is the ideological in art.

In Musil's *Man Without Qualities*, Ulrich is mauled by a gang on his way home from a party. He can't stand to think that he was just randomly attacked; it impinges on his self-regard. He is reassured by convincing himself that the gang mistook him for someone else. A mistaken identity is preferable to none at all. This is funny in the novel because it is clear that the ease and conclusiveness of the thought has been achieved by dissociation from the self which the establishment of self-identity was to preserve. Jameson has reached his conclusion in the same fashion. He could even argue, as an example of his non-instrumental hermeneutic, that Ulrich had reconciled

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himself artificially. That was not a gang that beat him up, it was a passing fraction of the utopian. The bruises which would clarify the difference between the ideological and the utopian have been deleted. Ulrich is stiff the next morning, but overall he has the health of a comic-book character; Jameson's "positive hermeneutic" likewise sloughs off those other hermeneutics "still limited by the anarchist categories of the individual subject and individual experience" (p. 286).

The *Gedächtniskirche* begins to waltz towards Munich. Jameson sees his thought that "all class consciousness. . . is in its very nature utopian" confirmed in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (p. 286). Although the utopian hermeneutic is obscured through much of the book by "an embattled commitment to high culture," towards the end of the book "anti-Semitism is shown to be profoundly utopian in character" (p. 288).

Jameson began with the claim to have "tried to maintain an essentially historicist perspective, in which our readings of the past are vitally dependent on our experience of the present." But he excludes any truth value from experience, identifies it with ideology, and instead of interpreting novels, he deduces their conditions. Indifference to the experience of the present becomes indifference to the past. Characters become effects of a system, likewise indifferent to their experience, with the result that no dynamic unconscious may be described. This may be contrasted with an interpretive theory, psychoanalysis, which tries to cure the past through the present. The ego frees itself from repression by reliving the past and interpreting it; the recovery of lost memories amounts to the transformation of drive-defense into drive-impulse. The present only becomes the present by the release of the past. The limit of psychoanalytic interpretation, however, when directed towards art is that it can describe a work's origins, but not its aesthetic significance. Art achieves its significance only by excluding these origins.

Jameson's theory, likewise, can only analyze the necessities of a work's functional origins. Art's value beyond these origins must be added on with a grotesque theory of the "utopic." His non-instrumental hermeneutic cannot just switch back from the deduction of structures to experience and the value of collectivity. What sense does it make to return to experience in order to pursue a "collective impulse" (p. 293) when the world is already "one" and fragmentation exists only "for us"? Wouldn't utopia also be "merely. . . for us?" Jameson is obliged to crash around with a fully faded out photograph of "utopia" because the exclusion of experience has reduced his thought to stereotypes, the form of thought in which subjectivity mimics rather than achieves objectivity. That the subjective, nevertheless, remains the final measure of thought which proposes to exclude the subjective is clear in Jameson's final argument for the value of his non-instrumental Marxist hermeneutic: "It is increasingly clear in today's world. . . that a Left which cannot grasp the immense utopian appeal" of cultural objects "can scarcely hope to 'reappropriate' such collective energies and must effectively doom itself to political impotence" (p. 298). The content of Jameson's theory is camouflaged by the quotation marks around reappropriation.

Robert Kantor

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T.J. Jackson Lears. *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture 1880-1920.* New York: Pantheon, 1981.

In 1782, Goethe spoke of his fear that at some point in the future, "the world will have turned into one huge hospital where everyone is everyone else's humane nurse." [1] Recently, Rieff and Lasch have described at great length the widespread allegiance to a therapeutic world view in America.[2] In *No Place of Grace,* Jackson Lears is concerned with the origin of today's search for authenticity that is characterized primarily by a hedonistic non-morality, a "vision of a self in endless development" which "is perfectly attuned to an economy based on pointless growth and ceaseless destruction" (pp. 306-307). According to Lears, the shift away from the republican moralism of the past to the modern search for self-fulfillment began in the latter part of the 19th century when the bourgeoisie underwent a "crisis of cultural authority."

Lears speaks of the sense of "weightlessness" experienced by the educated strata of the Northern bourgeoisie, many of whom were mired in ethical confusion as supernatural frameworks of meaning, particularly Protestant theology, began to evaporate. He explores the attempts to shore up a fragmented identity by members of the upper class who felt trapped in the sterile confines of a highly rationalized, over-civilized world and charts their uneven movement toward an anti-modernist vision embracing intense physical and spiritual practices of Oriental, medieval, and primitive origin. There began to flourish cults of outer experience, embodied in the interest in primeval rusticity, preindustrial craftsmanship, social reform, and even militarism, as well as cults of inner experience reflected in the convictions of mystics, mind-curists, occultists, and Orientalists. By focusing considerable attention on the inner lives of significant members of the bourgeoisie of the late 19th century, Lears suggests that their "half conscious hopes and aspirations" "pervaded the middle and upper classes" and came to shape American society.[3]

He seeks "to revise Gramsci by drawing on Freud" to show the way in which upper class family tensions "had *unintended* social results: the revitalization and transformation of their class' cultural hegemony" (p. xv).[4] Lears indicates that though anti-modernism began as an attack upon desiccated bourgeois values, it either provided the basis for the revitalization of the old republican moralism in the emphasis upon strenuosity or it became the source for new forms of domination in the 20th century since the quest for intense experience was increasingly absorbed by consumer capitalism, which stressed the importance of immediate gratification. According to

1. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Italian Journey 1786-1788,* entry for May 27, 1782, trans. W.H. Auden and E.B. Mayer (New York, 1962), p. 312. Quoted in Lears, p. 56.

2. Philip Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud* (New York, 1966); Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism* (New York, 1978).

3. In speaking of the rapprochement between the American bourgeoisie and anti-modernism, Lears is referring not so much to powerful businessmen or politicians but primarily to "journalists, academics, ministers, and literati whose circumstances ranged from the wealthy to the moderately comfortable. While they often did not share the world view of businessmen or politicians, they often did share kinship ties, educational background, and sources of income. Old-stock, Protestant, they were the moral and intellectual leaders of the American WASP bourgeoisie, who joined their British counterparts in shaping a transatlantic Victorian culture and who helped (sometimes unwittingly) to maintain dominant norms and values" (p. xiv).

4. One of Lears' concerns is to urge methodological reconsiderations since he is reacting against the tendency of some Marxists to view culture as simply a "static 'superstructure,' " rather than a "continuous process" that "generates dissent as well as accommodation" (pp. xv-xvi). For him "culture is not 'determined' by class structure. The two co-exist in a dialectical process: each continually reshapes the other" (p. xvi).

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Lears, only when anti-modernists were able to transcend the narrowness of self-concern did their critique become a significant challenge to the social order.

That this protest was often of a fundamentally religious nature is an indication of the degree to which secularization had taken hold in America. However, Lears rejects "the stale and mistaken view" (p. xvi) that anti-modernists reflected the death of a patriciate which was unable to adjust to the new forces of industrialism. Rather, he suggests, they helped revitalize traditional bourgeois values and eased the transition to corporate capitalism.

Sympathy for aspects of the republican tradition of the American past signified an attempt to create a moral revolution in the face of the disintegration of the Calvinist ethic of sacrifice and self-control. What was once a faith that imaged a fitful, omnipotent God whose subjects' perception of hell was not a metaphor for evil but a horrendous place had become "a bland religion of reassurance" (p. 23). For the older cyclical notion of history in which man's innate depravity limited the possibilities for reform, a positivist sense of reality was substituted. There emerged "a Christ-centered evolutionary creed which married spiritual to material progress and preached universal salvation" (p. 23).

To the anti-modernists of the late 19th century, this new body of belief was inadequate. First, they were not unduly optimistic about the significance of material growth. Like earlier republican moralists, they were concerned with the way this creed might justify the "slothful ease" of urban luxury and promote a loss of public responsibility. Lears points out that here the anti-modernist critique reflected class and ethnic fears since a rootless urban proletariat began to develop, composed of a large immigrant population. Fearing physical and moral enervation, some members of the bourgeoisie railed against the conveniences of the modern age and admired the rigorous lives of their ancestors.

If anti-modernists could be drawn to a stringent "masculine" ego ideal, they were equally susceptible to yearnings for "feminine" dependency. Increasingly, the idea of individual autonomy was challenged not only by the bureaucratization of daily life in urban areas but also by a growing recognition of the inherent frailty of the ego since depth psychology began to provide an intellectual framework for acknowledging the power of unconscious forces. Although anti-modernists, like other Victorians, tried to use the family as a place to vent their impulses, they were overly sensitive to the contradictory demands emanating from this "haven." As much as the home was sought as an emotional refuge, it was invaded by the world outside. For women were required to be submissive as well as to be pillars of strength by upholding a sentimental domestic ideal; and men were allowed to nurture their dependency needs in order to compete better in the public realm. Regardless of gender, because one was required to maintain persistent conscious control in all aspects of life, sexual as well as aggressive impulses found few outlets.

Thus many people, particularly those representing the educated bourgeoisie, experienced psychic crises that usually took the form of immobilizing depressions. Without the old theological sanctions it became more difficult for men and women to uphold the standards of the genteel age. Yet, the internalized morality of the past still exerted considerable influence, so that yearnings for release, especially for intense experience, were found threatening. The rage generated in this process was often turned inward, reflected in morbid forms of introspection and even nervous prostration.

In this context, anti-modernists gravitated toward various forms of "mind-cure in which unconscious mental powers" were usually deprived of their darker side and

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viewed as a source of strength. According to Lears, in rejecting the excessive rationalizations of modern culture, therapists promoted accommodation to the social order by urging that these " 'liberated' impulses be channeled into 'constructive' purposes" through the integration of mind and body "for more efficient service in factory and office" (p. 54). A "resilient achievement ethos" (p. 301) was created, sustained by the marriage of the therapeutic world view and the bureaucratic state: "Both stressed becoming over being, the process of experience rather than its value or result" (p. 303). Philosophically, this represented a narrow pragmatism that encouraged people to immerse themselves in immediate experience.

Only in avant garde art and literature does Lears see at times the desire to find a point of stillness in the midst of the search for ceaseless change. In the symbols of religious experience, a few found a perspective from which to criticize the process of modernization and the destruction of meaningful belief.

Regardless of whether anti-modernism led to protest or accommodation, it was at the very least a challenge to the "evasive banality" that characterized most Americans' sense of the world in the latter part of the 19th century. That failure of perception was revealed not only in the widespread faith in individual autonomy with its concomitant denial of the existence of inner conflict, but also in the belief in the beneficence of liberal capitalism with its simultaneous refusal to acknowledge the systemic origin of social strife.

However, among anti-modernists dedicated to the craft ideal, there were those who spoke of the degraded conditions of labor in the work place. Utilizing the critique of the factory system of John Ruskin asnd William Morris, some urged the revival of handicraft modes of production. For instance, Charles Eliot Norton and Horace Traubel lectured and wrote on the craft ideal. Traubel as well as Edward Pressey organized communes in which people were committed to living in Thoreauvian simplicity. Still others, such as Elbert Hubbart and Gustav Stickley, were concerned with the making and marketing of craft goods.

Foreshadowing the utopian visions put forth during the 1930s and the 1960s, these men criticized over-civilized urban life and emphasized the importance of doing hard, significant work within a genuine community. Nevertheless, according to Lears, "American craft leaders were hampered from the outset by their class interests and anxieties, their individualist and idealist assumptions about the nature of social reform, and above all by their own underlying ambivalence toward modern culture and its progressive creed" (p. 64). More interested in revitalizing their own genteel lives and in staving off the demands of labor agitators than in radical institutional change, these anti-modernists were easily absorbed by the capitalist system. Those who embraced the simple life often came to stress the virtues of discipline and difficult work, regardless of the demanding social and economic context within which laborers toiled. Educational reformers advocated manual training in the public schools in order to calm immigrants and angry workers as well as to return an incipient leisure class to productive life. And aesthetes, intent upon collecting *objets d'art*, were the forerunners of an economy based as much on consumption as on production. Having essentially rejected the existence of larger religious or communal values outside the self, craft ideologues focused their attention upon the importance of the psychic rejuvenation of the individual confronted with the process of modernization.[5]

Another response to the increasing sense of "weightlessness" experienced at the end

5. For Lears, the major contemporary legacy of the "Arts and Crafts movement" is that large number of Americans who escape to their wooded retreats and their hobbies during their time away from work.

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of the 19th century involved the resurrection of the martial ideal. Premodern images drawn from the medieval past, especially the ferocity of the knight, were held up as alternatives to the ease of modern life. Meaning and purpose, it was thought, might be found in the suffering brought about by a life of action and confrontation in close contact with the springs of primal irrationality. Thus, in popular fiction, sale of the historical romance, particularly the work of Walter Scott, flourished. And in the serious work of novelists such as Frank Norris and Francis Crawford and poets like Richard Hovey and Louise Guiney, the use of the martial ideal echoed the widespread desire for revitalization. In everyday life, the importance of engaging in strenuous activity within a toughened moral framework was evident in educational reforms designed to enforce the socialization of children through a regimen of athletics and military drill as well as in the penal system, where capital punishment was reinstituted along with other measures designed to promote retribution rather than rehabilitation.

Politically, this stance reflected a desire to return to the republican past when the free-holding warrior-citizen held sway as the embodiment of the Spartan tradition. While Northern businessmen generally desired peace in order to allow commerce to function smoothly, those who upheld the matrial ideal were anti-commercial in their opposition to the flaccidity and enervation that resulted from economic abundance as well as in their distrust of mercantile expansion, bureaucracies, and professional armies. Fearful of lower-class and immigrant unrest and convinced of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic races, they advocated an ideology of empire and began to form Christian paramilitary youth groups. Idleness and irresolution were now defined as the racial traits of an inferior people to be combatted by Anglo-Saxon ferocity at home and abroad. Although in this scheme of values, the soldier was held to be more valuable than the businessman, American militarists did not urge the dismantling of bourgeois society but rather the adoption of the martial spirit in all walks of life. Thus both Frank Norris and Brooks Adams suggested that even businessmen and administrators might find this idea useful since it provided freshened images of masculine potency.

If many found in this revaluation of strenuosity new sanction for the idea of autonomous achievement, they might be left with spiritual yearnings that were satisfied for some in the resurrection of still other ideals advanced during the Middle Ages. In addition to the warrior, the saint and the seer were elevated in importance as an emphasis on faith, feeling and mystery now provided ballast for the imposition of logical order in daily life. Often, as in the work of psychologist G. Stanley Hall, it was simply the youthful traits of these figures that were glorified (part of the larger attempt to perceive the Middle Ages as the childhood of the human race), and any challenge to secular modes of thought was lost in the reverence for the sincerity and spontaneity of early age. Depending upon the intensity of the desire for immersion in "the flux of 'pure experience' " (p. 143), this reverence for the childlike might provide a temporary respite from the rigors of conventional adult life or a serious alternative to the demands for autonomy placed upon the bourgeois individual. And when that desire was especially strong, anti-modernists helped fuel the emerging culture of consumption, which stressed the importance of instant gratification.

In other instances, childlike innocence and republican virtue were linked in the figure of the saint (e.g., Mark Twain's Joan of Arc) whose strenuous ascetic life in the past was held up as an ideal to combat the moral degeneration and spiritual vacuity perceived in the present. Yet even here there was as much admiration for the intensity of medieval belief as there was for its firmness. According to Lears, these "longings for medieval vitality could reinforce zeal for modern achievement" (p. 164) by providing

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either a religious framework for a gospel of worldly activity or a brief retreat from the stringent demands for rationality of the modern superego.

Only in those cases when religious longing surfaced that embraced visionary experience does Lears perceive a significant alternative to the existing structure of belief and behavior. In this context, some anti-modernists began to investigate the European folk mind where an interest in magic and myth suggested the recovery of lost irrtational forces. Though this too was frequently an attempt to recapture the buried spontaneity of childhood in respectable form, at times it countered the "evasive banality" of genteel culture. Unlike most anti-modern vitalists of the period, who envisioned the unconscious as relatively benign, a reservoir of positive energy, some, like William James, became interested in Catholic mysticism, which accepted the inevitability of conflict, especially in the existence of the darker forces of the psyche such as aggression and rage. In addition, they preserved a set of loyalties outside the self in their emphasis on the need for union with the Divine.

Always sensitive to issues of power, Lears states that the turn to Catholicism also provided a "nervous ruling class" with "premodern emblems of unity, exclusivity and cultural authority" (p. 184), in contrast to the "centrifugal" tendencies of late 19th-century liberalism. In looking back to the Middle Ages, some anti-modernists not only revered mystical creeds but also the art and ritual that clothed religious expression, a public "feast" of color, incense, and music on a massive scale.

Many anti-modernists simply collected medieval religious art in order to escape from the strains of secular, bourgeois life and urban unrest. Periodically, those who came from a Protestant background showed a willingness to embrace the pageantry of Catholicism which may have provided greater solace than "habits of introspection" that "had lost supernatural sanction" (p. 193). Moreover, the same urge to infuse life with passion that encouraged anti-modernists intent on pursuing a craft or martial ideal also acted as a catalyst for Protestants who wished to preserve their religious feeling without attending vapid religious rites that lacked a convincing theology. Thus, some turned to Episcopalianism in which ministers might utilize medieval art and Catholic ritual for their own liturgical purposes. Others, like Ralph Cram, a well-known architect, embraced Anglo-Catholicism, which required submission to a God perceived as wholly other and therefore far beyond mundane human affairs, all in sharp contrast to the "market morality of secularized Calvinism" (p. 200).

However, this interest in Catholic forms promoted adjustment to modern culture as much as it created dissent. The pursuit of *objets d'art* was engaged in by those interested in industrial growth and could be easily accommodated by the consumerism of the future. In fact, the development of "churchly aestheticism" suggested the emergence of "a gilded religion for a gilded age" (p. 193). According to Lears, only someone like Vida Scudder, who used her commitment to Anglo-Catholicism to combat Protestant individualism by skeptically embracing mystical modes as well as social activism, engaged in genuine protest against the American social order. In contrast to Cram, who advocated a return to the decentralized communalism of the Middle Ages without sufficiently acknowledging modern class domination, Scudder adopted a form of Christian socialism. Her sacramental mysticism, constructed in opposition to the sterility of a sheltered upper-class life, immersed her in the world of settlement work at the same time that it allowed for the nurturance of religious impulses.

For Lears, the conflict between the need for engagement as well as withdrawal in Scudder's life is but a reflection of the dual urges for autonomy and dependence in the lives of the members of the educated bourgeoisie in late 19th-century America. In his

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biographical portrayals of William Sturgis Bigelow, George Cabot Lodge, Percival Lowell, Charles Eliot Norton, G. Stanley Hall, Van Wyck Brooks, and Henry Adams, Lears convincingly details patterns of ambivalence. The private struggles of these " 'point men' of modernization," he argues, "portended a shift from republican moralism toward a 20th-century culture of consumption" (p. 225).

All of them were forced in varying ways to reconcile the desire for an autonomous, "masculine" life of conscious control, designed to promote material progress, with a yearning for a passive "feminine" state where an emphasis upon faith, the irrational, and emotional dependency often involved a commitment to either Catholic Mariolatry or Oriental mysticism. Since older types of authority which involved direct obedience to an external figure had been replaced by an internalized ethic of self-control, anti-modernists repeatedly floundered and might even become immobilized by their contradictory yearnings. Neurasthenia was one solution, since it preserved "a secularized, republican ethic of suffering in an expanding commercial society" and provided "medical sanctions for escapes into idleness" (p. 221). Another was to search for intense experience by turning toward a "vitalist apotheosis of spontaneity and energy" that involved both "a 'masculine' reassertion of will" in poetic fantasy if not social reality and "a 'feminine' submission to an oceanic realm of feeling" (p. 223) in mystical or aesthetic modes. When they could avoid equating the process of letting go with self-extinction (given the degree to which the achievement ethic had been internalized as a source of identity), these anti-modernists might experience, at least tentatively, a sense of psychological wholeness.

However, only a few anti-modernists, particularly Charles Eliot Norton and Henry Adams, were able to maintain ambivalent attitudes in their private as well as public lives. In his admiration for the Catholic Middle Ages, Norton turned to aesthetic contemplation but at the same time was committed to an ethic of suffering. For Lears, Norton's "stoical integrity" avoided both the harsh moralizing of the 19th century and the ethical void of the years to follow. In the virgin and the dynamo, Adams sought to fuse the symbol of unity for the 13th century with the image of multiplicity of the 20th century. Both Norton and Adams were willing to move carefully between the poles of autonomy and dependence, of doubt and faith, of reason and instinct within a loose religious frame of reference, unlike most anti-modernists who collapsed their tensions by yielding to one pressure and submerging the other. While George Cabot Lodge in poetic fantasy, Van Wyck Brooks in his social criticism, and Percival Lowell as a research astronomer turned to activist modes, William Sturgis Bigelow in his Oriental mysticism and G. Stanley Hall in a remissive psychology embraced relatively passive styles. These solutions resulted in accommodation of the social order since they were essentially therapeutic guests for self-realization that tended to deny the importance of a supraindividual perspective from which American society might be seriously criticized.

In emphasizing the necessity to sustain allegiances that transcend simply the importance of self-fulfillment, Lears indicates the nature of his own commitments. Acknowledging that neither traditional conservatism with its "nostalgia" for the past nor the " 'progressive' bromides of the left" are adequate responses to "the signs of spiritual sterility which surround us in the late 20th century" (p. xviii), Lears shows the greatest sympathy for those anti-modernists who forged a set of beliefs which subsumed the need for radical social change within an ethical and religious vision suffused with skepticism. Lears is highly critical of conservative anti-modernists who tried to preserve the power of their embattled class by denying the existence of social, political, and economic inequality and turning to ideas of racial superiority. Yet, he

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states that "the most powerful critics of capitalism have often looked backward rather than forward, directing their fire at the bureaucratic 'rationality' common to all corporate systems, including capitalist progress for its corrosive impact on family, craft, community, or faith" (p. xviii). Extending his critique to the present, Lears has little faith in socialism under which "the acids of modernity are often as corrosive" (p. xviii) as under capitalism. In "the decentralized communitarianism" of those anti-modernists who prefigured the more recent work of Paul Goodman, Lewis Mumford and E.F. Shumacher, Lears sees the possibility of preserving technology but at the same time undermining "the rationalizing elites who remain obsessed with efficient productivity at the expense of satisfying labor and humane community" (p. 95).

Moreover, like Max Weber, Lears protests against "the disenchantment of the world" because of the forms of rationality that have come to prevail in industrialized nations. Therefore he aligns himself with anti-modernists, especially Henry Adams, who advanced a religious perspective that brought "mystery" and "strangeness" back into the universe. More than any of the other figures described by Lears, it was Adams who tried to move beyond "a narrow positivist reality" toward more "unconscious modes of perception" that spurred the search for new artistic forms in the 20th century. At the end of his life, after alternatively subscribing to the "masculine" and "feminine" ideals of his time, Adams could not envision either social or personal harmony and adopted a stoical vision permeated with religious longings. In his admiration for Adams, who tried to create an identity built upon ambivalence, Lears suggests the complexity of his allegiance to aspects of the anti-modernist critique.

Unlike Lasch, Bell and Rieff, who view the breakdown of the Protestant ethic primarily as preparation for today's catastrophic "culture of release,"[6] Lears skillfully details the progressive as well as the regressive elements in the anti-modernist assault on the republican moralism of the past. He is much more skeptical than these cultural historians about the beneficence of the ideal of autonomy propounded in the 19th century and shows how a "masculine" emphasis upon efficiency and decorum had devastating personal as well as social consequences. In addition, he carefully describes the attempts to rebel against the constraints of the superego — attempts that cannot be understood if they are simply dismissed as regressive political or psychological longings.

However, when Lears at times tries to understand the tensions of the 19th-century American bourgeoisie within the framework of Erik Erikson's ideas on the life cycle, his argument becomes problematic. Erikson perceives individual growth as the resolution of alternative possibilities that emerge at phase-appropriate periods dependent upon age. Despite his criticism of those ego psychologists who erroneously believe that "the individual's need to establish an independent identity" transcends "Western, bourgeois cultural norms" and is "a universal, timeless drive" (p. 220), Lears utilizes Erikson's ideas about "generativity" to criticize the psychological paralysis that often set in during advanced age for many anti-modernists. As Mark Poster has pointed out in his criticism of Erikson's theory of the life cycle, it is highly questionable whether all societies were designed to produce in adults the desire to guide the next generation.[7] Yet Lears, like Erikson, encourages one to look positively

6. Philip Rieff uses this phrase throughout *The Triumph of the Therapeutic* to describe the loosening of the old forms of restraint and the pressure today for instinctual liberation. Rieff as well as Lasch generally echoes Daniel Bell's belief that with the onset of the 1960s there were widespread longings on an unprecedented scale for "the lost gratifications" of childhood. See *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (New York, 1978), p. 144.

7. *Critical Theory of the Family* (New York, 1980), p. 69.

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only upon those people who engaged in child rearing or produced "books, ideas, or some altruistic aim outside the self" (p. 246).[8]

At the same time that he is critical of Western norms of productivity and the implicit belief in unending progress, in his discussion of the issue of generativity Lears comes dangerously close to echoing Erikson's optimistic vision of the possibility for personal reconciliation with the public realm. However, this strain in Lears' thinking is superseded by his commitment to the more orthodox Freudian idea that "unresolved conflict" is the "essence of the human predicament" (p. 260). For Lears "the anti-modern legacy survived and sustained some of the profoundest cultural criticism of the 20th century" (p. 310). In the lives of Freud, Unamuno, and Eliot, he sees examples of men who were willing to acknowledge the existence of "persistent inner conflict" while still providing a moral or religious critique of the social order.

Given these commitments, Lears is particularly concerned with the way many anti-modernists of the late 19th century helped prepare future Americans for today's therapeutic world view that denies the existence of the darker forces of the psyche and that places great emphasis upon the expression of feelings.[9] Thus he suggests that a major result of anti-modernist sentiment is the contemporary "quest for authenticity" which "conceals a desperate flight from a meaningless existence" (p. 305). Without a supraindividual framework, the stress upon the importance of self-expression is likely to degenerate into a search for intense inner experience with its implicit sentimentalization of uncontrolled, instinctual life.[10] These are, in part, the psychological contours for today's "leisure-oriented ethos" appropriate to an "economy of consumer capitalism" (p. 223).

In seeking alternatives to "the flatulent pieties of our progressive creed" (p. 58),

8. Lears also draws too freely on Erikson's ideas about "negative identity." Where Erikson uses this concept to describe "an identity perversely based on all those identifications and roles which, at critical stages of development, had been presented to the individual as most undesirable and dangerous, and yet, also as most real," Lears obliquely applies it to the attempt of some anti-modernists to regain psychological strength through the denigration of ethnic and racial minorities. See Erikson's "The Problem of Ego Identity," *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 4 (1956), p. 87.

9. In this context, Lears has a tendency to stress too much the degree to which a "fun morality" has come to prevail in the United States. Though he is alert to the "note of urgency — the play is frenetic, the pleasure-seeking so relentless" (p. 305), he does not sufficiently acknowledge that vestiges of the Protestant ethic still persist, and that within the collective American psyche tensions remain between the demands for autonomous achievement and contrary yearnings for release and dependence. Daniel Bell addresses this issue in *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* when he speaks about people's attempt in contemporary America to be "straight by day" and "swingers by night" as part of the larger conflict that exists betwen the functional rationality imposed in the economic arena which conflicts with the desire for self-expression in the cultural realm.

In addition, in emphasizing the way Americans have come to stress the importance of the expression of feelings, Lears does not distinguish between theory and practice. Today therapists and their clients talk a great deal about the importance of expressing positive as well as negative feelings precisely because of the widespread sense of emotional impoverishment. Thus, Lasch states that 20th-century Americans "have erected so many psychological barriers against strong emotion, and have invested those defenses with so much energy derived from forbidden impulse, that they can no longer remember what it feels like to be inundated by desire. They tend, rather, to be consumed with rage, which derives from defenses against desire and gives rise in turn to new defenses against rage itself. Outwardly bland, submissive and sociable, they seethe with an inner anger for which a dense, overpopulated, bureaucratic society can devise few legitimate outlets." *The Culture of Narcissism, op.cit.*, p. 11.

10. In speaking of the "quest for authenticity" as a contemporary form of dissent, Lears looks positively at "the agrarian communards of the 1960s and the principle opposition to the bureaucratic 'rationality' of the Vietnam war" (pp. 305-306).

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Lears is intent upon praising the process as much as the content of certain aspects of anti-modernist dissent. Thus he can say of William Sturgis Bigelow's turn to Buddhism that "His persistent quest for union with the Divine, however confused or ultimately frustrated, marked an heroic protest against the encroaching restraints of a secularizing culture" (p. 660). In addition, his discussion of Charles Eliot Norton and Henry Adams suggests that Lears believes in the viability of that aspect of the Christian tradition that attempts "to recover the sense of tragic conflict" embodied in "the longing for transcendence" given "the fact of human finitude" (p. 310). However, Lears states that the "more profound anti-modernists recognized the hopelessness of those yearnings" even though "they acknowledged and indeed embraced them just the same" (p. 58). In the end, there is only the small solace of Henry Adams, "the silent solitude of an empty faith."

Clearly, this is not a book offering solutions to the process of modernization and attendant questions of power. At times, in fact, Lears seems to be overly enthralled with a more religious and mystical version of Camus' use of the myth of Sisyphus to celebrate the quest for meaning in a fundamentally unintelligible universe. However, it is important to remember that Lears' discussion of the religious yearnings of the anti-modernists is meant to be understood in the context of his discussion of the process of domination. For he has shown that, with few exceptions, these religious inclinations were absorbed by the prevailing ideology of the time.

Lears, then, has imaginatively utilized the "concept of hegemony" "to underscore the unconscious self-deceptions among ruling-class custodians of culture as well as the unintended consequences of their attitudes and ideas — which were often far removed from issues of class relations" (p. 10). If the importance of social class becomes muted at times in his argument because of his interest in the psychological, philosophical, and religious dimensions of anti-modernism, Lears is always concerned with the nature of domination, whose complexity he describes in a brilliant manner.

Robert Ehrlich

Arthur Hirsh. *The French New Left: An Intellectual History from Sartre to Gorz*. Boston: South End Press, 1981. 253 pages. $7.00.

Arthur Hirsh approaches his subject without reverence. Social theory is dealt with as a problem of everyday living rather than as a strictly philosophical problematic. In a down-to-earth way, Sartre, Lefebvre, Castoriadis, Poulantzas and Gorz become peers rather than masters in an ongoing discussion about the struggle against post-industrial, bureaucratic alienation.

Hirsh takes up the challenge laid out by George Lichtheim in his 1966 *Marxism in Modern France*. Lichtheim stated that a study of Marxist though in France would have to deal with the effort to acclimatize Hegel and Marx in France. "However subversive from the standpoint of orthodox Marxism, such an investigation would unquestionably correspond to the current state of affairs." Two years before May 1968, Lichtheim recognized the importance of theoretical challenges to traditional Marxism.

Hirsh uses 1968 as the focal point that divides his book into two distinct parts. The first deals with the formulation of a new critique, based in Marxism, that takes aim at both Soviet-style state socialism and consumer, bureaucratic capitalism. The key

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concept of the New Left, taken from Hegel and the early Marx, is alienation — alienation at the workplace, alienation from others, alienation within a society that imposes values of gratification rather than fulfillment. Alienation is the critical category that can be applied to both Eastern and Western Europe. It is the disenchantment from Soviet Marxism, Stalinism and a hollow determinism that forces the postwar generation in France to confront the meaning and goals of the struggle for liberation.

Althusser saw alienation as a fetish of the immature Marx that became irrelvant to the later Marxist project — the deconstruction of the capitalist framework. Yet, the rediscovery of Hegel and the early Marx in the 1930s, '40s and '50s obviously responded to a need to deal with the individual, isolated not only within a capitalism that stripped it of its humanity, but from a Marxist movement that seemed to deny its consciousness. The French Communist Party was the focus of Lichtheim's work; for Hirsh, the PCF was both the obstacle and sounding board for new theoretical formulations.

Hirsh selects Sartre, Lefebvre and Castoriadis as the articulators of three criticial lines of thought that prove most fertile to the "revolutionaries" of 1968. This first part of the book is a sophisticated intellectual history in that Hirsh does not try to impose a simple theme or an artifically direct line between Sartre or Lefebvre and 1968. It is also, thankfully, not an encyclopedia of leftist challenges. Rather, Sartre, Lefebvre and Castoriadis are viewed as the formulators of new questions and the creators of new vocabularies that will shape the way a new generation focuses on social problems.

Hirsh delineates three basic critiques of traditional Marxism: Sartre and the existentialist critique; Lefebvre and the revisionist critique; Castoriadis and the *gauchiste* critique. The three critiques deal with alienation at different levels: the alienation of the individual from others and from class, and ultimately social consciousness; the alienation of the individual from a life that has been devitalized for the express purpose of domination; the alienation of the worker from a bureaucratic machine, whether economic or political, that denies the worker control over his labor and his life.

All three were involved in the process of demystification of both bourgeois and Marxist ideology. Hirsh, obviously sympathetic to the projects of his subjects, uses a small m for marxism and a small s for stalinism to indicate that god, in whatever guise, is indeed dead. Disenchantment with the Communist Party was the spur to creative activity for all three. What is fascinating, however, is that Lefebvre in 1928 and Sartre in 1952 were first attracted to the party during its most rigid, Stalinist phases.

Sartre was obviously creative before he met Marx and the Communist Party; but what Hirsh finds most attractive is Sartre's attempt to fuse existentialism and Marxism. Sartre's philosophical travels have always been something of an enigma. There are those, like Hirsh, who feel that Sartre's movement from existentialist humanism to commitment to Marxism, to a post-Communist synthesis, was a natural, fruitful evolution that has added tremendously to a Marxist understanding of subjectivity and of the relation between individual and class consciousness. On the other hand, one can see Sartre within the long tradition of French *moralistes*. His commitments were personal leaps of faith that offer no models to others. His political theory was in actuality a moral theory defined by his own philosophical absolutes.

Hirsh devotes two chapters to Sartre, one discussing the "existentialist challenge" to Marxism, the other essentially dealing with Sartre's 1960 *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. Sartre's existentialism is fairly well known. The call to social action is Sartre's specific addition to an existentialist theory that goes back 100 years. His conception

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grew out of the 1930s and the war, when engagement was a battle cry for a whole generation of intellectuals drawn into a highly politicized, polarized debate. Many of those intellectuals were fascists, and this is one of Sartre's basic problems. How do you define the nature and goals of social action? In a world without meaning, what leads one to engagement for progressive social change?

A second major problem is that existentialism has no social theory — it is a moral theory. In a series of debates with the Communists in 1944 and 1945, Sartre attempted to deal with these problems by developing a nebulous notion of intersubjectivity and by falling back upon a Kantian ethics. The existentialist challenge to Marxism was a challenge of popularity, not of social theory. Its attraction to a new generation was a threat to Marxism because existentialism was essentially anti-Marxist. It was ahistorical, it denied the importance of economic and class structures, and its conception of freedom was totally subjective, ignoring the freedom of others. The common ground shared by existentialism and Marxism was the dialectic, the recognition that reality is defined only through interaction and confrontation.

Is it possible to bring together the consciousness of an individual and the consciousness of class and history? Sartre began his famous attempt to do this in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when he moved closer to the Communists. In *The Communists and the Peace,* of 1952, Sartre recognized that freedom is conditioned and limited by historical determinations. Between 1952 and 1956, Sartre worked closely with the Communist Party. What he found attractive in Marxism was its "totalization of knowledge" and its grounding of values similar to his own.

Sartre grew increasingly disenchanted with the Communists, however, realizing that Stalinism and even post-Stalinism had no place for individual consciousness, that the economism of Stalinism was a form of idealism that denied the varied levels of mediation between individual and class consciousness. *The Critique of Dialectical Reason* was an attempt to establish a methodology for finding and studying mediations. Sociology was one important area of research of the multiplicity of social relations, both within and beyond class relations. In addition, Sartre saw psychoanalysis as providing a key framework for the study of consciousness-formation, of the process by which the child is socialized into a class or society. But what are the goals of psychoanalysis? Is psychoanalysis not built on a hidden framework of normality that coincides with class and social norms?

Sartre develops certain other concepts that will be of more value to the revolutionaries of 1968. With the idea of "seriality," he brings his wonderful descriptive gifts to the isolation of alienation and the problem of competing *praxes.* The "group-in-fusion" overcomes the series and recognizes common praxis. The freedom, equality and democracy of the group-in-fusion will definitely serve as a model for the movement of 1968, when the group-in-fusion is actualized. Sartre recognized that history moves from series to groups to series, and in a sense, anticipated the failure of 1968, which was the inability to maintain spontaneity. Sartre tries to organize the "freedom realized in the spontaneous group," but the very terms of this project are rife with contradiction.

In *The Critique,* Sartre comes back to the problem of the Other, which was his basic problem with existentialism. In *The Critique,* the Other appears as competing praxis, which is determined by scarcity. According to Sartre, scarcity shapes the relations of the individual to nature and to others. Scarcity is at the root of man's alienation, even prior to exploitation. Thus ending exploitation does not necessarily mean ending alienation, which is a neat apology for the Soviet Union. History becomes the collective project of transcending scarcity.

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Sartre's new-found Malthusianism, which is central to Marx's political economy, does not deal with advanced capitalism, in which alienation increases with material wealth. Henri Lefebvre dealt head-on with this problem of Marxism in an age of post-scarcity. Lefebvre had a deeper grounding in Marx and Marxist thought. He was one of the first to translate the works of the early Marx into French, and it was here that Lefebvre discovered alienation and praxis. Like Sartre, Lefebvre was deeply influenced by the political struggles of the 1930s and the demand for revolutionary praxis, which Lefebvre saw as reconciling the individual to himself, to others and to nature as a "total man." During the 1950s and 1960s, Lefebvre began his critique of Communism, seeing that orthodox Marxism had become a totalizing process that was as self-reflective as traditional philosophy.

While Sartre was attracted to the totalizing process implicit in Marxism, Lefebvre rejected this very process and demanded an anti-systematic mode of thought to deal with the fragmentation of modern life. Lefebvre recognized that Marx was, in a sense, a 19th-century Victorian with a strong dose of the Protestant ethic. His praxis was too instrumental, too geared to the very productive values of the capitalism he was dissecting. Lefebvre expands upon Marx, tracing the weight of alienation at all levels of human interaction. Like Lukacs, Horkheimer and Adorno, Lefebvre focuses on the realm of culture that solidifies, maintains and even shapes economic relations. He sees modern society as bureaucratically organized toward the goal of consumption; consumption is both the means and the ends of pacification and domination.

Lefebvre examines the repression of everyday life, the attempt bureaucratically to eliminate human autonomy. He calls for a philosophy that could be applied to the transformation of everyday life, a cultural revolution to break through the bureaucratic repression that denies freedom, creativity and community. Alienation must be confronted head-on, in the workplace, in the street, in the bedroom. Central to Lefebvre's conception is a faith, like that of Sartre, in the "irreducibility of the subject." The bureaucratic denial of consciousness and freedom is ultimately unstable because the human subject cannot be crushed.

Castoriadis, the third of Hirsh's main subjects, shares Lefebvre's faith that the repressive bureaucratic project is unstable and unrealizable. In terms of Marxism, Castoriadis is the most radical in that he rejects Marxism as an extension of capitalism and builds upon Weber and Proudhon to develop an analysis of contemporary society and of revolutionary activity and freedom. A former Trotskyist, Castoriadis rejected Trotsky's position that Stalinism was a deformed variant of socialism and saw Communism instead as the highest stage of capitalism, one that has rejected the form but not the content of capitalist exploitation. Castoriadis rejects the central tenet of Marxism, that classes are defined by relations to the means of production; instead, Castoriadis sees society divided into the order-givers and the order-takers. Bureaucracy is central to this organization, rationalizing and managing hierarchy. For Castoriadis, the key to revolutionary praxis is the abolition of hierarchy and command, returning to workers control over their work-process through *autogestion*: self-management through workers' councils. The model for Castsoriadis' socialist society would be a Proudhonist vision of decentralized workers' cooperatives in which there is no separation between management and production.

Like Lefebvre, Castoriadis sees the basic flaw of Marxist theory as its attempt to totalize the human experience. The result is that human consciousness and freedom become abstractions at odds with the totalizing process. According to Castoriadis, Marx shares with the classic economic theorists a reductionist view of man as an economic being. This primary form of reification leads to alienation at all levels.

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The first part of Hirsh's *The French New Left* is strong. Sartre, Lefebvre and Castoriadis (whose post-'68 writings are not examined) fit together well to focus on different levels of alienation. Hirsh writes clearly and sympathetically. What emerges from the first part of the book are the basic themes of the movement of May 1968. Although Sartre, Lefebvre and Castoriadis start from and end at different points, there is a certain unity to their thought. They are all essentially anti-Leninist and anti-hierarchical; they are all in search of spontaneity in one form of another; they all want to break through bureaucratic obfuscation that denies human autonomy and individual consciousness; they share a faith in the irreducibility of human freedom.

They all come to see the Communist Party as an extension of bureaucratic alienation. Their varied relations to Marxism are intriguing. Sartre never grasps the essential historical and class components of Marxism, its grounding in an analysis of economic relations. His problems with individual consciousness and the Other (taken up again in *The Family Idiot,* not discussed by Hirsh) reveal that he never accepted Marxist class consciousness as a social and historical consciousness reached by the individual. Lefebvre is the closest to Marx, although he obviously rejects the determinist component of Marxism. Lefebvre is willing to take the basic Marxist tools of analysis and apply them to a society that Marx could not possibly have envisioned. Castoriadis rejects Marxism entirely. He sees the Soviet Union as a logical extension of a centralizing, alienating movement whose goals of production and organization are implicit in Marx.

May 1968 can be viewed from two perspectives — as a glorious revolutionary movement that proved that bureaucracy can be challenged, or as a utopian gasp that revealed the inadequacies of post-Marxist revolutionary theory and praxis. Hirsh sees 1968 from both perspectives, but he deals with it too quickly. He views 1968 as both a vindication of the theoretical work that preceded it and a testing ground for some of its shortcomings. Hirsh situates the basic problem of New Left theory in its failure to develop organization and structure: "May was a cultural revolution without a political revolution;" "The May revolt failed because it lacked organization." The paradox, both in the May movement and in this analysis is that the basic New Left thrust was anti-structural, anti-hierarchical. The joyous part of '68 was its spontaneity — but how can spontaneity be organized or even sustained? The group-in-fusion is always fleeting; a situation of non-hierarchy is temporary. New Left theory runs up against the analyses of Pareto and Michels, the "iron law of oligarchy" and hierarchy that will always reassert itself.

Hirsh feels, though, that 1968 was a crucial turning point that opened up new avenues for radical politics and social theory in France. In the last part of the book, Hirsh traces some of the new movements, from Althusser to Eurocommunism to self-management, feminism and ecology. The chapter on Althusser and structuralist Marxism is excellent, deftly revealing the hidden contradictions and problems of Althusser's desubjectivized Marx, and as Thompson and others have done, disclosing it as a sophisticated form of neo-Stalinism. One would think that the PCF would be happy to have such a distinguished intellectual as Althusser providing a defense against the attacks of the humanists. But in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the PCF itself was in the process of change, adopting with Eurocommunism its own version of many of the values and concerns of those same Marxist humanists. The change in the PCF stemmed from its inability to control or even relate to the May 1968 rebellion; the *embourgeoisement* of its own constituency; the rise of a revitalized Socialist Party that was democratic and embraced groups to the left of the PCF; and the growing disillusionment, even among Party faithful, with the Eastern European model.

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During the 1970s, the Socialist Party and the PCF worked together to develop the Union of the Left, dedicated to a broad program of nationalization, democratization and decentralization. In its Eurocommunist phase, the PCF declared its faith in the democratic process and in 1976, Georges Marchais announced the abandonment of the slogan "the dictatorship of the proletariat." The Union of the Left created great hopes for leftist union and victory in the 1970s. But conflict and distrust between the PS and the PCF led to failure in the 1978 elections. And when the left did take power in 1981, it was essentially a Socialist victory that showed a weakening of support for the Communist Party.

The adoption of Eurocommunism was a dramatic shift for the PCF, the most Stalinist party in Western Europe. It is interesting that Hirsh quotes from Santiago Carillo, secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party, when he presents the liberal goals of Eurocommunism. In many ways, the *raison d'être* of the PCF was in offering a negative alternative to bourgeois, democratic politics. By declaring its faith in democratic evolution, the PCF may have lost its reason for being and its hold over its longtime adherents. Its centralized discipline was its very appeal; but this appeal did not draw the young who had gone through the experience of the 1960s and May '68.

While many denounced the PCF's shift as a sell-out, as political opportunism and insincere, the PCF did have a "revolutionary" theoretical explanation for Eurocommunism. The same Althusser who was too hyper-intellectual and too Stalinist for the PCF provided the basic theoretical framework for this explanation. In his work of the late 1970s, Althusser rejected Stalinist economism and argued that Marx's concept of production involved three distinct levels — the economic, the political and the ideological. Never rejecting the primacy of the economic structure, Althusser argued that each sphere was relatively autonomous and that any one of the three levels could be dominant at a certain stage of history. Hirsh also discusses Althusser's student, Nicos Poulantzas, who extended the idea of "structures of dominance" to an interpretation of the state. Yet Poulantzas himself was to become disenchanted with a structuralist Marxism, recognizing perhaps the contradictions between a desubjectivized Marxism and the Eurocommunist commitment to representative democracy and civil liberties.

The "crisis of Marxism" that Hirsh describes is symbolized by the suicide of Poulantzas. The popularity of the new philosophers, with their bitter, ethical indictment of Communism, the lack of unity in the Union of the Left, and the decline of the PCF seem to point to the fact that the heralded revolution as not only not arrived, but is perhaps impossible, that Marxism itself is incapable of analyzing 20th-century structures of domination. In the spring of 1982, the enthusiasm for the leftist government of Mitterrand has begun to wane, as principle confronts hard economic and social realities.

In the last section of the book, Hirsh turns from pessimism to find hope in the new social movements that have emerged since 1968. He focuses on three movements in particular — self-management, feminism and ecology — and finds in these "single-issue movements. . . the seeds of a general vision of society." Hirsh seems to like triads. His first triad, Sartre, Lefebvre and Castoriadis, is very effective. The second much less so. Perhaps this is because the issues that he discusses are too close at hand. The problem with all three movements is that they do not represent a general vision of society. They concentrate on specific manifestations of domination and do not offer a programmatic praxis for creating a new society. This was the power of Marxism, even if it was misguided or wrong.

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Self-management is a continuation of the Proudhonist vision of worker control. The basic problem with it is that there are no lasting models of non-hierarchical work situations. All of the revolutionary moments are fleeting. How are workers to take control? Can economic democracy be maintained? Would worker control of the machine line bring workers satisfaction and overcome alienation?

The seeds of feminism were laid earlier in the book with a discussion of Simone de Beauvoir and *The Second Sex*. De Beauvoir's feminism was essentially Sartrean, indicting modern society for viewing women as the other, and demanding a recognition of women as equal subjects. Many of the feminists of the 1970s and 1980s, though respecting de Beauvoir, see her view of feminism as too male-oriented and too male-defined. Contemporary feminism is represented by several different lines of thought. Hirsh focuses on the radical feminists who feel that socialism has failed to change relations between the sexes. Christine Delphy, in particular, wants to place women's oppression at the center of social theory, as the core of an analysis of domination. Marx, undoubtedly a phallocrat of the first order, would probably argue that it is impossible to separate the exploitation of women from class exploitation. In the 1840s, Flora Tristan talked to French workers about the connection between female liberation and workers' liberation. A focus on women's emancipation and the perception of the male-patriarchal discussion of exploitation, domination and hierarchy, is vital to any real critique of modern society, though by itself it seems fragmentary.

The ecology movement is even more problematic, although it also may have more potential for producing a general social critique. Hirsh uses André Gorz as the chief spokesman of the ecological movement in France. Earlier in the book, Gorz, the student of Sartre, had been presented as the synthesizer of Sartre, Lefebvre and Castoriadis. In his 1964 *Strategie ouvrière et néo-capitalisme*, Gorz had developed the theory of a "new working class" that brought together white- and blue-collar workers. In the 1970s, Gorz moved to a discussion of capitalist technology as the primary source of alienation, calling for a new technology in harmony with nature and a rejection of consumerism. He then laid out a model for an egalitarian, democratic community, in which work becomes secondary to the "re-integration of culture into everyday life." Gorz's communities would be pollution-free, self-managed and self-reliant.

There are several problems with Gorz's position, which Bookchin has recently and harshly criticized. His post-industrial vision sounds romantically pre-industrial. His indictment of capitalist technology, with its division of labor, ignores the fact that this same alienating technology has produced the ability to move beyond scarcity. As a student of Sartre, Gorz should deal with this issue. His denigration of work in general and search for "autonomous activities" is, in a sense, an extension of the very consumer and leisure-oriented values promoted by capitalism. The search for gratification beyond work avoids the central problem of integrating work into a total and full life. Lastly, Gorz's community with "driverless taxis" sounds like a form of non-science fiction. How are we supposed to get there?

The anti-nuclear movement, which is growing so quickly in Europe today, does represent a direct and total confrontation with both the mechanisms and the values of a society of domination. In attacking nuclear weapons and power, one is challenging non-social capital formation and reproduction and the life-denying values of capitalism and state socialism. The anti-nuclear movement does contain "the seeds of a general vision of society" and it may motivate collective action by focusing on ultimate alienation, the alienation of death.

Hirsh has produced a fine introduction to this range of difficult and important

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issues. He is, above all, very sensitive to the complexity of hopes, frustrations and problems of the Left in the modern world. At times, one wishes he had turned his critical abilities, evident in the Althusser chapter, on some of the ambiguities and contradictions in the work of the theorists he clearly prefers. Then again, he has provided his readers with some work of their own.

David Ennis

André Gorz. *Abschied vom Proletariat: Jenseit des Sozialismus*. Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1980. 160 pages.*

Socialist movements are faced with two complementary experiences that constitute "the crisis of Marxism": an unanticipated stability of post-war capitalism and a changed function of the proletariat. Not the capitalist system, but the proletariat — or at least a certain image of it — is disintegrating. "The system" has proven far more durable than its critics had assumed. Today, even if the system cannot develop any further, that does not necessarily imply a transcendence of capitalism. The status quo can be considered permanent. Is welfare state capitalism inescapable? This poverty of alternatives brought about by the severing of the objective connection of crisis and liberation appears even more critical if the *subjective* dimension of social change is taken into account. That is the theme of Gorz's book; and the inability to provide an answer is what has precipitated the crisis of Marxism. What brings about change? The capitalist crisis. Who makes change? The working class. Time is overdue to re-examine both answers. Gorz focuses on the second aspect: the possible subject of social revolution.

Traditional Marxist theory assumed that capitalist production would generate the conditions for revolutionary change, i.e., a large working class. This class was also to be sufficiently united and qualified to carry out the revolutionary task. It was forced to seek social changes, and it knew the goal: socialist society. All this has been discussed for some time. Gorz does not rehash these themes, but focuses on the power which the proletariat is prevented from exercising by the capitalist organization of factory work. It is not a question of the proletariat no longer existing, but of surrendering a conviction: that the proletariat is the exclusive agency of historical change.

If such is the case, "higher forms of non-capitalist production" do not mean socialism but, according to Gorz, a "dual society." The working class and socialism are displaced by the "non-class of non-workers" and the *dual* society. Two recent experiences have brought this about. First, "real socialism" has shown the limitations of planning, requiring the expansion of market mechanisms (Kornai, Brus); and second, the ecological movement has encouraged the development of technologies making self-management possible as an alternative to big-industry. Gorz does not replace workers with other groups, such as students, the "new" working class, or the new middle classes. No social group remains entrusted with an exclusive and privileged revolutionary role.

The changed role of the working class is related to changes in the political and social structure: (a) the working class has been increasingly integrated into bourgeois society; (b) society is beginning to run out of work; and (c) new attitudes toward work lead to a declining importance of trades in the formation of personal identity (erosion of the Protestant ethic). Gorz does not discuss this extensively, but argues that the

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progressive Taylorization of work has destroyed the *source of the workers' autonomy* (p. 39). Everywhere in production "automation [transfers] knowledge and initiative from men to machines. Now the machine is in command. There are no longer any trades" (p. 119). Nothing indicates that this process is reversible: "Technological evolution runs in the direction not of a possible appropriation of production by producers, but...rather of an exclusion of social producers" (p. 66). Thus, Gorz concludes that *liberation of work* must be replaced by *liberation from work*. His rejection of labor as the locus for self-realization and identity-formation leads to a critique of traditional strategies and forms of organization. Dante's slogan can be hung over the workplace: "Abandon all hope, ye who enter here!" Since nothing is left to save or reform in Taylorized labor, it is no longer a matter of "conquering power as workers, but of conquering power in order not to have to function as workers any longer" (p. 62).

The image of the factory as a hell of self-alienation with no hope for change is part of Gorz's depiction of a "dual society" split into heteronomous and autonomous realms — a distinction modeled after Marx's "realm of necessity" and "realm of freedom." The heteronomous sphere comprises industrial production and the autonomous sphere all other activity. Gorz still strives for personal fulfillment and social identity, but he thinks it is impossible to achieve in the heteronomous area (p. 88). The goal is thus to expand autonomy and minimize heteronomous necessary work rather than abolish it. Similarly, self-management no longer makes sense within Taylorized production. There is nothing worth self-managing (p. 117). The only way to eliminate the Taylorist organization of labor would be to abolish the division of labor, which he explicitly rejects (pp. 91, 113).

Gorz's strength is his avoidance of a monist account. The point is to prevent the exclusive application of any one principle ("market," "plan," "community"). The task, then, is to determine where the various principles can be meaningfully applied (p. 104). This does not lead to a revolution in the old sense, but to a realistic recombination of social planes with the appropriate steering principles. As with the first thesis, Gorz's second thesis, that liberation means minimization of the heteronomous sphere, is based on the assumption that Taylorization has become universal.

This account cannot withstand empirical scrutiny. Capitalist production tends to deprive the working class of control over the production process, but it is another question whether the existing production system and the existing power of the work-collectives over the production process cannot be points of departure for strategies to reappropriate lost capacities. Strategies for humanization, for instance, aim at such goals: on the one hand, the enrichment of work performances through skills that had split off and been lost; on the other, the democratization of the economy: in other words, a "producers' socialism" (Korsch) in contrast to "consumer's socialism." Technical progress was never purely a matter of increasing productivity. Distrust of labor was always behind the introduction of technical innovations. By eliminating part of the labor force and depriving the rest of their skills, technical progress was meant to undermine the workers' power over the production process. Yet, subjectivity in production cannot be altogether eliminated. Not only is work still essential in all production, but capitalist production, as well as state bureaucracies, depends on at least a minimal consent by subjects *without which it cannot function*. It is on this that labor can ground its liberation strategies.

The project of a dual society must be abandoned if one thinks Gorz through to his logical conclusions. His real weakness is that he has written off the "realm of

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necessity." He sees factory work so fixed and irreversible that he renounces control over the labor process. But why should Taylorism be limited only to the organization of labor? Critical Theory has described welfare state capitalism as rationalizing all aspects of social reality. Capitalism grows by shifting its outer boundaries and, as it were, "eating its way" into its basic preconditions. Today it is a question of protecting remnants of internal and external nature from absorption and assimilation. Expanding industrial production erodes natural environments, threatens life and destroys culture and civilization. Although the apologists of unlimited modernization regard these norms and traditions as obstacles to growth, they are also preconditions of the "good life." Where, then, should the "unrestricted activity of the imagination" in the autonomous realm come from (p. 93), if the heteronomous realm becomes anonymous and trivial? And where is the rejection of work to be grounded if "power as workers" is no longer a goal (p. 62)? The dual society Gorz envisions cannot be stabilized unless elements of autonomy and free activity are introduced into the "realm of necessity." The domination of market socialization over political control and self-organization can be prevented only if planning and self-organization also obtain in material production.

Gorz's political model ascribes different steering principles to separate areas. This rigid correspondence of social sectors and principles of organization is thus the weakest feature in Gorz's book. It would make more sense to ascribe a combination of organizing principles everywhere since no field (education, health, factory work, etc.) can be reasonably organized according to any *one* principle.

The argument that it is not a question of abolishing the heteronomous industrial sector but of subordinating it to the autonomous sector, also mars Gorz's political theory. From the viewpoint of *functional power systems,* private industry and state bureaucracy can be equated (p. 42). Thus, he criticizes political as well as economic reforms: "In modern societies power has no subject; it is the result of an apparatus domination that assigns functional power positions independently of ability and political views.... The plan to take over the apparatus of domination in order to change it is the continual illusion of reformism" (p. 56). Since they are based on a highly differentiated division of labor, bureaucratic systems resist all reforms. "The only chance to eliminate relations of domination is based on the insight that functional power is inevitable and a previously demarcated area must be granted to it in order to separate power and domination from one another and to protect the respective autonomy of civil society and the state" (p. 57).

Although Gorz really sees the formation of functional power as a gigangic rise of *domination* paraphrased metaphorically as the "condensation of power in things," his account follows current sociological theories of power (here Foucault's influence is decisive). Weber (bureaucratic rationality versus personal arbitrariness) or Elias (institutional power-monopoly leading to the internalization of social coercion), always saw a civilizing component in the transition from personal to functional power systems — especially in the transition from feudal to capitalist domination. The dismissal of industrial reforms (humanization) becomes a skepticism towards political democratization. According to Gorz, there is a clearly demarcated domain of "complexes of apparatuses" to which we must submit. What political philosophy regarded as great democratic institutions and what the authors of the constitution sought to protect against state power, i.e., human rights, division of powers, the parliamentary system, seems to come up against an insurmountable obstacle in bureaucratic systems. But if individual political autonomy is the goal of socialism, what guarantees that the functional power systems will accept this? Only a

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continuation of the democratic project can check functional power.

The problem is not just to safeguard individual autonomy from apparatuses. Gorz's very concept of power is wrong, as can be seen in his interpretation of fascism. Contrary to accounts that interpret modern capitalism as "state monopoly capitalism" and see fascism as an emergency project of big capital, Gorz understands fascism as a reaction of the masses to the functional power system: "Against a system of irresponsibility — anonymous bureaucracies which exercise power without taking responsibility for it — . . . the *Führer* first appears as the 'great individual' who dares to say 'I'. . . . Fascism eliminates functional power on all levels and replaces it with the personal power of the stronger and most capable. It abolishes the system" (p. 51). Though he does wonder whether such definitions may apply only to the "ideological praxis" of fascism (p. 54), his argument is that fascism responds to a popular demand to replace functional with personal power.

Although the industrial bureaucratic abolition of feudal domination disentangled personal and functional power, neither the Taylorized factory nor the state bureaucracy has succeeded in doing away with subjectivity as industrial workers' consent and collaboration or as the power elites' political culture. The complementarity of system integration and social integration could not be neutralized.

Gorz's conception also implies a *strategic* contradiction. With the development of dual structures, three things become evident. First, great social problems such as unemployment cannot be solved by the market or the welfare state. This necessitates an alternative to both capitalist and bureaucratic solutions. Secondly, industrial bureaucratic structures seem to restrict or even abolish spaces for individual autonomy. Since individuals do not feel regulated and expelled to the sector of "non-work," they develop a positive attitude toward work in the sense that only in it can subjectivity develop. But this goal is no longer seen attainable through the centralization of the economy and politics. The experience of "real socialism" has disqualified the project of a monist construction of society.

Even assuming that dual models actually work, the *transition* to them generates a contradiction that explodes in Gorz's conception. If dual systems are not introduced merely to relieve pressure on the market economy and the state sector, without endangering their dominance (the neo-conservative model of self-organization), then they must at least be protected organizationally and financially. But such a protection will inevitably lead to a *permanent conflict* with the economic and political systems' imperatives. This permanent conflict, in turn, points to the need for a social agency. If "new social movements" are seen as the possible agencies of the Gorzian project, then a hopeless particularism and multiplicity of directions will result. In order to enlighten these social agents about their real goal (the dual system), there is no getting around organizational and institutional links. No matter how strictly this "apparatus against the apparatuses" may be programmed as direct democracy, if this organization is to survive the permanent political conflict, it will have to absorb and harmonize all those heteronomous — in Gorz's sense — political forms he rejects in his critique of reformism. The expansion of autonomous spaces is linked with forces that Gorz relegates to the heteronomous realm: political surveillance and defusing of further industrial growth; political forms of organization that make "liberating activity" subject to consensus and negotiation; and finally, the fact that labor unions and leftist parties acquire their own interest in reforms of welfare state capitalism beyond Social Democratic statism and neo-conservative privatization.

Johannes Berger
Norbert Kostede

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Edmund E. Jacobitti. *Revolutionary Humanism and Historicism in Modern Italy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.

Thomas Nemeth. *Gramsci's Philosophy: A Critical Study*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980.

Nemeth's book is a study of those parts of Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks* relating to "first philosophy" and epistemology. The book examines the extent to which Gramsci's philosophy is Marxist by discussing some of the relevant works of Marx and Engels; Gramsci's relation to the traditions of Italian Marxism, to Croce and to Gentile; the similarities and differences between Gramsci and phenomenology, especially that of Husserl; and occasional comparisons with Kant and Hegel. Some of the discussions are particularly original, e.g., Nemeth's account of the connection between Gramsci and Gentile, and his phenomenological interpretation of parts of Gramsci's epistemology in terms of the notion of constitution. Of Nemeth's two central themes, the phenomenological one seems correct. As for the other, i.e., the epistemological theme, it is unlikely that "Gramsci's principal philosophical concerns were epistemological in character" (p. 13), for they dealt obviously with political philosophy.

Jacobitti's book is an intellectual history of Italian humanism from Vico to Croce up to World War I. The emphasis is on the alleged rise and fall of Crocean humanism. Croce's pre-aesthetic phase (including his critique of Marxism) is viewed as a search for a new secular, humanist faith, grounded on the recognition of the importance of some philosophical guide in life. Jacobitti then interprets Croce's *Aesthetic* of 1902 as providing a sketch of such a faith, and not merely, or not even primarily, a philosopher's theory of artistic activity. The immediate and phenomenal success of this book is related to prevailing cultural conditions in Italy, such as the struggle against positivism, and the construction of an alternative to both Catholicism and reformist socialism. Similarly, Croce's journal *La Critica*, founded soon thereafter, is compared to the many other less successful ones started during the same period. There is a discussion of some of the connections between Sorel and Croce, and also an account of Croce's interpretation of Hegel and of relevant parts of Croce's *Logic* and *Philosophy of the Practical*. The book ends with what Jacobitti sees as the failure of Croce's philosophy in the years just preceding the Great War. He not only documents the disillusionment felt by many of Croce's younger followers, but he also suggests that there is an intrinsic difficulty due to its lack of political content and the absence of a philosophy of history.

The book's greatest merits are its integration of philosophical ideas and cultural-political conditions; its insistence on the revolutionary character of Croce's philosophy during his formative period; and the articulation of the Southern Italian problem of the "two peoples" (the intellectual elite and the uneducated masses). Jacobitti's periodization, however, is somewhat problematic. Why stop with World War I, which is really only the midpoint of Croce's intellectual life? In fact, his political involvement was destined to increase in the second half of his life. Similarly, why is there no discussion of Mazzini in the account of revolutionary Italian humanism before the 20th century? Jacobitti also fails to distinguish between Croce's revisionism and his liquidationist criticism of Marxism, provides an account of one of the central thesis of the *Logic,* which merely reproduces Croce's own unnecessary obscurities, and his discussion (pp. 149-150) of the *Philosophy of the Practical* is based largely on *History as the Story of Liberty*.

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Nemeth's central concern is to compare Gramsci's thought to that of others, especially Marx and Husserl; Jacobitti's main interest is to relate certain cultural developments (including some of Croce's actions) to Croce's thought. Jacobitti's account seems more enlightening, probably because his connections are more historically real than Nemeth's. In the latter's account, the comparison with Husserl provides more information about Husserl than Gramsci, and the connection is not meant by Nemeth to be anything other than a purely abstract one.

Deeper issues arise regarding these authors' final evaluations. Nemeth's final judgment is essentially positive. One of his reasons is that "Gramsci's great originality . . . within the Marxist tradition lies in his adumbration of a transcendental, indeed a phenomenological, perspective" (p. 195). This supposedly involves such things as the attempt "to place philosophy on a rigorous foundation" (p. 195) and "the notion of primordial time" (p. 196). Although Nemeth tends to exaggerate Gramsci's interest in these adumbrations, he has made a convincing case. By contrast, Jacobitti's final evaluation of Croce is essentially negative. He is supposedly a "prophet who failed" (pp. 154ff), since he had sought a philosophy of mere contemplation. This conclusion requires stronger grounds than those provided by Jacobitti, which amount primarily to establishing that in the years just before World War I many Italians became disillusioned with the practical irrelevance of Croce.

From a historical-political viewpoint, humanism, historicism and revolutionism are three cultural features of Italian intellectual history. If the first half of the seven centuries that make up this history was dominated by Northern Italians, especially Florentines such as Dante and Machiavelli, the last half has been dominated by Southern Italians, especially Neapolitans such as Vico and Croce. Here humanism means primarily secularism and opposition to revealed religion, and its perennial character is understandable in view of the Italian location of the Papacy. Historicism refers in part to an emphasis on the past and on development — an attitude explainable in terms of the length and richness of history in the Italian peninsula. Jacobitti eloquently describes this element by coining the formula *ero ergo sum* (p. 5). He is also clear that historicism refers in part to an emphasis on the concrete, special cases of which would be Machiavelli's realism, Galileo's anti-scholasticism, Vico's anti-Cartesianism, and Croce's critique of the philosophy of history. This historicist element is very important if we want to avoid confusing the secularism of Italian humanism with that of Enlightenment rationalism. The revolutionary spirit of so many Italian thinkers stems from the age-old gap between the advanced level of the intellectual elite and the backward conservatism of the popular masses. Hence it has tended to take the form of the intellectual and moral reform of popular culture through education.

In the 20th century, the most well known case of this is, of course, Gramsci. Equally important, however, is the case of Croce, for in some ways Croce's cultural revolution was more successful than Gramsci's. In fact, Jacobitti's book may be construed as a documentation of the *occurrence* of a Crocean revolution, while its *success* must be admitted at least to the extent that, in the words of H. Stuart Hughes, "not since Goethe had any single individual dominated so completely the culture of a major European country." [1] However, success is a temporary phenomenon, and so, even if Croce's revolution was successful, it may now have exhausted itself. Moreover, success is a multi-sided affair, and hence Gramsci's aborted revolution may be more promising than Croce's initially more successful one. To argue both points it is

1. *Consciousness and Society* (New York, 1958), p. 201.

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necessary to do more than merely report that Croce's philosophy is now generally discarded, and that Gramsci's ideas are widely accepted.

Nemeth's and Jacobitti's works are useful contributions. This usefulness is, however, rather limited since the *leitmotif* which Nemeth chooses to extract from Gramsci — phenomenological first philosophy — seems only marginal for the problem of intellectual and moral reform of popular culture. On the other hand, the *leitmotif* that Jacobitti emphasizes in Croce is the detached contemplativism of his avoidance of one-sidedness (pp. 142, 145). There is little question that this is a feature of Croce's approach (as well as a problematic one). But since Jacobitti does not suggest any more promising alternative, even if Croce's philosophy is a failure, that would not prevent it from being the best available one. Second, given that the motivating problem is that of intellectual and moral reform of popular culture, it is not clear that Croce's alleged detachment is inappropriate or ineffective. Here one should recall one of his slogans to which Jacobitti does not pay sufficient attention: theoretical activity prepares but does not determine action.

Maurice A. Finocchiaro

Frank Sulloway. *Freud, Biologist of the Mind.* New York: Basic Books, 1979. 612 pages.

A Harvard-trained historian of science, Sulloway has written a new biographical study of Freud. It is an important book that explores the origins of Freud's thought in 19th-century evolutionary biology. Sulloway's work is based on a very wide reading of source material and its publication has occasioned considerable critical acclaim. The author claims to have produced "a comprehensive intellectual biography of Sigmund Freud" and "an entirely new historical interpretation." What he has actually produced is far less than he claims and far more than he would admit. Less, because he exhaustively catalogues one aspect of Freud's thought and tries to make it stand for the whole. But more, because he has produced a kind of empiricist propaganda attempting to justify the claims of sociology (and implicitly the medical model of psychiatry) at the expense of all other approaches.

Sulloway's thesis is clear and straightforward: Freud was essentially a crypto-biologist who attempted to obscure the biological underpinnings of his theory in part by claiming that psychoanalysis was a "pure psychology" arising ineluctably from purely clinical data. Sulloway claims that subsequent Freud scholarship has promoted the myth that psychoanalysis arose out of the sheer creative genius of its founder. According to this myth, psychoanalysis was born not in the scientific tradition but *ex nihilo* partly as a result of Freud's famous self analysis. Sulloway claims to have uncovered no less than 26 similar myths and he attempts to present a systematic refutation of each. These myths have presumably annihilated the prehistory of psychoanalysis and legitimated its particular claims to originality. He claims that his work is the first to have explained psychoanalysis in terms of the sociology of knowledge.

Sulloway sees himself as a revisionist historian representing a minority viewpoint. In his view, orthodox Freud scholarship, including the work of Ernest Jones and Ernst Kris, is intent on maintaining the Freud legend to establish its claims that psychoanalysis is a "pure psychology." Sulloway's Freud is, in contrast, a biologist of the mind, a scientist bent on extending Darwinian evolutionary theory to new areas.

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In the first place, this is a false dichotomy since "pure psychology" is not a term that adequately describes Freud's understanding of his project, nor have his followers in the psychoanalytic tradition attempted to deny Freud's abiding interest in evolutionary biology. Sulloway's dichotomy is particularly puzzling since he himself quotes Ernest Jones as having said that "the creation of psychoanalysis signifies a contribution to biology comparable in importance only with Darwin's" (pp. 4-5). In fact, the insistence of Freud (and his loyal followers) on the importance of libido theory understood as a biologically immutable fact of human existence was the major source of disagreement within the psychoanalytic movement and led eventually to the rift between Freud and Jung, Adler, and, later, the so-called ego psychologists. It has been one of the most pervasive accusations brought against Freud by his critics, including Jung and Adler, that he was overly biological in his discussion of libidinal sexual and aggressive energy. Sulloway's effort to understand the rift solely in terms of differing biological assumptions is therefore patently ridiculous.

Another problem is Sulloway's consistent refusal to recognize that there were at least two aspects to Freud's work: his concern to represent a fully elaborated theory of the mind and his effort to develop a technique of treating neurotic patients. It may well be that many of the early psychoanalytic practitioners tended to idealize Freud and to overestimate his originality but this phenomenon has been exhaustively — even obsessively — documented by Paul Roazen in *Freud and his Followers* (1971) and others. Indeed, Sulloway seems almost ignorant of psychoanalysis as a technique of treatment, and focuses exclusively instead on Freud's theory of mental functioning, which he insists on confining to evolutionary biology. As a result, several important and original aspects of Freud's thought are overlooked, including the existence of the unconscious and Freud's keen understanding of the limits of instrumental reason as a guide of human action.

Yet, there is a point here. In his single-minded and often absurd reductionism, Sulloway does provide some sobering documentation of the family resemblances between Freud's work and that of contemporary biologists. In so doing he shows just how great was Freud's debt to biology and how seriously he worked to maintain that connection throughout his career. In this regard, Sulloway provides many persuasive examples of major misconceptions regarding the origins of Freud's work. A few examples will suffice.

It is commonly believed that Joseph Breuer broke off his famous analysis of Anna O. (Bertha Pappenheim) and terminated his relationship with Freud because of his inability to accept the sexual etiology of hysteria. Not so, says Sulloway. Breuer was fully aware of the importance of sexuality and the real reason for Freud's break with him had to do with Freud's "fanatical" claim that sexuality was the cause of every hysteria and most other neuroses as well. Nor for that matter is it true, as Freud claimed in his autobiography, that his insistence on the existence of male hysteria was rudely rejected by his colleagues in Vienna and marked the beginning of his near complete isolation from the scientific establishment.

It is commonly believed that Freud abandoned his *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (1895) shortly after it had been written because he realized the impossibility of constructing his new psychology on a purely scientific basis. What Freud abandoned, says Sulloway, was the idea of a purely neurophysiological psychology, but that he never abandoned the project and indeed resurrected it in a new form on the bedrock of evolutionary biology. Sulloway insists that Darwinian biology in general and the work of Ernst Haeckel in particular was a major influence, perhaps

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the major influence on Freud's mature thought. While this may be an overstatement, Sulloway shows that Haeckel's ideas (particularly the notion that ontogeny capitulates philogeny; that the development of a single embryo from conception to maturity mirrors the entire evolutionary development of the species) were a unifying theme in Freud's thought — a theme he never abandoned. To take but one example, the Oedipus complex as an ontogenetic event was seen by Freud as having a philogenetic complement in real events in human prehistory. The wish to murder one's father, which every male child experiences symbolically, was an actual prehistoric event in which bands of brothers conspired to murder the patriarchal father.

The pervasive influence of Haeckel's ideas on Freud's thought has never been as thoroughly documented as in Sulloway's work. Whether the concept that ontogeny capitulates philogeny had for Freud the status of a scientific law or was merely a central organizing metaphor is, however, another matter.

Another famous piece of psychoanalytic lore concerns Freud's relationship to Wilhelm Fliess. According to the tradition, says Sulloway, Fliess was something of a numerological mystic whose contributions to science were marginal at best and whose chief importance to Freud was as a source of emotional support during the period of Freud's self-analysis. Sulloway buys none of this. In the first place, he claims Fliess was by no means the crackpot he has been made out to be. Indeed, Fliess had a fully developed theory of infantile sexuality including recognition of the sexually gratifying character of oral and anal zones. Secondly, Fliess had independently arrived at the theory that libido develops in periodic thrusts of sexuality interrupted by a latency period. In addition, Fliess had a sophisticated notion of bisexuality which included the idea that neurotics often suffer from unconscious homosexual impulses — an idea that Freud reformulated in the notion that neuroses are the opposite of perversions. In these and many other instances, Sulloway documents Freud's debt to Fliess and he claims that Freud eventually broke with his colleague precisely because of his great unacknowledged debt. It was because of Freud's "obsessional need for intellectual immortality" and neurotic concerns for scientific precedence and originality and not a rejection of Fliess' theory of periodicity which led to a break between the two.

Nor was Freud's emphasis on sexuality particularly original or indeed all that shocking to 19th-century scientific circles. Indeed, says Sulloway, sexology had become a respectable area of scientific inquiry and had been the subject of comprehensive study by Krafft-Ebing, Havelock Ellis, Albert Moll and many others. Fully 300 pages of the book are devoted to a meticulous study of scientific antecedents to Freud's theory and the result, in spite of its reductionism, is a book that demonstrates the full measure of Freud's debt to evolutionary biology.

Recognizing the importance of biology in Freud's thought is a blow to those who, following Marcuse and others, have sought to interpret psychoanalysis as a critical theory of politics and society. If Freud is to be interpreted exclusively as a socio-biologist then the socially necessary repression which Freud discussed in his later work remains as immutable as evolution itself and therefore changes in the social order could be expected to occur over milennia and not, as Marcuse believed, within the course of a lifetime. In this respect, Sulloway's work is like a cold shower, dampening, if not extinguishing, the left's enthusiasm for Freud. While a cold shower may be useful for temporarily diminishing desires, we will argue that the interpretive impulse springs libidinally eternal.

Sulloway's Freud is but one partial understanding of Freud and his intellectual heritage. There have been and will be others. David Bakan, for example, in *Sigmund*

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Freud and the Jewish Mystical Tradition (1958), has disclosed a surprising family resemblance between Freud's work and Jewish mysticism. One could explore Freud's debt to ancient Greek thought. While Freud's constant reference to Greek mythology and Platonic thought has been widely discussed, it has never been adequately explained. Nor has the resemblance between Freud's thought and 19th-century German philosophy been fully explored. This is particularly true with respect to Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche.

We might conclude that a "comprehensive" understanding of Freud or, for that matter, of any intellectual figure, is simply not possible and that what we have instead are particular interpretations always tied to concrete social and political interests. Recall Freud's own thoughts on the subject: "Anyone turning biographer commits himself to lies, to concealment, to hypocrisy, to flattery, and even to hiding his own lack of understanding, for biographical truth is not to be had, and even if it were it couldn't be used" (*Letters*, 1960, p. 430). In this sense, then, there is and can be no such thing as a comprehensive biography; only interpretation, and any act of interpretation can never be separated from concrete personal, social and political interest.

What is finally at issue in the perennial struggle for the definitive interpretation of Freud is the familiar competing interests represented by empiricist and dialectic modes of understanding. While Sulloway clearly represents empiricist interests, his work presents a useful and necessary criticism of the work of Marcuse and others. Clearly Freud took science in general and evolutionary biology in particular very seriously. Perhaps Marcuse erred in not taking seriously enough the complexity and revolutionary importance of Freud's early discoveries and may have focused his analysis too heavily on Freud's later speculative essays.

It can be argued that Freud's originality lay not in his discovery of the unconscious, nor in his formulation of the antagonism between civilization and individual desire, but in his discovery that the unconscious speaks and that it has a structure. Among other things, Freud, with Hegel, recognized that the understanding subject participates in the creation of its own object, that there is no simple separation between the thinking subject and its object, as the empiricists would have it. In fact, Freud's originality lies in his discovery of an entirely new mode of reflexivity, which Jacques Lacan likens to the Copernican revolution. Just as Copernicus demonstrated that the Earth is not the center of the universe, so Freud demonstrated that the individual ego is not master in its own house.

From this viewpoint, the central issue in interpreting Freud's thought is not the opposition between psychoanalysis and science but between an empiricist and a dialectic conception of science. The social and political implications of this dichotomy are clear enough. The empiricist tradition that Sulloway represents is a repressive one whose function, as Foucault shows in *Madness and Civilization*, is to isolate the experience of madness from human discourse in the triumph of instrumental reason and capital accumulation. A dialectic conception of science, on the other hand, proceeds historically through the explication of contradiction and, in so doing, offers the possibility of a dialogue with madness.

Which of these two positions most clearly resembles Freud's own is, of course, a matter of interpretation. It is important to recall, however, that Freud's model of the mind, his theory of mental illness, and his method of treatment are all based on a conception of conflict in which the warring parties are always dialectically related. Secondly, Freud's account of mental illness as well as his model of the mind are

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historical conceptions unfolding through the ontogenetic development of the individual and the philogenetic development of the species. The distinction between dialectic and empiricist interpretations of Freud is a distinction from which concrete political and social conclusions inextricably follow. In therapy, for example, an empiricist sees a symptom to be categorized with nosological precision. As a result, therapist and patient are forever isolated from each other, and psychoactive drugs become necessarily the treatment of choice. A dialectic understanding, on the other hand, poses the possibility of dialogue between therapist and patient and offers for the patient the liberating possibility of freely choosing to give up the symptom. One method is necessarily repressive, the other at least potentially liberating.

From the viewpoint of critical theory, it is relatively easy to understand the necessarily repressive nature of a sociobiological reading of Freud. But, as Marcuse's work demonstrates, a dialectic analysis is no panacea either. If nothing else, Sulloway's book helps us to understand that Marcuse's optimistic and often extravagant claims concerning the malleability of human nature were in part based on his overemphasis on Freud's later speculative essays.

Thus if psychoanalysis is to be interpreted as both a clinical theory of treatment and a critical theory of politics and society, Freud's early work and particularly his relation to 19th-century biology must be taken seriously. Freud's later essays applying psychoanalysis to social questions should therefore be understood as frankly speculative, profoundly suggestive, but not necessarily definitive. Therefore, to understand the critical content of Freud's work it is necessary to begin with what is essential; the theory of the unconscious and the technique of treatment, and to elaborate that theory.

As for Sulloway, his work in itself would hardly merit serious consideration if it did not represent the voice of authority and an officially acceptable definition of the limitations of the possible. There is, however, something particularly galling about an orthodoxy that presents itself in the guise of radical revisionism. As a contribution to the sociology of knowledge Sulloway's work fails *by virtue* of its claim to scientific disinterestedness when in fact it is very much interested in the maintenance of the status quo and the medical and behavioral models of mental illness. Its positive value is that it helps us recognize that the romantic view which regarded Freud's self-analysis as an inaugural event in world history was more correct than even Freud's most orthodox followers understood.

Larry Fuchser

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34 **GOULDNER:** Stalinism as Internal Colonialism; **CASTORIADIS:** French Leftists; **JACOBY:** Politics of Objectivity; **CARLO:** Imperialism, Monopoly, Inflation; **SIEBERT:** Fromm's Theory of Religion; **NEGT:** Misery of Democracy in Germany; **LIPES:** Berufsverbot and Terrorism; **ZUKIN:** On Self-Management; **BERMAN:** Adorno, Marxism, Art; **GROSS:** On Irony

36 **BOOKCHIN:** Beyond Neo-Marxism; **LEFORT:** Then and Now; **BOBBIO:** Why Democracy? **GEORGE:** On Contradiction; **CARLO:** Capitalism and Crisis in Yugolavia; **DAHMER:** Sexual Economy Today; **GROSS:** Culture and Negativity; **MONGIN:** Questioning Politics; **HOWARD:** 'Esprit'

38 **CARLO:** Unemployment; **CASTORIADIS:** The Social Regime in Russia; **KONRAD, SZELENY:** Intelligentsia and the Social Structure; **LEVI:** Sources of Wittgenstein's Ethics; **ADORNO:** Metacrique of Epistemology; **VAJDA:** Lukacs' and Husserl's Critique of Science; **SALVADORI:** Eurocommunism; **MARCUSE ET AL.:** Theory and Politics; **HELLER:** Marxist Ethics and Eastern Europe

40 **ZASLAVSKY:** Rebirth of the Stalin Cult in the USSR; **FEHER:** Kadarism the Model State of Khrushchevism; **KERI:** The Czech Crisis; **WHITEBOOK:** Nature in Habermas; **COHEN:** Why More Political Theory? **ADLER:** Thalheimer, Bonapartism and Fascism; **THALHEIMER:** On Fascism; **KLARE:** Law-Making as Praxis; **TERTULIAN:** On the Later Lukacs

35 **BOBBIO:** Is There a Marxist Theory of the State? **BOBBIO:** Alternatives to Representative Democracy; **FEHER:** Dictatorship over Needs; **PICCONE:** Crisis of One Dimensionality; **LUKE:** The Age of Artificial Negativity; **ARATO:** Bureaucratic Centralism; **D'AMICO:** Desire and the Commodity Form; **ADORNO:** On the Social Situation of Music; **ADORNO:** Resignation

37 **KOVEL:** Rationalization and the Family; **MILLER:** Nietzsche and Marx; **EWEN:** Americanized Consumption; **TSCHIRHART:** Chinese Asexuality; **RADNOTI:** Benjamin's Politics; **TRAUB:** Lenin and Taylor; **ADORNO:** Culture and Administration; **BOELLA:** Radicalism and Needs in Heller

39 **HABERMAS:** History and Evolution; **HONNETH:** Adorno and Habermas; **SCHMIDT:** Offensive Critical Theory? **REED:** Black Particularity Reconsidered; **ROELOFS:** The Warren Court and Corporate Capitalism; **FEHER:** Lukacs in Weimar; **BEILHARZ:** Trotsky's Marxism — Permanent Involution? **BIRO:** The Plan to Film 'Capital'; **HABERMAS:** Capitalism and Democracy: An Interview

41 **BOOKCHIN:** Self-Management and Technology; **FINOCCHIARO:** Gramsci's Crocean Marxism; **WILDT:** Totalitarian State Capitalism; **BOELLA:** Eastern European Societies; **STOJANOVIC:** Democratization in Yugoslavia; **RITTERSPORN:** Conflict in the USSR 1936-38; **WOLIN:** On Adorno's Aesthetische Theorie; **HEYDORN:** Gustav Landauer

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No. 47: *On Poland* No. 50: *Symposium on Intellectuals*

42 **ZASLAVSKY:** The USSR and the Working Class; **MLYNAR:** From Prague to Moscow; **FEHER:** Toward a Post-Machiavellian Politics; **CARLO:** The Italian Crisis and the Left; **CLARK:** Marx, Bakunin and Social Transformation; **FAULET:** Remarks on Horkheimer's Pessimism; **COLLETTI:** The Three Faces of Italian Communism; **BERMAN:** German Notes; **LOHMANN:** Society versus the State; **SARTRE ET AL.:** Discussion

43 **CARLO:** The Crisis of Bureaucratic Collectivism; **COBLER:** The Determinate Assertion of Normalcy; **WOLIN:** An Aesthetic of Redemption; **CASTORIADIS:** Socialism and Autonomous Society; **McNALL:** Greece and the Common Market; **MAHAIRA-ODONI:** Reply to McNall; **ADORNO:** Music and the New Music; **ZASLAVSKY:** Why Afghanistan? **GREFFRATH ET AL.:** Conversations with Wittfogel; **MELOTTI:** Socialism and Bureaucratic Collectivism

44 **LASCH, ARONOWITZ, EWEN, ALT, PICCONE, HEARN, JACOBY, KOVEL, ELSHTAIN:** Symposium on Narcissism; **LEVY ET AL.:** Tributes to Sartre; **ZUKIN:** Beyond Titoism; **LOWY:** Marcuse and Benjamin; **PACHTER:** Brecht's Politics; **JANIK:** Wittgenstein's Ethics; **HABERMAS:** On the German-Jewish Heritage

45 **JAY, HABERMAS, HELLER, GROSS, FEHER, LUDKE, SAYRE:** Tribute to Lowenthal; **FEHER:** Eastern Europe in the 1980s; **JACOBY:** Conformist Marxism; **ZASLAVSKY:** Ethnicity in the USSR; **MOUZELIS:** Reductionism in Marxist Theory; **LAYTON, PAPKE:** Towards a Non-Sexist Society

46 **RITTERSPORN:** Stalin in 1938; **CASTORIADIS:** Facing the War; **CARLO:** The Crisis of the State in the 1930s; **SCHMIDT:** Recent Hegel Literature; **KOGAWA:** Adorno's Strategy of Hibernation; **HOFENER:** Sparks, Insanity, Fireworks; **WOODS:** Black Politics in the '80s; **D'AMICO, KIM, PICCONE:** Marvin Farber (1901-1980); **BRONNER:** Tribute to Henry Pachter (1907-1980)

47 **ARATO:** Civil Society vs. the State; **BAUMAN:** The Maturation of Socialism; **CARLO:** Afghanistan, Poland, Detente; **MICHNIK:** Hopes and Realities; **POMIAN:** Miracle in Poland; **MAZOWIECKI:** Solidarity's Task; **WOJCICKI:** The Reconstruction of Society; **DAMUS:** Strike Cycles in Poland; **SVITAK:** Comparisons; **SWIDLICKI:** Struggle for the Media; **MINK:** Public Opinion and Power in Poland

48 **FEKETE:** On Interpretation; **RADNOTI:** Mass Culture; **SILARD:** History of the Workers' Councils; **WELLMER:** Terrorism and Social Criticism; **HIRSCH:** The New Leviathan; **GORZ:** 9 Theses for a Future Left; **REED:** Narcissistic Politics in Atlanta; **GONZALES:** Rethinking Radical Politics; **SCHMIDT:** Recent Hegel Literature: Part II; **NAIR:** Goldmann's Legacy; **BAPTISTA:** 2 Models of Agrarian Reform

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